See Full Document Text
27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/31
RESOLUTION (EU, Euratom) 2019/1411 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
of 26 March 2019
with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the
implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2017,
Section III — Commission and executive agencies
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
— having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European
Union for the financial year 2017, Section III — Commission,
— having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive
agencies for the financial year 2017,
— having regard to Rule 93 of and Annex IV to its Rules of Procedure,
— having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees
concerned (A8-0110/2019),
A. Whereas the Union budget plays a significant role for achieving Union policy objectives, although it represents
only 1 % of Union gross national income;
B. Whereas when the Parliament grants discharge to the Commission it checks whether or not funds have been used
correctly and policy goals achieved;
Implementation of the 2017 budget and results achieved
1. Notes that in 2017 the Union budget was in the fourth year of implementation of the current Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF), and amounted to EUR 159,8 billion, including six amending budgets, and that the
allocations in different areas were:
(a) EUR 75,4 billion for smart and inclusive growth;
(b) EUR 58,6 billion for support to the European agricultural sector;
(c) EUR 4,3 billion for reinforcing the external borders of the Union and addressing the refugee crisis and
irregular migration;
(d) EUR 10,7 billion for activities outside the Union;
(e) EUR 9,4 billion for the administration of the Union institutions;
2. Underlines that the Union budget supports the implementation of the Union policies and the achievement of their
priorities and objectives by complementing resources of Member States dedicated to the same purposes; notes in
this regard the achievement of the following results:
(a) in 2017, Horizon 2020 provided EUR 8,5 billion of funding, which further mobilised direct additional
investments, leading to a total of EUR 10,6 billion and funding to 5 000 projects;
(b) by the end of 2017, COSME provided financing to more than 275 000 small and medium-sized companies
(of which 50 % were start-ups) in 25 countries that would otherwise have struggled to secure private
financing due to their high risk profile;
(c) as regards the programmes' achievements reported by Member States up to the end of 2016, the implemented
projects under the Cohesion Fund (CF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) had already
delivered:
— support to 84 579 enterprises, of which more than 36 000 are supported by financial instruments,
— 10 300 jobs created along with 636 new researchers employed,
— 41 800 households with an improved energy consumption classification and a 14,9 million kWh/year
decrease in annual primary energy consumption of public buildings,
— 2,7 million people benefitting from improved health services; 156 000 additional people served by
improved water supply and 73 000 served by improved waste water treatment,
— broadband access to 1 million additional households;L 249/32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
(d) by the end of 2016, Rural Development Programmes contributed to the restructuring and modernisation of
almost 45 000 agricultural holdings;
(e) in 2017 the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) supported the creation of over 7 000 additional
places in reception centres; the number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors, an especially vulnerable
migrant group, also increased from only 183 places in 2014 to 17 070 places in 2017; by the end of 2017,
1 432 612 third-country nationals had received integration assistance;
(f) the Union provided more than EUR 2,2 billion in humanitarian aid in 80 different countries; Union
humanitarian funding supported the education of over 4,7 million children caught up in emergencies in over
50 countries;
The Court of Auditor's Statement of assurance
3. Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) gave a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts
of the European Union for 2017, as it has done since 2007, and that the Court concluded that the revenue for
2017 underlying these accounts was legal and regular in all material respects;
4. Notes that for 2017, the Court has issued for a second consecutive year a qualified opinion on the legality and
regularity of the payments underlying the accounts, which according to the Court, indicates that a significant part
of the 2017 expenditure audited by it was not materially affected by error and that the level of irregularities in
Union spending has continued to decrease;
5. Welcomes the positive trend of a continuing decrease in the most likely error rate for payments determined by the
Court in recent years, reaching an all-time low level of 2,4 % in 2017, which, regrettably, is still above the
threshold of 2 % but represents an almost two-thirds' reduction in the most likely error rate estimated by the
Court for the financial year 2007, which stood at 6,9 % for payments; notes, however, that payments continue to
be affected by errors because the control and supervision system is only partially effective;
6. Notes that where payments were made on the basis of cost reimbursements (where the Union reimburses eligible
costs for eligible activities), the Court estimates the level of error at 3,7 % (4,8 % in 2016), whilst the error rate for
entitlement payments (which are based on meeting certain conditions) was below the materiality threshold of 2 %;
7. Notes that the Court audited transactions worth a total of EUR 100,2 billion, which represents less than
two-thirds of the total budget for 2017, and that the area of ‘Natural resources’ makes up the largest share of the
overall audit population (57 %), while in contrast to previous years, the weight of the area of ‘Economic, social
and territorial cohesion’ is relatively small (around 8 %);
8. Regrets that the Court has not examined the level of error for spending under heading 3 ‘Security and citizenship’
and heading 4 ‘Global Europe’; considers that, although the figures under these headings are relatively low, they
are of particular political importance; stresses that the audit of a representative sample size from under these two
headings is essential for a rigorous and independent evaluation of financial transactions, as well as for better
oversight on the use of Union funds by the European Parliament, and calls on the Court to provide data on the
error rate for payments under these headings in its next annual reports;
9. Points out that the Commission itself has noted that the improved error-rate performance for 2017 was due in
large part to the score from the ‘Natural Resources’ area (1);
10. Urges the Court, in its future reports, to present the error rate for fisheries separately from those for the
environment, rural development and health, and not on an aggregate basis; notes that combining them makes it
impossible to work out the error rate for fisheries policy; notes that maritime affairs and fisheries are not covered
in sufficient detail in the Court's annual report and that a proper evaluation of financial management in those
areas is therefore difficult; considers that, to increase transparency, in future, the Court's annual report should
include a separate breakdown for the figures relating to DG MARE;
(1) Annual and Performance Report (AMPR) p. 81 — ‘Compared to 2016, the main change is the significant decrease in Cohesion,
Migration and Fisheries. In this policy area, the current 2014-2020 programmes are coming up to speed, which have an inherent lower
risk given the newly introduced annual clearance of accounts and the 10 % retention mechanism on interim payments until all controls
and corrective measures are implemented (see under “progress made” in Section 2.2)’.27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/33
11. Regrets that for the area of ‘Competitiveness for growth and employment’, to which transport belongs, the Court
does not provide any comprehensive information regarding the audits performed for transport sector, in particular
regarding Connecting Europe Facility (CEF);
Revenue
12. Notes that in 2017, the Union had own resources of EUR 115,4 billion and other revenue of 17,2 billion, and
that the surplus carried over from 2016 was EUR 6,4 billion;
13. Notes with satisfaction the Court's conclusion that in 2017 revenue was free from material error and that the
revenue-related systems examined by the Court were, overall, effective, but that some controls for Traditional Own
Resources (TOR) were only partially effective;
14. Notes with concern that the Court's opinion is that there is necessity for improvement in the Commission's
actions to safeguard Union revenue in order to address weaknesses in its management of the risk of under-valued
imports in relation to TOR and in its verifications on the VAT-based own resource;
15. Expresses serious concern that these weaknesses may affect the Member States' contributions to the Union budget;
calls, in this regard, on the Commission to:
(a) improve its monitoring of import flows, including making wider use of reasonable and legal data mining
techniques to analyse unusual patterns and their underlying reasons, and act promptly to ensure that due
amounts of TOR are made available;
(b) review the existing control framework and better document its application in verifying Member States'
calculations of the weighted average rate (WARs) presented by the Member States in their VAT statements,
which the Commission uses to obtain the harmonised VAT bases;
16. Notes with concern that for the second year in a row, DG Budget set a reservation on the value of TOR collected
by the UK, due to the country's failure to make available to the Union budget customs duties evaded on textiles
and footwear imports;
17. Welcomes the infringement procedure initiated by the Commission on 8 March 2018 as a follow-up to the UK
customs fraud case, but, especially in light of the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from the European
Union and the increased difficulties this will impose on any collection process, regrets that it took the Commission
more than seven years to launch this procedure after its request to the UK in 2011 to set risk profiles for under-
valued textiles and footwear imports from China; points out that similar fraud networks operate in other Member
States, leading to avoidance of at least 2,5 billion EUR in custom duties since 2015; calls on the Commission to
approach such cases without hesitation and unnecessary delays in future; reaffirms the clear need for more
cooperation between custom services in the Member States to avoid harm to Union and national budgets and to
Union product standards; demands information from the Commission on which products reach the internal
market without meeting Union product standards;
18. Regrets the discrepancies in the level of customs checks between the various Member States; highlights the
importance of harmonising checks at all points of entry into the Customs Union and calls on the Member States
to ensure coordinated, uniform and efficient implementation of the border system, discouraging divergent
practices between Member States to reduce the number of existing loopholes in customs control systems; calls on
the Commission, in this respect, to examine the various customs control practices in the Union and their impact
on trade diversion, focusing in particular on Union customs practices at external borders, and to develop reference
analyses and information on customs operations and the procedures used in the Member States;
Budgetary and financial management
19. Points out that in 2017, 99,3 % of the amount available for commitments was implemented (EUR 158,7 billion),
but stresses that the executed payments were only EUR 124,7 billion, considerably lower than budgeted and than
those in the corresponding year of the 2007-2013 multiannual programme period, mainly due to Member States
submitting fewer claims than anticipated for the multiannual programmes of the 2014-2020 European Structural
and Investment Funds (ESIF), as well as to the late adoption of the MFF and sectoral legislation; notes that this
could create future risks for implementation of the budget if there is a large number of overdue payments at the
end of the programming period; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the maximum
support to improve their absorption rates;L 249/34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
20. Is deeply concerned that in 2017 the combination of high commitments and low payments increased outstanding
budgetary commitments to a new record of EUR 267,3 billion (2016: EUR 238,8 billion) and that the Court
projections indicate this amount will rise even more by the end of the current MFF, which may lead to a signifi
cantly increased risk of insufficient payment appropriations, but also to a risk of errors under the pressure for
a swift absorption given a potential loss of Union funding; stresses the fact that the Union budget is not allowed
to run a deficit and that the growing payments backlog in fact represents a financial debt;
21. Calls on the Commission to present a thorough analysis of why some regions still exhibit low fund absorption
rates and to assess specific ways of remedying the structural problems underlying those imbalances; calls on the
Commission to increase on-the-spot technical assistance to improve absorption capacity in Member States
experiencing difficulties in this regard;
22. Recalls that the Court reported that the issue of whether to count special instruments within the ceilings for
payment appropriations has not yet been resolved; considers that this could represent an additional risk of
creating a payment backlog;
23. Calls on the Commission to improve the accuracy of the payment forecast and to use the lessons learned from the
previous programming period in order to deal with the accumulated backlog in payments and avoid its
negative effect on the next MFF and to present the Action Plan on reducing the payments backlog during the
2021-2027 multiannual financial framework;
24. Stresses its deep concern that the overall financial exposure of the Union budget has grown, with significant
long-term liabilities, guarantees and legal obligations implying that careful management needs to be applied in the
future; calls, therefore, on the Commission when presenting legislative proposals that include the creation or
addition of sizeable contingent liabilities to accompany them with an overview of the total value of contingent
