See Full Document Text
Official Journal EN
of the European Union L series
2024/3137 16.12.2024
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/3137
of 13 December 2024
amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 as regards the list of air carriers banned from operating or
subject to operational restrictions within the Union
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005on
the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community and on informing
air transport passengers of the identity of the operating carrier, and repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/CE(1), and in
particular Article 4(2) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006(2) establishes the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating
ban within the Union.
(2) Certain Member States and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (‘the Agency’) communicated to the
Commission, pursuant to Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, information that is relevant for updating
that list. Third countries and international organisations also provided relevant information. Based on the
information provided, the list should be updated.
(3) The Commission informed all air carriers concerned, either directly or through the authorities responsible for their
regulatory oversight, about the essential facts and considerations, which would form the basis of a decision to
impose an operating ban on them within the Union or to modify the conditions of an operating ban imposed on an
air carrier, which is included in the list set out in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.
(4) The Commission gave the air carriers concerned the opportunity to consult all relevant documentation, to submit
written comments and to make an oral presentation to the Commission and to the EU Air Safety Committee.
(5) Within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/660(3),
the Commission informed the EU Air Safety Committee about the ongoing consultations with the competent
authorities and air carriers of Armenia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Suriname and Tanzania. The Commission also
informed the EU Air Safety Committee about the aviation safety situation in Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Kenya, Libya,
Mali, Nepal and Sierra Leone.
(1) OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 15, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2005/2111/oj.
(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 of 22 March 2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an
operating ban within the Community referred to in Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of
the Council (OJ L 84, 23.3.2006, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/474/oj).
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/660 of 2 December 2022 laying down detailed rules for the list of air carriers banned
from operating or subject to operational restrictions within the Union referred to in Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 473/2006 laying down implementing rules for the
Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community referred to in Chapter II of Regulation
(EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 83, 22.3.2023, p. 47, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/
2023/660/oj).
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(6) The Agency informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the technical assessments conducted
for the initial evaluation and the continuous monitoring of Third Country Operator (‘TCO’) authorisations, issued
pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014(4).
(7) The Agency also informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the results of the analysis of
ramp inspections carried out under the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft programme (‘SAFA’), in accordance
with Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012(5).
(8) In addition, the Agency informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about the technical assistance
projects carried out in third countries affected by an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.
Furthermore, the Agency provided information on the plans and requests for further technical assistance and
cooperation to improve the administrative and technical capability of civil aviation authorities in third countries
with a view to helping them assure compliance with applicable international civil aviation safety standards. Member
States were invited to respond to such requests on a bilateral basis in coordination with the Commission and the
Agency. In that regard, the Commission reiterated the usefulness of providing information to the international
aviation community, particularly through the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (‘ICAO’) Aviation Safety
Implementation Assistance Partnership tool, on technical assistance to third countries provided by the Union and
Member States to improve aviation safety around the world.
(9) Eurocontrol provided the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee with an update on the status of the SAFA
and TCO alarming functions, including statistics about alert messages for banned air carriers.
Union air carriers
(10) Following the Agency’s analysis of information resulting from ramp inspections carried out on the aircraft of Union
air carriers, as well as standardisation inspections carried out by the Agency, and complemented with information
stemming from specific inspections and audits carried out by national aviation authorities, Member States and the
Agency, acting as competent authorities, took certain corrective and enforcement measures, and informed the
Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about those measures.
(11) Member States and the Agency, acting as competent authorities, reiterated their readiness to act, as necessary, in the
event that pertinent safety information indicates imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance by Union air
carriers with relevant safety standards.
Air carriers from Armenia
(12) In June 2020, air carriers certified in Armenia were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736(6).
(13) During the first quarter of 2024, ICAO conducted a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (‘USOAP’) visit at
the Civil Aviation Committee of Armenia (‘CAC’), identifying a serious safety deficiency in the area of air carrier
certification. The audit revealed that the certification process of Armenian air carriers was based on outdated
requirements and lacked a structured and systematic approach for the issuance of Air Operator Certificates (‘AOC’).
(4) Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014 of 29 April 2014 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures
related to air operations of third country operators pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council (OJ L 133, 6.5.2014, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/452/oj).
(5) Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures
related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296,
25.10.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/965/oj).
(6) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736 of 2 June 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 as regards the list of
air carriers banned from operating or subject to operational restrictions within the Union (OJ L 172, 3.6.2020, p. 7).
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(14) Furthermore, the audit revealed noteworthy challenges in Armenia’s ability to ensure effective aviation safety
oversight, with a notable reduction in its Effective Implementation score and critical weaknesses in areas such as
Resolution of Safety Issues and Surveillance Obligations.
(15) With regard to the serious safety deficiencies in the area of air carrier certification, a dedicated support initiative was
launched in April 2024 with the aim of resolving this situation expeditiously. By August 2024 the situation had been
resolved, albeit additional efforts are needed to address other safety oversight issues identified during the USOAP
audit, for which the CAC has developed a corrective action plan.
