Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

Official Journal EN of the European Union L series 2025/2572 15.12.2025 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).

(2) On 18 July 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) published a statement on behalf of the Union in which she strongly condemned the persistent malicious activities posed by Russia, which form part of broader, coordinated and long-standing hybrid campaigns aimed at threatening and undermining the security, resilience and democratic foundations of the Union, its Member States and its partners. The High Representative stressed that Russia’s malicious activities had escalated further since the beginning of the war of aggression against Ukraine and were highly likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

(3) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malicious activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.

(4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 12 natural persons and two entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.

(5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1 Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2 This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 15 December 2025.

For the Council The President K. KALLAS

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2572/oj 1/14ANNEX Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:

Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘48. John Mark DOUGAN Function: former Florida deputy sheriff John Dougan is a former Florida deputy sheriff who fled to Russia in 2016. He is 15.12.2025 publicly accused of participating in pro-Kremlin digital information operations

DOB: 15.12.1976 from Moscow by operating the CopyCop network of fake news websites and

POB: Wilmington, Delaware, United States of supporting Storm-1516 activities. The inauthentic websites mimic legitimate America media outlets and spread fabricated stories and AI-generated deepfake content.

Reports from Western authorities and independent investigative sources link

Nationality: American, Russian Dougan’s activities to Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU) and the Moscow-based think tank the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, suggesting he

Gender: male receives Russian support and direction to influence elections, discredit political figures and manipulate public discourse in Western countries.

Therefore, John Dougan is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union and in third countries by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

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49. Andrey Andreievich Function: Director of the Institute for Andrey Sushentsov is one of the Russia’s key foreign-policy ideologues operating 15.12.2025 SUSHENTSOV International Studies (IIS), Moscow State within the state-academic and think-tank system. His institute (IIS MGIMO) is Institute of International Relations (MGIMO directly subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and closely (Russian: Андрей Андреевич University) – a diplomatic academy under the integrated with official diplomatic and strategic planning structures. Sushentsov СУШЕНЦОВ) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian regularly appears in Russian and international media, presenting Russia’s Federation; Programme Director of the Valdai foreign-policy worldview in line with Kremlin messaging. His commentary Discussion Club; member of the Council on consistently promotes the following narratives: the West provoked the conflict in Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP); frequent Ukraine by expanding NATO and threatening Russia’s security; Russia’s actions are commentator for Russian state media and defensive and aimed at restoring “strategic balance” in the international system; the author for Russia in Global Affairs and other “unipolar world order” led by the US is collapsing, and Russia, together with China Kremlin-aligned outlets and the “Global South”, is constructing a fairer multipolar world; and Western sanctions are illegitimate and self-destructive, used as tools of coercion against

DOB: 8.6.1983 sovereign states. He frequently represents the Russian perspective at Valdai panels

POB: Orenburg, USSR (now Russian attended by President Vladimir Putin and senior officials, serving as both an Federation) organiser and a spokesperson for Kremlin-approved messaging.

Nationality: Russian Therefore, Andrey Sushentsov is responsible for or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or

Gender: male threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or

INN: 400407010797 which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country

(Ukraine) by supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

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15.12.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

50. Dmitry Vyacheslavovich Function: Deputy Director, Centre for Dmitry Suslov is a Russian foreign-policy analyst embedded in institutions closely 15.12.2025 SUSLOV Comprehensive European and International linked to the Kremlin’s policy and messaging apparatus. Through his roles at HSE Studies (CCEIS), Higher School of Economics University, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and the Valdai Discussion (Russian: Дмитрий Вячеславович (HSE University), Moscow; Deputy Director for Club, he regularly participates in high-level discussions shaping and disseminating СУСЛОВ) Research Programmes at the Council on Russia’s foreign-policy narratives. He frequently appears as an “independent Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP); expert and expert” in Russian state and international media, where he advances positions frequent speaker at the Valdai Discussion Club; consistent with official Kremlin lines: portraying NATO and the United States as contributor to Russia in Global Affairs and responsible for provoking the war in Ukraine, framing Western military support to other Kremlin-aligned publications Kyiv as “escalation” or “direct involvement” in the conflict and justifying Russian coercive actions as defensive or inevitable responses to Western aggression.

