Date: 2025-04-15Category: Not ApplicableState: Union GovernmentCountry: Europe
Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779 of 14 April 2025 amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment
Here's the policy analysis report, based on the provided text:
**1. Executive Summary:**
This report analyzes Council Decision CFSP 2025/779, an amendment to Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which defines common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. The amendment revises several key articles of the original Common Position, strengthening criteria for export licensing, particularly concerning human rights, international law, and end-use monitoring. The key findings highlight stricter obligations for Member States in assessing export applications and promoting convergence in arms export policies.
**2. Introduction:**
This report provides an informative overview and analysis of Council Decision CFSP 2025/779 of 14 April 2025, based solely on the provided text. The Council Decision amends Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, concerning the control of exports of military technology and equipment. The analysis focuses on the rationale for the amendment, the specific changes introduced, the impacted stakeholders, and the likely implications of these changes.
**3. Policy Overview:**
* This report concerns an *amendment* to the original policy: Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
* **Core Objective(s):** (Inferred from the text) The core objectives of the amended policy are to:
* Reinforce cooperation among Member States in controlling exports of military technology and equipment.
* Promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment.
* Set and uphold revised, stricter criteria for assessing the control of transfers of military technology.
* Ensure high common standards in the implementation of the control of transfers of such technology and equipment.
**4. Background and Rationale:**
This amendment appears designed to address perceived shortcomings or gaps in the implementation and effectiveness of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. The text mentions developments at both international and Union level necessitating a revisitation of the criteria and the imposition of new obligations. It suggests a need to strengthen cooperation among Member States, improve risk assessment, and promote greater unity and coherence in the Union's external action related to arms exports. The Council conclusions of 16 September 2019, tasking COARM with reassessing the implementation, further indicates a review process that identified areas for improvement, including a need to uphold revised criteria against which the control of the transfer of such technology is to be assessed..
**5. Key Provisions / Changes:**
The amendment introduces the following key changes to Common Position 2008/944/CFSP:
* **Article 2 (Criteria):** This article is entirely replaced. The new Article 2 details eight specific criteria for assessing export license applications. Key changes include:
* **Criterion One:** Explicitly lists international obligations and commitments, including specific treaties and agreements, non-proliferation and other subjects that would lead to denial of an export license if approval would be inconsistent with them.
* **Criterion Two:** Strengthens the focus on human rights and international humanitarian law. It mandates denial of export licenses if there is a clear risk that the exported technology might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence, or serious violations of human rights. It also mandates special caution and vigilance regarding exports to countries where serious human rights violations have been established.
* **Criterion Three:** Focuses on the internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts, and prohibits issuing an export license that may provoke or prolong such conflicts.
* **Criterion Four:** Preservation of regional peace, security and stability, denying an export licence if there is a clear risk the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
* **Criterion Five:** Focuses on the national security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
* **Criterion Six:** Behaviour of the buyer or recipient country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law.
* **Criterion Seven:** Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the recipient country or reexported under undesirable conditions.
* **Criterion Eight:** Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the country of final destination.
* **Effect:** These changes introduce a more detailed and stringent framework for evaluating export license applications, placing greater emphasis on human rights considerations and compliance with international law.
* **Article 5:** This article is replaced to emphasize the importance of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination, generally requiring a thoroughly checked enduser certificate, appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. Member States may use other enduser monitoring tools, including requiring endusers to agree to specific verification mechanisms. The revised article strengthens end-use monitoring requirements and risk assessment for production in third countries.
* **Effect:** This change is expected to enhance accountability and prevent the diversion of military technology to undesirable end-users.
* **Article 6:** This article is replaced to clarify that the criteria set out in Article 2 and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States in respect of dualuse goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation EU 2021/821 where there are serious grounds for believing that the enduser of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the country concerned.
* **Effect:** This extends the Common Position's criteria to dual-use goods and technologies under certain circumstances.
* **Article 7:** This article is replaced to focus on reinforcing cooperation among Member States and promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, enduse monitoring, by consulting regarding their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in Union external action.