(16) On 13 November 2024, as part of the Commission’s continuous monitoring activities, a technical meeting took
place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the CAC. During the meeting, the recent
developments and progress made in strengthening the CAC’s safety oversight system were examined, including
updates on regulatory and operational improvements.
(17) It could be noted that Armenia has made progress in updating its aviation safety regulations and oversight
capabilities in response to observations from the Union on-site assessment visit conducted in 2020. This progress
includes the hiring and training of personnel, revising regulations and associated implementation procedures,
conducting oversight activities, and taking enforcement measures, such as grounding unsafe aircraft and
strengthening air carrier compliance.
(18) Despite these efforts, the technical meeting of 13 November 2024concluded that there remains insufficient evidence
to justify relaxing operational restrictions on air carriers certified in Armenia imposed by Regulation (EU) 2020/736.
Further assessments of the evidence supporting the measures enacted by the CAC are required to determine the
appropriate next steps to be taken, including the eventuality of a new Union on-site assessment visit to Armenia
in 2025.
(19) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission
considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an
operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Armenia.
(20) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Armenia with the
relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
Air carriers from Iraq
(21) In December 2015 and November 2023, the air carriers Iraqi Airways and Fly Baghdad were included in Annex A to
Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2322(7) and Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2691(8), respectively.
(22) On 22 October 2024, as part of the Commission’s continuous monitoring activities with regard to the overall safety
situation in Iraq, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (‘ICAA’),
a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the ICAA. During the
meeting, the ICAA presented updates on its efforts to enhance its legislative and regulatory framework, as well as its
oversight performance.
(7) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2322 of 10 December 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing
the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community (OJ L 328, 12.12.2015, p. 67, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/2322/oj).
(8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2691 of 29 November 2023 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 as regards the
list of air carriers banned from operating or subject to operational restrictions within the Union (OJ L, 2023/2691, 30.11.2023, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2691/oj).
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(23) During the meeting the ICAA noted that in July 2024 it had engaged a consultancy team to support its regulatory
development and strengthen its oversight capacities. Progress has been reported in implementing recommendations
from technical assistance projects conducted by the Agency in 2017 and 2023, particularly in aligning flight
operations and personnel licensing procedures with Commission Regulations (EU) No 965/2012 and
No 1178/2011(9).
(24) The ICAA informed the Commission about the amendments made to the Iraqi Civil Aviation Law, which is currently
in the final stages of approval. Additionally, the ICAA has made progress in addressing resource gaps by recruiting
four flight operations inspectors and one cabin safety inspector, with efforts ongoing to hire two additional
airworthiness inspectors. Furthermore, it has initiated the development of the Iraqi State Safety Program (‘SSP’) and
is updating the rulemaking procedures and inspector training in areas such as dangerous goods and fatigue risk
management. However, the implementation of these updates remains incomplete.
(25) Whilst acknowledging these efforts, the ICAA continues to face challenges, including critical shortages in qualified
personnel for helicopter and airworthiness inspection. To address this, the ICAA has commenced a five-year
training program for 14 newly recruited cadet aeronautical engineers, aimed at qualifying them as airworthiness
inspectors and reducing reliance on international experts.
(26) The Commission requested the ICAA to confirm a date for the postponed Union on-site assessment visit, which was
originally planned for the first quarter of 2024 but rescheduled at the ICAA’s request to the fourth quarter of 2024.
In response, the ICAA has proposed further rescheduling the visit to the second or third quarter of 2025, with a
preference for September 2025, depending on the progress achieved in the interim.
(27) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission
considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an
operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers from Iraq.
(28) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Iraq with the relevant
international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of all those carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
(29) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005,
if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant
international safety standards.
Air carriers from Kyrgyzstan
(30) In October 2006, air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006(10).
(31) On 16 July 2024, as part of its continuous monitoring activities, the Commission held a technical meeting with
representatives from the State Civil Aviation Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic (‘SCAA’).
(32) During that meeting, the SCAA provided an update on its efforts to address the safety deficiencies that had led to the
inclusion of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, as well as other
measures taken to improve the safety oversight capacity and capability of the SCAA.
(9) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures
related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 311,
25.11.2011, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1178/oj).
(10) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006 of 12 October 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the
Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community referred to in Chapter II of Regulation
(EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council and as amended by Regulation (EC) No 910/2006 (OJ L 283,
14.10.2006, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1543/oj).
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(33) On that occasion the Commission presented the SCAA with the results of the assessment conducted on the basis of
the information and documentation provided by the SCAA at the beginning of 2024. The assessment covered areas
such as training programs, oversight processes, the occurrence reporting system, licensing procedures, and overall
operational effectiveness.
(34) The Commission’s assessment revealed several shortcomings in the SCAA’s training programs for its staff. The
training program for inspectors, while containing the necessary elements related to their duties, lacked clear
implementation and scheduling details, notably as regards the inclusion of the required on-the-job training courses
for newcomers.
