Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2133 of 18 September 2026 imposing a provisional safeguard measure with regard to imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel

Official Journal EN of the European Union L series 2026/2133 18.9.2026 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION(EU) 2026/2133 of 18 September 2026 imposing a provisional safeguard measure with regard to imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015(1), and in particular Articles 5 and 7 thereof, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015(2), and in particular Articles 3 and 4 thereof, Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area(3), and in particular Article 113(3), second paragraph, thereof After having consulted the Committee on Safeguards established under Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 respectively,

Whereas:

1. BACKGROUND

(1) On 27 March 2026, the Commission published a Notice of Initiation of a safeguard investigation concerning imports of (1) certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (‘GOES’) and of (2) steel laminations and cores (‘SLCs’), whether or not stacked or wound(4).

(2) The investigation was initiated following a request from three Member States (Germany, France and Poland), submitted on 2 March 2026. The analysis of the request showed that the rising trend in imports of GOES and SLCs and the conditions in which they take place cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the Union industry.

(3) In order to obtain the information necessary to carry out an in-depth assessment, the Commission published questionnaires for Union producers, importers, and users of the product under investigation on 27 March 2026 and invited interested parties to make submissions within 21 days. On the same date, the Commission published the non-confidential version of the request containing key import statistics and available injury indicators.

(4) The Commission received 34 questionnaire replies and 65 free submissions following initiation from Union producers, exporters, importers, users, associations and third country authorities, and it held hearings with 30 interested parties.

(5) The Commission conducted a thorough verification of the information provided by Union producers for the preliminary determination. To this end, questionnaire responses submitted by the two known existing GOES Union producers, located in Germany and Poland, were verified on-spot. The verifications included data of the GOES producers’ subsidiaries, located in France and the Czech Republic. The total GOES output of the two producers and their subsidiaries represents 100 % of the total Union GOES production. Questionnaire replies of the two main Union producers of SLCs, LTC and Lagor, both located in Italy, were also verified on spot. A visit was also carried out at the premises of a transformer producer in the Netherlands (SGB-Smit).

(1) Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (OJ L 83,

27.3.2015, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/478/oj).

(2) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj).

(3) Agreement on the European Economic Area - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Declarations by the Governments of the Member States of the Community and the EFTA States - Arrangements - Agreed Minutes - Declarations by one or several of the Contracting Parties of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/1/oj).

(4) Notice of initiation of a safeguard investigation concerning imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (OJ C, C/2026/1848, 27.3.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1848/oj).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 1/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026

2. PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE OR DIRECTLY COMPETING PRODUCTS

(6) The product concerned as defined in the Notice of Initiation is (1) certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (‘GOES’), and (2) steel laminations and cores, whether or not stacked or wound (‘SLCs’), for transformers and inductors. GOES currently fall under CN codes 7225 11 00 and 7226 11 00. SLCs currently fall under CN code 8504 90 13.

(7) The Commission provisionally determined that GOES and SLCs produced by Union producers, referred to as the ‘like product’, are like and are directly competing with the product concerned. Both the domestic and imported products possess the same fundamental physical, technical and chemical characteristics. They serve identical purposes and are offered through similar or identical sales channels to customers who may acquire them from both domestic and foreign suppliers. Accordingly, there exists a significant level of competition between the product concerned and the one produced by Union producers.

(8) The Commission has also found in the preliminary analysis that there is an important interrelation and strong competition between GOES and SLCs. GOES is the main input material to produce SLCs. GOES are slit into laminations and then stacked to form a core, which is then incorporated into a transformer. EU transformer makers were found to purchase either GOES or SLCs and to have processing facilities that allow them to slit GOES into laminations and stack the latter into cores. When they purchase GOES, they would process them to laminations and cores in their own production sites. This level of integration shows that the transformer makers have some flexibility on the sourcing side, and they can shift from buying GOES to buying SLCs depending on the market situation.

(9) Data submitted by GOES producers confirmed that they sold GOES to two categories of customers, i.e. to laminations and core makers on the one hand and to transformer makers on the other. This finding was confirmed through the on-spot verifications of the submitted questionnaire replies. Therefore, the Commission concluded that GOES and SLCs are products that compete with each other.

(10) The Commission thus rejects claims by several parties that GOES and SLCs are not like or directly competing products because they are fundamentally transformed products with different use and technical characteristics.

Given the high level of interrelation, competitive pressure and easy shift from one product type to another, GOES, laminations and cores are all directly competing with each other and should be considered as the product concerned.

(11) After initiation, a large number of interested parties, including the Union producers and a number of transformer producers, claimed that SLCs incorporated in a transformer should be part of the product concerned and, hence, should be subject to measures, in case the Commission would impose measures.

(12) The Commission agreed. Whereas GOES are the upstream product, SLCs are directly downstream, and transformers are the next downstream product in the value chain. The basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics, i.e.

transmitting electricity efficiently, of GOES and SLCs do not change when they are incorporated as a core in a transformer.

(13) GOES exist in different quality grades, which are measured in terms of ‘core loss’ in Watt/kg. The lower the core loss, the more efficiently electricity is transmitted. The different quality grades have a significant impact on price.

(14) In view of correctly categorising GOES, the Commission carefully analysed user questionnaire replies and submissions. The Commission provisionally categorised GOES as follows, based on the cores loss in watt/kg which

is widely accepted as a unit of measurement: High-end grade < 0,7 W/kg, mid-range grade 0,7 W/kg to 0,9 W/kg, and conventional grade > 0,9 W/kg.

3. THE UNION PRODUCERS

(15) The Union producers are the producers of GOES and of SLCs (‘Union industry’). The GOES producers are ThyssenKrupp Electrical Steel GmbH, Gelsenkirchen, Germany, ThyssenKrupp Electrical Steel UGO S.A.S., Isbergues, France (related to ThyssenKrupp Electrical Steel GmbH), Stalprodukt S.A., Bochnia, Poland, GO Steel Frydek Mistek a.s., Frýdek-Místek, Czech Republic (related to Stalprodukt S.A.).

2/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(16) All above producers have co-operated with the investigation by filing questionnaire responses. ThyssenKrupp Electrical Steel GmbH and Stalprodukt S.A. were verified on the spot. The verifications also covered partial data pertaining to the related subsidiaries.