liabilities supported by the budget, as well as with an analysis of stress test scenarios and their possible impact on
the budget;
25. Regrets that the Union did not succeed to manage and respond adequately to both the financial and socioeco
nomic crisis of 2008 (the case of Greece being an example given the recent apologies of the Commission
expressed to this Member State) and the refugee crisis of 2015, which led to further deepening of divisions within
the Union between North and South and East and West, to increased inequalities, as well as to growing mistrust
among Member States;
26. Reiterates its request to add a budget line in future budgets of the Union dedicated to tourism in order to ensure
transparency regarding the Union funds used to support actions for tourism;
SHARED MANAGEMENT
27. Points out that according to the Court, progress has been achieved in reducing the error rate in the spending areas
covering ‘Natural resources’ (2,4 %) and ‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (3 %), which come under
shared management between the Commission and the Member States;
28. Notes that in 2017, the Court audited less expenditure than last year under the area of ‘Economic, social and
territorial cohesion’ comprising payments worth EUR 8 billion;
29. Points out that similarly to 2016, eligibility errors (i.e. ineligible costs in costs claims, non-respect of agri-
environment-climate commitments and ineligible projects, activities or beneficiaries) contributed most to the 2017
estimated level of error;
30. Takes into account that in the agricultural sector the amounts received by the beneficiaries are relatively small
compared to other Union projects and therefore the administrative burden to prove correct use of money is
proportionately higher;
31. Points to a recent Commission study, which demonstrated that between 2014 and 2017 the large majority of ESIF
management authorities used SCOs (Simplified Cost Options) (64 % of European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD) Rural Development Programmes (RDPs), 73 % of ERDF-CF Operational Programmes (OPs)
and 95 % of European Social Fund (ESF) OPs); in terms of projects, the number of projects using SCOs is 19 % for
EAFRD, 65 % for ESF, 50 % for ERDF and 25 % for CF; considers that the use of SCOs could contribute to
reducing the eligibility errors;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/35
32. Stresses that simplifying Union legislation and reducing the administrative burden on farmers and other benefi
ciaries must continue in the future;
33. Notes that access to data and good monitoring especially of environmental aspects is essential for the future,
considering that certain natural resources underpin long-term agricultural productivity, such as soil and
biodiversity;
34. Observes that the Court found very few public procurement errors in 2017: less than 1 % (compared with 18 %
in 2016), but notes that the reason for this could be the relatively low level of expenditure accepted under the
ERDF and the CF, which have tended to be more prone to errors in public procurement; calls on the Commission
and Member States not to weaken, but to continue strengthening their vigilance on the correct implementation of
public procurement rules;
35. Sees the need to further clarify procurement procedures and relations with bidders in Member States as bidding
procedures may have turned into semi legal procedures preventing fair competition and possibly allowing fraud;
welcomes the ‘single bidder’ study of the Commission and the in-depth analysis ‘Gaps and errors in the TED
database’ requested by the Parliament's Budgetary Control Committee; notes with concern their conclusions that
the quality and reliability of TED data is highly problematic thereby limiting the analytical value of an analysis of
public procurement data; asks the Member States to significantly improve their way of publishing public
procurement information in TED; asks furthermore for a regular monitoring mechanism of single bidding;
36. Fully supports the position of the Court that its mandate does not imply reporting on individual Member States
but presenting an audit opinion on the legality and regularity of the implementation of the Union's budget as
a whole;
37. Nevertheless, draws attention to the reservations issued by the Commission services during the normal annual
discharge procedures and the fact that every Member State performs differently in using the diversity of Union
funds and that there are always areas where improvement is required; notes in this regard that for 2017
reservations were issued by:
— DG AGRI concerning: AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, SE, UK,
— DG MARE concerning: BG, CZ, IT, NL, RO,
— DG REGIO concerning: BG, HR, CZ, ET, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LV, PL, RO, SK, SI, SE, UK,
— DG EMPL concerning: AU, CZ, FR, DE, HU, IT, PL, RO, SK, UK,
— DG HOME concerning: FI, DE, GR, UK;
38. In this sense, notes that although the services of the Commission did not issue reservations in 2017 for IE, LUX,
M, CY, LT, in 2016 they issued for DG AGRI: IE, LT, M, CY, for DG EMPL: CY and for DG REGIO: IE;
39. Welcomes the progress made in implementing the 181 Greece priority projects:
(a) 119 projects with expenditure of EUR 7,1 billion are reported as completed;
(b) 17 projects with expenditure of EUR 0,5 billion are to be completed by March 2019 with national funds
(additional EUR 0,53 billion estimated to be needed);
(c) 24 projects (EUR 0,8 billion) are phased into 2014-2020 where they are estimated to require another
EUR 1,1 billion funding;
(d) 21 items with an estimated budget of EUR 1,1 billion have been cancelled;
Sees a success story in the way the Commission supported Greece to implement and finish Union projects;
40. Notes with deep regret that, despite multiple warnings from the European Parliament, the Commission has reacted
to the issue of the conflict of interest of the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic (the Czech PM) only after
Transparency International Czech Republic filed a complaint against him in June 2018; is deeply worried that
a Union legal document, dated 19 November 2018, pointed out that the situation of the Czech PM qualifies as
a conflict of interest, because he could influence decisions on the use of Union funds from which companies
linked to him (2) have benefited;
(2) The Agrofert Holding is the single biggest group in Czech agriculture and food industry, second largest in chemistry and plays
a significant role also in forestry, is an owner of the MAFRA Publishing Company, publishing some of the most popular printed and
online media, such as MF DNES, Lidové noviny, iDnes.L 249/36 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
41. In this regard calls on the Commission to investigate fully the conflict of interest of the Czech PM as demanded by
the European Parliament's resolution of December 2018 and acts firmly on the results of its investigation without
further delays, as well as to investigate also his situation as media owner and to draw conclusions from this case;
42. Recalls that the Commission services have asked the national authority responsible for the coordination of Union
Funds (Ministry of Regional Development) to provide the necessary information (3) with respect to funding to
enterprises that are owned by his holding company;
43. Welcomes the fact that the Czech Ministry of Regional Development has collected the requested information from
the different managing authorities concerned and has forwarded it to the Commission; asks the Commission what
action it intends to take in light of its recent legal appreciation of the situation;
44. Recalls that the European Parliament asked the Commission last year to speed up the conformity clearance
procedure opened on 8 January 2016 to get detailed and precise information on the risk of conflicts of interest
concerning the State's Agricultural Intervention Fund in the Czech Republic;
Economic, social and territorial cohesion
Success stories
45. Notes the progress in project selection and that by January 2018, 673 800 projects had been selected for support
by the ERDF, the CF, the ESF, and the Youth Employment Initiative, amounting to EUR 260 billion or 54 % of the
total financing available for the 2014-2020 period; notes that the rate of project selection had reached 70 % of
the total financing available at the end of 2018 and was similar to the selection rate at the same point in the last
period;
46. Welcomes the fact that out of the 450 000 projects selected up to the end of 2016 to support SMEs, 84 500 have
already been completed, thus contributing to productivity and competitiveness of firms;
47. Welcomes also the fact that up to the end of 2017, around 5 500 projects were selected on the ground to support
the achievement of a connected Digital Single Market, corresponding to EUR 9,1 billion of total investment;
48. Notes with satisfaction that, in the area of energy efficiency and renewables, more than 2 000 MW of additional
capacity of renewable energy production was created, and greenhouse emissions were reduced by close to
3 million tonnes of CO equivalents by the end of 2016; stresses though that more must be done in order to
2
achieve goals from the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement;
49. Notes that by the end of 2017, 99 % of the action plans for ex ante conditionalities affecting the ESF, the CF and
the ERDF had been completed;
50. Welcomes in particular, with regard to structural funds, the Court's audit work on preventive measures and
financial corrections, ex ante conditionalities, the performance reserve and absorption;
51. Notes with satisfaction that the outputs and results described for the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived
(FEAD) are on track to be achieved and that the instrument compliments national efforts to eradicate poverty and
promote social inclusion;
52. Notes that in the course of the Court of Auditor's review of 113 completed projects under the ‘Economic, social
and territorial cohesion’ spending area, 65 % had a performance measurement system with output and result
indicators linked to the objectives of the operational programme — which represents an improvement compared
to previous years; notes with concern that 30 % of the projects had no result indicators or targets, making it
impossible to assess the specific contribution of those projects to the overall objectives of the programme;
(3) (a) list of all projects financed by the ERDF, CF, ESF and EAFRD which relate to the AGROFERT group since 2012 when the current Prime
Minister entered as Minister of Finance the government, and whether the projects are still ongoing or have been completed; (b) the
amounts granted, already paid and still to be paid (as well as the Fund concerned) to these companies or to other companies of the
AGROFERT group; (c) periods when such amounts were granted and paid; (d) whether the projects were subject to verifications (adminis
trative and/or on-the-spot) with respect to such funding and the outcome of such verifications;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/37
Critical issues requiring improvement
53. Regrets that the Court identified and quantified 36 errors in its sample of 217 transactions for 2017, which audit
authorities in Member States had not detected, and that the number and the impact of these errors indicate
persisting weaknesses with the regularity of the expenditure declared by managing authorities; regrets also that the
Court found weaknesses in the sampling methods of some audit authorities; calls on the Commission to work
even closer with the managing and audit authorities of individual Member States on detecting these errors and
specifically targeting the most frequent ones;
54. Deplores the fact that for 2017, as noted by the Court, the Commission presented at least 13 different error rates
in the area of economic, social and territorial cohesion for the programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020,
which makes reporting unclear and confusing, and makes it difficult to evaluate data;
55. Notes that Member States' Audit Authorities communicate to DG REGIO the error rates for Structural Funds only
after deduction of corrections which does not give a real picture of the situation of Union projects on the spot
and of the 2017 error-rate for actual payments;
56. Is concerned that despite the significant increase in the average absorption rate in terms of payments by the
Commission from 3,7 % in 2016 to 16,4 % in 2017, the absorption remains even lower than in the
corresponding year of the previous MFF, which was 22,1 % in 2010;
57. Observes with concern that as of September 2018 there are still 7 non-completed action plans related to ex ante
conditionalities and that one suspension of interim payments has been adopted and other two are under inter-
service consultation for adoption; regrets that the fulfilment of the ex ante conditionalities proved to be administra
tively burdensome for managing authorities and one of the reasons for delayed absorption; appreciates in
particular the targeted support provided to programme authorities and increased level of implementation reached
thanks to the ‘Catching up Regions’ and the ‘Task force for Better Implementation’ initiatives taken by the
Commission; asks the Commission to ensure that in the next programming period, the identified weaknesses and
problems related to fulfilment of enabling conditions, which will replace ex ante conditionalities, are properly
addressed;
58. Is worried about the lack of transparency in spending for financial instruments as four times more money is
available for financial instruments under the current MFF; notes that by the end of 2017, 24 Member States were
making use of FIs and the total programme contributions committed to FIs were nearly EUR 18,8 billion
(EUR 13,3 billion at the end of 2016), of which EUR 14,2 billion was from the ESIF; notes as well that a total of
EUR 5,5 billion (around 29 %) of these amounts committed had been paid to FIs (EUR 3,6 billion at the end of
2016), including EUR 4,4 billion from the ESIF; is concerned, however, that three years after the start of this MFF
EUR 1,9 billion (only 10,1 %) had been paid to final recipients (EUR 1,2 billion at the end of 2016), of which
EUR 1,5 billion (10,5 %) was from the ESIF;
59. Agrees with the Court on the need for more detailed reporting on financial instruments and calls
on the Commission to significantly improve reporting on the results of those instruments for 2007-2013 and
2014-2020;
60. Calls on the Commission to present accurate and complete information on financial instruments under shared