(35) The Commission noted that the number of inspectors appeared insufficient to assure an effective oversight of
Kyrgyzstan’s aviation sector. The shortage of administrative support staff imposes an additional strain on the
inspectors who must perform additional administrative tasks, thereby limiting their ability to focus on certification
and surveillance. In terms of financing and resources, the SCAA referenced planned increases in salaries and
resources but did not provide specific details regarding budgetary provisions.
(36) The assessment also highlighted deficiencies in the SCAA’s occurrence reporting system, notably as regards the lack
of a comprehensive incident and accident database. Furthermore, it was found to be unclear and ineffective, with no
systematic approach to collecting and analysing incident and accident data.
(37) The Commission identified several gaps in the SCAA’s oversight activities. Oversight of several air carriers and
maintenance organisations was either incomplete or had not been conducted at all. The oversight documents
provided were vague and lacked the procedural detail necessary for effective evaluation. Additionally, no
compliance system or internal audit unit had been established, despite claims of preparations for ISO 9001
certification. That raised further concerns about the SCAA’s ability to ensure consistent adherence to international
safety standards.
(38) On 24 October 2024, at the request of the SCAA, a second meeting took place in Brussels during which the SCAA
acknowledged the challenges it faces. In response to these challenges, the SCAA presented a strategic transformation
plan aimed at aligning Kyrgyz aviation standards with international safety standards. Under its current leadership,
the SCAA has initiated several organisational improvements, such as restructuring its internal framework,
introducing a new financial model, and completing a gap analysis aligned with international safety standards. These
efforts reflect the SCAA’s commitment to addressing deficiencies in safety oversight and strengthening its
cooperation with the Commission.
(39) Recognising the importance of sustained and measurable progress in improving safety oversight capabilities shown
by the SCAA, the Commission emphasises the need for the SCAA to continue providing clear evidence of
substantial improvement before considering a future Union on-site assessment visit to Kyrgyzstan. To support these
efforts, the Commission, through the Agency, will implement a dedicated technical assistance project in 2025. This
initiative will focus on evaluating the SCAA’s roadmap, delivering targeted training, and enhancing internal
oversight procedures, with the ultimate objective of achieving compliance with international safety standards, and
facilitating Kyrgyzstan’s removal from the EU Air Safety List.
(40) There is, however, currently insufficient substantiated evidence to confirm that the SCAA has effectively resolved all
the safety deficiencies that led to the operating ban imposed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006.
(41) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission
considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an
operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan.
(42) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan with the
relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
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Air carriers from Pakistan
(43) In March 2007, Pakistan International Airlines (‘PIA’) was included in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 235/2007(11), and subsequently removed from that Annex in November 2007, by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2007(12).
(44) As a follow-up to the EU Air Safety Committee deliberations in May 2024, experts from the Commission, the
Agency and Member States held a technical meeting on 18 and 19 September 2024. During the first day, the
corrective action plan submitted by the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (‘the PCAA’), and subsequently reviewed
by the Commission and the Agency, was assessed. The PCAA provided clarification and substantiating
documentation as requested. On the second day, a series of spot checks were performed in the areas of Flight
Operations, Personnel Licensing, Airworthiness, Quality Management System (‘QMS’) and Safety Management
System (‘SMS’). Those checks were unplanned remote checks, with the objective of obtaining more information on
the authority’s ability to carry out effective oversight, after the Union visit in November 2023.
(45) In 2020, the TCO authorisations of PIA and Vision Air were suspended by the Agency. The suspension will last until
the Agency has verifiable evidence that the PCAA can conduct effective oversight of its air carriers, that oversight
deficiencies have been corrected, and that air carriers have properly addressed all findings. The information now
obtained would assist the Agency in considering a decision on a possible lifting of the suspensions of PIA and Vision
Air TCO authorisations, as well as the granting of a TCO authorisation to Airblue Limited.
(46) The technical meeting concluded that all elements of the corrective action plan have been addressed and no serious
deficiencies have been observed. There is still work to do, but all the steps taken seem solid and coherent.
(47) The conclusions of the technical meeting found that the PCAA is in the process of shifting from a reactive towards a
proactive safety oversight approach. In that regard, the PCAA has solved the lack of inspecting staff in the Flight
Standards area, which was a critical issue at the time of the Union on-site assessment visit. In order to prevent the
re-occurrence of a similar situation a number of actions have been taken, including better rationalisation of
activities, task-appropriate job profiles, the use of tools to calculate resources vis-à-vis evolving needs, securing of
sufficient budget for recruitment and training, a staff retention policy, and measures to avoid conflict of interest
between inspectors and the organisations under their oversight.
