RBI Bulletin - Mar 19, 2025

MARCH 2025 VOLUME LXXIX NUMBER 3Editorial Committee Rajiv Ranjan Ashwani Kumar Tripathi Rekha Misra Praggya Das Sunil Kumar Snehal Herwadkar Pankaj Kumar V. Dhanya Shweta Kumari Anirban Sanyal Sujata Kundu Editor G. V. Nadhanael The Reserve Bank of India Bulletin is issued monthly by the Department of Economic and Policy Research, Reserve Bank of India, under the direction of the Editorial Committee. The Central Board of the Bank is not responsible for interpretation and opinions expressed. In the case of signed articles, the responsibility is that of the author. © Reserve Bank of India 2025 All rights reserved. Reproduction is permitted provided an acknowledgment of the source is made. For subscription to Bulletin, please refer to Section ‘Recent Publications’ The Reserve Bank of India Bulletin can be accessed at https://bulletin.rbi.org.inCONTENTS Speeches Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage 01 Shri Sanjay Malhotra Keynote Address at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance 07 Shri Sanjay Malhotra Address at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025 11 Shri Sanjay Malhotra Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance 15 Shri M. Rajeshwar Rao Articles State of the Economy 23 Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production 73 Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey 85 Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis 99 Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe 111 Current Statistics 127 Recent Publications 181SPEECHES Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage Shri Sanjay Malhotra Keynote Address at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance Shri Sanjay Malhotra Address at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025 Shri Sanjay Malhotra Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance Shri M. Rajeshwar RaoTransforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage SPEECH Transforming Grievance Scheduled Commercial Banks alone received over 10 million complaints from their customers. If we take Redress: The AI Advantage* into account the complaints received at other RBI- regulated entities (REs), the number would be even Shri Sanjay Malhotra higher. One may argue that this amounts to only four complaints per thousand accounts per year as I am delighted to participate in this year’s Annual there are about 2.5 billion bank accounts. But, for us, Conference of the RBI Ombudsmen. The Reserve even one complaint is a cause of concern. We have Bank has been organising this conference on or 10 million complaints and with the rapidly growing around the World Consumer Rights Day, that is, 15th customer base and expanding suite of products, this March. World Consumer Rights Day is celebrated may grow, if we do not get our act together. every year with the aim of raising global awareness Customer satisfaction – a cornerstone for banking about consumer rights and needs. We organise this and other financial services conference to reflect on our achievements with regard to consumer services and to deliberate on how Excellent customer service, in fact excellent to improve services and reduce grievances. We need customer experience is a sine qua non in any service to improve consumer services, not only because it industry. Our effort should be to enhance the total is our duty to do so, but because it is in our selfish customer experience. The experience should be such interest to do so. In this age of competition, we would that there is no cause for a grievance that requires not survive long if we do not provide quality service a redress. Let me state a fundamental truth: every to our consumers. complaint is a test of trust. When a consumer files a grievance – whether for a disputed transaction, a We have made tremendous strides in improving lapse in service, inappropriate pricing or charges consumer services over the years. We have enabled or an unfair practice – it is a signal that our system internet banking and mobile banking. Most of the has fallen short. Left unresolved, such issues can banking services, be it opening a deposit account, erode consumer confidence and tarnish the entire or taking a small loan have been digitised, adding to ecosystem. the convenience and speed. We are making record number of digital transactions through UPI and other I am reminded of a real story about customer means of digital payments. Many among the younger service. Some of you, especially the management generation may have never visited a bank branch. We graduates, may have heard it but it is so appropriate have even enabled opening of accounts using video for today’s theme that it is worth being retold. In the KYC. winter of 1975, in a town in Alaska, a man walked into a store and complained to the salesman present While we have enhanced customer experience that the snow tyres that he bought some time ago over the years, the high number of customer were not holding. The salesman was a little puzzled. grievances continues to be a matter of serious He said that he could not replace them but will check concern. I am told that last year (2023-24), the 95 what he could do and went to the back of the store. * Inaugural Address by Shri Sanjay Malhotra, Governor, Reserve Bank of Those of you, who have visited departmental stores India At the Annual Conference of the RBI Ombudsmen, March 17, 2025, Mumbai. in the USA, would know that refunds are processed RBI Bulletin March 2025 1SPEECH Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage at the back of the store. The salesman came back after number of complaints processed at the Office of RBI some time and handed over some cash as refund and Ombudsman increased by 25 per cent from about the customer left satisfied. Can anyone guess why 2,35,000 in 2022-23 to almost 2,94,000 in 2023-24. this was unique, as no questions asked policy for Not only are large number of complaints getting refunds is fairly common in the USA? It is because escalated, a large proportion of them – nearly 57 the company in question is Nordstrom which does per cent of the maintainable complaints last year – not even sell tyres. It sells apparel and shoes. But, for required mediation or formal intervention by the Nordstrom, customer comes first. Trusting him and RBI Ombudsmen. You would all agree that this is a winning his trust is more important than anything highly unsatisfactory situation and needs our urgent else. attention. Some say that this is not a true story. How is I would, therefore, strongly urge all the this possible? How could a company offer refund for MD&CEOs, Zonal and Regional Managers and the a product which it never sold? Nordstrom, however, Branch Managers to spend some time every week, insists that this incident did take place. Nordstrom if not every day on grievance redressal. This is a had acquired three stores from another company must. All great CEOs find time to do it. We too must that sold miscellaneous articles including tyres. The keep some time in our diary for improving customer customer did not realise that the store had changed service and grievance redressal. and walked in with his complaint. The key message Improving customer service systems is that Nordstrom saw itself being in the business Customer complaints aren’t a nuisance – they are of customer service, and not just selling goods. We in fact opportunities to improve, innovate, and build too need to realise that we are in the business of trust. Handling them well can define your success. providing unalloyed customer service and not just Each unresolved grievance is a missed opportunity selling banking and other financial services. for regulated entities to reaffirm customer trust and Top management to accord priority to customer loyalty. It is also a warning signal as repeat complaints service are often signs of systemic flaws. Today, complaints I am sure you will all agree that we are indeed in often surface on social media even before reaching the business of customer service. However, I suspect official channels, highlighting the need for proactive that we are not spending enough time on customer measures. service and grievance redressal as a result of which The effort thus should be to not only resolve the not only are there a large number of complaints being complaints but also to ensure that the same type of received by banks and NBFCs but in the absence of complaint does not arise again. Many of the complaints satisfactory resolution, a large number of them are like digital transaction disputes, unauthorized charges, getting escalated to RBI Ombudsmen. or miscommunication frequently recur. These are Let me give you some perspective. The number clearcut symptoms of underlying issues in the overall of complaints received under RBI’s Integrated customer service framework of the regulated entities. Ombudsman Scheme increased at a compounded A thorough root cause analysis should be performed average growth rate of almost 50 per cent per year for each complaint so as to enable remedial action over last two years to 9.34 lakh in 2023-24. The and avoid repetition of same type of complaint. 