management after closure of the 2007-2013 MFF period, indicating amounts returned to the Union budget and
those remaining in the Member States;
61. Deeply regrets that, in the context of financial instruments, the auditors were not able to verify the selection and
implementation of investments at financial intermediary level, where a number of irregularities occurred,
accounting for 1 % of the estimated level of error for the area of ‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion’;
62. Stresses that unlike what was done in 2016, the estimated level of error for cohesion includes a quantification of
2017 disbursements to financial instruments; recalls that since the eligibility of expenditures for structural funds
for the period 2007-2013 was postponed to the end of March 2017, the disbursements to financial instruments
for the first three months of 2017 are to be included into the calculation of the error-rate; nevertheless regrets
that the Court has not mentioned the clear error rate for those disbursements anywhere in its annual report,
except in a box; calls on the Court to take on board all the irregularities having a financial impact when
determining the most likely error-rate, and to clearly mention the percentage of funds affected; calls on the
Commission to table the necessary legislative proposal to put an end to future unilateral decisions on the
extension of the eligibility of expenditures for structural funds via implementing acts;L 249/38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
63. Calls on the Commission to provide accurate and complete information on the closure of the financial
instruments for the 2007-2013 MFF, including the final amounts returned to the Union budget and amounts
belonging to Member States;
64. Calls on the Commission to take into account, in the case of large-scale infrastructure projects, all relevant risks of
environmental impact and to finance only those which have demonstrated real added value for the local
population and from an environmental, social and economic point of view; stresses the importance of strictly
monitoring possible risks of corruption and fraud in this context and the need to carry out careful and
independent ex ante and ex post assessments with regard to the projects to be financed;
65. Notes that according to the Commission, few evaluations were carried out by Member States relating to the
European Social Fund beyond the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI); calls on Member States to systematically
evaluate the European Social Fund in order to enable evident based policymaking, and on the Commission to
promote this;
66. Recalls that in its Special Report No 5/2017 ‘Youth unemployment’, the Court found that, while some progress
had been made in implementing the Youth Guarantee (YG), and while some results had been achieved, the
situation fell short of the initial expectations raised at the launch of the YG; stresses however that the YEI and the
YG still represent one of the most innovative and ambitious policy responses to youth unemployment in the wake
of the economic crisis, and should therefore have the continued financial and political support of Union, national
and regional institutions in their delivery;
67. Stresses that establishing whether the YEI budget is well spent, and whether the ultimate YEI goal of helping
young unemployed people into sustainable employment is attained, can only be achieved if operations are closely
and transparently monitored on the basis of reliable and comparable data, and if Member States that have made
no progress are addressed in a more ambitious manner; insists therefore that the Member States improve
monitoring, reporting and the quality of data as a matter of urgency and guarantee that reliable and comparable
data and figures on current YEI implementation are gathered and made available in a timely manner and more
frequently than is required under their annual reporting obligation, as defined in Article 19(2) of the ESF
Regulation; calls on the Commission to revise its guidelines on data collection in line with the recommendation of
the Court in order to minimise the risk of overstatement of results;
68. Insists that any internship or apprenticeship programme must provide paid placements, never lead to job
substitution and be based on a written internship or apprenticeship agreement in accordance with the applicable
regulatory framework or applicable collective agreements, or both, of the country where it takes place, and that it
should follow the principles outlined in the Council Recommendation of 10 March 2014 on a Quality Framework
for Traineeships (4).
Natural resources
Some success stories
69. Welcomes the positive evolution of the error rate in the area of ‘Natural resources’ in 2017, being 2,4 % (in
comparison with 2,5 % in 2016, 2,9 % in 2015 and 3,6 % in 2014), as well as that for three-quarters of the
agriculture budget corresponding to ‘European Agricultural Guarantee Funds (EAGF) — direct payments’ the Court
estimated the level of error to be below the materiality threshold of 2 %;
70. Welcomes the fact that the overall level of error established by the Court tallies very closely with the overall error
rate for the CAP given in DG AGRI's 2017 annual activity report, demonstrating the effectiveness of the remedial
action plans that Member States have implemented in previous years;
71. Stresses that the positive achievements in the area of EAGF direct payments were mainly due to the quality of the
Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS), and to the
progressive introduction of the Geo-Spatial Aid Application and new preliminary cross-checks on farmer's
applications, which led to reduced time for completion of aid claims by beneficiaries and is expected to prevent
some error and save time in processing of claims;
(4) OJ C 88, 27.3.2014, p. 1.27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/39
72. Notes that direct payments from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund account for around three-quarters of
expenditure and are free from material error; points out that direct payments to farmers are entitlement-based and
have benefited from simplified land eligibility rules and an effective ex ante control system (IACS) that allows
automated cross-checks between databases; is concerned that a persistently high level of error remains in the other
spending areas on rural development, the environment, climate action and fisheries; notes, furthermore, that rural
development projects are inherently more complex due to the wider goals pursued, and expenditure in the three
other areas is co-financed or disbursed through reimbursement of costs and ineligible beneficiaries, activities,
projects or expenditure contribute around two-thirds of the estimated level of error for that MFF heading;
73. Welcomes the findings in which the Court, having examined a total of 29 rural development investment projects,
established that 26 were in line with the priorities and focus areas set out in the rural development programmes
and that Member States had applied appropriate selection procedures; also welcomes the fact that, in most cases,
the beneficiaries of the projects examined carried them out as planned and the Member States made checks to
ascertain whether the costs were reasonable; believes therefore that the rural development approach must remain
a fully supported, significant and core element in the CAP Strategic Plans, moving forward;
74. Welcomes the fact that in its 2017 Annual Activity Report (AAR), the Director-General of DG AGRI referred to
a slight increase in farmer income, recalling that there had been a slight decrease the last 4 years;
75. Points out that the corrective capacity of financial corrections and recoveries increased to 2,10 %, compared with
2,04 % in 2016, thus further lowering the amount at risk for the CAP in 2017;
Critical issues requiring improvement
76. Notes the fact that direct payments per hectare decreased with increasing farm size, while the income per worker
increased, and that according to the Commission very small farms, of less than 5 ha, represent over half of the
beneficiaries; notes with concern that according to the DG AGRI AAR, ‘Big farms managing over 250 ha represent
1,1 % of farms, manage 27,8 % of the total farmland and receive 22,1 % of total direct aid. Among these “big
farms”, the majority has between 250 and 500 ha.’ 1; urges the Commission to change this unjustifiable and
unequal treatment;
77. Notes a fast increase in inequalities in direct payments in some Member States, mainly Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, where 7 % of the beneficiaries receive currently over 70 % of all direct payments, as well as Estonia,
Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark where over the last 10 years a growing share of beneficiaries
have received more than EUR 100 000; calls on the Commission and the national authorities to take appropriate
measures to remedy those increasing inequalities and to report on those measures;
78. Notes with great concern that the Court found a persistently high level of error in areas corresponding to one
quarter of the budget for ‘Natural Resources’, which includes the expenditure for market measures under the
EAGF, rural development, environment, climate action and fisheries; notes in addition that the main sources of
error were non-compliance with eligibility conditions, the provision of inaccurate information on areas and non-
compliance with agro-environmental commitments; stresses that such errors should be better detected by the
managing authorities of individual Member States or in cases when the ex post audits point to these errors the
samples for future audits and on-site checks should be updated to provide for a better controls;
79. Calls on the Commission to continue its work to assess the effectiveness of the Member States' actions to address
the underlying causes of these errors and to issue further guidance or direct help where necessary;
80. Calls on the Commission to arrange for a genuine simplification of the procedure, including in the documentation
required in order to gain access to funding, without neglecting the principles of audit and monitoring; calls for
special attention to be paid to administrative support for small-scale producers;L 249/40 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
81. Notes with great concern that the results of the cross compliance on the spot checks made by DG AGRI are
worrying, and in particular that 47 % of the total number of on the spot checks has led to sanctions; urges the
Commission to check the implementation of the remedial action taken by Member State authorities where it
found it could place no or limited reliance on the certification body's work;
82. Recommends that:
(a) the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) issue separately error rates regarding respectively the direct payments, the
market operations and the rural development spending of the CAP as the Director-General of DG AGRI does
in its annual activity report;
(b) the Commission assess the effectiveness of the Member States' actions to address the underlying causes of
errors and issues further guidance where necessary;
(c) the Member States fully exploit the possibilities offered by the system of simplified cost options in rural
development;
(d) the Commission take on board in its proposals for the future CAP that larger farm incomes do not necessarily
need the same degree of support for stabilising farm incomes as smaller farms in times of income volatility
crisis since they may benefit of potential economies of scale which are likely to make them more resilient;
(e) DG AGRI define a new key performance objective, accompanied with indicators, aiming at mitigating the
income inequalities between the famers;
(f) the Commission carry out a closer examination of the quality of the certification bodies' transaction testing;
(g) the CAP funding remain at current levels at least and to do the job it was designed to do, support the
producers so they have a sustainable living, while ensuring an affordable top-quality food-supply for Union
citizens;
(h) the Commission take steps to ensure that CAP funds should be distributed in a weighted manner, such that
the payments per hectare are on a reducing scale relative to the size of the holding or farm;
83. Takes the view that the Commission should require Member State action plans to include remedial action to deal
with the most frequent causes of error;
84. Given that the environmental objectives of ‘greening’ have not met any of the expectations raised and that they
produced a considerable increase in the administrative burden for both farmers and public administrations, asks
the Commission to ensure that the green architecture of the new CAP proposal with the so-called eco-scheme
achieve better environmental results based on the reward of the efforts that overcome the reinforced conditionality
of the new proposal;
85. Recalls in particular, that the Director-General of DG AGRI refers to an analysis made by an external contractor,
which found that: ‘overall, the greening measures have led to only small changes in farmers' management
practices, except in a few specific areas. For both Member States and farmers, instead of environmental priorities,
the main concern tended to consist in minimising the administrative burden of implementation, and avoiding any
errors as controls and enforcement may lead to the reduction of CAP payments’;
86. Calls on the Commission to provide structural data for the 20 biggest receivers of direct payments in Member
States;
87. Is concerned that the highly critical Special Reports of the Court Nos 10/2017 and 21/2017 on Young Farmers
and Greening, showing that almost no desired result was achieved, did not have financial consequences; is
concerned that the financing of those policy areas just goes on as if nothing had happened;
88. Stresses that four years after its adoption on 15 May 2014, the implementation rate for the 2014-2020 EMFF
remains unsatisfactory, as by October 2018 only 6,8 % of the EUR 5,7 billion made available under the shared
management system had been used;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/41
Security and citizenship
Some success stories
89. Notes that the 2014-2020 allocated resources for AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) increased from
EUR 2 752 million to EUR 5 391,5 million by the end of 2017 and that between 2014 and 2017, the number of
target group persons provided with assistance (in reception and asylum systems) increased from 148 045 to
297 083, and that of these, the share of persons having benefited from legal assistance has risen from 18 395
(12,4 %) to 56 933 (19,1 %);