* **Effect:** To facilitate decisionmaking on exports of jointly funded and produced military equipment or technology, Member States participating in a joint defence project may use facilitating mechanisms to that effect.
* **Article 15:** This article is replaced to push the review date to April 15, 2030.
* **Effect:** This allows the Common Position to have a longer life cycle.
**6. Target Audience and Stakeholders:**
Based on the text, the primary target audience and stakeholders include:
* Member States of the European Union (specifically, national authorities responsible for export licensing).
* Manufacturers and exporters of military technology and equipment within the EU.
* Recipients of military technology and equipment from EU member states.
* The Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Controls (COARM).
* Industries involved in joint defence projects
**7. Implementation Aspects (Inferred):**
* **Responsible agency/bodies:** National export licensing authorities of EU Member States, COARM.
* **Timelines/Procedures:** The decision enters into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (April 15, 2025). No other specific timelines are detailed in the provided text. Procedures for implementing the revised criteria are left to the discretion of Member States, within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
**8. Expected Outcomes / Impact of Changes:**
The likely intended outcomes of these changes include:
* Enhanced scrutiny of export license applications, with a greater emphasis on human rights considerations and potential for misuse.
* Increased harmonization of arms export policies among EU Member States.
* Reduced risk of military technology being diverted to undesirable end-users or used for purposes that violate international law or human rights.
* Greater accountability and transparency in the arms export process.
**9. Conclusion:**
Council Decision CFSP 2025/779 represents a significant update to the EU's common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. By strengthening the criteria for export licensing and promoting greater cooperation among Member States, the amendment aims to ensure that EU arms exports are consistent with the Union's values and international obligations. The changes underscore the EU's commitment to promoting human rights, upholding international law, and preventing the misuse of military technology.
Key Entities Referenced
Zangger Committee: Commitment of Member States.
COUNCIL DECISION CFSP 2025/779: Council Decision amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP: Defines common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.
Treaty on European Union: Basis for the Council's decision, specifically Article 29.
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: The updated and replaced code by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
Treaty on European Union: Refers to Article 21 related to Unions action on the international scene.
Treaty on European Union: Refers to Article 212 related to cooperation in all fields of international relations.
Treaty on European Union: Refers to Article 213 related to consistency between the different areas of its external action.
Regulations EU 2021/821: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
EU 2025/41: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Controls COARM: The Working Party tasked with reassessing the implementation of that Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations: Deals with the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law.
United Nations Development Programme: Relevant source for information.
World Bank: Relevant source for information.
International Monetary Fund: Relevant source for information.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Relevant source for information.
Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP: Framework to reinforce cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: International obligation of Member States.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: International obligation of Member States.
Chemical Weapons Convention: International obligation of Member States.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: International obligation of Member States.
Arms Trade Treaty: International obligation of Member States.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction Ottawa Convention: International obligation of Member States.
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Commitment of Member States.
Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management: Commitment of Member States.
Australia Group: Commitment of Member States.
Missile Technology Control Regime: Commitment of Member States.
Nuclear Suppliers Group: Commitment of Member States.
Wassenaar Arrangement: Commitment of Member States.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Commitment of Member States.
United Nations: Referred to in peacekeeping activity.
European Union: Referred to in peacekeeping activity.
Regulation EU 2021/821: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dualuse items.
United Nations Security Council: Adopt restrictive measures.
European Union: Adopt restrictive measures.
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Arms embargoes.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights: Referenced in instruments of international humanitarian law.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Referenced in instruments of international humanitarian law.
Official Journal EN
of the European Union L series
2025/779 15.4.2025
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2025/779
of 14 April 2025
amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of
military technology and equipment
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which updated and replaced the
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.
(2) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP outlines the foreign and security policy criteria that each Member State must use
to assess, on a case-by-case basis, export licence applications. Since the adoption of Common Position
2008/944/CFSP, a number of developments both at international and Union level have resulted in a need to revisit
those criteria and to impose new obligations and commitments for assessing export licence applications.
(3) On 16 September 2019, the Council adopted conclusions on the review of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP,
tasking the Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Controls (COARM) with reassessing the implementation of
that Common Position.
