Date: 2025-05-28Category: Not ApplicableState: Union GovernmentCountry: Europe
Decision (EU) 2025/1114 of the European Central Bank of 20 May 2025 on the delegation of the power to take certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves (ECB/2025/16)
## Policy Analysis Report: Delegation of Decisions on Publication of Sanctions for Failure to Hold Minimum Reserves
**1. Executive Summary:**
This report analyzes a new policy decision (Decision (EU) 2025/1114) by the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding the delegation of authority to make certain decisions concerning the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves. The core purpose of this policy is to streamline the decision-making process related to publishing sanctions, while maintaining appropriate oversight. The key finding is that the ECB is delegating a specific subset of publication decisions to members of the Executive Board, creating efficiencies while retaining control over more complex cases.
**2. Introduction:**
The purpose of this report is to provide an informative analysis of Decision (EU) 2025/1114 of the European Central Bank (ECB) based solely on the provided text. This report aims to outline the policy's objective, key provisions, implementation aspects, and expected outcomes.
**3. Policy Overview:**
This is a new policy decision.
* **Core Objective(s):** Based on the provided text, the core objective of this policy is to facilitate the ECB's decision-making process regarding the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves. The policy aims to delegate authority for routine decisions while retaining Executive Board control over decisions involving novel elements or exceptions to publication.
**4. Background and Rationale:**
As a new policy, it addresses the administrative burden of the Executive Board having to make a substantial number of decisions each year on whether an exception to the publication of sanctions applies. The policy addresses the need for efficient decision-making while adhering to established regulations regarding publication of sanctions, as indicated in Article 9.1 of ECB Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999. The rationale for delegation is supported by the Court of Justice of the European Union's recognition of the necessity and appropriateness of delegation in institutions with high decision-making volumes.
**5. Key Provisions:**
This policy establishes the following key provisions:
* **Delegation of Power:** The Executive Board delegates to the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Legal Services reports and the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Market Operations reports, the power to jointly take certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves.
* **Criteria for Delegated Decisions:** Decisions can be delegated when:
* The undertaking concerned objects to the *publication* of a sanction (but not the sanction itself).
* The objections to publication are similar to those underlying previous Executive Board decisions.
* The technical and legal assessment concludes that none of the exceptions to publication outlined in Article 9.1 of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 apply.
* The competent national central bank agrees with the assessment.
* **Exclusion of Complex Cases:** Decisions involving novel elements or where an exception to publication applies remain with the Executive Board.
* **Reporting Obligation:** The delegated members of the Executive Board must jointly report to the Executive Board annually on decisions taken under this delegated authority.
**6. Target Audience and Stakeholders:**
The primary target audience and stakeholders directly affected by this policy include:
* Undertakings subject to minimum reserve requirements set by the ECB.
* The European Central Bank (ECB) Executive Board.
* Members of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Legal Services and Directorate-General Market Operations report.
* Competent national central banks acting on behalf of the Executive Board in notifying undertakings of failures to hold minimum reserves and corresponding sanctions.
* Directorate-General Legal Services
* Directorate-General Market Operations
**7. Implementation Aspects (Inferred):**
* **Responsible Agency/Bodies:** The ECB Executive Board retains ultimate responsibility. The day-to-day decisions for routine cases are handled by the specified members of the Executive Board. National central banks are involved in the initial notification of sanctions and assessment, and their agreement is needed for delegated decisions.
* **Timelines/Procedures:** The policy establishes an annual reporting obligation for the delegated members. Prior to any decision, the undertaking concerned must be notified of the alleged failure and corresponding sanction, allowing for objections. The policy comes into force on the tenth day following publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
**8. Expected Outcomes / Impact of Changes:**
The likely intended outcomes of this policy include:
* **Increased Efficiency:** Streamlining the decision-making process for routine publication of sanctions.
* **Reduced Burden on the Executive Board:** Allowing the Executive Board to focus on more complex and novel cases.