90. Stresses that the main Union level benefit is considered to come from the transnational dimension of actions such
as European Migration Network, but also from burden-sharing, supported in particular by emergency assistance
and the relocation mechanism;
91. Notes that the number of returnees co-financed by the AMIF was 48 250 in 2017 compared to 5 904 in 2014,
and that of those returned, the share of non-voluntary returns has increased from one quarter (25 %) in 2014 to
half (50 %) in 2017, while the reported number of persons who returned voluntarily was 17 736 in 2017; notes
also that there is no Key Performance Indicator (KPI) to measure what's being done to protect those migrants —
regular and irregular — who most need protection, the women and children;
Critical issues requiring improvements
92. Points out that the Court regretted that the accounts of AMIF and ISF (Internal Security Fund) national
programmes cleared by the Commission in 2017 did not distinguish between pre-financing payments (advances)
by Member States to final beneficiaries, and payments made to reimburse expenditure actually incurred, which
does not allow the Commission to obtain information on how much was actually spent;
93. Asks in this regard the Commission to require from Member States, in the annual accounts of their AMIF and ISF
national programmes, to break down the nature of the amounts they report into recoveries, pre-financing and
expenditure actually incurred and to report in its AAR from 2018 onwards the actual spending per fund;
94. Points out that for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and for the Internal Security Fund DG HOME only
reports an error rate from which financial corrections have already been deducted, which makes unclear what
corrections have been made and what the 2017 actual payments error rate is;
95. Takes note of the Court's observation that overcomplicated bureaucracy could be one of the reasons for the
increased backlog of commitment appropriations and recommends to the Commission to simplify the regulatory
requirements introduced for the national authorities involved in the management of the AMIF and ISF in order to
facilitate the faster use of the available funds and to improve the transparency and better accountability of AMIF
and ISF expenditure;
96. Points out that the Court found inconsistencies in the way Member States treated the eligibility of value-added tax
declared by public bodies and calls on the Commission to provide guidance to Member States in with regard to
the AMIF/ISF implementation specifying that, when public bodies implement Union actions, the Union
co-financing may not exceed the total eligible expenditure excluding VAT;
97. Recommends that:
(a) the Commission define and put in place a balanced and comprehensive migration policy based on the
principles of solidarity and partnership instead of considering the migration policy as a crisis management
issue;
(b) DG HOME introduce a Key Performance Indicator relating to situation of the most vulnerable migrants and in
particular child migrants and refugee women and girls in order to prevent and avoid abuse and trafficking;
(c) DG HOME systematically provide error rates at payment and residual error rate;
(d) the Commission require Member States, in the annual accounts of their AMIF and ISF national programmes,
to break down the nature of the amounts they report into recoveries, pre-financing and expenditure actually
incurred; and report in its AAR from 2018 onwards the actual spending per fund;L 249/42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
98. Is seriously concerned about the weaknesses in EASO's management and audits; considers it unacceptable that the
Commission did not monitor them effectively and did not intervene quickly to resolve the situation; calls on the
Commission to constantly monitor the agencies operating under Heading 3;
99. Is concerned that there is a risk that Union money foreseen for development is used for other purposes such as to
fight irregular migration or military action;
DIRECT MANAGEMENT
100. Points out that for 2017, the Court found the highest estimated level of error in spending under ‘Competitiveness
for growth and jobs’, at 4,2 %; notes that these are expenditures managed directly by the Commission, and for
which the Commission is solely and directly accountable; expects the Commission to adopt an urgent Action Plan
to improve the situation and to implement all measures at its disposal to lower the level of error in spending;
101. Regrets that of the 130 transactions examined by the Court, 66 (51 %) contained errors and that in 17 cases of
quantifiable error made by beneficiaries, the Commission or the independent auditor had sufficient information
presented in the reimbursement claim (e.g. incorrect exchange rate or cost incurred outside the reporting period)
to prevent, or to detect and correct, the error before accepting the expenditure; emphasises that, had the
Commission made proper use of all information at its disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would
have been 1,5 percentage points lower;
102. Urges the Commission to undertake all necessary measures to improve the use of the available information at its
disposal for preventing and correcting errors before exercising payments in order to return to the positive trend of
reduction of the error rate seen in previous years (from 5,6 % in 2014, to 4,4 % in 2015 and from 4,1 % in
2016);
103. Notes that the Court did not provide a separate error rate for security and citizenship, as just a small part (2 %) of
the 2017 budgetary payments relate to this area, but that DG HOME presented the following error rates in its
AAR, which, however, were not checked by the Court:
(a) Solidarity and Management of migration Flows (SOLID): Detected Error Rate (DER) of 2,26 % and Residual
error rate (RER) of 0,75 %;
(b) Asylum Migration and integration Fund (AMIF) Internal Security Fund (ISF): DER of 0 % and RER of 1,54 %;
(c) Indirect management decentralised agencies: RER of less than 2 %;
104. Notes that for 2017, the Court has not calculated an error rate for the Union funds spent under heading 4 of the
MFF ‘Global Europe’ and that this decision was taken following the general strategy of the Court to reduce its
substantive testing and partially rely on the so-called ‘work of others’;
105. Takes note of the positive evolution of the residual error rate as established by the residual error rate (RER) studies
ordered by DG DEVCO and DG NEAR and notes that the most likely estimate of the representative RER for the
transactions of DG DEVCO was 1,18 % compared with 1,67 % in 2016, and 2,2 % in 2015 whilst for the DG
NEAR transactions the residual error rate was 0,67;
106. Notes, however, that the Residual Error Rate of DG DEVCO and DG NEAR does not refer to a sample of all
payments for ongoing projects, but is calculated on transactions only from closed contracts for which all controls
and checks have been applied, with the consequence that only pre-2017 payments have been analysed, but not
the 2017 actual payments error-rate;
107. Notes the fact that the Court considered that the RER studies were broadly fit for purpose although the Court had
strong concerns about the quality of those studies;
108. Notes with concern that despite good scores in terms of error rate, the only spending area with an indicative error
rate above 2 % is ‘Direct Management — Grants’, with error rates of 2,80 % for DG NEAR and 2,12 % for DG
DEVCO;
109. calls on the DG RTD to publish its country specific recommendations in the AAR of DG RTD;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/43
110. Highlights the highly negative findings by the Court on Public-Private Partnerships (5) (‘PPPs’) and the Court's
recommendation ‘not to promote a more intensive and widespread use of PPPs’ inside the Union; calls on the
Commission to take this recommendation fully into account when dealing with PPPs in developing countries
where the environment for successful implementation of PPPs is even more difficult than inside the Union;
111. Welcomes the results achieved under the three axes of the European Union Programme for Employment and
Social Innovation (EaSI) in 2017; draws attention to the importance of EaSI support, and, in particular, of its
Progress and European Employment Services network (EURES) axes, for the implementation of the European Pillar
of Social Rights; notes with concern however that the thematic section Social Entrepreneurship within the EaSI
Microfinance and Social Entrepreneurship axis continues to underperform; appreciates the fact that the
Commission is working closely with the European Investment Fund (EIF) to ensure it commits to full utilisation of
the resources under the Social Entrepreneurship thematic section;
Research and innovation
Success stories
112. Notes with satisfaction that with Union co-financing under Horizon 2020 Gérard Mourou won with other
researchers the Nobel Prize in physics for their research in ultra-brief, ultra-sharp laser beams facilitating refractive
eye surgery, as well as that the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium (IRDIRC) achieved its objective of
delivering 200 new therapies for rare diseases three years earlier than foreseen;
113. Notes in addition that through the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, Horizon 2020 has funded
36 000 researchers at all stages of their career, regardless of their age and nationality and that two of the three
researchers who were awarded the 2017 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for optimising electron microscopes have
participated in Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions and other Union-funded research projects;
114. Welcomes the launch of the first phase of the European Innovation Council pilot in October 2017 as part of the
Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2018-2020, endowed with funding of EUR 2,7 billion, which aims at supporting
top-class innovators, start-ups, small companies and researchers with bright ideas that are radically different from
existing products, services or business models, are highly risky and have the potential to scale up internationally;
115. Notes that the Commission is looking into the possibility to extending the use of the Simplified Cost Option
(SCO) even further, in particular using lump-sum funding;
Critical issues requiring improvement
116. Notes that, according to the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) the innovation performance of the Union has
increased by 5,8 % since 2010; notes, however, that there has been no convergence between Union countries;
notes that the following countries benefit most from the funds under Horizon 2020 (Participant Net Requested
Union Contribution in Euro): Germany 5 710 188 927,80/United Kingdom 5 152 013 650,95/France
3 787 670 675,13; calls on the Commission to pay greater attention to the geographic distribution of research
funds with the view to contributing to the creation of a level playing field for growth and jobs in the European
research area;
117. Notes that the Commission admits that there are some weaknesses in the performance framework for
Horizon 2020 which make it difficult to assess the progress of the programme towards all of its objectives at
a given moment; expects that the proposals for the next MFF Horizon Europe programme will address these
weaknesses and regrets that no measures are considered for improvement of the performance framework in the
current period;
118. Notes that the Annual Activity Report (AAR) of the Directorate-General (DG) RTD mentions 6 different error
rates, three for the Seventh Framework Programme and three for Horizon 2020; stresses that such an approach
does not facilitate transparency and accountability and should be improved immediately; accepts however that two
different programmes under two different financial periods are concerned;
(5) Special report No 9/2018: Public Private Partnership in the EU. Widespread shortcomings and limited benefitsL 249/44 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
Security and citizenship
Some success stories
119. Points out that DG Home managed a budget of EUR 1 831 million for migration and EUR 313,75 million
for security and that the initial overall budget of EUR 6,9 billion for the Multiannual Financing
Framework 2014-2020 was substantially reinforced from 2015 to 2017, by EUR 3,9 billion;
120. Notes that the budget managed by DG HOME and its number of staff have been increased in order to cope with
the increased activities in the context of the migration crisis and threats to the internal security; in terms of
human resources, at the end of 2017, DG HOME had 556 staff members, compared to 480 in 2016;
Critical issues requiring improvement
121. Notes with concern that the implementation pace of the resources managed by DG HOME triggered an increase of
24 % of the total RAL at the end of 2017 and that the good implementation rate in 2017 reflects the fact that
part of the commitment appropriations were carried over to 2018;
122. Is concerned by the significant weaknesses identified in the management and control systems of EASO that
justified the adoption of a reservation on reputational grounds; stresses though that DG HOME has reacted by
introducing a co-decision process by the executive board and put in place new management of EASO to bring the
situation under control;
123. Repeats its demand that the budget lines under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme (REC) 2014-2020
should specify the resources allocated to each of the objectives of the programme devoted to gender equality
ensuring a proper accountability of the funds devoted to this aim;
124. Reiterates its call to have a separate budget line for the Daphne specific objective in order to show the
commitment of the Union with the combat of violence against women and girls; calls for increased resources in
this budget line and to reverse the decrease of funds dedicated to Daphne during the 2014-2020 period; calls on
an steady effort to raise the awareness of the grants included in the Daphne specific objective along with measures
to make its related administrative procedures more user-friendly;
Global Europe
Some success stories
125. Points out that the Court work on the regularity of the transactions revealed that the Commission strengthened its
control systems, which has led to proportionally fewer errors than in past DAS exercises;
126. Notes that the Court has also checked the performance of 7 projects; welcomes the fact that all 7 projects had
relevant performance indicators and that the framework was well structured and had achievable outputs;
127. Takes note of the Special Report of the Court on Union Assistance to Myanmar/Burma and the response of the