(17) The SLC Union producers consist of about 8 companies, most of them located in Italy. 5 of these producers filed a questionnaire reply, of which two were verified on spot. Some of these producers were found to have partly relocated the SLC production to countries outside the Union, including Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.

(18) Several interested parties claimed that the producers of SLCs are not part of the Union industry, as they process both imported and Union GOES into SLCs. Thus, they should rather be treated as importers.

(19) The Commission rejected this claim. The SLC producers, which the claiming parties referred to as service centres, bring the product concerned into existence by processing GOES, irrespective of whether the GOES is of EU or third country origin, into SLCs in their production premises in the Union. Therefore, SLC producers are part of the Union industry.

4. INCREASE IN IMPORTS

(20) Based on information from Eurostat, as well as information submitted by Union producers, the Commission carried out an analysis of the increase of imports of the product concerned over the period 2021 to 2025 (‘the period considered’).

(21) In its assessment of import evolution, the Commission did not take into account the import volumes from certain countries that should be excluded from the scope of the provisional measures, in particular: the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA countries, Kenya, and Ukraine. On account of the close integration of markets with EEA/EFTA members, the overall figures of imports from these countries, and the low risk of trade diversion, the Commission considers that the products under assessment originating in Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein should be excluded from the application of this Regulation. Imports from Kenya are excluded based on the bilateral agreement(5)(6), and Ukraine is excluded based on the suspension of the safeguard regulation(7)(8). No imports from Iceland, Liechtenstein and Kenya were reported during the period considered, and the imports from Norway and Ukraine represented 0,0009 % and 0,0006 % respectively of the total EU imports of the product concerned.

(22) The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the sales of the Union industry in the Union to the imports into the Union. The information on imports was sourced from Eurostat. Production volume was established on the basis of questionnaire replies from the Union producers.

(23) The total imports of the product concerned developed as follows:

Table 1 Imports volume, production, consumption and imports relative to production and consumption Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Imports of GOES and SLC in tonnes 135 140 180 871 181 761 223 580 297 079 index 2021 = 100 100 134 134 165 220 Imports of GOES in tonnes 101 617 134 440 132 732 172 006 227 396 index 2021 = 100 100 132 131 169 224

(5) Agreement on the European Economic Area, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/1/oj.

(6) Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Kenya, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/ agree_internation/2024/1648/oj.

(7) Regulation (EU) 2025/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2025 suspending certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 as regards imports of Ukrainian products into the Union (OJ L, 2025/1153, 5.6.2025, ELI: http://data.

europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1153/oj).

(8) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/09/2025-10524/adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-and-steel-into-the-united- states.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 3/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026 Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Imports of SLC in tonnes 33 523 46 431 49 029 51 574 69 683 index 2021 = 100 100 139 146 154 208 Production in tonnes 336 555 363 039 332 378 336 553 306 539 index 2021 = 100 100 108 99 100 91 Imports over production (ratio) 0,40 0,50 0,55 0,66 0,97 index 2021 = 100 100 124 136 165 241 Consumption in tonnes 397 698 450 172 435 769 480 947 525 088 index 2021 = 100 100 113 110 121 132 Imports over consumption (ratio) 0,34 0,40 0,42 0,46 0,57 index 2021 = 100 100 118 123 137 166

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

(24) The analysis of import trends of the product concerned shows a 120 % increase of import volumes in absolute terms during the period considered, a 141 % increase compared to Union production, and a 66 % increase compared to Union consumption.

(25) A first significant import increase of 34 % occurred between 2021 and 2022. Imports remained at a similar level in 2023 and further increased by 23 % in 2024 and 33 % in 2025. In 2025, Chinese imports hold a 53 % share of total imports, followed by Japan (20 %), Türkiye (13 %) and Korea and UAE (4 %). The Chinese import share increased from 20 % to 53 % over the period considered, while the import shares decreased for Japan (25 % to 20 %), Türkiye (16 % to 13 %), and Korea (9 % to 4 %) over the same period.

(26) Import prices should be assessed by product type, and the distinction must be made between the price of GOES, laminations and cores. Import prices of GOES and SLC combined increased by 78 % between 2021 and 2023, they started to decrease in 2024 and in 2025 when they had increased by 27 % as compared with 2021.Furthermore, GOES should be distinguished by grade. The domestic sale prices of GOES are only available at an aggregated level and not per different grade, whereas import prices are available per grade.

4/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(27) Import prices for laminations and cores cannot be distinguished as they are being imported under the same CN code. From market intelligence, it is however possible to provisionally conclude that the imports from UAE represent almost completely only laminations, and that the import price of cores should be an average of the remaining imports.

Table 2 Import prices of GOES and SLC, GOES and Cores Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Import price of GOES and SLC (EUR/tonne) 2 169 3 379 3 863 2 826 2 746 index 2021 = 100 100 156 178 130 127 Import price of GOES (EUR/tonne) 1 904 3 046 3 448 2 432 2 405 index 2021 = 100 100 160 181 128 126 Import price of Cores (EUR/tonne) 2 950 4 342 5 024 4 233 3 970 index 2021 = 100 100 147 170 144 135

Source: EUROSTAT.

(28) The Commission therefore concludes that the product concerned is being imported in increased quantities. There has been a notable increase in imports, both in absolute and in relative terms. This conclusion is derived from a comprehensive analysis of the data over the entire period of investigation and is supported both by the global analysis and an analysis at disaggregated level, per product category. These figures confirm that the increase in imports is recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough for the product concerned globally, which is confirmed at product category level.

5. UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS

(29) The Commission has reached a provisional conclusion that the significant increase in GOES and SLC imports into the Union is a direct consequence of unforeseen developments that not only create but also intensify imbalances in the international trade of the product concerned.

(30) The global steel market, including the GOES sector, is characterised by overcapacity, with worldwide capacity having increased significantly in recent years. Already in 2024, China alone accounted for a GOES overcapacity of 600 000 tonnes (equivalent to 20 % of its total domestic demand), while India, Korea and Japan collectively represented an additional 242 000 tonnes. This level of spare capacity stands in stark contrast to EU consumption, which amounted to 366 850 tonnes in the same year. It has significantly contributed to the increasing import volumes observed in the Union market.