2 RBI Bulletin March 2025Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage SPEECH In fact, I would go a step further. Best service is As for KYC, we need to ensure that once a not one in which there is no occasion for grievance customer has submitted documents to a financial redressal but one in which there is no occasion for institution, we do not insist on obtaining the same the customer service department to step in. Systems documents again. Once the customer has updated his should work seamlessly and conveniently so that details, for example, his residential address, with one customers do not have to call the branch or the regulated entity of any financial sector regulator, it customer service centre or talk to anyone in the Bank gets updated in CKYCR and other REs are notified of or NBFC. Systems have to be so user-friendly that the updation. PML Rules made by the Department of customers can rely on self-service rather than being Revenue in the Ministry of Finance and RBI’s Master dependent on anyone else. Directions on KYC mandate regulated entities to check Improving internal grievance redressal systems the CKYCR system before seeking KYC documents While improving systems to reduce grievances for opening an account. However, most banks and is important, setting up a robust grievance redressal NBFCs have not enabled the same in their branches/ system is equally important for all regulated entities. business outlets, causing avoidable inconvenience to I would urge you all to review the same. While the customers. This may be facilitated early. This will be regulations do not make any prescription for the in the interest of all. organisational structure for grievance redressal, my Another important issue connected to customer experience suggests that there should be at least protection is rising digital frauds. It is a matter of two levels for grievance redressal in large REs, with unresolved grievances getting escalated from the great concern that innocent customers continue to lower to the higher level. The highest level should fall prey to scamsters. While this could be attributed be at a fairly high rank. This to ensure that requests to rise in digital transactions and innovative methods do not get rejected without having been examined adopted by fraudsters, lack of customer awareness by a senior functionary who is empowered to take is also a major reason for the same. To mitigate this decisions in consumer interest. This will help reduce menace, REs not only need to put in place robust grievances getting escalated to the Ombudsman. It internal controls but also enhance digital financial must also be ensured that there are sufficient number literacy. of grievance redress officers at all levels including in The issues of mis-selling and aggressive recovery the Internal Ombudsman office. practices have been highlighted earlier too. In this I would also like to draw your attention to the context too, I would request you to keep consumer misclassification of complaints as requests, queries, interest supreme. and disputes by the regulated entities. This results in the complainants’ grievances remaining unaddressed. Embracing technology – the AI way Moreover, this is also a gross regulatory violation. Let me now come to the theme of this year’s Major areas of service improvement conference: AI’s potential to revolutionize grievance redressal. We are entering an exciting era where Let me now briefly allude to some of the major areas where we need to improve. These relate to KYC, technology, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), can digital frauds, mis-selling, and aggressive recovery drive remarkable improvements in speed, accuracy, practices. and fairness of complaint resolution. RBI Bulletin March 2025 3SPEECH Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage AI can help categorize incoming complaints Challenges and guardrails in AI driven grievance by urgency, complexity, or subject area, ensuring redressal system minimal delay in reaching the right people or the While AI presents unparalleled opportunities, right team. AI can also help in optimising complaint we need to be cognizant of the challenges and risks routing. Further, it can assist in decision-making and that its adoption poses. There are concerns on data reducing processing time. privacy, algorithmic bias and complexity in AI-driven models. As we embrace AI in grievance redressal or Secondly, AI can be used to pinpoint systemic any other process, we must also remain mindful gaps by analysing both structured and unstructured of ethical considerations. Human oversight, bias data such as emails, chat logs, and call transcripts. mitigation and data privacy must be integrated into This will aid in identifying training needs and guiding the AI Systems to ensure transparent and consistent necessary process reforms. Using data from millions outcomes. of consumer branch visits, call centre logs, mobile apps, and social media, a unified, AI-driven view of Investing in human resources all these interactions can help identify common pain While technology in all its forms is a powerful points more efficiently. Leveraging data analytics, enabler, I would like to emphasise that it is no sentiment analysis, and predictive models, AI can be substitute for integrity, empathy, and human used to analyse large volumes of data to detect spikes judgment. In a world increasingly driven by data, in issues – such as ATM failures or erroneous charges algorithms, and automation, it is all too easy to – and alert REs pre-emptively. lose sight of the human element. Every transaction represents not just a number in a ledger, but the Lastly, in a linguistically diverse country like hard-earned savings of a family, the dreams of a small India, AI-driven chatbots and voice recognition entrepreneur, or the lifelong savings of a senior citizen. tools can eliminate language barriers by operating It is, therefore, critical that REs continue to invest in in local languages. Moreover, the implementation human resources dedicated for customer service and of conversational AI in chatbots, voicebots, and grievance redressal. It is essential to invest in training advanced IVR systems can handle routine queries of staff, especially in behavioural aspects of customer round the clock, thereby freeing people to focus on service. Moreover, the staff needs to be empowered cases that require empathy and complex problem- to take decisions based on their judgement to redress solving. consumer grievances, enhance customer satisfaction and win consumer trust. In short, integrating AI at every stage – from complaint lodging to closure – can result in a seamless, RBI as a facilitator efficient, and data-driven grievance redressal system. In the end, I would like to assure you that, while Such a framework not only reduces processing times we exhort you to provide services efficiently to and addresses repetitive complaints but also fosters customers, we in the Reserve Bank shall also provide equitable outcomes by mitigating human biases. It is various services, approvals, clarifications, etc. to the time that the banking industry explores and pioneers regulated entities in a timely manner. We already have the integration of technology – including AI – to a citizen’s charter. We are in the process of reviewing strengthen the grievance resolution mechanisms and the charter. We will make the charter comprehensive make it best in class across the globe. to include all services that we offer either to the REs 4 RBI Bulletin March 2025Transforming Grievance Redress: The AI Advantage SPEECH or directly to citizens. Moreover, we are reviewing the Conclusion timelines for each service. It will be our endeavour to We stand at a pivotal juncture as India looks to provide all approvals, etc. within the timelines. We are realise its dream of a more resilient and inclusive Viksit also making mandatory the use of PRAVAAH, which Bharat. With the financial sector touching the lives of is RBI’s secure and centralised web-based portal for almost the entire population, we have a critical