Commission; welcomes in this respect that the Union played a leading role in supporting development priorities
in a difficult context and with limited staff resources; notes however that Union assistance was found to be only
partially effective; supports the Court in stressing the need to pay increased attention to domestic revenue
mobilisation, in particular in emerging economies; in view of the documented atrocities committed by the army of
Myanmar expresses great concern about continued sectoral budget support provided from the Union budget to
Myanmar;
128. Calls for an incentive-based approach to development by introducing the more-for-more principle, taking as an
example the European Neighbourhood Policy; believes that the more and the faster a country progress in its
internal reforms in relation to the building and consolidation of democratic institutions, the respect for human
rights and the rule of law, the more support it should receive from the Union;
129. Underlines the importance of increasing the attribution of funds aiming at supporting good governance,
democracy and the rule of law in developing countries in order to promote accountable and transparent
institutions, support capacity building and foster a participatory decision-making and public access to information;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/45
130. Draws attention to the scale and implication of energy poverty in developing countries and to the Union's strong
involvement in efforts to reduce such poverty; underlines the need for strong and concerted efforts by
governments and stakeholders in affected countries to reduce energy poverty;
Critical issues requiring improvement
131. Notes with concern that the Court has detected recurrent errors of over-clearance of expenditure in interim
payments;
132. Regrets once again that the external assistance management reports (EAMR) issued by the heads of Union
delegations are not annexed to the annual activity reports of DG DEVCO and NEAR as is foreseen by Article 67(3)
of the Financial Regulation; regrets that they are systematically considered as confidential whilst in accordance
with Article 67(3) of the Financial Regulation, ‘they shall be made available to the European Parliament and the
Council having due regard, where appropriate to their confidentiality’;
133. Notes with concern the large number of contracts awarded to a very limited number of national development
agencies, with the attendant risk of re-nationalisation of Union policy contrary to the interests of greater
integration of Union external policy; urges the Commission, in addition to granting the discharge authority access
to the pillar assessment, to do so in such a way as to make it publicly accessible; in this regard, notes with
concern the commercial focus of these national bodies invoked by the European Commission to restrict access to
such information; calls on the Commission, as soon as possible, to strengthen and consolidate the monitoring of
the tendering and contracting procedures to avoid any distortion of competition between this limited number of
strongly subsidised national agencies and other public and private entities with a clear European vocation;
134. Notes with concern that the Court found that the RER studies have certain limitations, as they are studies and not
audits and so do not follow International Audit Standards and include very limited checks on public procurement;
135. For the 2019 RER study onwards, calls on DG NEAR and DG DEVCO to provide the RER contractor with more
precise guidelines on checking second-level procurement and to stratify the RER population based on the inherent
risk of the projects, with more weight being placed on direct management grants and less on budget support
transactions;
136. Asks the Commission to take the necessary measures to address the deficiencies detected by its own Internal Audit
Service and to transform the EAMR into a reliable and fully public document that properly substantiates the
declarations of assurance of the heads of delegation and of the Director-General of DG DEVCO;
137. Believes that when providing external aid, more attention should be put by the Commission on respect for human
rights as per the UN Charter, and the Rule of Law, in the receiving countries;
138. Is concerned about lack of visibility of Union funding pooled for projects; urges the Commission to improve
visibility and to strengthen enhanced complementarity of actions of different instruments;
139. Is very worried by an ongoing trend in Commission proposals to ignore legally binding provisions of Regulation
(EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) when it comes to Official Development
Assistance (‘ODA’) eligible expenditure and eligible countries for Development Cooperation Instrument (‘DCI’)
spending; recalls that legality of Union spending is a key principle of sound financial management and that
political considerations should not take precedence over clearly spelled out legal provisions; recalls that DCI is first
and foremost an instrument designed to fight poverty;
140. Regrets that in every annual activity report since 2012, the Commission's Directorate-General for International
Cooperation and Development had to issue a reservation on the regularity of underlying transactions which points
to serious internal management, deficiencies;
(6) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for
development cooperation for the period 2014-2020 (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 44).L 249/46 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
Environment, public health and food safety
141. Notes that in 2017 the LIFE Programme celebrated its 25th anniversary; highlights that the programme provided
EUR 222 million to co-finance 139 new projects; stresses that further efforts need to be made to lower payments
delays under the LIFE Programme, as 5,8 % of payments exceeded legal deadlines in 2017 (3,9 % in 2016, 12 % in
2015);
142. Points out that the mid-term evaluation of the LIFE Programme, covering the years 2014-2015, was released in
2017; notes that, as most projects had yet to start and few projects had ended, that evaluation focused mainly on
the processes put in place to reach the LIFE Programme's objectives, and concluded that the LIFE Programme
provides Union added value, while pointing to possible improvements; stresses that grant management procedures,
particularly application and reporting procedures, should not only be simplified but also significantly accelerated;
143. Notes that the terms of the externalisation decision for cooperation with the Executive Agency for Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises (EASME) regarding staff imply that the staffing situation is very tight in DG ENV as
regards the activities related to the LIFE programme, which may require further review of the working methods
and arrangements within the DG;
144. Highlights that those of DG ENV's and DG CLIMA's internal control systems that were audited are only partially
effective, as some very important recommendations still need to be addressed in line with the agreed action plans;
145. Stresses that DG CLIMA and DG BUDG monitor the 20 % climate mainstreaming target in the Multiannual
Financial Framework, and that DG CLIMA supports other DGs in integrating climate in their activities; regrets that
in 2017, only 19,3 % of the Union budget was spent on climate-related activities, and that it is estimated that the
average for the period 2014-2020 will only be 18,8 %;
146. Is concerned with the fact that the reservation on reputational grounds concerning the remaining significant
security weakness identified in the Union registry of the Emissions trading system (EU ETS) is repeated in DG
CLIMA's Annual Activity Report for 2017;
147. Regrets that DG SANTE's average residual error rate reached 2,5 % for the overall activity in the area of food and
feed safety in 2017, exceeding the materiality threshold of 2 %; notes that this is due to overstatements in costs
claims of Member States, in the context of structural changes made to management and controls of the claims in
one Member State; asks DG SANTE to take all the necessary measures to ensure that this does not happen again
in the future by increasing for instance the use of simplification measures offered by the Financial Regulation;
148. Highlights that in 2017 DG SANTE released the mid-term evaluation of the Common Financial Framework for the
food chain 2014-2020, which concluded that the current framework functions well and contributed to achieving
Union added value; notes that the Commission, as recommended by the Court, is working to develop a cost-
effectiveness analysis methodology for the food chain area, in order to make future economic evaluations of the
Union-funded interventions more robust;
Transport and tourism
149. Notes that in 2017 the Commission selected 152 projects for a total of CEF Transport funding of EUR 2,7 billion,
with the total investment of EUR 4,7 billion, including other public and private financing; reiterates the
importance of the CEF funding instrument for the completion of the TEN-T network, for achieving a Single
European Transport Area, for developing the cross-border links and filling the missing links;
150. Invites the European TEN-T Coordinators to conduct a thorough assessment of the projects completed and the
improvements achieved along the TEN-T corridors under the current programming period, and to present it to the
Commission and the Parliament;
151. Calls upon the Commission to clearly present for the sector of transport an assessment of the impact of EFSI on
other financial instruments, in particular with regard to the CEF as well as on the coherence of the CEF Debt
Instrument with other Union initiatives in good time before the proposal for the next MFF; requests that this
assessment present a clear analysis on the geographical balance of investments in the transport sector; recalls,
however, that the amount of money spent under a financial instrument should not be considered to be the only
pertinent criteria to be used when assessing its performance; invites, therefore, the Commission to deepen its
assessment of the achievements completed under Union funded transport projects and measure their added-value;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/47
152. Welcomes the results of the 2017 blending call for CEF funding and the decision to increase its budget to EUR
1,35 billion, which confirms the relevance and added value of using Union grants for blending with financing
from the European Investment Bank or National Promotional Banks or other development and public financial
institutions as well as from private-sector finance institutions and private-sector investors, including through
public private partnerships; takes the view that CEF should therefore continue to support actions enabling
combination between Union grants and other sources of financing, while maintaining grants as the main funding
instrument;
153. Notes that the Commission's Internal Audit Service, as part of its audit on the Commission's supervision of the
implementation of CEF financial instruments, found that there was a very low rate of implementation of financial
instruments under CEF and the majority of the budget originally allocated to CEF financial instruments
(EUR 2,43 billion) was re-allocated to CEF grants budget lines, leaving only EUR 296 million available for CEF
financial instruments until 2020; also notes that one of the reasons given was that the eligibility criteria of the
CEF financial instruments and of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) largely overlap and potential
CEF eligible projects have in fact been financed by EFSI, as it has greater political priority and a larger remit; calls
on the Commission, as regards the CEF, to improve the level of awareness among beneficiaries of the eligibility
rules, in particular by drawing a clear distinction between an implementation contract and subcontract — which
was the main source of confusion among beneficiaries; calls on the Commission to ensure that financial
instruments complement rather that substitute each other;
154. Notes that 2017 was the first year of the audit campaign for the CEF programme and that it will require
2-3 further years of CEF auditing to deduce a meaningful error rate calculation for all CEF sectors; nevertheless
welcomes the fact that detected errors for CEF and TEN-T audits closed in 2017 were very low;
155. Is concerned that Commission's Internal Audit Service found significant weaknesses in DG MOVE's current system
of monitoring both aviation and maritime security policy and made three very important recommendations; calls
on DG MOVE to fully implement the action plan that it prepared for addressing the identified risks;
Culture and education
156. Welcomes the achievements of 30 years of the Erasmus, programme, engaging 9 million people, including young
people, students and, recently, members of staff in mobility activity since 1987; stresses the strong European
added value of the programme and its role in delivering as a strategic investment in Europe's young people;
157. Notes that the Erasmus programme needs to do more to be accessible to marginalised groups, in particular,
persons with disabilities and special education requirements, persons who are geographically disadvantaged, early
school leavers, persons belonging to a minority, those at a socioeconomic disadvantage, etc.;
158. Is alarmed by the low take-up of the Erasmus+ Student Loan Guarantee Facility as well as its insufficient
geographical coverage, limited to banks in three countries and universities in another two; urges the Commission
and European Investment Fund to put in place an implementation strategy to maximise the Facility's effectiveness
till 2020; or alternatively, to facilitate the redistribution of the unused funds in the programme itself and allow for
a better funding coverage of actions within the different strands;
159. Is worried by the still low project success rates under the Europe for Citizens programme and the Creative Europe
Culture sub-programme (21 % and 22 % respectively in 2017); stresses that a more adequate level of financing is
decisive to tackle these unsatisfactory results which are counterproductive to the objectives of the programme
itself in discouraging citizens from participating;
160. Highlights the role of the Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) in implementing the three
culture and education programmes: expresses however its concern at the weakness of the EACEA internal control
identified by an audit on the Erasmus+ and Creative Europe grant management; notes that the Commission's