(4) Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Union’s action on the international scene is to be
guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world.
These include democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter and international law.
(5) In accordance with Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is to work for a high degree of
cooperation in all fields of international relations, including to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and the principles of international law, as well as to preserve peace and international security.
(6) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is required
to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action. In this respect, the Council takes note, inter
alia, of Regulations (EU) 2021/821(2) and (EU) 2025/41(3) of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(7) In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States should work within the framework
of the common foreign and security policy to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the
field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including
information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate,
end-use monitoring, by consulting on their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further
increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in the Union’s external action.
(1) Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military
technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj).
(2) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control
of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.
eu/eli/reg/2021/821/oj).
(3) Regulation (EU) 2025/41 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on import, export and transit
measures for firearms, essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations Protocol against the
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (OJ L, 2025/41, 22.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/
eli/reg/2025/41/oj).
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OJ L, 15.4.2025
(8) It is therefore appropriate to further reinforce cooperation among Member States on rules relating to export
licencing and promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment. It is also necessary
to set and uphold revised criteria against which the control of the transfer of such technology is to be assessed. These
aims can be achieved by updating Common Position 2008/944/CFSP to ensure high common standards in the
implementation of the control of transfers of such technology and equipment.
(9) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP should therefore be amended,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP is amended as follows:
(1) Article 2 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 2
Criteria
1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the
restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council or by the European Union, agreements on
non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations and commitments.
An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with the international obligations and commitments
of Member States, including:
(a) the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
(b) the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant
Protocols annexed thereto;
(d) the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty;
(e) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention);
(f) the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;
(g) the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition
Management;
(h) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of
international humanitarian law.
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human
rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be
used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence
against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;
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OJ L, 15.4.2025
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature
of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been
established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia,
technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal
repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be
diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of
the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security
purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of
international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be
used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected
groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or
armed conflicts.
Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong
armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or armed conflicts within the country of final destination, without
prejudice to the legitimate and lawful security and defence of that country.
4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military
technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia:
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national
security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient
country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the
responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
Member States shall take into account:
(a) the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests
as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the
consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional
peace, security and stability;
(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States
and those of friendly and allied countries.
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OJ L, 15.4.2025
6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer or recipient country with regard to the international community, as regards
in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law.
Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer or recipient country with regard to:
(a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
(b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with
international humanitarian law;
(c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature,
ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to
(d) of Criterion One.
7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the recipient
country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
In assessing the impact on the recipient country of the military technology or equipment to be exported, and the risk
that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the
following shall be considered:
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United
Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment;
(c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or
equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the
recipient country;
(d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the
recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member
State considers appropriate to impose;
(e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
(f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
(g) the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United
Nations or by the European Union;
(h) the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and
equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons.
8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and
economic capacity of the country of final destination, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their
legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.
Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as reports from the United
Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable
development of the country of final destination. They shall consider in this context that country’s relative levels of
military and social expenditure, also taking into account any Union or bilateral aid.’;
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(2) Article 5 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 5
Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final
destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or
some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. Member States may use other end-user
monitoring tools, including requiring end-users to agree to specific verification mechanisms. When assessing
applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries,
Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production
and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end-user.’;
(3) Article 6 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 6
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*), the criteria set out in
Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 of this Common Position
are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation
(EU) 2021/821 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the
armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the country concerned. References in this Common
Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.
(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union
regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206,
11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/821/oj).’;
(4) Article 7 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 7
1. In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in
the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including
information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, end-use
monitoring, by consulting regarding their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase
convergence and to promote unity and coherence in Union external action.
2. In order to promote convergence and facilitate decision-making on exports of jointly funded and produced
military equipment or technology, Member States participating in a joint defence project may use facilitating
mechanisms to that effect. Member States participating in a joint defence project are encouraged to consult with each
other on their risk assessment.’;
(5) Article 15 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 15
This Common Position shall be reviewed by 15 April 2030.’.
Article 2
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Done at Luxembourg, 14 April 2025.
For the Council
The President
K. KALLAS
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