(31) When there is overcapacity on a global scale, producers produce excess quantities that they seek to offload wherever possible and preferably in markets with high price levels. The Union market, where such high price levels prevailed, became an appealing destination for such excess production.

(32) The above effect has been exacerbated by trade-restrictive practices in third country markets. In the recent years, major other markets were found to be increasingly closed as many countries have increasingly used trade policies and trade defence instruments to protect domestic producers. Since the US introduced the Section 232 measures in 2025,(9)(50 % tariff on steel products, including GOES), GOES imports into the US have decreased, which has

(9) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/09/2025-10524/adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-and-steel-into-the-united- states.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 5/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026 prompted trade diversion and increased GOES imports into the Union. In addition, the Union market remains attractive due to its size, as it is among the largest GOES markets worldwide. Only China has a larger domestic market than the Union. However, the market of the PRC is subject to AD measures on imports from Japan and Korea(10)ranging between 37 % and 46 %, which led Japan and Korea to redirect some exports to the Union.

(33) Some parties claimed that the global overcapacity and the US Section 232 tariffs, as invoked by the Commission, should not be regarded as "unforeseen developments". They added that global overcapacity had already been mentioned in the anti-dumping expiry review completed in 2022, thus this element should not have come unexpected.

(34) The Commission rejected the claim. Market participants can reasonably expect the build-up of capacities by their competitors in line with market trends, such as growing consumption. As outlined in the present Regulation, such growth in consumption was indeed observed over the period considered. Further growth is expected in the near future, against the background of, for instance, energy transitions and the increasing need for data centres.

However, the evidence on file shows that China has already built capacities that clearly exceed what the market has been able to absorb. The fact that some overcapacity was already observed at the time the last anti-dumping expiry review(11)was conducted does not mean that the overcapacity built up thereafter could be expected.

(35) Moreover, GOES and SLCs are subject to a VAT rate of 13 % in China. However, China has introduced a VAT rebate of 13 % applicable to exports of SLCs and transformers, in which SLCs are incorporated, under China’s current tax policy. Such rebate was however not introduced with regard to GOES exports. This means that Chinese exporting producers have an incentive to export SLCs and transformers. Such VAT rebates are introduced by the Chinese Government in a selective manner to promote the export of certain products from time to time. These measures come hence unexpected to market participants outside China.

(36) In light of these circumstances, the Commission provisionally concluded that the unforeseen developments, in particular global overcapacity, third country trade defence measures and overall tariff increases, notably in the US, and Chinese VAT rebates have not only led to but will also continue to drive a substantial increase in imports of GOES into the Union.

6. OBLIGATIONS WHOSE EFFECT RESULTED IN THE INCREASE IN IMPORTS

(37) The product concerned comprises several tariff lines and on all of these tariff lines, the European Union has, as a result of tariff concessions made in past rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the tariff commitments(12)of:

Table 3 Duty rates Tariff line Duty rate (tariff commitment) 7225 11 00 Free 7226 11 00 Free 8504 90 13 Free

(10) https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-extend-anti-dumping-duties-steel-product-japan-south-korea-eu-2022-07-22/#: ~:text=Reuters%20Plus-,China%20to%20extend%20anti%2Ddumping%20duties%20on%20steel%20product%20from,during%20the %20year%2Dlong%20investigation.

(11) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/58 of 14 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel originating in the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation

(EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 10, 17.1.2022, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/ 2022/58/oj).

(12) http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2522/oj.

6/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(38) These concessions are inscribed, at the time of the provisional safeguard determination, in Part I, Section II of the European Union’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments, certified as Schedule EU CLXXIII – European Union on 1 December 2016(13), as amended.

(39) As a result of these concessions inscribed in the European Union’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments,

annexed to the GATT and incorporated pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 and as a result of other parts of the GATT 1994, the European Union has obligations incurred under the GATT 1994 notably as follows:

Article XI:1, prohibiting non-tariff restrictions on the importation of the above-listed products, and, importantly,

Article II:1(a) and Article II:1(b), first and second sentences, of the GATT 1994. Under Article II:1(b), first sentence, the EU is not allowed, absent an applicable exception, to impose ordinary customs duties on the product concerned in excess of those set forth and provided in the relevant part of the EU’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments, i.e. the rate pointed out above for each of the tariff lines covered. Furthermore, the EU’s applied import tariff on the product concerned, also known as the most-favoured-nation tariffs, at the time of the investigation, was at the maximum levels allowed under the tariff commitments indicated above.

(40) The product concerned was being imported in increased quantities as a result of the above obligations undertaken under the GATT 1994 (Article XI:1, Article II:1(a) and II:1(b), first and second sentences, of the GATT 1994), because those obligations, combined with the tariff concessions which the European Union made in the successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, enhanced and secured the conditions of market access for imports of the product concerned to the market of the European Union. The above-mentioned tariff commitments of the European Union thus resulted in the increase in imports and gave no leeway for the European Union to increase ordinary customs duties in lieu of introducing a safeguard measure. This simultaneously explains how the obligations in question resulted in the increase in imports that cause serious injury.

(41) The GATT obligations specified simultaneously prevented the EU from increasing the applied import duties on the product at issue. These were, thus, the European Union’s ‘obligations of the GATT 1994 which constrained its ability to prevent or remedy injury from an increase in imports’. Concomitantly, the European Union suspended those obligations as a result of its safeguard measure.

7. SERIOUS INJURY

7.1. Situation of the Union producers

(42) In order to formulate its preliminary determination as to whether there is evidence of serious injury to the Union producers of the product concerned, the Commission, in line with Article 9 of Regulation 2015/478 and Article 6 of Regulation 2015/755, has examined the trends of consumption, production, capacity utilisation, sales, market shares, prices, profitability, stocks, return on capital employed (ROCE), cash flow and employment for the product concerned during the period considered.

(43) Injury indicators generally showed negative trends over the period considered. Following a rather promising recovery in 2022 and 2023 after the COVID-19 pandemic, a significant downturn occurred in 2024, with a slight but insufficient improvement in 2025.