Internal Audit Service itself has found weaknesses in EACEA's Erasmus+ grant management process; takes the
view, therefore, that the Commission and EACEA should have no difficulty in putting in place the necessary
corrective actions in order to ensure full transparency, and guarantee the highest quality of their implementation
of the culture and education programmes;L 249/48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
INDIRECT MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
161. Notes that in 2017, the Commission has signed contracts with UN agencies with a value of nearly
EUR 253,5 million of contributions from the Union budget, with United Nations Development Programme
(EUR 119,21 million), Unicef (EUR 29,34 million) and United Nations Office for Projects Services
(EUR 20,05 million) being the biggest beneficiaries, and contracts with the World Bank worth
EUR 174,11 million;
162. Given the shift in aid modalities from direct grants to trust funds and blended finance, including through the
European Fund for Sustainable Development, invites the Council, Commission and European Investment Bank to
adopt an inter-institutional agreement with the European Parliament on transparency, accountability and parlia
mentary scrutiny on the basis of the policy principles set out in the New European Consensus on Development;
163. Welcomes the Court's recommendations for improving the transparency of Union funds implemented by NGOs
published in the Special Report No 35/2018, where it, amongst other things, recommends that the Commission
improve the reliability of the information on NGOs in its accounting system, and that the Commission improve
the information collected on funds implemented by NGOs; calls therefore on the Commission to implement these
proposals before the end of the current mandate;
164. Fully recognises the complex nature of many challenges and the need for multifaceted and complementary
response actions, but insists on the need for clarity in funding arrangements and respect for international
commitments;
165. Notes that the number of financial instruments has increased considerably which allows for new blending oppor
tunities in the transport sector, while at the same time creating a complex web of arrangements around the Union
budget; is concerned that these instruments alongside the Union budget could risk undermining the level of
accountability and transparency, as reporting, audit and public scrutiny are not aligned; calls upon the
Commission to find how the Union budgetary system could be reformed, in particular as how best to ensure that
overall funding arrangements are not more complex than necessary to meet Union policy objectives and guarantee
accountability, transparency and auditability;
EFSI
166. Points out that the budgetary authority increased the EFSI guarantee from EUR 16 billion to EUR 26 billion and
the target investment volume from EUR 315 billion to 500 billion and that by the end of 2017, the EIB Group
had signed EUR 36,7 billion worth of contracts (2016: EUR 21,3 billion);
167. Notes that, according to the Court, 64 % of the total value of EFSI contracts that the EIB Group had signed by the
end of 2017 was concentrated in six Member States: France, Italy, Spain, Germany, UK, Poland;
168. Regrets the fact that only 20 % of EFSI financing has supported projects that contribute to climate change
mitigation and adaptation, whereas the EIB's standard portfolio has attained the 25 % threshold; calls on the
Commission to propose sustainable finance or funding options and an environment conducive to investment
reflecting the Union's commitments and general goals, with a view to fostering innovation and economic, social
and territorial cohesion within the Union, as well as to reinforcing the social dimension of investment by bridging
the investment gap in the social sector and with regard to infrastructure safety;
169. Calls on the Commission to ensure that EFSI's management bodies take into account the need for a proper
geographical balance when signing contracts and to report back to the Parliament on the progress achieved;
Research area
170. Notes that in terms of payments, in 2017 the Commission invested EUR 11,2 billion in the area of research and
innovation (R&I), 58 % being managed directly and 42 % allocated via entrusted bodies, and that of the latter,
18,2 % (EUR 583 million) were executed via Joint Undertakings and 16,8 % (EUR 540 million) were distributed
via the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF);
171. Calls on the Commission to report to Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control during the second half of
2019 on the implementation and results of the financial instruments in the area of research;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/49
Trust funds
172. Points out that aid to non-Union countries used increasingly alternative financing models — such as trust funds
and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey — which increases the complexity of existing financial structures; however
acknowledges that these instruments have made it possible to react swiftly to challenging circumstances and
provide flexibility;
173. Points out that pooling resources from the European Development Fund (EDF), the Union Budget and other
donors in trust funds should not have as consequence that money flagged for development and cooperation
policy do not reach their normal beneficiaries or pursue their original objectives, such as the eradication of
poverty and the promotion of fundamental rights;
174. Points out that the increased use of trust funds also stems from a lack of flexibility currently possible within the
Union budget;
175. Highlights that the increasing use of other financial mechanisms to deliver Union policies alongside the Union
Budget risks undermining the level of accountability and transparency as reporting, audit and public scrutiny
arrangements are not aligned; calls, therefore on the Commission to consider putting an end to trust funds,
especially where their ‘emergency’ nature is not well justified, where they are unable to attract significant contri
butions from other donors, and where fundamental rights violations risk to happen or third country authorities
are involved that do not respect fundamental rights;
Facility for Turkey
176. Notes that in its Special Report No 27/2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Court found that, in
a challenging context, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey rapidly mobilised EUR 3 billion to provide a swift
response to the refugee crisis, but did not fully achieve its objective of coordinating this response effectively, or
achieving sufficient value for money; asks the Commission to implement all recommendations made by the Court
on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, notably improving monitoring and reporting on cash-assistance projects
and improving the operating environment for (International) Non-Governmental Organisations with the Turkish
authorities, to ensure that funds are accurately targeting refugee projects and not used for any other purposes;
calls on the Commission to report regularly to the Parliament on the compatibility of the actions financed with
the underlying legal basis;
177. Notes in addition that according to the Court, the audited projects provided helpful support to refugees and that
most of them achieved their outputs, but half of them had not yet achieved their expected outcomes;
178. Notes that the European Ombudsman has concluded that the Commission should do more to ensure that the
EU-Turkey Statement respects EU fundamental rights, and therefore calls on the Commission to systematically
include fundamental rights considerations in its decisions under this facility, including through fundamental rights
impact assessments; calls on the Commission to report on this regularly to the European Parliament;
179. Regrets that an investigation by EIC European Investigative Collaborations has raised doubts about the use of
funds from the instrument; calls on the Commission to thoroughly investigate the matter and to report to
Parliament on the results;
180. Calls on DG DEVCO to revisit by 2020 the existing guidance to beneficiaries of projects implemented under
indirect management, with the aim of ensuring that planned activities are executed in a timely manner and
contribute to the practical use of the projects outputs, to obtain the best value for money;
181. Notes that the Court indicates that the level of error in spending on ‘Administration’ was not material;
nevertheless notes with concern that the error rate increased when compared to the previous year (0,55 % in
2017 and 0,2 % in 2016);
182. Notes that while the Court did not find any significant weaknesses, it did find recurring areas where there was
scope for improvement;L 249/50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
International Management Group (IMG)
183. Notes that the Court of Justice in its final and unappealable judgment of 31 January 2019 on the International
Management Group (IMG) case (7) annuls two decisions of the Commission: (1) not to conclude any new
delegation agreements for indirect management with IMG from 8 May 2015; and (2) to reallocate EUR 10 million
from IMG to the German public operator GIZ for a contract on technical assistance to Myanmar's trade policy;
notes, in addition, that according to the Court of Justice, it is necessary to decide on the amount of the financial
compensation due to IMG because of the damage caused by the Commission's decision of 8 May 2015, and the
Commission must dismiss all the cross-appeals presented by it;
184. Notes the conclusion of the Court of Justice that the legal arguments developed by the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF) on which the Commission based its decisions concerning IMG constitute a legal error both in terms of
international law and the Union's Financial Regulation; regrets that, as the Court of Justice explains, in its investi
gation of IMG OLAF has exceeded its powers and has not taken into consideration the requirements of the
guarantee code so often claimed by Parliament; supports in this regard any further measures ensuring that the
ongoing revision of the OLAF Regulation establishes the necessary control of procedural guarantee and appeal
possibilities to avoid such harmful actions which erode the credit and the trust of citizens in the Union;
185. Takes also note of the judgment of 13 February 2019 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration situated in the
Hague (8) according to which the Commission is due to pay EUR 2 million, which it has refused to do based on
the allegations against IMG and on the OLAF investigation, for expenditures invoiced by IMG on seven joint
management contracts signed with the Commission;
186. Deeply regrets that since 2012 the Parliament's procedure for the Commission discharge has been unable to reveal
the false allegations against IMG or to contribute to avoiding the serious damage to IMG both financially and
reputationally, including the loss of more than 200 jobs;
187. Urges the Commission to implement the judicial decisions and to fully recognise IMG's status as an international
organisation, which was incorrectly put into question and denied by it and by OLAF; calls on the Commission to
undertake all necessary measures in order to repair and compensate the damages inflicted on IMG and to ensure
that IMG can participate in a fair procedure as is provided for international organisations in the Financial
Regulation; asks the Commission to report to the discharge authority as soon as possible on the measures taken;
Administration
Nomination procedure for the designation of the secretary general of the Commission
188. Is not satisfied by the Commission's reactions to the media's and general public's valid concerns on the procedure
immediately after the appointment of the Secretary-General of the Commission took place, or by Commission's
explanations presented at the European Parliament's plenary debate and in its written response to the European
Parliament's resolution of 18 April 2018 on the integrity policy of the Commission, in particular the appointment
of the Secretary-General of the European Commission (9), which were evasive, defensive and legalistic,
demonstrating a lack of sensitivity for the importance European citizens attach to transparent, fair and open
recruitment procedures;
189. Recalls, in this context, the European Ombudsman's finding of four instances of maladministration in its
Recommendation in joint cases 488/2018/KR and 514/2018/KR; notes that the Ombudsman's conclusions are
‘largely similar to those of the European Parliament’ and that it agrees with the European Parliament's assessment
that the double appointment stretched and possibly even overstretched the limits of the law; stresses the
Ombudsman's final recommendation to the Commission that the Commission should develop a specific
procedure for its Secretary-General, separate and independent from other senior appointments; regrets, therefore,
the Commission's defiant reply to the Ombudsman of 3 December 2018, which shows little discernment of the
points raised by the Ombudsman following the Ombudsman's examination of 11 000 pages of documentation;
calls on the next College of Commissioners and their president to review the appointment in light of the
Ombudsman's findings and Parliament's resolution;
(7) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v European Commission, Joined Cases C-183/17 P
and C-184/17 P, ECLI:EU:C:2019:78.
(8) PCA Case No 2017-03.
(9) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0117.27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/51
190. Takes into account the fact that Commissioner Oettinger organised an interinstitutional round table on senior
management selection and appointment on 25 September 2018, although the meeting seems to have been
inconclusive; calls therefore on the Commission to put in practice paragraph 29 of its abovementioned resolution
of 18 April 2018;
191. Calls on the Commission, as well as on all European institutions to review, where necessary, nomination
procedures, in particular for senior officials and where relevant for cabinet members, and to take additional
measures to improve transparency, fairness and equal opportunity during appointment procedures on the basis of
the European Ombudsman's findings and the study of the European Parliament on the appointment procedures in
the EU institutions; calls on the Commission to report back to the European Parliament by 31 August 2019 on
the progress made;
192. Requests the immediate resignation of the Secretary-General and the opening of a fair, fully transparent and open
competition for this post.