(48) The conclusions of the technical meeting acknowledged that the PCAA has made considerable progress to address
the most serious safety deficiencies. There is still room for improvement in aspects such as identification of the
findings, their correct categorisation and management. Improvement is also expected in ramp inspections, as the
training of ramp inspectors has only been accomplished recently. As far as inspector training is concerned, the
current team of inspectors in Flight Standards is fully trained, but still needs experience. Follow-up on all those
elements in the mid and long term is required. The PCAA has agreed to regularly inform the Commission on
progress made in this regard.
(49) The latest AOC inspections of Airblue Limited and PIA have been reviewed. No major flaws were identified.
(50) Improvement is necessary in the QMS area. Whereas control of documentation remains suboptimal, important
progress has been noted. This includes ensuring consistency of findings and their management equally across all
areas, as well as the implementation of a single software for the management of findings in all areas.
(11) Commission Regulation (EC) No 235/2007 of 5 March 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the Community list
of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community (OJ L 66, 6.3.2007, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/
2007/235/oj).
(12) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2007 of 28 November 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the
Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community (OJ L 311, 29.11.2007, p. 12, ELI: http://
data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/1400/oj).
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(51) The development of an SSP is in the early stages. The PCAA is committed to implement it as soon as possible,
namely the occurrence reporting and risk classification.
(52) Overall, no significant safety issues were found. After the technical meeting it can be concluded that the PCAA has
made substantial progress, evidenced by the information gathered during that technical meeting.
(53) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission
considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an
operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Pakistan.
(54) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Pakistan with the
relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
(55) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005,
if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant
international safety standards.
Air carriers from Suriname
(56) In July 2010, following an initial listing in June 2006 and a subsequent removal in November 2007, Blue Wing
Airlines was again listed in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EU) 590/2010(13)
due to verified evidence of serious deficiencies involving the air carrier, as identified by shortcomings reported in
ramp inspections carried out by Member States, as well as two fatal accidents.
(57) On 26 June 2023 the Commission and the Agency organised a remote technical meeting with the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority of Suriname (‘CASAS’). This meeting took place on the basis of a number of exchanges with the
CASAS, as well as Blue Wing Airlines, in the period from November 2018 till May 2022, for the purpose of
relaunching formal consultations with the CASAS considering the time elapsed since the initial contact in May
2019. In this regard, on 11 September 2023, the Commission requested a comprehensive set of information and
documentation from the CASAS for the purpose of assessing the safety oversight capacity and capability of the
CASAS for the eight air carriers certified in Suriname, of which one, Surinam Airways, has held a TCO authorisation
since July 2016.
(58) The results of the assessment of the information and documentation provided by the CASAS showed serious safety
deficiencies, evidenced by the incomplete status of basic oversight programmes, doubts on training and
qualification of the inspecting staff, repetitive serious findings, and poor management of findings.
(59) On 23 October 2024, a technical meeting was held between experts from the Commission, the Agency, Member
States, and the CASAS. On that occasion, the deficiencies identified during the assessment of the information and
documentation received were confirmed, both in terms of nature and numbers.
(60) Namely, concerns remain on the ability of the CASAS to ensure an effective oversight of the air carriers under its
surveillance. This is evidenced by the situation of the Directorates of Flight Operations and Personnel Licensing,
which appear to be severely understaffed, and by the oversight programmes which are not delivered as planned. The
training and qualification of inspectors is also a concern. The approval and extension of AOCs is a worrying aspect,
as many of the necessary procedures do not exist, and those presented are very basic and not fit for purpose. This
indicates that the CASAS’ oversight activities are mostly carried out on an ad hoc basis. The recurrence of the same
serious findings in audit reports in different years was also noted. Moreover, it was found that most of the authority
procedures are not in line with the latest updates of the international safety standards.
(13) Commission Regulation (EU) No 590/2010 of 5 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 establishing the Community list
of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community (OJ L 170, 6.7.2010, p. 9).
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(61) Considering the CASAS’ apparent lack of progress in terms of assuring an appropriate level of safety oversight
capacity and capability, the Commission informed the EU Air Safety Committee that it intends to organise a Union
on-site assessment visit in Suriname in the first quarter of 2025.
(62) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission
considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an
operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Suriname.
(63) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Suriname with the
relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
(64) Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005,
if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant
international safety standards.
Air carriers from Tanzania
(65) Air carriers certified in Tanzania have never been included in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.
(66) Air Tanzania Company Limited (‘Air Tanzania’) applied for a TCO authorisation on 23 August 2023. The Agency
assessed Air Tanzania’s TCO application in accordance with the requirements as set out in Commission Regulation
(EU) No 452/2014.
(67) The Agency, in conducting its assessment, raised concerns regarding the lack of ability by Air Tanzania to respond to
identified safety deficiencies. Notably, it found that Air Tanzania failed to maintain control over its flight training
programme, particularly as regards assuring the inclusion in recurrent flight crew training of all types of
emergencies and abnormal procedures, such as engine, airframe or system malfunctions, fires, and other critical
scenarios. In view of the considerable number of serious deficiencies identified during its assessment, the Agency
determined that this situation indicates a systemic weakness within the air carrier that compromises safety and
poses a serious hazard to flight operations. Furthermore, that resulted in Air Tanzania failing to demonstrate
compliance with the relevant international safety standards.