* **Consistent Application of Rules:** Ensuring consistent application of the rules regarding publication of sanctions in accordance with Article 9.1 of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999, while maintaining oversight.
* **Improved Transparency:** Promoting transparency in the application of minimum reserve requirements.
**9. Conclusion:**
Decision (EU) 2025/1114 represents a significant step towards improving the efficiency of the ECB's decision-making process related to the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves. By delegating authority for routine decisions while retaining control over complex cases, the policy seeks to balance administrative efficiency with appropriate oversight and adherence to established regulations. The streamlined process should lead to quicker and more consistent application of publication rules, fostering greater transparency within the Eurosystem.
Key Entities Referenced
23 November 1998: Date of Council Regulation EC No 2532/98.
European Union: A political and economic union of European countries.
28.5.2025: Date mentioned in the Official Journal EN of the European Union L series 2025/11/14.
DECISIONEU 2025/11/14: Reference to a decision of the European Union, dated 2025/11/14.
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: The central bank of the Eurozone.
20 May 2025: Date of the European Central Bank decision.
ECB/2025/16: Identifier for the European Central Bank decision on the delegation of power to take certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves.
EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: The executive body of the European Central Bank.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: A primary treaty of the European Union.
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank: The legal statute governing the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank.
Articles 19.1 and 34.3: Specific articles within the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
Council Regulation EC No 2532/98: Council Regulation concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions.
Article 6(2): Specific article within Council Regulation EC No 2532/98.
European Central Bank Regulation EC No 2157/1999: European Central Bank Regulation on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions.
23 September 1999: Date of European Central Bank Regulation EC No 2157/1999.
ECB/1999/4: Identifier for the European Central Bank Regulation EC No 2157/1999 on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions.
Article 9(1) and Article 11: Specific articles within European Central Bank Regulation EC No 2157/1999.
Article 7(1): Article mentioned in Council Regulation EC No 253/1983.
Regulation EC No 2157/1999 ECB/1999/4: Refers to the European Central Bank Regulation on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions.
Article 11(3 and 4): Specific article within Regulation EC No 2157/1999 ECB/1999/4.
Court of Justice of the European Union: The court of the European Union
DirectorateGeneral Legal Services: A department within the European Central Bank.
DirectorateGeneral Market Operations: A department within the European Central Bank.
Article 71 of Regulation EC No 253/198: Article within Regulation EC No 253/198 related to imposing minimum reserves.
Official Journal of the European Union: The official gazette of the European Union.
Frankfurt am Main: City where the decision was made.
Christine Lagarde: The President of the ECB.
Official Journal EN
of the European Union L series
2025/1114 28.5.2025
DECISION(EU) 2025/1114 OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
of 20 May 2025
on the delegation of the power to take certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to
hold minimum reserves (ECB/2025/16)
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, and in particular
Articles 19.1 and 34.3 thereof,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European
Central Bank to impose sanctions(1), and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,
Having regard to European Central Bank Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 of 23 September 1999 on the powers of the
European Central Bank to impose sanctions (ECB/1999/4)(2), and in particular Article 9(1) and Article 11 thereof,
Whereas:
(1) In accordance with Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98(3), where an institution fails to hold all or
part of the minimum reserves imposed in accordance with that Regulation and related European Central Bank (ECB)
regulations or decisions, the ECB may impose a sanction.
(2) Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 (ECB/1999/4), the ECB is required to publish decisions
imposing sanctions in case of a breach of an ECB regulation or decision on its official website without undue delay,
once the decision has become final. Publication is required to take place unless the Executive Board determines that
such publication would: (a) jeopardise the stability of the financial markets or the financial system or an ongoing
criminal investigation; (b) cause, in so far as can be determined, disproportionate damage to the undertaking
concerned; or (c) result in the publication of confidential information, which would put at risk legitimate public
interests in security, such as the security and protection of the integrity of euro banknotes or the secure management
of cyber or operational risks to systemically important payment systems. If one or several of these circumstances
apply, decisions regarding sanctions will be published on an anonymised basis or publication may be postponed. In
the circumstances referred to in point (c), the ECB may choose not to publish a decision imposing a sanction.