European Schools
193. Notes that the European Schools received EUR 189,9 million from the European budget in 2017;
194. Acknowledges that the Court's review did not reveal material errors in the final consolidated financial statements
of the European Schools for 2017 and that the European Schools and the Central Office prepared their annual
accounts within the legal deadline; notes however that the internal control system of the European Schools still
needs further improvements to meet the recommendation made by the Court and the European Commission's
Internal Audit Service (IAS);
195. Finds it exasperating that after more than 15 years there is still no sound financial management system in place
for European schools;
196. Remains concerned by the significant weakness in the internal control systems of the Central Office and selected
Schools, in particular in payment systems, control environment and recruitment process;
197. Notes that the Court has been unable to confirm that the Schools' financial management in 2017 was compliant
with the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules: demands, therefore, further efforts in closing the
remaining recommendations related to the management of extra-budgetary accounts, improvement of the
accounting and internal control systems, as well as recruitment and payment procedures and the development of
the guidelines to improve budgetary management;
198. Reiterates Parliament's view that a ‘comprehensive review’ of the European Schools system is urgently required to
consider ‘reform covering managerial, financial, organisational and pedagogical issues’ and recalls its request that
‘the Commission submit annually a report giving its assessment of the state of progress’ to Parliament;
199. Finds it unacceptable that, according to the Commission, eight critical or very important recommendations issues
by the Commission's Internal Audit Service over the period 2014-2017 are still pending; requests to obtain
a progress report on these recommendations implementation by 30 June 2019;
Follow-up of the Commission discharge for 2016
200. Notes that in the Communication of the Commission on the follow-up of the 2016 discharge, the Commission
made a selection of the 394 issues that are raised by the Parliament for the financial year 2016 and did not
comment on 108 paragraphs; demands that the Commission reply in detail to all the issues raised by the
European Parliament in its resolutions forming an integral part of its decisions on the discharge;
201. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has responded to Parliament's remarks on the External Assistance
Management Reports (EAMR) and Key Performance Indicators contained in its resolution of 18 April 2018 on
discharge for the financial year 2016 (10), and has made changes in order to improve those; notes that the
Commission has transmitted the 2017 EAMR to the Parliament without confidentiality constraints but regrets that
the access to those reports de facto has become more cumbersome; looks forward to a facilitated access for
Parliament to those reports in the future;
(10) OJ L 248, 3.10.2018, p. 29.L 249/52 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
Miscellaneous issues
202. Is concerned by the Commission's delay in addressing the growing problem of the disparity in the correction
coefficient applied to European civil servants posted to Luxembourg, given that by 2018 this disparity had more
than tripled (16,8 %) as compared to the threshold of 5 % laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Union, with the resulting erosion of the attractiveness of Luxembourg and unfair discrimination against
more than 11 000 European Union officials, obliging more than one third of them to reside in neighbouring
countries, thus worsening cross-border traffic; notes that other international institutions located in Luxembourg
have already given a positive solution to this problem; urges the Commission to examine itself the existing
problem of the current correction coefficient and to undertake the necessary measures;
203. Points out that impact assessments are an indispensable part of the policy cycle; regrets that on occasion,
legislative proposals made by the Commission lack a comprehensive impact assessment; further regrets that in
some cases, the Commission has failed to take fundamental rights into account; reiterates that impact assessments
should be based on evidence, and at all times comply with fundamental rights that are enshrined in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights;
204. Urges the Commission to terminate as soon as possible, as already done in 2018 with the convention with
doctors and dentists, the convention with Luxembourg hospitals on over-charging for the treatment of officials
and other servants of the European Union in Luxembourg, which costs more than EUR 2 million per year and is
in breach of Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (11) as regards the equal
treatment of European patients, in line with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 October 2000 (12);
205. Calls on the Commission to carry out the most rigorous and most up-to-date analysis of the impact of the design
of open spaces, as those in the new JMO II building, with regard to the effect on productivity and provision of
decent workplaces and working conditions for the staff concerned; asks the Commission to inform the Parliament
of the outcome of this analysis;
206. Stresses the necessity to further implement active and effective measures to prevent and combat all forms of
harassment and mobbing; emphasises the urgent need for stricter standards on mobbing and harassment at work,
and the creation of an ethical culture to prevent any form of abuse inside the Commission and the institutions of
the Union;
2014-2017: How the European Parliament contributed to and continues to contribute to establishing
sound financial management structures in the Commission and in the Member States
Performance-based budgeting and auditing
207. Insists that the planning, implementation and reporting on the achieved results of the European Union budget
should be policy-driven;
208. Insisted that the implementation of the European Union budget should focus on results and achieving broader
positive outcomes and that the structure of the Union budget should be modified to provide for measuring
progress and performance;
209. Encouraged, in this context, the Commission and the Court to pay greater attention to simplification, results and
broader outcomes achieved, performance audits and the final impact of policies;
210. Stresses that any and all audits should be focused on the areas most likely to be subject to error, especially those
with the greatest funding levels;
211. Cooperated closely with the Commission to develop the Article 318-Evaluation-Report into a comprehensive
synthesis report, recording the progress in different policy areas, which later became the first part of the Annual
Management and Performance Report;
(11) Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients' rights in cross-
border healthcare (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45).
(12) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 October 2000, Angelo Ferlini v Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg, Case C-411/98,
ECLI:EU:C:2000:530.27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/53
Integrated internal control framework
212. Supported the inclusion of Article 63 in the revised Financial Regulation, which introduces the ‘single audit
scheme’ into the shared management, emphasising that well-functioning management and control systems at
national and European level are a crucial element in the single audit chain; agrees that the single audit approach
allows a better use of resources and should avoid duplication of audits at the level of beneficiaries; notes that the
Commission's single audit strategy is to ascertain the reliability of audit results and error rates reported annually
by audit authorities and to monitor their work through a robust and coordinated control and audit framework;
encourages the Commission to continue monitoring and reviewing the work of audit authorities in order to
ensure a common audit framework and reliable results;
Research
213. Advocated clearer rules and greater use of the simplified cost option (SCO), i.e. lump-sum payments under the
Horizon 2020 programme;
Structural funds
214. Insisted on strengthening the responsibilities of national management and audit authorities for the budget
implementation;
215. Supported the move away from ‘reimbursement’ (reimburse incurred costs) to ‘entitlement’ schemes which reduce
considerably the risk of errors;
Agriculture
216. Advocated that environmental requirements should be reinforced, that income support should be more fairly
allocated with progressive payments scheme favourable to small farms and sustainable and environmentally
friendly farming and that the CAP should urgently and definitively be made more attractive to young farmers;
217. Called on the CAP to become more environmentally sensible whilst farmer-friendly;
Migration
218. Contributed Union funding to meet the increased migratory challenges for the period 2015-2018 by doubling the
funding to EUR 22 billion;
219. Called on the Member States to address the root causes of migration in coordination with development policy as
well as with external policy;
Union foreign affairs
220. Called for Union foreign affairs to be consistent and well-coordinated and that the EDF, trust funds and financial
instruments be managed in step with internal policies;
Administration
221. Insisted on the revision of the Code of Conduct for Commissioners, which finally entered into force on 31 January
2018;
222. Insisted that the recruitment procedures for senior positions in European institutions and bodies be revised and
that all vacant posts should be published in the interest of transparency, integrity and equal opportunities;
223. Continued to advocate a policy of zero-tolerance for fraud;
Recommendations for the future
Reporting
224. Recalls that for future years, Article 247(1)(c) of the Financial Regulation sets out an obligation for the
Commission to communicate annually to the European Parliament and the Council an integrated set of financial
and accountability reports, including a long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows covering the next
5 years;L 249/54 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
225. Insists that that report should analyse the impact of commitments to the size of payments' backlog of a given
Multiannual Financial Framework;
226. Calls on the Commission, for management and reporting purposes, to establish a way of recording Union
budgetary expenditure that will make it possible to report on all funding related to the refugee and migration
crisis, as well as for the future Union policy on management of migration flows and integration;
227. Wonders why the Commission uses two sets of objectives and indicators to measure the performance of financial
management: on the one hand, the Commission's Directors-General evaluate the achievement of the objectives
defined in their management plan in their AARs, and, on the other, the Commission measures the performance of
spending programmes via the programme statements of operational expenditure annexed to the draft budget; calls
on the Commission to make its reporting based on single set of objectives and indicators;
228. Points out that performance information is mainly used at DG level to manage programmes and policies; is
concerned that as the performance information that meets day-to-day management needs is not aligned with the
Commission's external reporting responsibilities, DGs do generally not use the Commission's core performance
reports to manage their performance of the Union budget;
229. Points out that there is no requirement for DGs or the Commission to explain in their performance reports how
they used performance information in decision-making; calls on the Commission to include such information in
their future performance reports;
230. Regrets once again that AARs do not include a declaration on the quality of the reported performance data, and
that consequently in adopting the Annual and Performance Report (AMPR), the College of Commissioners takes
overall political responsibility for the financial management of the Union budget but not for the information on
performance and results;
231. Points out that the Communication to the Commission on the Governance in the European Commission adopted
on 21 November 2018 (C(2018) 7703) does not modify the distinction made between the ‘political responsibility
of Commissioners’ and the ‘operational responsibility of Directors-General’ introduced by the administrative
reform of 2000; observes that it has not always been made clear whether ‘political responsibility’ encompasses
responsibility for the directorates-general, or is distinct from it;
232. Reiterates the findings of the Court's 2017 audit, indicating that the ‘Commission should make better use of its
own performance information and develop an internal culture more focused on performance’; consequently, calls
on the Commission to incorporate performance-based budgeting in their whole policy cycle;
233. Deplores the increasingly late publication of the Commission's ‘Annual Report on the implementation of the
European Union's instruments for financing external actions’, practically hampering Parliament's oversight and
public accountability, with the report on 2016 published only in March 2018 and the report on 2017 still
outstanding; invites the Commission to publish the report on 2018 by the end of September 2019 at the latest
and to maintain this calendar for subsequent years;
234. Notes that a number of weaknesses were found in the performance measurement systems of Member State
authorities, in large part related to projects completed under the 2007-2013 period; invites the Commission to
improve the overall performance measurement system, including the presence of result indicators at project level
to allow the assessment of the contribution of a given project to specific operational programmes objectives; notes
that the legislation covering the 2014-2020 programming period has strengthened the intervention logic and
focus on results;
235. Reiterates its request that the Commission, in view of the multiple sources of funding, provides an easy access to
projects, in form of a one-stop-shop to allow citizens to clearly follow the developments and funding of
infrastructures co-financed by Union funds and by the EFSI; encourages the Commission therefore to publish, in
cooperation with the Member States, an annual overview of transport and tourism projects that have been
co-financed through the ERDF and cohesion funds as it is practised for the CEF;
236. Calls on the Commission to:
(a) streamline performance reporting by:
— further reducing the number of objectives and indicators it uses for its various performance reports and
focusing on those which best measure the performance of the Union budget,
— improving the alignment between high-level general objectives and specific programme and policy
objectives;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/55
(b) better balance performance reporting by clearly presenting information on the main Union challenges still to
be achieved;
(c) provide a declaration on the quality of the reported performance data;
(d) take overall political responsibility in the AMPR for the information on ‘performance and results’;