role. any individual or entity to seek authorisation, license To succeed in this role, we must continue to enhance or regulatory approval on any reference made to the customer service and customer protection. Reserve Bank in a timely manner. This will help us in expediting the disposal of applications received by Thank you ! the Reserve Bank. RBI Bulletin March 2025 5Keynote Address at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance SPEECH Keynote Address at the Policy Central Banks in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), on the other hand, have adopted Seminar on Climate Change directed lending policies to channelise credit to certain Risks and Finance* sectors of their economies given their individual country circumstances and developmental objectives. Shri Sanjay Malhotra In the Indian context, as you are all aware, the priority sector lending guidelines facilitate credit to be channelled to specific sectors including renewable I am delighted to be present here and be part of this energy. important event on climate change which continues to draw attention in the national and international On the prudential aspect, there are several discourse. I would not dwell in detail about the perils channels through which climate change risks impact of climate change since this audience is already well the financial system. All the major types of financial aware about its impact not only on the real economy, risks - be it credit, market, or operational risk - are but also the financial system, as well as our day-to-day influenced by climate change. These risks include lives. Climate related changes are perceptible, clear, losses from credit portfolio due to extreme climate and visible. They are intensifying and threatening events or natural disasters (physical risks) and loss in ecosystems, livelihoods, and economies. It is our value of collaterals due to stranded assets (transition individual and collective responsibility, to work risks); losses from investments; and operational together effectively and contribute to the global losses. Although climate change impacts almost all efforts to mitigate the risks associated with climate economic sectors, the extent and nature of these risks change and ensure that the Indian financial system vary by sector, industry, geography, and institution. remains resilient. The mitigation of climate change risks, therefore, rests – firstly, on realistic and comprehensive assessment Dimensions of Climate Change Risks of the frequency and severity of climate risks and There are two dimensions to climate change secondly, estimating their financial impact, which is related risks that we as regulators, policymakers no easy task. and practitioners have to be aware of – the first is As a Central Bank, the Reserve Bank is mindful facilitative involving capacity building, development of of its role in addressing and mitigating risks to the the ecosystem and financing of green and sustainable financial system from climate change. In this context, transition; and the second is the prudential aspect, our endeavour has been to play the role of a facilitator which is related to risk management. – including supporting capacity building and fostering While the role of the Central Banks in managing a conducive regulatory framework for promoting risks posed by climate change to the financial system is green and sustainable finance. One important aspect increasingly being recognised, their role in facilitating of green financing/lending for sustainable finance is the financing of green and sustainable transition has the higher credit risk due to borrowers’ use of new and been a matter of debate and has varying dimensions emerging green technologies, which have relatively to it. Central Banks in Advanced Economies have limited track record in terms of reliability, efficiency, traditionally followed an asset neutral approach. and effectiveness. Regulated Entities, therefore, need to develop suitable capacity and technical know-how * Keynote Address by Shri Sanjay Malhotra, Governor, Reserve Bank to better appraise risks in financing projects which of India at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance organised by Reserve Bank of India, March 13, 2025, New Delhi. use such green technologies. RBI Bulletin March 2025 7SPEECH Keynote Address at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance Evolution of climate change risks and mitigation for and carbon emission intensity database related to the Indian Financial System transition risk assessment. Work on this repository is underway and we expect to launch it later this year. The Reserve Bank’s approach with respect to climate related financial risks is oriented not just Several jurisdictions have started work for the short-term but also the medium-term, taking on the assessment and disclosure of climate into consideration the evolving national and global related risks. International organisations such as circumstances. Over the short-term, our goal is to be International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) able to make a realistic estimation of the impact of of the International Financial Reporting Standards climate related risks not just on individual institutions (IFRS)1 Foundation has released standards on climate but also on the financial system as a whole. This would related disclosures. The Basel Committee on Banking involve scenario analysis and stress testing exercises, Supervision (BCBS) has also released a consultative using both bottom-up and top-down approaches. document on disclosure of climate-related financial risks2 with a view to integrate climate risk related The risk management framework in Regulated disclosures under the Pillar III disclosure requirements Entities for climate related financial risks is still of the Basel framework. The Reserve Bank, as you evolving. There is a need for concerted efforts are aware, had already issued draft guidelines on in developing the risk management framework; Disclosure Framework on Climate related Financial building technical expertise and competencies for risks in February 2024, for public comments. We have comprehensive assessment and mitigation of climate received valuable feedback and are in the process of related financial risks as also on the extent of losses finalising the guidelines. A guidance note on Climate due to such risks. I would now like to highlight some Scenario Analysis and Stress Testing is also being of the initiatives of the Reserve Bank has taken in this developed for the Regulated Entities. regard. As we all are aware, technology and finance have Climate related financial risk modelling is very a critical role in the transition towards a low-carbon important and data intensive. There is limited data economy. There is a need to build innovative solutions available for measuring financial impact of climate and capabilities in these areas. The Reserve Bank has change. Moreover, there is lack of benchmark been encouraging and facilitating innovations through sectoral transition pathways and country-specific its Regulatory Sandbox and Hackathon initiatives in carbon emission database. These constraints limit the Fintech space. We propose to set up a dedicated “on our ability to make a comprehensive assessment of Tap” cohort on climate change risks and sustainable climate change risks. These limitations also constrain finance under RBI’s Regulatory Sandbox initiative. We comparison of financial impact, as each Regulated are also planning to conduct a special “Greenathon” Entity may use its own assumptions and models on climate change and related aspects. to process climate related data. To address such We had in April 2023, issued the Framework constraints, we had in October last year announced on acceptance of Green Deposits3 with the objective the creation of a repository called the Reserve Bank of enabling banks to augment the flow of credit to – Climate Risk Information System (RB-CRIS). The repository is intended to bridge data gaps by providing 1 https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/ifrs-sustainability-standards- standardised datasets. These datasets include hazard navigator/ 2 https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d560.pdf data, vulnerability data and exposure data related to 3 https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id= physical risk assessment, sectoral transition pathways 12487&Mode=0 8 RBI Bulletin March 2025Keynote Address at the Policy Seminar on Climate Change Risks and Finance SPEECH green activities and projects. This again shows our requirements and circumstances. We