(68) Air Tanzania’s inability to address such safety deficiencies was further evidenced by the submission of an
unacceptable corrective action plan to resolve the identified issues. As a result, Air Tanzania failed to demonstrate
compliance with the applicable international safety standards. The Agency concluded that further assessment would
not lead to the issuance of an authorisation to Air Tanzania, as the air carrier did not meet the requirements of
Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014. Consequently, on 12 April 2024, the Agency rejected Air Tanzania’s
TCO application on the grounds that it did not meet safety requirements.
(69) On 2 May 2024, the Commission, within the framework of Regulation (EU) No 2111/2005 and Regulation
(EU) 2023/660, requested a comprehensive set of information and documentation from the Tanzania Civil Aviation
Authority (‘TCAA’). That request was made to assess the safety oversight capacity and capability of the TCAA over air
carriers certified in Tanzania.
(70) The requested information covers key aspects of the TCAA’s organisational structure, staff qualifications, training
programmes, and oversight processes, including the management of safety deficiencies, corrective actions, and
occurrence reporting systems. Additionally, the request seeks details on accidents and incidents, the certification
and licensing processes for AOC holders and pilots, as well as the oversight of continuing airworthiness and aircraft
maintenance organisations.
(71) The requested information and documentation were provided by the TCAA on 7 June 2024and revealed significant
shortcomings in staff allocation and oversight effectiveness, particularly a lack of clarity on how inspectors are
distributed across key functions, raising concerns about the adequacy of resources to effectively oversee
airworthiness, flight operations, and personnel licensing.
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(72) Moreover, the training and qualification processes for inspectors were found to be insufficient, lacking clear
guidelines for specialised training, structured performance evaluations, and recurrent training. These deficiencies
may compromise the capability of the TCAA personnel to carry out effective safety oversight. Furthermore, the
TCAA’s oversight procedures were either incomplete or entirely absent in some critical areas, such as the oversight
manuals for a key domain like Personnel Licensing.
(73) Records of the TCAA’s certification and oversight activities revealed several deficiencies, including inconsistent usage
of forms for special approvals, insufficient surveillance of air carriers’ continuing airworthiness, inadequate
follow-up on safety findings, unresolved corrective actions over extended periods, and recurring safety issues that
failed to address root causes.
(74) On 10 October 2024, as part of its continuous monitoring activities, the Commission, the Agency, and
representatives of the TCAA held a technical meeting. On that occasion, the TCAA outlined its role as the regulator
of Tanzania’s civil aviation sector, operating under Tanzania’s Civil Aviation Act and ICAO Annexes, with the
declared objective of ensuring safety in compliance with international safety standards. Nevertheless, significant
challenges persist in the effective implementation of these regulations, preventing full alignment with international
safety standards.
(75) Furthermore, the TCAA presented its ongoing initiatives to strengthen its safety oversight system. These include the
development of performance-based surveillance plans, the implementation of a comprehensive Inspector Training
System, and the revision of civil aviation regulations to align with evolving ICAO standards. These efforts are
supported by plans for capacity building within the aviation sector and increased engagement with industry
stakeholders to facilitate the effective implementation of regulatory requirements. While acknowledging these
measures, persistent shortcomings such as gaps in inspector training, unresolved audit findings, and inadequate
procedural documentation underscore the need for further actions to strengthen oversight mechanisms.
(76) By letter dated 18 October 2024the Commission informed Air Tanzania, as well as the TCAA, that the case of Air
Tanzania had been placed on the agenda of the EU Air Safety Committee meeting to be held between 19 and
21 November 2024, and that both Air Tanzania and the TCAA would be given the opportunity of being heard
before the EU Air Safety Committee in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.
(77) Air Tanzania, as well as the TCAA were heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 20 November 2024. Air Tanzania’s
presentation during the hearing detailed efforts to address findings stemming from the TCO authorisation process,
including an SMS gap analysis, revisions to the Safety Management Manual, alongside updates to operational
manuals and the Minimum Equipment List. The airline also developed a thirty-six-month recurrent training plan
addressing Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, winter operations, and dangerous goods handling.
Additionally, it introduced procedures for route and aerodrome qualification tracking and controls for hard-time
and life-limited components to improve operational and airworthiness practices.
(78) The EU Air Safety Committee members expressed concerns over Air Tanzania’s approach to the overall management
of findings, and in particular its root cause analyses. It was observed that many of the root causes presented by the
air carrier merely reiterated the findings, without performing a comprehensive analysis to identify the underlying
systemic or procedural deficiencies. An example of this was Air Tanzania’s identification of the sixteen Level 2
findings as the root cause for the Level 1 finding related to the non-compliance with the applicable requirements of
Annex 1 (Part-TCO) of Regulation (EU) No 452/2014. This clearly demonstrated Air Tanzania’s failure to address the
fundamental reasons behind the air carrier’s inability to meet these requirements. This lack of a deeper examination
weakens the effectiveness of the proposed corrective actions, as they address the symptoms rather than resolving the
underlying systemic weaknesses.