(44) Over the period considered, against a background of increasing consumption, the production volume decreased by 9 %, sales by 4 %, and the Union industry’s market share decreased to 43 % (compared to 66 % in 2021).

Profitability on domestic sales to unrelated customers decreased from 8,4 % to 3,6 % over the period considered.

(45) This was found to be unsustainable in a capital-intensive sector. Moreover, the Commission found that a target profit of around 15 % was needed to allow for the necessary investments required to achieve and maintain the highest grade quality. This target profit was based on profit rates the Union producers realised in 2022 and 2023 prior to the substantial increase of imports.

(46) In view of the increase in demand of 32 %, the Union GOES producers increased capacity by 9 %. However, due to the import pressure, capacity utilisation decreased from 85 % to 71 % over the period considered, and the Union GOES producers lost 35 % market share.

(13) WTO doc. WT/Let/1220.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 7/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(47) Overall, the economic situation of the Union producers of GOES (TK and Stalprodukt) showed a consistent downward trend of most injury indicators, whereas the situation of the Union producers of SLCs shows a more mixed picture, depending on their business model, in particular whether they mainly sourced GOES from Union producers or from third countries. Some were found loss making, whereas others made profit. Overall, the Commission found that the Union SLC producers that relied on GOES supplies from Union producers suffered more injury than those that at least partly relied on cheaply priced imports, in particular from China.

(48) When looking at the overall situation, Union consumption, sales of Union producers, and the corresponding

market share developed as follows:

Table 4 Import prices, domestic sales to unrelated customers prices and price undercutting Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Import price of GOES and SLC (EUR/tonne) 2 169 3 379 3 863 2 826 2 746 index 2021 = 100 100 156 178 130 127 EU domestic GOES and SLC sale price (EUR/tonne) 2 270 3 529 3 529 2 826 2 896 index 2021 = 100 100 155 155 124 128 Price undercutting of GOES and SLC 4,5 % 4,3 % - 9,5 % 0,0 % 5,2 % index 2021 = 100 100 96 - 212 0 116

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Import price of GOES (EUR/tonne) 1 904 3 046 3 448 2 432 2 405 index 2021 = 100 100 160 181 128 126 EU domestic GOES sale price (EUR/tonne) 2 062 3 441 3 325 2 579 2 803 index 2021 = 100 100 167 161 125 136 Price undercutting of GOES 7,7 % 11,5 % - 3,7 % 5,7 % 14,2 % index 2021 = 100 100 150 - 48 74 185

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Import price of Cores (EUR/tonne) 2 879 4 270 4 934 4 038 3 796 index 2021 = 100 100 148 171 140 132 EU domestic Cores sale price (EUR/tonne) 3 568 4 684 4 980 4 235 4 186 index 2021 = 100 100 131 140 119 117 Price undercutting of Cores 19,3 % 8,8 % 0,9 % 4,6 % 9,3 % index 2021 = 100 100 46 5 24 48

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

8/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(49) Union producers are predominantly selling GOES of lower grades, while imports consist to a large extent of higher grades. Given the different product mix of domestically sold GOES and imported GOES, any price undercutting calculations based on averages are conservative and even understated. A separate undercutting analysis was conducted for cores, where based on questionnaire replies we were able to identify EU prices of cores and with higher accuracy extrapolate their import prices. The available data did not allow for a meaningful calculation of the undercutting of laminations,

(50) For GOES and SLC the undercutting was present in 2021 and 2022. In 2023, the global market prices were at absolute high and import prices were on average higher than domestic sales prices. In 2024 the import prices dropped, prices undercutting was again present. In 2025, price undercutting was at 5,2 % for GOES and SLCs at an aggregate level, and 14,2 % for GOES and 9,3 % for cores.

Table 5 Consumption, domestic sales to unrelated customers and domestic market share Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Consumption in tonnes 397 698 450 172 435 769 480 947 525 088 index 2021 = 100 100 113 110 121 132 Domestic sales to unrelated customers in 262 558 269 301 254 008 257 368 228 009 tonnes index 2021 = 100 100 103 97 98 87 Domestic market share 66 % 60 % 58 % 54 % 43 %

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

(51) Consumption steadily increased during the period considered with only a small decrease from 2022 to 2023. In total, it increased by 32 % during the period considered. Domestic sales to unrelated customers were initially oscillating around the 2021 value but in 2025 decreased by 13 % as compared to 2021. The increase in consumption and decrease in domestic sales lead to major loss of domestic market share from 66 % to 43 %.

Table 6 Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Production in tonnes 336 555 363 039 332 378 336 553 306 539 index 2021 = 100 100 108 99 100 91 Production capacity in tonnes 393 825 408 735 411 135 427 107 430 107 index 2021 = 100 100 104 104 108 109 Capacity utilisation 85 % 89 % 81 % 79 % 71 %

Source: Questionnaire replies.

(52) Production in the period considered initially increased by 8 %, then returned to the 2021 levels, and finally dropped by 9 % in 2025 as compared to 2021. Production capacity was progressively increasing over the time to reach 9 % increase in 2025 as compared to 2021. With both indicators having opposite trends, capacity utilisation decreased by 14 % in 2025 as compared to 2021.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 9/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026 Table 7 Domestic sales and exports to unrelated customers and their profitability Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sales to domestic unrelated customers in 262 558 269 301 254 008 257 368 228 009 tonnes index 2019 = 100 100 103 97 98 87 Exports to unrelated customers in tonnes 80 538 94 515 85 858 81 573 100 973 index 2019 = 100 100 117 107 101 125 Profitability of domestic sales (% turnover) 8,4 % 14,5 % 14,1 % - 2,3 % 3,6 % Profitability of exports (% turnover) 8,3 % 16,4 % 14,2 % - 1,9 % 4,4 %

Source: EUROSTAT and questionnaire replies.

(53) Profitability increased by 6,1 percentage points for domestic sales and 8,1 percentage points for exports from 2021 to 2022 but dropped dramatically in 2024. It slightly improved in 2025 but still remained at low and unsustainable levels.