will collaborate willingness to facilitate financing green/sustainable and coordinate with the government and other projects. The idea behind the Green Deposits is similar regulators to ensure that there is harmonisation and to that of sovereign green bonds. We all need to raise consistency in rules, regulations and our approach awareness about such products. towards mitigating the impacts of climate change. I would like to highlight an important initiative I am happy to note that while we are deliberating to promote green finance. We have included finance on this important topic, the Annual Steering to small renewable energy projects – solar, biomass Committee meeting of the Network for Greening the based, windmills, micro-hydel plants and non- Financial System (NGFS) is also taking place today at conventional energy based public utilities viz. street this venue. NGFS is doing some pioneering work in lighting systems, and remote village electrification the area of managing climate related financial risks. Be it the NGFS scenarios, the recent work on adaptation, projects as part of priority sector lending. or the work on data directory, they have been a source One of the oft-cited constraints to adequate of technical guidance and capacity building across the flow of climate related finance has been the lack of globe. We look forward to continued engagement and bankable projects. Capacity and expertise constraints coordination with the NGFS. limit the ability to appraise and thus finance climate Conclusion change mitigation. It also enhances the risk of funding such projects. Thus, creation of a common To conclude, let me reiterate that climate change pool of such bankable projects will have multi-fold risks are real and all stakeholders need to be prepared benefits for the entire ecosystem. Regulated Entities to address the risks and challenges from climate with experience of such projects can contribute to the change. Even though we have made a decent start, pool for the benefit of others, while also benefiting there are still issues that need to be addressed. The from such information shared by other Regulated Reserve Bank remains committed to continue adopting Entities. This will help share knowledge for benefit of a constructive and consultative approach towards all. There is a need for collaboration in this emerging supporting the various initiatives being undertaken and evolving area. I urge the Regulated Entities to towards management and mitigation of financial risks seriously consider setting up such a pool through an related to climate change. We will continue to work appropriate institutional arrangement. steadfastly to realise our vision to build a financial system that can not only withstand future climate Before I conclude, let me say what is perhaps shocks, but also actively contribute to India’s journey obvious. The impact of climate change risks is not towards a sustainable and resilient future. I urge you limited to the financial system alone but extends to all to contribute towards this cause. As Albert Einstein the real economy. Be it the corporates or the MSMEs had said “The world will not be destroyed by those or the agricultural sector, climate change risks are who do evil, but by those who watch them without ubiquitous. This calls for a cohesive co-ordination doing anything.” and harmonisation in approach, among not only the Let me also take this opportunity to extend my financial sector regulators and the Regulated Entities best wishes to you and your families on the occasion but also various government agencies. There is a need of Holi - the festival of colours. to adopt a holistic approach towards mitigation of climate change risks considering the country specific Thank you. RBI Bulletin March 2025 9Address at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025 SPEECH Address at the Inauguration of with a simple click, tap or scan. We will continue to proactively support the development of the payment Digital Payments Awareness ecosystem. Week 2025* Digital Payments – Safety and Security While promoting digital payment systems and Shri Sanjay Malhotra innovations around them, we have been mindful of the needs of safety and security in payments. We have Digital Payments – Background and benefits thus put in place various measures for this purpose: Payments are the lifeblood of commerce, enabling • Multi-factor authentication; security controls the flow of goods and services in an economy. They for internet and mobile payments apps and connect people, empower individuals and businesses, card payments; card tokenisation (to prevent and drive economic growth. Quick, secure and reliable storage of card details in merchants systems), payments at affordable prices are the bedrock for a etc. are intended to make our payments vibrant economy. Payments through digital modes support economic growth. They also deepen financial ecosystem robust. inclusion by overcoming barriers like high transaction • We have enabled customers to have control costs and geographical limitations1. In effect, digital over creating and terminating e-mandates for payments are not just convenient but are also a recurring transactions. powerful tool for economic empowerment and Enhancing safety and security of payments growth. ecosystem is a work in progress. The recently released Digital Payments – Convenience : Bouquet of drafts on “Framework on Alternative Authentication products Mechanisms for Digital Payment Transactions”, and Over the years, the Reserve Bank has supported on “Additional Factor of Authentication (AFA) for various digital payment products. This has enhanced cross-border Card Not Present (CNP) transactions” are choice and convenience to the customers. We steps in this direction. started with ECS (electronic clearing service). We Payment Systems – Way Forward then introduced NEFT, RTGS, IMPS, NACH (this Apart from the RBI, the government and other is for e-mandates, it has replaced ECS), AePS, UPI, important stakeholders such as the Banks and NETC, etc. We have introduced many new features Payment System Operators have also taken a number on UPI and expanded its scope to cater to different of initiatives to encourage the adoption of digital needs of customers. These include UPI123Pay, UPI payments. While these efforts have produced results, Lite, linking RuPay credit cards to UPI, processing payment mandates with single-block-and-multiple- as visible in the huge growth of digital payments, debits, enabling Credit Lines for UPI, linking PPIs there is still a lot more to be done. Going forward, we with UPI, etc. UPI with its multiple features, allows will work on three broad areas. us to transfer money, pay bills, and make purchases Payment Systems – Soft Touch Regulations to continue promoting innovation * Address by Shri Sanjay Malhotra, Governor, Reserve Bank of India at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025, March 10, First, we will continue to encourage innovation 2025, RBI, Mumbai. 1 World Bank, Digital Financial Services, April 2020. in payments, as also generally, while being mindful RBI Bulletin March 2025 11SPEECH Address at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025 of risks and taking appropriate measures to mitigate and suitable steps taken to expand awareness and them. We will promote innovation to facilitate improve usage. payment systems that are fast, safe, secure, accessible We are now in the 3rd year of this mission. The and resilient. We have adopted a soft-touch approach theme for this year is “India Pays Digitally”. This to regulating the payments ecosystem and FinTechs. year too, we will continue our awareness activities. Through these regulations, the Reserve Bank attempts By showcasing how digital payments have become a to balance these divergent set of expectations. ubiquitous part of our lives, we will encourage those Our approach has been to put in place regulatory who haven’t adopted digital payments yet, to do so. guardrails within which all stakeholders are free to The Reserve Bank, as in the previous years, will operate. We will continue to encourage innovation be running multimedia campaigns around this year’s while promoting safety and security through soft- theme. To encourage active involvement of citizens, touch regulations. we will be conducting various competitions over Promote awareness generation social media with attractive prizes. Second, though much progress has been made The Regional Offices of RBI too conduct Awareness in the development, spread and adoption of digital Programs, called eBAAT, across the country covering payments, there is a lot of