(79) The information provided by Air Tanzania was not sufficient in nature to address the safety deficiencies from which
the decision by the Agency to refuse the TCO authorisation emanated. The Corrective Action Plan (‘CAP’) provided
by Air Tanzania, notably the associated root cause analysis, did not demonstrate the air carrier’s ability to implement
appropriate measures to assure compliance with international safety standards.
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(80) During the hearing, the TCAA presented its regulatory framework and emphasised its commitment to ensuring
safety oversight in line with international safety standards. The TCAA reported its immediate actions following the
rejection of Air Tanzania’s TCO authorisation by the Agency, including a special audit that identified critical areas for
improvement, such as an ineffective SMS, staff shortages, and organisational inefficiencies.
(81) Furthermore, the TCAA informed the EU Air Safety Committee that, in response to the findings issued by the
Agency, a dedicated team of inspectors was established to evaluate and verify the revised CAP developed by Air
Tanzania. According to the TCAA, these efforts have resolved eleven out of nineteen findings, with the remaining
findings at various stages of implementation. The specific actions described by the TCAA during the hearing, such
as the approval of revised training programs, amendments to operational manuals, and the verification of critical
updates like commander upgrade training, crew recency records, and compliance with airworthiness directives,
were not substantiated by any evidence. Moreover, it appeared during the hearing that the TCAA also did not fully
adhere to the principles of root cause analysis, casting doubt on the adequacy and effectiveness of their assessment
of the CAP provided by Air Tanzania.
(82) In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore
assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to
include the air carrier Air Tanzania in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.
(83) In view of the apparent deficiencies identified from the exchanges with the TCAA, the Commission will carry out,
with the assistance of the Agency and the support of Member States, a Union on-site assessment visit to Tanzania.
(84) Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Tanzania with the
relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.
(85) Further action could be taken by the Commission as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if
any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant
international safety standards.
(86) Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(87) Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 recognise the need for decisions to be taken swiftly and, where
appropriate, urgently, given the safety implications. It is therefore essential, for the protection of sensitive
information and the traveling public, that any decisions in the context of updating the list of air carriers, which are
subject to an operating ban or restriction within the Union, apply immediately after their adoption.
(88) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the EU Air Safety Committee,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 is amended as follows:
(1) Annex A is replaced by the text in Annex I to this Regulation;
(2) Annex B is replaced by the text in Annex II to this Regulation.
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Article 2
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 13 December 2024.
For the Commission,
On behalf of the President,
Apostolos TZITZIKOSTAS
Member of the Commission
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ANNEX I
‘ANNEX A
LIST OF AIR CARRIERS WHICH ARE BANNED FROM OPERATING WITHIN THE UNION, WITH
EXCEPTIONS(1)
Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
AIR TANZANIA TCAA/AOC/001 ATC Tanzania
AIR ZIMBABWE (PVT) 177/04 AZW Zimbabwe
AVIOR AIRLINES ROI-RNR-011 ROI Venezuela
BLUE WING AIRLINES SRBWA-01/2002 BWI Suriname
IRAN ASEMAN AIRLINES FS-102 IRC Iran
FLY BAGHDAD 007 FBA Iraq
IRAQI AIRWAYS 001 IAW Iraq
All air carriers certified by the Afghanistan
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Afgha
nistan, including
ARIANA AFGHAN AIRLINES AOC 009 AFG Afghanistan
KAM AIR AOC 001 KMF Afghanistan
All air carriers certified by the Angola
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Ango
la, with the exception of TAAG
Angola Airlines and Heli Malongo,
including
AEROJET AO-008/11-07/17 TEJ TEJ Angola
GUICANGO AO-009/11-06/17 YYY Unknown Angola
AIR JET AO-006/11-08/18 MBC MBC Angola
BESTFLYA AIRCRAFT AO-015/15-06/17YYY Unknown Angola
MANAGEMENT
HELIANG AO 007/11-08/18 YYY Unknown Angola
SJL AO-014/13-08/18YYY Unknown Angola
SONAIR AO-002/11-08/17 SOR SOR Angola
All air carriers certified by the Armenia
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Arme
nia, including
AIR DILIJANS AM AOC 065 NGT Armenia
(1) Air carriers listed in this Annex may be permitted to exercise traffic rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier which is not
subject to an operating ban, provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with.