Table 8 Cash flow, return on capital employed, stocks and employment Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Cash Flow (thousand EUR) 51 240 166 298 157 549 91 611 108 224 index 2021 = 100 100 325 307 179 211 Return on capital employed (%) 12,2 % 34,5 % 23,7 % - 2,4 % 5,3 % Stocks (tonnes) 19 413 24 802 23 530 26 244 16 553 index 2021 = 100 100 128 121 135 85 Employment 2 798 2 895 2 973 3 043 3 057 index 2021 = 100 100 103 106 109 109

Source: Questionnaire replies.

(54) Cash Flow increased by 111 % in the period considered. Return on capital employed became negative in 2024 and overall decreased by 6,9 percentage points in between 2021 and 2025. Stocks have decreased by 15 % during the period considered. Employment increased symmetrically with the increase of production capacity by 9 % in 2025 when compared to 2021.

7.2. Conclusion

(55) Considering the above, the Commission preliminarily concluded that the Union producers are suffering serious injury as evidenced in particular by a decrease in production, sales, a significant loss of market share, significant price suppression and substantially reduced profitability.

8. CAUSATION

(56) The Commission examined whether the increased imports caused serious injury to the Union producers. In addition, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union producers as to call into question the presence of a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the increased imports.

10/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

8.1. Increased imports

(57) The Commission has made a preliminary determination that there is a causal link between the increased imports of the product concerned and the serious injury suffered by the Union producers.

(58) While imports of the product concerned increased by 120 % between 2021 and 2025, the Union producers, in particular GOES Union producers, in the same period, against a background of increasing consumption, suffered in terms of loss of production, sales and a loss of significant market share resulting in decreasing and unsustainable profit levels.

(59) The Commission therefore preliminarily concluded that there is a causal link between the increase in imports and the serious injury suffered by Union producers.

8.2. Other known factors

(60) To ensure that the serious injury is not attributed to factors other than increased imports, the Commission has carried out a preliminary analysis to determine whether other factors may have contributed to the serious injury suffered by the Union producers and to distinguish the effects of those factors from the effects of increased imports, with a view to preliminarily establishing the existence of a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect.

(61) Several interested parties have argued that Union producers are suffering from high energy prices within the Union rather than from increased imports. Indeed, energy prices are generally higher in the Union than in some other regions of the world. However, under normal market conditions, manufacturers can reflect cost increases in their sales prices and thus maintain reasonable profits. The increased level of imports has prevented the Union producers from increasing their sales prices sufficiently to cover for the increase in energy costs. It is thus not the increase of costs as such, but, due to the increased imports, the Union producer’s inability to accurately reflect these cost increases in their sales prices that caused injury.

(62) Several parties claimed that the Union producers were not able to supply GOES in sufficient quantity and quality.

The investigation revealed that, at present, the Union producers are able to theoretically supply around 80 % of the GOES demand in the grades currently being produced in the Union.

(63) However, the Commission found, and to that extent agreed with this claim, that the Union producers were not able to produce the highest quality needed for the most energy efficient transformers to meet the increased demand (i.e.

those with the lowest technically possible core losses). The Union producers also agreed with this claim. Yet, this factor did not attenuate the causal link between increased import volumes and the serious injury suffered by the Union producers, as these quality issues did not prevent the Union industry from achieving robust profit rates in 2022 and 2023 (see table 6).

(64) Several parties claimed that the increase in imports reflects growing demand and market normalisation after the pandemic. The Commission noted that the Union industry should have benefitted from these favourable market conditions, but this did not materialise because of the increasing imports, which exceeded the growth in consumption.

(65) The Commission also assessed the export performance of the Union producers based on data of the questionnaire replies received. The Commission found that the Union GOES producers slightly increased export volumes over the period considered. Therefore, the Commission provisionally dismissed the claim that the export performance contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(66) Some parties also raised that the injury was caused by large investments of the Union producers and decarbonisation. However, the investments were necessary to keep supplying a consistently good quality of the product concerned and to further improve it. The Union industry was prevented by the increase of imports and the rapid deterioration of its economic situation to make more necessary investments in order to achieve further quality improvements.

(67) Consequently, the Commission has not identified any other factors that would attenuate the causal link between the increase in imports and the serious injury to the Union producers.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 11/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026

8.3. Conclusion

(68) For the above reasons, the Commission provisionally concluded that there was a causal link between the significant increase of imports and the serious injury suffered by the Union industry. Other factors, in particular the high energy prices, may have contributed to the serious injury suffered by Union producers, but these factors did not attenuate the causal link.

9. UNION INTEREST

(69) The Commission examined whether it would be in the Union interest to adopt provisional measures. The analysis of the Union interest was based on an appraisal of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union producers, importers and users.

(70) The Union industry consists of about 12 producers, located in different Member States of the Union, and directly employed more than 3 000 employees in 2025 in relation to the product concerned. Its disappearance would have significant negative consequences for both the employees and the regions in which the production facilities are located.

(71) It was established that the Union industry is suffering serious injury caused by an increase of imports. So, the imposition of measures to protect the Union industry against this significant increase of imports is clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

(72) GOES and SLCs are an indispensable input in transformers, which are a critical grid component, whose availability and affordability are essential for Europe’s energy transition and security of supply. With no production in Europe of GOES and SLC, the Union transformer industry would depend entirely on imports of these materials from third countries. During the period considered, the Union industry’s market share in GOES and SLC decreased by 23 percentage points to 43 %, while the market share of importers continued to increase, in particular that from China, which rose to above 50 % of total imports.

(73) With global supply chain disruptions highlighting vulnerabilities, having a viable GOES and SLCs industry ensures that the Union can maintain its industrial output and strategic autonomy, even in times of global uncertainty.

(74) Furthermore, a Union GOES and SLC industry helps the Union meeting its climate goals. The Union industry adheres to the Union environmental regulations, whereas imports of GOES and SLCs could lead to carbon leakage.

(75) Users and importers, in general, seek the lowest possible price. However, it is also in their interests to have a competitive and viable Union industry, as a reliable source of supply.

(76) Several interested parties claimed that the Union producers met neither the quantity nor the quality of Union users’ demand. Furthermore, the total capacity of the Union GOES industry would not meet the Union GOES consumption. Moreover, GOES produced by the Union industry would not meet the core loss and noise requirements required under Commission Regulation (EU) No 548/2014(14). Subsequently, the Union transformer industry would not be able to produce transformers meeting these requirements. Moreover, parties claimed that a measure would significantly increase GOES and SLC prices for the downstream Union transformer industry.