DOB: 15.2.1979 In 2024, Suslov publicly suggested that Russia should consider a “demonstrative

POB: Leningrad, USSR (now Saint Petersburg, nuclear explosion” to “remind the West of the dangers of nuclear war,” a statement Russian Federation) widely reported by Reuters and other outlets. Such remarks normalise the idea of

Nationality: Russian nuclear signalling and coercion, directly contributing to the climate of intimidation surrounding Russia’s war policy.

Gender: male Therefore, Dmitry Suslov is responsible for or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country

(Ukraine) by supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference or by instigating or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country.

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15.12.2025Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

51. Fyodor Aleksandrovich Function: journalist, TV presenter and political Fyodor Lukyanov is a prominent Russian political analyst, foreign-policy 15.12.2025 LUKYANOV scientist; Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global commentator, and academic closely tied to Kremlin-affiliated think tanks. He is the Affairs; Research Director of the Valdai Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, one of Russia’s most influential (Russian: Фёдор Александрович Discussion Club; member of the Russian foreign-policy journals, and serves as Research Director of the Valdai Discussion ЛУКЬЯНОВ) International Affairs Council (RIAC) Club, a platform strongly linked to the Russian leadership and frequently used to promote official narratives. He is also a member of the Russian International

DOB: 1.2.1967 Affairs Council (RIAC) and often moderates sessions with President Vladimir Putin

POB: Moscow, USSR (now Russian Federation) at Valdai forums.

Nationality: Russian Through his writing, interviews and public appearances, Lukyanov consistently amplifies Kremlin propaganda, portraying Russia’s war of aggression against

Gender: male Ukraine as a defensive reaction to Western policies. He repeatedly blames the Union, NATO and the United States for “provoking” the conflict, describes Ukraine as a Western proxy rather than a sovereign state, and justifies Russian military actions as “necessary” to stop NATO expansion. His arguments are frequently cited in pro-Kremlin media and shape the intellectual framework used to legitimise Russia’s aggression.

He is a key opinion leader providing ideological cover for Russian aggression. His work at Valdai and Russia in Global Affairs directly supports Kremlin foreign-policy narratives abroad. He contributes to systematic disinformation campaigns that shift blame for the war onto Ukraine and the West.

Therefore, Fyodor Lukyanov is responsible for or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country

(Ukraine) by supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference or by instigating a violent conflict in a third country.

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15.12.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

52. Ivan Nikolaevich TIMOFEEV Function: political scientist, foreign-policy Ivan Timofeev is a prominent Russian political scientist and foreign-policy analyst 15.12.2025 analyst and policy strategist; Director-General closely associated with Kremlin-aligned institutions. He serves as the of the Russian International Affairs Council Director-General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) – an

(RIAC); Programme Director of the Valdai organisation established by the Russian Foreign Ministry – and as a Programme Discussion Club Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, a high-profile platform used by the Russian leadership, including President Vladimir Putin, to promote official state narratives

DOB: 1983 to domestic and international audiences. Timofeev is also a frequent contributor to

POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Russia in Global Affairs and a commentator for state media such as TASS and Izvestia.

Nationality: Russian Through his writing, interviews and appearances at Valdai forums, Timofeev

Gender: male consistently amplifies Kremlin propaganda. He portrays Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defensive response to Western provocation, describes Ukraine as a Western “proxy,” and blames the United States and NATO for escalating the conflict. His analyses routinely legitimise Russian military aggression and normalise confrontation with the West, while discrediting Western sanctions and portraying them as acts of hostility.

Therefore, Ivan Timofeev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country

(Ukraine), or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country (Ukraine) by supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

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53. Andrey Georgievich Function: journalist, media manager, academic Andrei Bystritskyi’s leadership in Valdai and his media/academic background 15.12.2025 BYSTRITSKYI and think-tank executive; Chairman of the suggest he actively supports and disseminates the official Russian narrative Board of the Valdai Discussion Club regarding international relations, media control and Russia’s role in global affairs.