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
ARMENIAN AIRLINES AM AOC 076 AAG Armenia
ARMENIA AIRWAYS AM AOC 063 AMW Armenia
ARMENIAN HELICOPTERS AM AOC 067 KAV Armenia
FLY ARNA AM AOC 075 ACY Armenia
FLYONE ARMENIA AM AOC 074 FIE Armenia
NOVAIR AM AOC 071 NAI Armenia
SHIRAK AVIA AM AOC 072 SHS Armenia
SKYBALL AM AOC 073 N/A Armenia
All air carriers certified by the Congo (Brazzaville)
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Congo
(Brazzaville), including
CANADIAN AIRWAYS CONGO CG-CTA 006 TWC Congo (Brazzaville)
EQUAFLIGHT SERVICES CG-CTA 002 EKA Congo (Brazzaville)
EQUAJET RAC06-007 EKJ Congo (Brazzaville)
TRANS AIR CONGO CG-CTA 001 TSG Congo (Brazzaville)
SOCIETE NOUVELLE AIR CONGO CG-CTA 004 Unknown Congo (Brazzaville)
All air carriers certified by the Democratic Republic
authorities with responsibility of the Congo (DRC)
for regulatory oversight of Demo
cratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), including
AB BUSINESS AAC/DG/OPS-09/14 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
AIR FAST CONGO AAC/DG/OPS-09/03 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
AIR KASAI AAC/DG/OPS-09/11 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
AIR KATANGA AAC/DG/OPS-09/08 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
BUSY BEE CONGO AAC/DG/OPS-09/04 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
COMPAGNIE AFRICAINE AAC/DG/OPS-09/02 DBP Democratic Republic
D’AVIATION (CAA) of the Congo (DRC)
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
CONGO AIRWAYS AAC/DG/OPS-09/01 COG Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
GOMA EXPRESS AAC/DG/OPS-09/13 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
KIN AVIA AAC/DG/OPS-09/10 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
MALU AVIATION AAC/DG/OPS-09/05 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
SERVE AIR CARGO AAC/DG/OPS-09/07 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
SWALA AVIATION AAC/DG/OPS-09/06 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
TRACEP CONGO AVIATION AAC/DG/OPS-09/15 Unknown Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
All air carriers certified by the Djibouti
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Dji
bouti, including
DAALLO AIRLINES Unknown DAO Djibouti
All air carriers certified by the Equatorial Guinea
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Equa
torial Guinea, including
CEIBA INTERCONTINENTAL 2011/0001/MTTCT/DGAC/SOPS CEL Equatorial Guinea
CRONOS AIRLINES 2011/0004/MTTCT/DGAC/SOPS Unknown Equatorial Guinea
All air carriers certified by the Eritrea
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Eri
trea, including
ERITREAN AIRLINES AOC No 004 ERT Eritrea
NASAIR ERITREA AOC No 005 NAS Eritrea
All air carriers certified by the Kyrgyzstan
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Kyr
gyzstan, including
AERO NOMAD AIRLINES 57 ANK Kyrgyzstan
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
AEROSTAN 08 BSC Kyrgyzstan
AIR COMPANY AIR KG 50 KGC Kyrgyzstan
AIRCOMPANY MOALEM 56 AMA Kyrgyzstan
AVIATION
AVIA TRAFFIC COMPANY 23 AVJ Kyrgyzstan
CENTRAL ASIAN AVIATION 58 KAS Kyrgyzstan
SERVICES
FLYSKY AIRLINES 53 FSQ Kyrgyzstan
GLOBAL 8 AIRLINES 59 Unknown Kyrgyzstan
HELI SKY 47 HAC Kyrgyzstan
KAP.KG AIRCOMPANY 52 KGS Kyrgyzstan
MAC.KG AIRLINES 61 MSK Kyrgyzstan
SAPSAN AIRLINE 54 KGB Kyrgyzstan
SKY JET 60 SJL Kyrgyzstan
SKY KG AIRLINES 41 KGK Kyrgyzstan
TRANS CARAVAN KG 55 TCK Kyrgyzstan
TEZ JET 46 TEZ Kyrgyzstan
All air carriers certified by the Liberia
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Liber
ia.