Together, this would harm the competitiveness of the Union transformer industry and lead to increased transformer imports and dependence on China. The Commission took account of the concerns regarding the GOES and SLC supply by introducing specific duties based on minimum import prices combined with tariff rate quotas, which aim at, in addition to protecting the Union industry, keeping the Union market open to imports. The form of the measures will also ensure that the additional cost, if any, will be limited to the strict minimum for the transformer producers, in particular for those which already source high quality GOES at prices close to the level of the price threshold. Also, the cost of GOES in a transformer represents, on average, between 10 % and 30 % and the cost increase will in most cases be only a small percentage thereof. On the other hand, the imposition of measures will allow the Union industry to invest with a view to increase the production of the high quality GOES.

(77) Furthermore, it was claimed that a measure on GOES and SLCs would lead to circumvention. Producers in exporting countries could further process GOES and SLCs into cores incorporated in transformers to avoid duties.

(14) Commission Regulation (EU) No 548/2014 of 21 May 2014 on implementing Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to small, medium and large power transformers, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/548/2019-11-14.

12/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(78) The Commission has reflected on this claim and found it warranted to apply the measures also to cores that are incorporated in transformers. Thus, GOES and SLCs, including SLCs further processed into transformers, will be subject to the provisional measures imposed under the present Regulation. This inclusion is needed, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measure. In addition, a core in a transformer is identifiable, and has the same physical, technical and chemical characteristics as a core not yet incorporated in a transformer.

(79) Moreover, several parties claimed that higher GOES and SLC prices due to the measure would adversely affect the transformer sector, which would delay grid expansion and lead to higher electricity prices.

(80) The Commission rejected these claims. Transformer prices represent only a small component of the total costs incurred for operating the electricity grid. The effect of an increase of transformer prices on the grid operating cost and subsequently on electricity prices was found negligible.

(81) Some parties argued that the imposition of safeguard measures is not in the Union interest because these measures, in combination with the carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’), which will soon be introduced under Union legislation, will lead to even higher import prices, which will likely have a negative impact on the competitiveness of transformer producers.

(82) The Commission dismissed this argument. Union producers continuously adapt production processes in order to comply with Union legislation meant to lower carbon emissions. The CBAM measures intend to keep the Union industry competitive against producers in exporting countries, which under their national legislation do not have to comply with similar rules on the reduction of carbon emissions. Accepting the argument would undermine the Union’s efforts to lower carbon emissions, which is clearly against the Union interest.

(83) Based on above claims and considerations, the Commission established that safeguard measures in the forms outlined below in Section 12.2 will strike the right balance between producers and user interests, on the one hand addressing the serious injury caused by increased imports while on the other hand taking into account the transformer producers’ interests by making the part of SLCs incorporated in imported transformers subject to measures.

(84) The measure will likely also serve as a catalyst for investments in GOES and SLC manufacturing by the Union industry and subsequent increases in capacity utilisation. Imposing measures will allow the Union producers to resume and increase production and regain their competitiveness. This will lead to a more sustainable and competitive Union industry in the long term.

(85) Based on the above considerations, and careful examination of the various interests, the Commission provisionally concluded that it is in the Union interest to adopt safeguard measures in the form of specific duties, based on the difference between an established price threshold and the actual import price per product quality grade. The positive effects for the Union industry outweigh the adverse effects that transformer industry may face. This balanced measure would allow imports into the Union, in particular of high-quality grades, ensuring that foreign supply continues to satisfy downstream industry demand, while ensuring sustainable price levels for the Union industry.

(86) The Union producers of the product concerned are of strategic importance to the Union’s economic security and long-term resilience, and the Union cannot afford losing this industry. Therefore, the Commission considers that the safeguard measure is in the Union interest.

10. CRITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

(87) In accordance with Article 7, paragraph 1, letter a) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478, the Commission examined whether critical circumstances existed where delay would cause damage which would be difficult to repair. In particular, the current situation of the Union producers was examined and whether imports are likely to further increase in the imminent future.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 13/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(88) The Union producers were already in a difficult situation, as reasoned in Section 7 of the present Regulation. In particular, Union producers lost significant market shares in an otherwise growing market. Moreover, one Union producer temporarily ceased production in one of its plants due to the unsustainable economic situation.

(89) Furthermore, as explained above in Section 5, the volume of existing global overcapacity (not including planned additional capacity) was estimated at more than 842 000 tonnes, which represents more than double the Union consumption in the same period. In view of the very significant overcapacity, which exceeds any potential demand including the forecasted demand growth in export countries, the excess production will try to find outlets in importing countries, including very likely the Union, which is, contrary to many other markets, still an open market.

(90) Due to trade defence measures in many third countries (see recital (32)) and the US tariffs imposed (see recital (32)), the Union market will remain an attractive export destination as clarified in Section 5. Given the already difficult situation of the Union producers, any further increase of imports would be unsustainable.

(91) Therefore, the Commission considered that, on account of the serious injury that the Union producers are suffering and the risk of a further increase of imports, there are critical circumstances. Any delay in the adoption of provisional safeguard measures would cause damage which would be difficult to repair. The Commission therefore concludes that provisional safeguard measures should be adopted without delay.

11. EXCLUSIONS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES FROM THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONAL MEASURES

(92) Further to initiation, Colombia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iceland, Mexico, Ukraine, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand claimed that they should be exempted from the scope of the measures, either in view of their developing country status, or in view of their negligible volumes of exports of the product concerned to the Union, or in respect of a bilateral trade agreement in force between them and the Union.

(93) Several parties requested to exempt Japan and Korea from the scope of the measures because these countries export high quality product types not produced in the Union that are thus not competing with product types made by the Union producers.

(94) In accordance with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and international obligations of the Union, the provisional measures must not apply to any product originating in a developing country WTO member or Algeria(15) as long as its share of imports of that product into the Union does not exceed 3 %, provided that developing country members of the WTO with less than a 3 % import share, collectively, do not account for more than 9 % of total Union imports of the product concerned.