scope to further deepen and various strata of society. We have been conducting expand digital payments in the country. In January these programs since 2012. In the last 8 years, more 2025, more than 20 billion payments worth almost than 1800 such programs have been conducted. During 250 trillion rupees were made in India through digital this year, the content and method of delivery of eBAAT modes. Digital payments have become the preferred will be reviewed, and a pilot will be conducted (in a mode of payment for many of us. However, surveys large State) with the objective to reach a very large have shown that nearly 40% of our adult population number of people in the most efficient way. still do not use digital payments. One of the main I urge the Banks, Payment System Operators reasons for this is the lack of awareness or familiarity and other stake holders to contribute in their own with using digital payments. innovative ways to take forward the mission of Har To create awareness of Digital Payments, the Payment Digital. Digital Payments Awareness Week is being observed More efficient Cross border payments in March every year. As part of this endeavour, the Third, while in domestic payments, the success of “Har Payment Digital” mission was launched in 2023. UPI has propelled India to a leadership position with The mission seeks to promote digital payments by a share of 48.5 per cent in global real-time payments enhancing awareness of digital payments among by volume2, we will endeavour to make cross-border all citizens and making available the necessary payments more efficient. This assumes priority as infrastructure and solutions for people to make India is the largest receiver of personal remittances payments digitally. The objectives of Mission Har globally. As per a World Bank3 report, it has been Payment Digital can be achieved only with the active estimated that in 2024, India received remittances participation of all stakeholders. Geographies and population segments, lagging behind in usage and 2 ACI Worldwide, 2024. 3 https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/peoplemove/in-2024--remittance-flows- awareness of digital payments need to be identified to-low--and-middle-income-countries-ar 12 RBI Bulletin March 2025Address at the Inauguration of Digital Payments Awareness Week 2025 SPEECH totalling approximately 130 billion USD. We need to marks the 20th year of the establishment of the address the challenges of high cost, slow speed, and Department of Payment and Settlement Systems insufficient access and transparency in cross border (DPSS). I congratulate the department on this key payments.. We will continue to expand the reach milestone. The work carried out by this department of UPI bilaterally by linking UPI with Fast Payment in association with all stakeholders has established Systems of other countries. We will also explore the India as a pioneer in digital payments. The revolution possibility of linking payment systems other than UPI in India’s payment systems is, however, far from over. for facilitating efficient cross-border payments. We We are just beginning to unlock the true potential of will continue our engagement in a multilateral project digital payments. I am confident that we will continue called Project Nexus, to enable instant cross-border retail payments4. to work with renewed vigour to ensure that India remains at the forefront of digital payments globally. As we observe the 5th Digital Payments Awareness Week, I am happy to note that this year Thank you. 4 Nexus, conceptualised by the Innovation Hub of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), aims to connect the Fast Payment Systems of four ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand); and India, who would be the founding members and first mover countries of this platform. RBI Bulletin March 2025 13Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock SPEECH Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance Inaugural address at the Indian Creative Disruption vis-à-vis Creative Destruction Innovation in finance has always been a double- Institute of Management edged sword—on one side, it drives efficiency Kozhikode (IIMK)- National and inclusion, but on the other, it can destabilize traditional structures if not managed well. This is Stock Exchange (NSE) joint where the distinction between creative disruption Second Annual Conference on and creative destruction becomes crucial. While both terms may seem similar, they carry very different Macroeconomics, Banking and implications. Creative destruction, as popularized Finance* by economist Joseph Schumpeter, refers to the complete dismantling of old systems to make room M. Rajeshwar Rao for new ones. In contrast, creative disruption is a more nuanced process—it’s about evolving existing systems, refining them, and making them better Introduction through technological innovations. We are not simply Good Morning All! looking to replace what exists but to transform it for I thank IIM, Kozhikode and the National the better. Stock Exchange for inviting me to deliver the This sets the context for my talk today. I will share inaugural address at this Conference. The theme my views on how digital transformation is reshaping for the conference— “Finance for Growth Amid finance, the role of AI, the way forward for more Creative Disruptions”—captures the essence of the meaningful financialization and financial inclusion transformation we are witnessing in the financial and how the regulatory landscape must evolve to sector – not just in India but globally. Disruptions in foster responsible growth. finance are not new, but what sets this era apart is the Digital Transformation in Finance unprecedented pace and scale of change, fuelled by digitalization, artificial intelligence, and the resulting The financial sector has undergone a profound confluence of these changes leading to emergence transformation in the digital era, reshaping how of new business models. These changes make it individuals and businesses access and utilize essential for us to understand how to harness them financial services. The shift from cash-driven, paper- for sustainable economic growth. based transactions to a seamless, technology-driven ecosystem has been one of the most defining changes For India, this transformation is particularly in modern finance. India has exemplified creative significant as we strive towards Viksit Bharat 2047 disruption in finance through innovations like — a vision of a developed and self-reliant economy. Unified Payment Interface (UPI), Account Aggregator Our goal of becoming an advanced economy by 2047 (AA) framework, and the recently launched Unified will require us to effectively integrate technology Lending Interface (ULI). This has complemented with finance to deepen markets, expand financial the other components of what is collectively known inclusion, and drive economic productivity. as the “India Stack”. In the context of the creative disruption referred to earlier, these initiatives have * Inaugural address delivered by Shri M. Rajeshwar Rao, Deputy Governor at IIMK-NSE 2nd Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, not just supplemented the traditional banking system Banking & Finance on February 21, 2025 at Mumbai. Inputs provided by Pramanshu Rajput are gratefully acknowledged. but have strengthened it by making transactions more RBI Bulletin March 2025 15SPEECH Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance seamless, expanding financial reach, and improving Figure 1: Evolution of India Stack efficiency. Similarly, the rise of digital lending has not rendered conventional credit channels obsolete but has complemented them, bringing underserved segments into the formal financial fold. In my opinion, what truly sets India apart from global peers is the open approach. Unlike many other countries, where these advancements have come as “walled gardens”, India’s financial infrastructure is built on the principles of openness and accessibility. Our platforms are designed as plug-and-play systems, enabling any entity to build on top of them, fostering competition, innovation, and inclusion. Whether it is the UPI, the Account Aggregator framework, or the ULI, our guiding philosophy remains the same— creating an open ecosystem. UPI stands as a prime example of open digital infrastructure that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) fosters both innovation and inclusivity. It provides will become the engines that drive the next phase an interoperable framework for instant payments, of financial transformation. These stand among