(3) As specified in Article 11(3) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 (ECB/1999/4), before any sanction is imposed
in the event of failure to hold minimum reserves, the Executive Board or, on its behalf, the competent national central
bank shall notify the undertaking concerned of the alleged failure and of the corresponding sanction. Upon receipt of
the notification, the undertaking concerned has the possibility to present any written information, explanations or
objections which may be deemed relevant to a decision on whether or not to impose the sanction. This includes the
possibility to raise objections against the publication of the sanction on the basis that one or several of the
exceptions to publication laid down in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 (ECB/1999/4) apply. In such a
case, if the competent national central bank is acting on behalf of the Executive Board, it shall without undue delay
forward the file to the Executive Board, which shall then decide whether such an exception to publication applies.
(4) The Executive Board is required to adopt a substantial number of decisions each year on whether an exception to
publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves applies. To facilitate the decision-making process a
delegation of decision-making powers is necessary in relation to the adoption of such decisions. The Court of Justice
of the European Union has recognised delegation to be necessary and appropriate to enable an institution required to
adopt a considerable number of decisions to perform its duties. Similarly, it has recognised the need to ensure that
decision-making bodies are able to function as a principle inherent to all institutional systems.
(1) OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/2532/oj.
(2) OJ L 264, 12.10.1999, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1999/2157/oj.
(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central
Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/2531/oj).
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1114/oj 1/3EN
OJ L, 28.5.2025
(5) Such decisions should be delegated to the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Legal
Services reports, and to the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Market Operations
reports, acting jointly.
(6) Delegation of decision-making powers should be limited and proportionate, and the scope of the delegation should
be clearly defined. The scope of the delegation laid down in this Decision should be limited to the power to take
decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves that do not deviate from the general
rule laid down in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 (ECB/1999/4), according to which decisions
imposing sanctions in case of a breach of an ECB regulation or decision should be published. Decisions on the
publication of sanctions where there are novel elements or where an exception to publication applies should be
excluded from the scope of the delegation and should remain with the Executive Board.
(7) To safeguard the control of the Executive Board as the delegator, the decisions taken by the members of the Executive
Board to whom the delegation is granted should be reported annually to the Executive Board,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
Delegation of the power to take certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum
reserves
The Executive Board delegates to the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Legal Services
reports and the member of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Market Operations reports, the power to
jointly take, in accordance with Article 2, certain decisions on the publication of sanctions for failure to hold minimum
reserves imposed pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2531/98.
Article 2
Criteria for the adoption of delegated decisions
Decisions to publish sanctions for failure to hold minimum reserves shall be adopted pursuant to the delegation of powers
laid down in Article 1 where the following criteria are met:
(a) the undertaking concerned has objected to the publication of a sanction for the failure to hold minimum reserves, but
not to the sanction itself;
(b) the objections to publication raised by the undertaking concerned and the ECB’s technical and legal assessment of
these objections are similar to those that underlie previous decisions on the publication of sanctions for the failure
to hold minimum reserves that have been taken by the Executive Board;
(c) the technical and legal assessment mentioned in point (b) that underlies the decision is that none of the exceptions
provided for in Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 (ECB/1999/4) apply and that the sanction should be
published;
(d) the competent national central bank that, acting on behalf of the Executive Board, has notified the undertaking
concerned of the alleged failure to hold minimum reserves and of the corresponding sanction, agrees with the
assessment referred to in point (c).
Article 3
Reporting obligation
The members of the Executive Board to whom the Directorate-General Legal Services and the Directorate-General Market
Operations report shall jointly report to the Executive Board on an annual basis on any decisions taken pursuant to
Article 1 during the preceding calendar year.
2/3 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1114/ojEN
OJ L, 28.5.2025
Article 4
Entry into force
This Decision shall enter into force on the tenth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union.
Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 May 2025.
The President of the ECB
Christine LAGARDE
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1114/oj 3/3