Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3174 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

Official Journal EN of the European Union L series 2024/3174 16.12.2024 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/3174 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Whereas: (1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (1). (2) In its conclusions of 17 October 2024, the European Council stated that the Union and the Member States will continue to strengthen their resilience and make full use of the EU hybrid toolbox to prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid activities. (3) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries. (4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 16 natural persons and three legal persons should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643. (5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision. Article 2 This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 16 December 2024. For the Council The President K. KALLAS (1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj). ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 1/17ANNEX The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows: (1) the following subheading and table are added: ‘A. Natural persons Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 1. Artem Sergeevich KUREEV Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service 16.12.2024 Service, Editor-in-chief of the “African Initative”, officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated (Russian: Артём Сергеевич Founder of “Rusafro” disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He КУРЕЕВ) conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by DOB: 24.10.1980 organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Nationality: Russian Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns Gender: male aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by Passport number: 4002209800 spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259 Western pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 2/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 2. Nikolai Aleksandrovich Executive director of the Structura National Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of 16.12.2024 TUPIKIN Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called “Doppelganger” campaign, (Russian: Николай POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at Александрович ТУПИКИН) Nationality: Russian manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and Gender: male targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160 Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia’s disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine. Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 3/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 3. Sofia Avraamovna Department head in the Office of the President of Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office 16.12.2024 ZAKHAROVA the Russian Federation for the Development of of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Information and Communication Technologies and (Russian: София Авраамовна Communications Infrastructure Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the ЗАХАРОВА) so-called “Doppelganger” campaign aimed at manipulating POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) information and spreading disinformation in support of the Nationality: Russian Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has Gender: female been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called “Team I” lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin’s campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition. Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 4/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 4. Andrey Vladimirovich Commander of GRU unit 29155 Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military 16.12.2024 AVERYANOV official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Major General Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of (Russian: Андрей DOB: 29.9.1967 Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ) command of Russian military operations in Africa was POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov Nationality: Russian was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Gender: male Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007 worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries. In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali. Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 5/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 5. Tinatin Givievna Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the 16.12.2024 KANDELAKI producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who Media Holding has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere a.k.a. to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian DOB: 10.11.1975 Tina KANDELAKI war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia) performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 (Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of КАНДЕЛАКИ) Nationality: Georgian Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Gender: female Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine. Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 6/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 6. Vladimir Vladimirovich Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary 16.12.2024 SERGIYENKO Schmidt assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence (Russian: Владимир DOB: 23.5.1971 officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО) POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and Gender: male supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 7/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 7. Denis Alexandrovich GRU colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who 16.12.2024 SMOLYANINOV specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the DOB: 26.8.1976 Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to (Russian: Денис POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also Александрович supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with СМОЛЯНИНОВ) Nationality: Russian the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established Gender: male with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Passport number: 672904784466 Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries. The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe. Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 8/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 8. Vladimir/ Volodymyr GRU officer Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks 16.12.2024 LIPCHENKO in Europe under his pseudonym “Wlodek Lyakh”. He is part of DOB: 28.9.1974 a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich (Russian: Володимир POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western ЛИПЧЕНКО) countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Nationality: Russian Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails. Gender: male Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which Passport number: 4015400649 undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence. 9. Yuriy SIZOV GRU military officer Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit 16.12.2024 No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ) DOB: 17.2.1988 target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same Federation) chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February Nationality: Russian 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity. Gender: male Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, Passport number: 784805190577 supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 9/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 10. Visa Nokhayevich MIZAEV Entrepreneur Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played 16.12.2024 a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) DOB: 9.7.1963 Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his a.k.a. POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Vishan Nochaevic Nationality: Russian Federation (FSB). MIZAYEV; Gender: male Therefore, Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev implements and supports Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV; Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order. Oleg SHISHKIN Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410 11. Olga Alekseevna Entrepreneur Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the 16.12.2024 BELYAVTSEVA wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is DOB: 25.10.1969 associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev through the (Ольга Алексеевна POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability БЕЛЯВЦЕВА) Companies “OOO Agronom-sad” and “OOO Biplast”. She a.k.a. Nationality: Russian founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their Gender: female Olha Oleksiyivna marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar BIELIAVTSEVA; Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation) ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 Olga Alekseevna Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in BELJIAWZEWA; the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base. Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. 10/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 12. Timofey Vyacheslavovich Political scientist Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist 16.12.2024 BORDACHEV and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director DOB: 28.1.1973 of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre (Russian: Тимофей POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ) Federation) National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. Nationality: Russian Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the Gender: male ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate. Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 11/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 13. Harouna DOUAMBA Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of 16.12.2024 pour le Commerce et l’investissement a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso. DOB: 8.1.1973 In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast called Aimons Notre Afrique (ANACOM) in the CAR. That Nationality: Ivorian organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Gender: male Douamba established the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations. Harouna Douamba’s disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 12/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 14. Anatolii PRIZENKO Businessman, employed by the Oriflame Cosmetics Anatolii Prizenko is a Moldovan businessman working for the 16.12.2024 S.A. company Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several Moldovan citizens to France, DOB: 26.11.1974 where they painted stars of David on the streets in exchange for POB: Moldovan SSR (now Moldova) financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect, in the context Nationality: Moldovan of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. The images of that operation were first spread by Gender: male the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns. Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society. Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 13/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 15. Alesia MILORADOVICH or Russian Government employee, Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the 16.12.2024 Alesya MILORADOVICH or Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a “foreign affairs “Foreign Affairs Facilitator” Olesya MILORADOVIC facilitator”. Associate of the project “Foreign journalists for Алеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called “electoral observation” Russia” (“Инностранные журналисты за Россию”) Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in DOB: 10.3.1968 the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government. Nationality: Russian She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Gender: female Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project “Foreign journalists for Russia” and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine. Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order. 14/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 16. Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active 16.12.2024’ officer member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is (Russian: Олег Сергеевич a member of “Officers of Russia” an organisation used by the ЕРЕМЕНКО) DOB: 18.5.1978 Russian military and security services to influence domestic POB: Bischkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Nationality: Russian Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Gender: Male Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the “Russian House” in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers. Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 15/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 EN(2) the following subheading and table are added: ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 1. GRU Unit 29155 Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military 16.12.2024 Parkovaya Street, 38A intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign ФКУ “Войсковая Часть assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through 29155” Registration No: 7719737879 coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other OGRN: 1097746770395 countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure. 16/17 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj EN OJ L, 16.12.2024Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 2. Groupe Panafricain pour le Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement (GPCI) is 16.12.2024 Commerce et a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert Date of registration: January 2022 l’Investissement influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. GPCI Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group. Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 3. African Initiative Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African 16.12.2024’ continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda Date of registration: September 2023 and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources. Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3174/oj 17/17 OJ L, 16.12.2024 EN