the enabling several private players to build seamless most transformative advancements of our times. financial solutions on top of it. As on date1, there are This growing significance is reflected in how both 39 Third Party Application Providers (TPAP) in the financial institutions and regulators are increasingly UPI ecosystem enabling UPI payments besides apps engaging with AI-related topics. An analysis (Chart 1) of banks. With over 16 billion transactions processed of the annual reports of Scheduled Commercial Banks monthly2, UPI demonstrates how public digital has revealed a sharp rise in references to AI and its infrastructure can empower private sector innovation applications in recent years4. for promoting financial inclusion, without the risks of exclusivity. A research article3 by World Economic Further, this trend is not limited to regulated Forum (WEF) had estimated that UPI has saved the entities—central banks are also devoting more Indian economy approximately $67 billion since its attention to AI in their public interactions. A review inception in April 2016. (Chart 2) of speeches5 by central bank officials globally AI/ ML in Finance shows a similar pattern, where discussions on AI related topics have increased significantly especially While the India Stack has successfully built the post-2022 generative AI wave. This underscores the digital pipelines that power a seamless and inclusive increasing awareness and strategic focus on AI within financial system, as we move forward, I believe the financial ecosystem. 1 As on February 20, 2025. 2 RBI Payment Systems Report, 2024. 4 How Indian Banks are Adopting Artificial Intelligence? RBI Bulletin 3 India’s digital leap: the Unified Payment Interface's unprecedented October 2024. impact on the financial landscape dated June 26, 2023 available at https:// 5 Based on text mining analysis of central bank officials speeches available www.weforum.org/stories/2023/06/india-unified-payment-interface- at Bank for International Settlements (2024). Central bank speeches, 2015- impact/ 2024, https://www.bis.org/cbspeeches/download.htm 16 RBI Bulletin March 2025Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock SPEECH Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance Chart 1: AI Word Count for Public and Chart 2: AI Word Count for Central Banker Private Sector Banks Speeches 70.0 1200 60.0 50.0 900 nt ou 40.0 nt C u AI Word 30.0 Word Co 600 AI 20.0 300 10.0 0.0 2015-162016-172017-182018-192019-202020-212021-222022-23 0 Private Sector Banks Public Sector Banks 2013 2015 2018 2020 2023 2025 While AI adoption in financial services is Challenges and Ethical Considerations increasing, it can make a significant impact in On an earlier occasion6, I spoke about the risks three areas viz. risk assessment and credit scoring, associated with AI/ML models and the guiding enhancing customer experience, and fraud detection. principles for their responsible use in finance. Today, Traditional credit evaluation relies heavily on however, I want to highlight a fundamental point: structured financial data, such as credit history and while AI raises critical issues such as algorithmic income statements. However, AI-driven models bias, fairness, data privacy, and security, the root enable analysis of vast amounts of alternative data— of these challenges and many other lies in lack of including transaction patterns, utility bill payments, explainability. e-commerce behaviour etc. to assess a borrower’s Critical Need for Explainability and Human Oversight creditworthiness more holistically. This is not only useful in initial underwriting, but in pro-active Many advanced AI models, particularly deep monitoring of existing borrowers to detect stress at learning-based systems, function as “black boxes,” early stage and take remedial measures. It also enables producing outputs that even their developers struggle offerings of hyper-personalized financial products to interpret. In a sector where trust, accountability, leading to enhanced customer experience. Another and regulatory compliance are paramount, a lack use-case gaining prominence is fraud detection. Unlike of explainability undermines confidence in AI- traditional rule-based fraud detection systems, which driven decisions. In the absence of explainability, rely on predefined parameters, AI based techniques human intervention can end up becoming mere continuously learn and evolve, adapting to new rubber-stamping, rather than responsible oversight, fraud techniques and identifying subtle anomalies in increasing the likelihood of systemic errors. transaction and payment behaviour. This is especially critical in the era of real-time payments and digital 6 Innovations in Banking - The emerging role for Technology and AI, transactions, where cyber threats, frauds and use of December 22, 2023 - at the 106th Annual Conference of Indian Economic Association in Delhi available at https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ mule accounts are becoming more sophisticated. SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1400 RBI Bulletin March 2025 17SPEECH Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance Second-Order Effects: Hidden Risks of Unexplainable Bridging the Gaps: Road Ahead for Financial AI Inclusion AI models continuously learn and evolve based Before I delve into the way forward on financial on new data. While ‘dynamic adaptation’ can be inclusion, another critical distinction is in order. beneficial, it also makes models susceptible to data Financialization and financial inclusion are often drift7 and concept drift8. These changes can cause used interchangeably, but they represent distinct aspects of economic development. Financialization models to misalign with real-world trends, risking refers to the increasing role of financial markets, incorrect financial decisions and instability. Regular institutions, and instruments in an economy. On human oversight and explainability are critical to the other hand, financial inclusion focuses on prevent such risks. ensuring that every individual, especially those Danger of Over-Reliance on AI from underserved and marginalized communities, has access to basic financial services like savings A less appreciated risk of AI-based decision models accounts, credit, insurance, and digital payments. is “automation complacency,” where people rely too The two are inherently complementary—without much on technology, even when situations need inclusion, financialization risks being concentrated careful judgment. As the aphorism goes, “All models among a privileged few, limiting broader economic are wrong, but some are useful9”. While algorithms participation. Conversely, without financialization, can provide valuable insights and efficiency, they inclusion remains superficial, as access to banking should be viewed as tools to support, not replace, alone does not empower individuals unless they can human judgment. also save, invest, and grow their wealth. Skill Gap: A Compounding Factor in the Explainability Present Status of Financial Inclusion Challenge Reserve Bank of India’s Financial Inclusion Index A significant yet often overlooked barrier to (FI-Index), a multidimensional composite index that responsible AI adoption in finance is the shortage captures the extent of financial inclusion across the of professionals who can interpret and oversee AI country, stood at 64.2 in March 2024, up from 60.1 in models. If financial institutions lack personnel with March 2023 and 43.4 in 2017. The index is based on the necessary skills in AI, data science, and regulatory three sub-indices – Access, Quality and Usage. India oversight, the explainability problem is further has made remarkable strides in expanding financial exacerbated and decisions made by AI models may access, with the success of schemes like PM Jan Dhan remain opaque. Yojana, etc. ensuring that 80% of adults now have a bank account10. Till date, 54.84 crore bank accounts 7 Data drift, or covariate shift, refers to the phenomenon where the distribution of data inputs that an ML model was trained on differs from have been opened under PM Jan Dhan Yojana with the distribution of the data inputs that the model is applied to. This can result in the model becoming less accurate or less effective at making a total balance of ₹2.45 lakh crore in the accounts11. predictions or decisions (changes in the data due to seasonality, changes However, true financial inclusion goes beyond in consumer preferences, the addition of new products). 