(Russian: Андрей Георгиевич Foundation The Valdai Club is used as a tool of Russian public diplomacy and soft power; by БЫСТРИЦКИЙ) managing this body, Bystritskyi contributes to the infrastructure of state narrative

DOB: 21.7.1960 production and dissemination. As dean of a major university faculty

POB: Moscow, USSR (now Russian Federation) (communications/media) and a seasoned media-manager, he is in a position to shape curricula, research and public discourse around media, communications and

Nationality: Russian state narratives – which can facilitate coordinated information or interference campaigns. His quotes and speeches reflect and promote Russian diplomatic

Gender: male narratives – such as those about a multipolar world or the Global South cooperating with Russia, which align with Kremlin strategic messaging.

Therefore, Andrei Bystritskyi is responsible for or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States or in a third country (Ukraine) by supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

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15.12.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

54. Vladislav Yevgenevich Function: officer (Senior Lieutenant) of GRU Vladislav Borovkov is a member of GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency), 15.12.2025 BOROVKOV Unit 29155 Unit 29155, as well as of cyber actor Cadet Blizzard. Borovkov acted in concert with other Cadet Blizzard members. Furthermore, between December 2020 and (Russian: Владислав Евгеньевич DOB: 7.10.1997 August 2024, Borovkov took part in cyber attacks against government БОРОВКОВ)

POB: Russian Federation organisations in Ukraine. Cadet Blizzard employed WhisperGate wiper malware on the compromised systems, causing significant damage to Ukraine’s systems.

Nationality: Russian Furthermore the group also targeted Member States of the Union and members of NATO with the aim of gaining sensitive information and destabilising their

Gender: male political situation.

Therefore, Vladislav Borovkov is responsible for or implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Union, several of its Member States, NATO and Ukraine by engaging in actions targeted at the functioning of services of public interest or aimed at damaging or destroying their critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities. He is also a person associated with the entity GRU Unit 29155.

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55. Denis Igorevich DENISENKO Function: officer of GRU Unit 29155 Denis Denisenko is a member of GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency), Unit 15.12.2025 29155, as well as of cyber actor Cadet Blizzard. Denisenko acted in concert with (Russian: Денис Игоревич DOB: 14.5.1997 other Cadet Blizzard members. Furthermore, between December 2020 and August ДЕНИСЕНКО)

POB: Russian Federation 2024, Denisenko took part in cyber attacks against government organisations in Ukraine. Cadet Blizzard employed WhisperGate wiper malware on the

Nationality: Russian compromised systems, causing significant damage to Ukraine’s systems.

Furthermore the group also targeted Member States of the Union and members of

Gender: male NATO with the aim of gaining sensitive information and destabilising their political situation.

Therefore, Denis Denisenko is responsible for or implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Union, several of its Member States, NATO and a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in actions targeted at the functioning of services of public interest or aimed at damaging or destroying their critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities. He is also a person associated with the entity GRU Unit 29155.

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15.12.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

56. Dmitry Iurevich GOLOSHUBOV Function: officer of GRU Unit 29155 Dmitry Goloshubov is a member of GRU (Russia’s military intelligence agency), 15.12.2025 Unit 29155, as well as of cyber actor Cadet Blizzard. Goloshubov acted in concert (Russian: Дмитрий Юрьевич DOB: 10.10.1998 with other Cadet Blizzard members. Furthermore, between December 2020 and ГОЛОШУБОВ)

POB: Russian Federation August 2024, Goloshubov took part in cyber attacks against government organisations in Ukraine. Cadet Blizzard employed WhisperGate wiper malware

Nationality: Russian on the compromised systems, causing significant damage to Ukraine’s systems.

Furthermore the group also targeted Member States of the Unionand members of

Gender: male NATO with the aim of gaining sensitive information and destabilising their political situation.