(95) Annex III.1 lists all the developing countries that are members of the WTO and are therefore entitled for exemptions from the safeguard measure.

(96) The preliminary determination made by the Commission shows that the imports of the product concerned originating in developing country WTO Members would not meet the requirements to benefit from the abovementioned derogation, if imports from these countries are considered for the product concerned as a whole.

In contrast, if imports from these countries are considered per product type, then with the exception of one product type, the derogation benefits many developing-country WTO Members. Therefore, and in line with past practice, the Commission considers it appropriate at this stage to calculate the import volume from developing countries based on each product type. Also, the tariff increase is established per product type, considering the significant variations in price levels. Annex III.2 (List of product types originating in developing countries to which the provisional measures apply)specifies the developing countries that are subject to provisional safeguard measures.

(15) 2005/690/EC: Council Decision of 18 July 2005 on the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part,(OJ L 265, 10.10.2005, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2005/690/oj).

14/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(97) In addition, as also explained in Section 4, based on existing Union legislation it is required to exempt imports from Ukraine from the application of safeguard measures. The Commission adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/1153(16) suspending the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 insofar as they pertain to imports from Ukraine. In line with said regulation, and in line with the requirement of parallelism, imports from Ukraine have been excluded from the scope of this safeguard investigation(17).

12. CONCLUSIONS AND ADOPTION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURE

12.1. Adoption of provisional measure

(98) It was preliminarily concluded that the Union producers are suffering serious injury. Given the critical circumstances, it is considered that a provisional safeguard measure should be taken in order to prevent further damage to the Union industry which would be difficult to repair before the conclusion of the current investigation.

12.2. Form, level and duration of the provisional measure

(99) When deciding on the most appropriate form of measure, the Commission considered several elements. First, the Commission considered what is appropriate to remedy the injury suffered by the Union producers. In that respect, the Commission constructed a non-injurious price, which consists of costs of goods sold to which a target profit of 15 % was added. Such target profit was found necessary to allow for the investments required to be capable of producing products of the highest quality, as increasingly demanded by the market.

(100) Second, the Commission took account of the anti-dumping measures in place, which will continue to apply, against imports of GOES from five countries(18), where a specific duty in connection with the difference between an established price threshold and the actual import price was found most appropriate, mainly in view of the need of users, i.e. the transformer industry, to be able to continue importing high-quality products at prices not resulting in an undue cost increase for the transformer producers. Indeed, since the measures were imposed in 2015, imports of in particular Japan and South Korea, mostly of high quality, were made at prices above the levels of the minimum import prices, which meant that no duties were paid at all. At the same time, the measures in place provided for a basic level of protection of the Union industry against imports made at low injurious prices. As the specific duties related to minimum import prices were set more than 10 years ago, these are currently outdated as the levels are too low and, hence, no longer offer any effective protection to the Union industry.

(101) Third, the Commission was guided by previous practice in safeguard investigations and by international obligations specifying that traditional trade flows should be respected to the extent they do not exacerbate the serious injury established. In this respect, the Commission also considered that a disproportionately high increase of imports, which was established in the case of Chinese imports, should be capped at the average increase rate between years 2021 and 2023 (43 %) and applied to the increase of imports between years 2023 and 2025, to calculate the TRQ volume with regard to imports from other trading partners during the same representative period.

(102) Fourth, some parties claimed that the measure should cover likewise the product concerned when incorporated in transformers in order to be efficient. The Commission agreed with this claim and considered that the provisional safeguard measures should indeed apply to the product concerned when incorporated in downstream products, i.e.

in transformers. This inclusion aims at avoiding a decrease of imports of the product concerned following the imposition of provisional safeguard measures, which would trigger increased imports of direct downstream products, i.e. of transformers, which would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the safeguard measure. The steel core is incorporated in the transformer but not absorbed, so it can be identified in a transformer.

(16) Regulation (EU) 2025/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2025 suspending certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 as regards imports of Ukrainian products into the Union (OJ L, 2025/1153, 5.6.2025, ELI: http://data.

europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1153/oj).

(17) The present measure accords also to non-WTO members the treatment afforded to WTO members.

(18) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1953 of 29 October 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel originating in the People's Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America (OJ L 284, 30.10.2015, p. 109, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/ reg_impl/2015/1953/oj).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 15/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026

(103) In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally found that a specific duty reflecting the difference between an established price threshold and the actual import price in combination with a tariff rate quota (TRQ) per product type would be the most appropriate form of the safeguard measure. The level of the established price threshold will differ in and out of quota. This measure will protect the Union industry against an increase of imports made at low injurious prices, and, at the same time, ensure that the transformer producers can continue importing the product concerned, in particular the high-quality products from Japan and South Korea.

Currently, these imports are already made at prices not far from the threshold prices as provisionally set, and occasionally even at higher prices. Hence, this form of the measure will be the least trade disruptive possible and ensure that the impact on costs for the transformer producers, if any at all, will be limited to the strict minimum.

(104) With regard to the core incorporated in transformers, the Commission found that a specific duty expressed in EUR/tonne, corresponding to the difference between an established price threshold for cores and the average import price based on Eurostat data during the years 2023 and 2025 would be most appropriate and practicable to achieve the intended objective.

(105) The Commission found that a separate quota for GOES and SLCs should be introduced. The levels of the quotas should be based on the last 3 years' average level of imports. Moreover, some interested parties claimed that imports under IPR should be taken into account, a high quota should be allocated to Japan, quotas should be quarterly, and a carry-over system for the quotas should be introduced.

(106) Based on Union interest considerations and in order to ensuring optimal use of the tariff quota volumes the Commission considered that they should be allocated on the one hand to country specific quotas for countries having a substantial interest in supplying the specific product type concerned and, on the other hand, to all other origins.

(107) For the purpose of this regulation, it is considered that countries with a share of more than 5 % of imports over the last 3 years for the product type concerned have a significant supplying interest. A residual TRQ (‘the residual quota’) based on the average of the remaining imports over the last three years should be allocated to all other supplying countries. The residual quota should be filled based on the chronological order of the dates on which declarations of release for free circulation are accepted, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation

(EU) 2015/2447. This method of administration calls for close cooperation between the Member States and the Commission.