8 Concept drift or drift is an evolution of data that invalidates the data merely opening accounts—it requires meaningful model. It happens when the statistical properties of the target variable, engagement with financial services. As the FI-Index which the model is trying to predict, change over time in unforeseen ways. This causes problems because the predictions become less accurate as time passes. 10 World Bank, Global Findex Report, 2021. 9 Generally attributed to British statistician George Box. 11 As on February 20, 2025, retrieved from https://pmjdy.gov.in/ 18 RBI Bulletin March 2025Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock SPEECH Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance models, which rely heavily on collateral-based Chart 3: FI-Index and Sub-Indices (end-March) lending, fail to accommodate first-time borrowers and small businesses with limited credit histories. As a result, such entities and individuals either remain underfunded or turn to informal sources of credit, often at exorbitant interest rates. Another critical gap is in insurance penetration, which stands at just 3.7% in FY24, significantly lower than the global average of 7%. Similarly, pension assets in India account for only 21.5% of GDP (17% under EPFO and 4.5% under NPS), which pales in comparison to the 80% of GDP in OECD countries14. Leveraging Digital Transformation for Greater Financial Inclusion Note:Figures in parentheses indicate weights in per cent in FI-Index. To bridge these gaps, we must harness the power (Chart 3) shows, Usage is the one which is lagging the of digital transformation to make financial services other two12. more accessible, efficient, and inclusive. Technology- driven solutions can democratize finance by breaking A bank account should serve as the entry point traditional barriers and bringing a wider range of for individuals to access a broader suite of financial financial products to underserved segments of the products, including credit, insurance, pensions, population. and investment opportunities. Without this deeper engagement, financial inclusion remains superficial, As I highlighted earlier, having a bank account and the true benefits of a formal financial system is not very useful if it does not lead to further do not reach every individual or business. It was financialization i.e. ensuring Quality and Usage. In encouraging to note that the improvement in the case of payments, UPI meets all three dimensions of FI-Index in 2023-24 was largely contributed by the Access, Quality and Usage. Given the omnipresence usage dimension, reflecting deepening of financial nature of UPI for retail payments and its ease of usage, inclusion13. While this shows that we are moving it has become essential for many informal sector in the right direction, there is still a long way to go businesses. This has created financial footprints for wherein the most vulnerable populations and low- a large informal economy which was earlier mostly income groups have access to secure and affordable dealing in cash. Access to these financial footprints finance. has been enabled for the financial service providers through the AA framework and it can be employed by One of the significant gaps lies in access to lenders to underwrite them using new-age models and credit, particularly for the informal sector of the combining with other alternative data to offer hyper- economy, which is a major contributor to Indian personalized products. This approach is particularly economy, employing millions. Traditional credit useful in extending credit to new-to-credit individuals, 12 RBI Annual Report 2023-24, page 99. 13 RBI Report on Trend and Progress in Banking, 2023-24. 14 Economic Survey 2024-25. RBI Bulletin March 2025 19SPEECH Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance gig workers, and small businesses who may lack formal that customers fully understand the risks associated credit histories but demonstrate strong financial with leveraged products and speculative investing. discipline through alternative indicators. Thus, the While RBI along with other financial sector AA framework acts as a bridge, allowing banks, NBFCs, regulators is taking progressive steps to educate and other financial service providers to access a more the customers, financial sector entities also need to holistic and accurate picture of a customer’s financial shoulder part of the responsibility. Absence of financial profile. literacy leads people to fall prey to unscrupulous Further, increasing formalization of MSMEs players which erodes the trust of the people in the through GST, e-commerce sales data, etc. can help system. Increased financial literacy will help increase lenders assess creditworthiness more accurately. To trust in the sector and its participants, whose benefits augment further data-driven financial inclusion, RBI will accrue to the entities themselves. has also facilitated the setting up of ULI as a digital Financial Regulation in the era of fast-paced public infrastructure in the lending space, which will innovation unlock critical financial, non-financial and alternate While educating consumers helps protect them data for lenders to enable informed credit decisions. from fraudulent practices, regulation plays a critical As on December 6, 2024, over 6 lakh loans amounting role in maintaining stability and preventing systemic to ₹27,000 crore, including 1.6 lakh loans amounting failure. Financial services are regulated because to ₹14,500 crore to MSMEs have been disbursed using their stability is crucial for the broader economy— the ULI platform. 36 lenders, including various banks failures in the financial sector have severe real- and NBFCs have been onboarded. These lenders are world consequences, often requiring costly taxpayer- using more than 50 data services including, inter funded bailouts. The 2008 global financial crisis is a alia, authentication and verification services, land reminder of how lax regulation and excessive risk- records data from six states, satellite service data, taking can lead to widespread economic distress, transliteration, property search services, dairy/milk job losses, and prolonged recessions. The cost of pouring data and identity/ document verification. restoring financial stability in such scenarios is often Financial Inclusion not Financial Excesses much higher than the cost of preventive regulation. While strong regulation is essential to prevent such While technology and digital innovations are crises, determining the optimal level of regulations driving financial inclusion and access, they also bring remains a delicate balance—too little regulation may with them the risk of excessive exposure and over- increase systemic risk, while excessive regulation can leveraging, which can create significant vulnerabilities stifle innovation, limit credit availability, and raise for both individuals and the broader financial system. costs. Thus, regulating finance in an era of fast-paced However, as it is said that presence of too much light technological innovation is a delicate balancing act. can also lead to blindness, we must be aware of the risk of reckless financialization. Of late we have seen At the same time, regulated entities must develop some concerns of excessive borrowing in unsecured the necessary capabilities to implement and comply segment and from derivative euphoria in the capital with evolving regulations. As financial institutions markets. The temptation of short-term gains can integrate AI, cloud computing, and API-driven easily overshadow the long-term financial security of finance into their operations, they must invest in individuals. Financial entities have a duty to ensure robust governance frameworks and risk management 20 RBI Bulletin March 2025Inaugural address at the Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode (IIMK)- National Stock SPEECH Exchange (NSE) joint Second Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Banking and Finance protocols to ensure compliance and customer and the banking sector emerged even more resilient appropriateness. Financial firms cannot afford to from these disruptions. Although, history does not view regulation as a barrier to innovation—rather, repeat itself, and the potential of the current wave compliance itself must become a core component of of disruption is arguably bigger, it may be prudent to their digital strategy. A strong internal culture of risk be cautious while making predictions about future of awareness, ethical AI usage, and customer-centric banking. innovation will be critical in navigating the evolving financial landscape effectively. For banks and NBFCs, however the message is clear: adapt or risk being made obsolete. To remain Conclusion competitive, financial institutions must invest in “Change is the only constant,” wrote an ancient digital infrastructure, and pivot to a customer-centric, Greek philosopher15 and yet change can appear data-driven approach in this new landscape. At the daunting, destabilizing, even threatening. So, will the technological changes lead to “creative destruction” same time, institutions must navigate the risks of and really replace the traditional financial institutions excessive reliance on third-party technology providers, like banks? The specter of banks being ‘dead’ has been ensuring that regulatory compliance and cybersecurity raised in the past also. A quarter century back, the while ensuring customer protection remain their top issue was examined in the light of disruptive financial priorities. The challenge is ensuring a balanced and innovation of those times such as securitisation which resilient financial ecosystem for the future. The key was touted as evidence enough for erasing the need is to harness the benefits while managing the risks. of banks as financial intermediaries16. As the passage of time has shown, these predictions proved false, Thank You! 15 Heraclitus of Ephesus. 