Therefore, Dmitry Goloshubov is responsible for or implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Union, several of its Member States, NATO and a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in actions targeted at the functioning of services of public interest or aimed at damaging or destroying their critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities. He is also a person associated with the entity GRU Unit 29155.

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57. Jacques BAUD Function: former colonel in the Swiss army; Jacques Baud, a former Swiss army colonel and strategic analyst, is a regular guest 15.12.2025 former strategic analyst, intelligence and on pro-Russian television and radio programmes. He acts as a mouthpiece for terrorism specialist pro-Russian propaganda and makes conspiracy theories, for example accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO.

DOB: 1.4.1955 Therefore, Jacques Baud is responsible for, implementing or supporting actions or

Nationality: Swiss policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which

Gender: male undermine or threaten stability or security in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

58. Xavier MOREAU Function: former military officer and Xavier Moreau is a businessman and founder of the Stratpol website, and a former 15.12.2025 Franco-Russian businessman; founder of the military officer. He acts as a mouthpiece for pro-Russian and pro-Kremlin Stratpol website propaganda, spreading conspiracy theories about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join

DOB: 25.10.1971 NATO.

Nationality: French Therefore, Xavier Moreau is responsible for, implementing or supporting actions

Gender: male or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

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15.12.2025 ENName Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing

59. Diana Vitaliivna PANCHENKO DOB: 21.5.1988 Diana Panchenko is a Ukrainian-born journalist and propagandist. She produces 15.12.2025’ (Ukrainian: Діана Віталіївна and diffuses anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian, anti-NATO narratives.

POB: Mykolaïv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) ПАНЧЕНКО) In her videos, she deliberately mimics news-broadcast formats, in order to

Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian (Russian: Диана Витальевна legitimise the Kremlin’s narratives. She manipulates information to portray ПАНЧЕНКО) Gender: female Ukrainian authorities as “Nazis” and accuses them of betraying their own people, while justifying Russia’s military aggression and crimes.

She has produced work in occupied Ukrainian regions (including in Mariupol and Donetsk) which has been described as propaganda justifying war crimes by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU). Her content was broadcasted on Ukrainian televisions during a Russian cyber attack that disrupted television programming.

Panchenko also amplifies conspiratorial and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric on her Telegram channel (402k subscribers) and on X (148k followers). On her X account, she tries to increase her English-speaking audience by using clickbait content and inauthentic activity and by promoting pro-Russian accounts.

Therefore, Diana Panchenko is responsible for, implementing or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

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15.12.2025(2) the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘16. 142nd Separate Electronic 236000, Posyolok Kumachevo, Kaliningrad The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, based in Kaliningrad region, is 15.12.2025 Warfare Battalion region, Russian Federation part of electronic warfare and plays an important role in ensuring the security and defence of the region. The battalion is responsible for using technology to 142-й батальон disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic радиоэлектронной борьбы warfare exercises to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well 142-й батальон РЭБ as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.

142-й отдельный батальон радиоэлектронной борьбы Recently, several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.

The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.

Therefore, the 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the (mis)use of the radio frequency sector, is responsible for actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Member States of the Union by engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference or actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities.

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17. International Russophile The International Russophile Movement is a movement responsible for amplifying 15.12.2025’ Movement destabilising narratives globally, on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation. The movement has strong ties with the Russian Ministry of Foreign (Russian: Международное Affairs, receiving endorsements for their work. Russian foreign minister Sergey движение русофилов) Lavrov has given keynote speeches in congress meetings of the movement. The (French: Mouvement movement is also associated with the Kremlin’s top ideologue Aleksandr Dugin International Russophile) and media oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. The Government of the Russian Federation uses the movement as a cover for manipulating the public opinion of other countries, promoting anti-Western sentiment and echoing other Kremlin speaking points.

Therefore, the International Russophile Movement is supporting or implementing actions attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in a third country

(Ukraine) by engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

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