(e) include up-to-date performance information in performance reporting, including in the AMPR, on progress
made towards achieving targets and always take, or make proposals for, action when these targets are not met;
(f) indicate how performance information concerning the Union budget has been used in its decision-making;
(g) introduce or improve measures and incentives to foster a greater focus on performance in the Commission's
internal culture, taking into account in particular opportunities offered by the revised Financial Regulation, the
Budget Focused on Results initiative, performance reporting for on-going projects, and other sources;
(h) develop data processing methods for the vast quantities of data created by performance reporting with the
goal of giving a timely, fair and true picture on achievements; insists that performance reporting should be
used to take corrective action when the objectives of programmes are not met;
237. Recommends that the Court continue to provide a separate chapter for security and citizenship in its annual
report and to deepen its analysis in this regard, as the public and political interest in the security and migration
part of the Union budget is much higher than its financial share;
238. Asks the Commission to provide the Parliament with an overview of the cases — in Union-funded cohesion and
rural development projects — where the Union reimbursement exceeds the actual costs incurred for a given
project without VAT;
239. Welcomes the proposal made by the Court in its consultation paper on ‘Recurrent reporting on the performance
of EU action’ to publish annually, in November of year N + 1, an evaluation of the performance of Union action,
covering a detailed review of the performance information reported by the Commission in its Article 318 TFEU
evaluation report; insists once again that this report should contain in a second part a detailed review of the
synthesis of the financial management of the Commission as stated in the second part of the Annual Management
and performance report;
240. Recalls that the ultimate objective of a more performance-focused audit analysis should be to put in place a global
and consistent model based not only on assessing the implementation of the European budget, but also on
achieving added value and the objectives of a Union political strategy 2021-2027 which should replace the Europe
2020 Strategy;
241. Insists that the Court should improve the coordination between project level performance assessments carried out
in the context of the Statement of Assurance work and the remainder of its performance work, through the
reporting, in particular, of the main conclusions of its special reports in sectoral chapters of its Annual report;
considers this helpful for improving and reinforcing a systematic association of Parliament's sectoral policy
committees in using the Court's products;
242. Requests the Court to provide the discharge authorities with an assessment in terms of both compliance and
performance, of each European policy, following chapter by chapter the budget headings in the Court annual
report;
243. Insists that the Court put in place an extended follow-up of its performance audit recommendations;
244. Stresses that women's rights and gender equality should be integrated and ensured into all policy areas; reiterates
therefore its call for the implementation of gender budgeting at all stages of the budgetary process, including the
implementation of the budget and assessment of its implementation;
245. Reiterates its demand to include in the common set of result indicators for the implementation of the Union
budget also gender-specific indicators, with due regard to the principle of sound financial management, namely in
accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;L 249/56 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
Error rate calculation and reporting
246. Is of the opinion that the Commission's methodology for estimating its amount at risk or errors has improved
over the years but that individual DGs' estimations of the level of irregular spending are not based on a consistent
methodology and that the AARs of the DGs and the AMPR use a complex terminology that could be confusing;
247. Notes in particular that the services of the Commission use at least all the following concepts: residual error rate,
reported error rate, error rate at payment, error rate detected in the year, net residual error rate, weighted average
error rate, error rate at closure or common representative error rate;
248. Points out, in addition, that for more than three quarters of 2017 expenditure, Commission DGs base their
estimates of amount at risk on data provided by national authorities whilst it appears from the annual activity
reports of the concerned Commission directorates-general (DG AGRI and DG REGIO) that the reliability of
Member States control reports remains a challenge;
249. Notes that the reported global amount at risk at payment estimated by the Commission in its AMPR 2017 is
based on figures of the individual services responsible for spending programmes which use different methods of
calculation of the level of error reflecting different legal and organisational frameworks; underlines that further
harmonisation of methods of calculation would increase the credibility, accountability and transparency of the
reported global amount at risk and allow a clear picture of the situation with regard to residual error rate and the
rate of risk on payment in the future;
250. Is worried, in addition, that the Annual Management and Performance Report compares very different figures and
is therefore misleading, given that the Court's estimated level of error is an error rate at payment and without
deduction of corrections, while the Commission's global amount at risk reported in the AMPR is calculated after
deduction of corrections; finds it therefore impossible to make proper comparisons or to draw reliable
conclusions; supports the Court in calculating the error rate without taking corrections into account; calls on the
Commission to indicate error rates without and with corrections in all annual activity reports, as well as in the
AMPR; would appreciate that, in order to find a solution to this incomparability, the Court express its opinion on
the Commission's error rate after correction;
251. In this regard, asks the Commission to further harmonise its methods for calculating error rates with the Court,
taking into account the different management modes and legal bases while making the error rates comparable,
and to clearly distinguish the amount at risk with and without integrated financial corrections; requests also that
the Commission present information about the corrective capacity for recovering unduly payments from the
Union budget;
252. Reiterates its concern at the difference between the Commission's and the Court's methods for calculating errors,
which prevents proper comparison of the error rates reported by them; stresses that in order to present a reliable
comparison of the error rates reported by the Commission in its AMPR and the AARs of the Directorates-General
and estimated by the Court, the Commission should use an equivalent methodology to that of the Court when
assessing the error rate and that both institutions should conclude as a matter of urgency an agreement in this
regard; calls on the Commission to present the data in a manner consistent with the methodology adopted by the
Court and including the expected estimated corrections;
253. Asks the Commission and the Member States once again to put in place sound procedures to confirm the timing,
the origin and the amount of corrective measures and to provide information reconciling, as far as possible, the
year in which payments are made, the year in which the related error is detected and the year in which recoveries
or financial corrections are disclosed in the notes to the accounts; asks the Court to mention the level of
correction applied to calculate the error rate in its Annual Report, as well as the original error rate before
corrections;
254. Deplores the fact that the Annual Management and Performance Report (AMPR) has not been audited by the
Court whilst some annual activity reports (AARs), and in particular, the ones of DG EMPL and DG REGIO have
been examined by the Court; calls on the Court carefully to examine and review the AMPR in its annual report;27.9.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 249/57
Timely absorption and performance
255. Notes that the low absorption rate is mainly due to the later closure of the previous MFF, the late adoption of
legal acts, difficulties in implementing the new requirements for the current MFF, the change in the
de-commitment rules from N + 2 to N + 3 and the administrative burden linked to overlaps between MFF periods;
256. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not yet produced a comprehensive, long-term projection to aid
decision-making for the next MFF that fully complies with the Interinstitutional Agreement;
257. Notes that the slow absorption of funds remains a problem in some countries; is therefore of the opinion that it is
appropriate to leave the ‘Task Force for Better Implementation’ in place; notes also that the Commission has
created a ‘Catching-up Regions’ initiative; in this context, points to the risk of accumulating a huge backlog of
commitment appropriations by the end of the financial term;
Conflicts of interest, rule of law, fight against fraud and corruption
258. Deplores any kind of risk of breaching the values stated in Article 2 of the TEU and non-compliance with Article
61(1) of the Financial Regulation regarding conflicts of interest that could compromise the implementation of the
Union budget and undermine the trust of Union citizens in the proper management of Union taxpayers' money;
calls on the Commission to ensure that a zero tolerance policy with no double standards will apply regarding any
breach of Union law, as well as conflicts of interest;
259. Calls on the Commission to enforce the European Parliament's resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in
Hungary (13), Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 regarding the rule of law
in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and
(EU) 2017/1520 (14) and the Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious
breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law submitted by the Commission on 20 December 2017
(COM(2017) 835);
260. Recalls the investigations OLAF conducted on the ELIOS and ‘Heart of Budapest’ projects where serious irregular
ities were found; in the first case a small amount of funds was recovered, whereas in the second case the
Hungarian authorities accepted the financial correction, but it has still not been implemented; notes that the facts
surrounding Metro-line four are still ‘sub judice’; notes in addition, that in Slovakia there is an ongoing OLAF
investigation on allegations of fraud, as well as that currently there are 6 conformity enquiries conducted by the
Commission regarding direct payments;
261. Recalls with concern the outcomes of the missions of the Parliament's Budgetary Control Committee to Slovakia,
which have revealed a series of shortcomings and risks for the management and control of Union funds and a risk
of infiltration by organised crime, especially in the context of the murder of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak;
calls in this regard on the Commission and OLAF to take the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee
outlined in its mission report, as well as on the Commission to actively monitor the situation, to take the
necessary measures and to keep the Parliament informed about the follow-up;
262. Calls on the Commission to create a unified Europe-wide strategy for the active avoidance of conflicts of interest
as one of its priorities with an adapted strategy of ex ante and ex post control; calls on the commission, OLAF and
the future European Public Prosecutor's Office to include in this strategy the protection both of whistleblowers and
of investigative journalists;
263. Calls on the Commission to ensure that action plans on conflicts of interest are prepared and implemented in
each Member State, and to report back to Parliament on progress;
264. Welcomes the fact that the Commission publishes meetings of Commissioners with interest representatives;
regrets, however that the subject matter discussed during the meetings is not included in the Register, calls on the
Commission to complete the register by including the content of the meetings;
265. Notes that according to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, the situation in a large number of Member States
has not improved or has even deteriorated; calls on the Commission to finally submit to Parliament a follow-up to
its anti-corruption report of 2015, describing, preferably on an annual basis, the situation with respect to anti-
corruption policies in the Member States as well as in the European Institutions;
(13) OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 75.
(14) OJ L 17, 23.1.2018, p. 50.L 249/58 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.9.2019
266. Underlines that, according to the Code of Conduct for Commissioners in force since January 2018, former
Commissioners must not lobby Commissioners or their staff on behalf of their own business, that of their
employer client, or on matters for which they were responsible within their portfolio for a period of two years
after ceasing to hold their office; calls on the Commission to bring this cooling off period in line with that for the
President, i.e. three years;
267. Welcomes the Ombudsman's findings and recommendations in her decision in the strategic inquiry OI/3/2017/NF
on how the Commission manages ‘revolving doors’ situations of its members of staff; shares the Ombudsman's
encouragement to the Commission to continue to lead by example but to take a more robust approach in its
assessment of senior staff who leave the Union civil service; calls on the Commission to implement the
improvements suggested by the Ombudsman and to follow up on the good transparency practices identified by
her;
268. Stresses that the opinions of the Ethical Committee on conflicts of interest must be proactively produced by the
Committee, especially for Commissioners who leave the service; furthermore, stresses that the composition of the
Ethical Committee should be strengthened with members from international organisations, such as OECD, and
NGOs with expertise in the field of integrity policies;
269. Recalls that in its abovementioned resolution of 18 April 2018, the European Parliament expressed its concerns at
the appointment procedures for its senior officials; urges the Commission to continue the discussion with
Parliament on the implementation of the various recommendations contained in Parliament's resolution;
270. Is deeply concerned by the statement made in the European Commission Reaction dated 15 March 2019 which
recognises that ‘the Secretary-general contributed to correctly establish the replies relating to him in order to
ensure that they are complete and exhaustive’ which is definitely contrary to Article 11a of the Staff Regulation
(Title II: Rights and Obligations of Officials) (15).
(15) ‘An official shall not, in the performance of his duties and save as hereinafter provided, deal with a matter in which, directly or
indirectly, he has any personal interest such as to impair his independence, and, in particular, family and financial interests.’