Official Gazette Notification Text
Official TranscriptOfficial Journal EN of the European Union L series 2025/1443 15.7.2025 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2025/1443 of 15 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High...
Official Journal EN of the European Union L series 2025/1443 15.7.2025 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2025/1443 of 15 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
(3) On 26 June 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it condemned Russia’s continued hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process. The European Council underlined that it would make full use of all means available, including the EU hybrid toolbox, to specifically prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid threats.
(4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 9 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Decision
(CFSP) 2024/2643.
(5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1 Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
Article 2 This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Done at Brussels, 15 July 2025.
For the Council The President K. KALLAS
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj).
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 1/12ANNEX Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:
(1) the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘39. Andrey Yuryevich Function: General Director of the Federal Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal 15.7.2025 ROMANCHENKO State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, (Russian: Андрей Юрьевич operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia.
РОМАНЧЕНКО) DOB: 16.10.1960 Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President,
POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable Federation) to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory
Nationality: Russian publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.
Gender: male Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively Russian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260 replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.
Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
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15.7.2025Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
40. Vladimir NAIDENOV Function: Director of the Department for Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of 15.7.2025 Coordination of Communications Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal (Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ) Infrastructure Development in New Territories State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia.
(RTRS) Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in
Gender: male implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation.
Nationality: Russian RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.
In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.
Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference
ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 3/12 OJ L,
15.7.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
41. Dmitri BUIMISTRU Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation 15.7.2025 and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based
DOB: 26.11.1992 online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his
POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically
Nationality: Moldovan debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of
Gender: male institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.
Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.
Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
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42. Veaceslav VALICO Function: Activist Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed 15.7.2025 by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of
DOB: 10.8.1977 the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas
POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.
Nationality: Moldovan Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of
Gender: male disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.
Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.
Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
43. Simeon BOIKOV Function: Pro-Russian blogger Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym 15.7.2025 “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and
Date of birth: 15.2.1990 misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian
Place of birth: Sydney, Australia invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American
Gender: male influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.
Nationality: Australian/Russian Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 5/12 OJ L,
15.7.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
44. Vitaly KULIKOV Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare 15.7.2025 military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic (Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ) center of the Baltic Fleet Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.
Nationality: Russian GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic
Gender: male warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.
The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.
Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
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45. Yuri Illarionovich Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) 15.7.2025 LASTOCHKIN the Russian Federation; Military Leader; Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the (Russian: Юрий Илларионович Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Kaliningrad region.
ЛАСТОЧКИН Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to
Ukrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” ЛАСТОЧКIН)
DOB: 18.8.1967 of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.
POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus) The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using
Nationality: Russian advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is
Gender: male also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.
Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
46. Yevgeny Shevchenko Function: Founder of TigerWeb Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites 15.7.2025 for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the (Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО) Nationality: Russian informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian
Gender: male content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing
Tax identification number: 910202780107 and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 7/12 OJ L,
15.7.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing 47 Aleksey Nikolayevich Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations 15.7.2025’ SHAVROV Main Directorate of the General Staff of the directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the (Russian: Алексей Николаевич Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, ШАВРОВ) DOB: 12.12.1989 Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including a.k.a. Andrey PETROV Nationality: Russian by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy (Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ) Gender: male interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.
Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
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15.7.2025(2) the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘10. Federal State-owned Enterprise Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting 15.7.2025 “Russian Television and Radio Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is
Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/ Broadcasting Network” (RTRS); directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications
Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of Федеральное государственное Moscow, Russia a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides унитарное предприятие infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “Российская телевизионная Date of registration: 30.11.2001 “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as и радиовещательная сеть” Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy
Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211;
Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that ОГРН: 1027739456084 transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.
Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 9/12 OJ L,
15.7.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
11. 841st Separate Electronic Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest 15.7.2025 Warfare Center of the Baltic settlement, Balebin street, 09643 electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology Fleet to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic 238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as 841-й центр радиоэлектронной ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643 well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by борьбы
Type of entity: Military unit observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.
Place of registration: Kalininingrad region, Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been Russian Federation attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad.
This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily
Phone number: 8(40153)37-244 affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.
Military unit 09643 The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.
Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
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12. BRICS Journalist Association Website: bricspress.live The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the 15.7.2025 Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).
Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
13. Center for Geopolitical Expertise Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank 15.7.2025 founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of Центр геополитических Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, экспертиз, CGE Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044 discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in
Date of registration: 17.12.2002 Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising
Registration number: 1027739806940 artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.
Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1443/oj 11/12 OJ L,
15.7.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
14. Foundation to Battle Injustice Date of creation: 23.3.2021 The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO 15.7.2025 created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI
Website: fondfbr.ru has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.
Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15. Tigerweb Website: Tigerweb.ru Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the 15.7.2025’ informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates
Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office through various so-called “informational portals”.
408 Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies
Date of registration: 2019 attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the
Registration number: 1199112018973 stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
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