All air carriers certified by the Libya
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Libya,
including
AFRIQIYAH AIRWAYS 007/01 AAW Libya
AIR LIBYA 004/01 TLR Libya
AL MAHA AVIATION 030/18 Unknown Libya
BERNIQ AIRWAYS 032/21 BNL Libya
BURAQ AIR 002/01 BRQ Libya
GLOBAL AIR TRANSPORT 008/05 GAK Libya
HALA AIRLINES 033/21 HTP Libya
LIBYAN AIRLINES 001/01 LAA Libya
LIBYAN WINGS AIRLINES 029/15 LWA Libya
PETRO AIR 025/08 PEO Libya
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
All air carriers certified by the Nepal
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Nepal,
including
AIR DYNASTY HELI. S. 035/2001 Unknown Nepal
ALTITUDE AIR 085/2016 Unknown Nepal
BUDDHA AIR 014/1996 BHA Nepal
FISHTAIL AIR 017/2001 Unknown Nepal
SUMMIT AIR 064/2010 Unknown Nepal
HELI EVEREST 086/2016 Unknown Nepal
HIMALAYA AIRLINES 084/2015 HIM Nepal
KAILASH HELICOPTER SERVICES 087/2018 Unknown Nepal
MAKALU AIR 057A/2009 Unknown Nepal
MANANG AIR PVT 082/2014 Unknown Nepal
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS 055/2009 Unknown Nepal
PRABHU HELICOPTERS 081/2013 Unknown Nepal
NEPAL AIRLINES CORPORATION 003/2000 RNA Nepal
SAURYA AIRLINES 083/2014 Unknown Nepal
SHREE AIRLINES 030/2002 SHA Nepal
SIMRIK AIR 034/2000 Unknown Nepal
SIMRIK AIRLINES 052/2009 RMK Nepal
SITA AIR 033/2000 Unknown Nepal
TARA AIR 053/2009 Unknown Nepal
YETI AIRLINES 037/2004 NYT Nepal
The following air carriers certi Russia
fied by the authorities with re
sponsibility for regulatory over
sight of Russia
AURORA AIRLINES 486 SHU Russia
AVIACOMPANY "AVIASTAR-TU"
458 TUP Russia
CO. LTD
IZHAVIA 479 IZA Russia
JOINT STOCK COMPANY "AIR
464 SYL Russia
COMPANY "YAKUTIA"
JOINT STOCK COMPANY "RUSJET" 498 RSJ Russia
JOINT STOCK COMPANY "UVT
567 UVT Russia
AERO"
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
JOINT STOCK COMPANY SIBERIA
31 SBI Russia
AIRLINES
JOINT STOCK COMPANY
466 AUL Russia
SMARTAVIA AIRLINES
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
480 IAE Russia
"IRAERO" AIRLINES
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY "URAL
18 SVR Russia
AIRLINES"
JOINT–STOCK COMPANY
230 DRU Russia
ALROSA AIR COMPANY
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
452 TYA Russia
NORDSTAR AIRLINES
JS AVIATION COMPANY
225 RLU Russia
"RUSLINE"
JSC YAMAL AIRLINES 142 LLM Russia
LLC "NORD WIND" 516 NWS Russia
LLC “AIRCOMPANY IKAR” 36 KAR Russia
LTD. I FLY 533 RSY Russia
POBEDA AIRLINES LIMITED
562 PBD Russia
LIABILITY COMPANY
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY
1 AFL Russia
"AEROFLOT - RUSSIAN AIRLINES"
ROSSIYA AIRLINES, JOINT STOCK
2 SDM Russia
COMPANY
SKOL AIRLINE LLC 228 CDV Russia
UTAIR AVIATION, JOINT-STOCK
6 UTA Russia
COMPANY
All air carriers certified by the São Tomé and
authorities with responsibility Príncipe
for regulatory oversight of São
Tomé and Príncipe, including
STP AIRWAYS 03/AOC/2006 STP São Tomé and Príncipe
All air carriers certified by the Sierra Leone
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Sierra
Leone
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Name of the legal entity of the air carrier
Air Operator Certificate ('AOC') Number or ICAO three letter
as indicated on its AOC (and its trading State of the Operator
Operating Licence Number designator
name, if different)
All air carriers certified by the Sudan
authorities with responsibility
for regulatory oversight of Sudan,
including
ALFA AIRLINES SD 54 AAJ Sudan
BADR AIRLINES 35 BDR Sudan
BLUE BIRD AVIATION 11 BLB Sudan
ELDINDER AVIATION 8 DND Sudan
GREEN FLAG AVIATION 17 GNF Sudan
HELEJETIC AIR 57 HJT Sudan
KATA AIR TRANSPORT 9 KTV Sudan
KUSH AVIATION CO. 60 KUH Sudan
NOVA AIRWAYS 46 NOV Sudan
SUDAN AIRWAYS CO. 1 SUD Sudan
SUN AIR 51 SNR Sudan
TARCO AIR 56 TRQ Sudan’
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ANNEX II
‘ANNEX B
LIST OF AIR CARRIERS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE UNION(1)
Registration
Name of the legal entity mark(s) and,
of the air carrier as Air Operator ICAO three when available,
State of the Aircraft type
indicated on its AOC Certificate letter construction State of registry
Operator restricted
(and its trading name, if ('AOC') Number designator serial number(s)
different) of restricted
aircraft
IRAN AIR IR.AOC.100 IRA Iran All aircraft Aircraft of type Iran
of type Fokker F100 as
Fokker mentioned on
F100 and of the AOC;
type Boeing aircraft of type
B747 Boeing B747 as
mentioned on
the AOC
AIR KORYO GAC- KOR North Korea All fleet All fleet with North Korea’
AOC/KOR-01 with the the exception
exception of: P-632,
of: 2 aircraft P-633.
of type TU-
204.
(1) Air carriers listed in this Annex may be permitted to exercise traffic rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier which is not
subject to an operating ban, provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with.
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