(108) The eligibility of imported goods from developing countries to be excluded from the tariff quotas is dependent on the origin of the goods. The criteria for determining non-preferential origin currently in force in the Union should therefore be applied.

(109) The TARIC codes listed in ANNEX II should be created.

(110) The provisional measures should apply for 155 calendar days (until 26.2.2027) from the date on which this Regulation enters into force,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. Subject to Article 4, specific tariff quotas are hereby opened in relation to imports into the Union of GOES and SLCs falling under the CN codes (7225 11 00, 7226 11 00 and 8504 90 13) for a period of 155 calendar days from the entry into force of this Regulation.

2. A provisional safeguard duty is hereby introduced in relation to imports into the Union of certain grain-oriented flat- rolled products of silicon-electrical steel, currently falling under the CN codes 7225 11 00 and 7226 11 00, for a period of 155 calendar days from the entry into force of this Regulation.

3. A provisional safeguard duty is hereby introduced in relation to imports into the Union of steel laminations and cores, whether or not stacked or wound, currently falling under the CN code 8504 90 13, whether or not incorporated in transformers, falling under the CN codes 8504 21 00, 8504 22 10, 8504 22 90, 8504 23 00, 8504 31 21, 8504 31 29, 8504 31 80, 8504 32 00, 8504 33 00 and 8504 34 00, for a period of 155 calendar days from the entry into force of this Regulation.

16/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026

4. All tariff quotas distributed under this Regulation are to be administered on a first-come, first-served basis, as

provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447. The amount of the provisional safeguard duty applicable to the products listed in Article 1.2 shall be the difference between the established price threshold listed in Annex I and the net free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, if the latter is lower than the former. The level of the established price threshold will differ in and out of quota. No duty shall be collected where the net free-at-Union-frontier price is equal to or higher than the established price threshold listed in Annex I.

5. The amount of the provisional safeguard duty applicable to the products listed in Article 1.3, when not incorporated in transformers, as defined in Article 1.3, shall be the difference between the established price threshold listed in Annex I and the net free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, if the latter is lower than the former. The level of the established price threshold will differ in and out of quota. No duty shall be collected where the net free-at-Union-frontier price is equal to or higher than the established price threshold listed in Annex I.

6. The amount of the provisional safeguard duty applicable to the products listed in Article 1.3, when incorporated in transformers, as defined in Article 1.3, shall be 1 140 EUR per ton of the product listed in Article 1.3, as incorporated in the transformer, presented for release for free circulation in the Union. The economic operators shall declare the weight in tonnes of a core in a transformer. The products listed in Article 1.3, when incorporated in transformers, as defined in Article 1.3, are not subject to quotas.

7. The established price thresholds per product type are listed in Annex I.

8. Certain TARIC codes established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1953 shall be replaced by succeeding TARIC codes created by this Regulation.

Article 2

1. The origin of any product to which this Regulation applies shall be determined in accordance with the provisions in force in the Union relating to non-preferential origin.

2. Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 3 The Member States and the Commission shall cooperate closely to ensure compliance with this Regulation.

Article 4 For the product concerned, Annex III specifies the originating developing countries which shall be subject to the measures set out in Article 1.

Article 5 Imports of the product concerned originating in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Kenya and Ukraine shall not be subject to the measure set out in Article 1.

Article 6 For imports subject to this provisional safeguard duties which are also subject to anti-dumping duties imposed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/58, the anti-dumping duties will not be levied for the period of application of this regulation, because these duties are lower than the provisional safeguard duties.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 17/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026 Article 7 This Regulation shall enter into force on 25 September 2026.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 September 2026.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN 18/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026 ANNEX I I.1Price threshold applicable for the tariff increase Price threshold (EUR/tonne) Product type TARIC Codes In Quota Out off Quota GOES 7225 11 00 11 3 400 3 500 GOES 7225 11 00 12 3 100 3 500 GOES 7225 11 00 15 2 800 3 500 GOES 7225 11 00 19 2 800 3 500 GOES 7225 11 00 90 3 400 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 12 3 400 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 13 3 100 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 14 2 800 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 16 2 800 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 19 3 400 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 92 3 400 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 93 3 100 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 94 2 800 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 96 2 800 3 500 GOES 7226 11 00 99 3 400 3 500 Laminations 8504 90 13 10 4 000 4 550 Cores 8504 90 13 90 5 000 5 600 I.2Volumes of tariff–rate quotas Volume of tariff HS and CN Allocation by country (Where quota (net tonnes) Additional duty Order Product type codes Applicable) applicable until rate numbers

26.02.2027 GOES 7225 11, China 30 693,68 see Annex I.1 09.0535 7226 11 Japan 23 103,61 see Annex I.1 09.0536 Korea, Republic of (South 4 789,93 see Annex I.1 09.0537 Korea) Other countries 5 360,39 see Annex I.1 09.0538 Laminations and 8504 90 13 Türkiye 14 161,55 see Annex I.1 09.0539 Cores China 4 241,07 see Annex I.1 09.0540 United Arab Emirates 2 704,99 see Annex I.1 09.0541 Other countries 2 694,36 see Annex I.1 09.0542

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 19/21EN OJ L, 18.9.2026 ANNEX II TARIC codes Description 7225 11 00 11 With a maximum core loss not higher than 0,7 W/kg 7225 11 00 12 With a maximum core loss higher than 0,7 W/kg but not higher than 0,9 W/kg 7226 11 00 12 With a maximum core loss not higher than 0,7 W/kg 7226 11 00 13 With a maximum core loss higher than 0,7 W/kg but not higher than 0,9 W/kg 7226 11 00 92 With a maximum core loss not higher than 0,7 W/kg 7226 11 00 93 With a maximum core loss higher than 0,7 W/kg but not higher than 0,9 W/kg 8504 90 13 10 Steel laminations for transformers and inductors 8504 90 13 90 Steel cores for transformers and inductors 20/21 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/ojEN OJ L, 18.9.2026 ANNEX III III.1 —List of developing countries, members of the WTO, and Algeria Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

III.2 —List of product types originating in developing countries to which the provisional measures apply Country / Product type GOES Laminations and Cores China X X Brazil X Türkiye X United Arab Emirates X

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/2133/oj 21/21