16 Boyd and Gertler’s Are banks dead? Or are the reports greatly exaggerated? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review Vol 18 No. 3. RBI Bulletin March 2025 21ARTICLES State of the Economy Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the GlobeState of the Economy ARTICLE State of the Economy* by 0.6 percentage points in 2025, and leave the U.S. economy persistently 0.3-0.4 per cent smaller in the long run.1 The projections by the Conference Board The resilience of the global economy is being tested indicate that the world economy is likely to witness a by escalating trade tensions and a heightened wave of significant deceleration over the next decade.2 These uncertainty around the scope, timing, and intensity of assessments have been vindicated by the incoming tariffs. While engendering heightened volatility in global data pointing to a weakening US growth momentum.3 financial markets, these have also caused apprehensions Financial markets are increasingly pricing about the slowdown in global growth. Amidst these in the anticipated slowdown in global growth, challenges, the Indian economy continues to demonstrate with benchmark indices in the US and most non- resilience as evident in the robust performance of the European geographies witnessing a decline. As of agriculture sector and improving consumption. The March 17, 2025, the US dollar has given up all of reverberations of a tumultuous external environment, its gains since mid-November 2024, weighed by US however, are being reflected in sustained foreign trade policy and growth uncertainties. Geopolitical portfolio outflows. India’s macroeconomic strength to tensions and changing global power relations are face these challenges is bolstered by a decline in headline adding another layer of complexity. In Europe, CPI inflation to a seven-month low of 3.6 per cent in shifting security priorities are triggering a surge in February 2025 on account of a further correction in military spending, particularly in Germany and its food prices. neighbouring nations, driving bond yields to rise the most in a week in nearly three decades. Expectations Introduction that the fiscal stimulus would lead to a turnaround The global economy, which entered 2025 on in growth in the Euro area led to gains in European a strong note of resilience, is caught in a storm of equities, making them significantly outperform their escalating trade tensions and a heightened wave US counterparts in 2025. With financial markets on the edge and global tensions rising, the months of uncertainty around the scope, timing, and ahead are shrouded in uncertainty. intensity of tariffs. What is more certain, however, is that trade wars and escalating tariffs could have Amidst these challenges, the outlook for a deleterious impact on growth and fuel inflation, global commodities remains a silver lining. Supply not just in the countries directly involved but for the prospects for food and energy have been improving. global economy as a whole. Estimates suggest that Global cereals production during 2025 is projected to a full-blown tariff war could raise the price level by surpass that of 2024.4 Oil prices (UK Brent) declined 1.0-1.2 per cent in the US, reduce real GDP growth by about 15 per cent since mid-January 2025 (up to 1 Yale University Budget Lab, available at https://budgetlab.yale.edu/ * This article has been prepared by Rekha Misra, G. V. Nadhanael, research/fiscal-economic-and-distributional-effects-20-tariffs-china-and- Shahbaaz Khan, Biswajeet Mohanty, Shreya Kansal, Bajrangi Lal Gupta, 25-tariffs-canada-and-mexico. Ramesh Kumar Gupta, Rajni Dahiya, Harendra Behera, Gautam, Amit 2 World GDP growth is projected to fall from 3.0 per cent in 2025-26 to Kumar, Amrita Basu, Aayushi Khandelwal, Rishabh Kumar, Radhika Singh, an average of 2.5 per cent during 2027-31 and 2.4 per cent during 2032-37. Rashika Arora, Aman Tiwari, Divya Kadian, Snigdha Yogindran, Shelja The Conference Board, Global Forecast Update, February 2025. Bhatia, Shivam, Khushi Sinha, Monica, Yuvraj Kashyap, Nikhil Prakash 3 The widely tracked Atlanta Fed GDPNow model projects US real GDP Kose, Ashish Khobragade, Satyam Kumar and Shreya Gupta. Views growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in Q1:2025 to be -2.1 per cent expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the (March 17, 2025 update). views of the Reserve Bank of India. 4 FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief, March 07, 2025. RBI Bulletin March 2025 23ARTICLE State of the Economy March 11) to below US$ 70 over concerns that a trade trajectory, signalling strong consumer confidence war could dampen economic growth and weaken and sustained demand. Government spending has energy demand. Prices are expected to moderate picked up significantly in recent months, providing through 2025-26 as inventories increase due to a further fillip to growth. Key sectors, including production expansion in an environment of modest construction, financial services, and trade, continue demand growth.5 Metal prices, however, witnessed to thrive as pillars of economic resilience. Various increases in February, tracking news of the US high-frequency indicators of economic activity point imposition of import tariffs on steel and aluminum. towards a sustained momentum in growth during Tariff concerns and safe-haven demand drove gold Q4 as well. The first revised estimates (FRE) of GDP prices to a historical high of US$ 3000 per ounce on for 2023-24 placed the real GDP growth at 9.2 per March 14, 2025. cent — the highest in over a decade if we exclude the post-COVID rebound — demonstrating that in Policymakers are now walking a tightrope, an uncertain world, India’s growth story remains a having to balance the upward strain of rising prices beacon of stability and progress. on account of tariffs and currency depreciation, as well as the downward pressure on inflation Recent developments across different sectors from economic slowdown. The stubbornness of reaffirm the assessment of a sequential pick-up in headline inflation in AEs, along with a sticky core growth momentum. The kharif season 2024-25 has and services inflation, could act as a constraint on seen an upward revision in production estimates for monetary policy being used as a tool to counteract foodgrains and oilseeds and rabi foodgrains registered the potential slowdown engendered by the tariff a growth of 2.8 per cent mainly on account of above war. Emerging economies remain vulnerable to the normal rainfall supported by comfortable reservoir contagion effects of these developments through levels.6 Despite a mild loss in momentum, the the trade, capital flows and currency depreciation Indian manufacturing sector saw a rise in purchasing channels. Divergence in domestic macroeconomic activity and employment in February 2025.7 The conditions is also reflected in dissension in policy services sector recorded a strong expansion in new actions among central banks. businesses and employment.8 The Indian economy continues to demonstrate Notwithstanding the innate strength built on resilience in this turbulent global environment, as the strong macroeconomic fundamentals and prudent growth momentum is supported by robust sectoral policy, the reverberations of a tumultuous external performance and improving consumption trends. environment are also reflected in various segments The Second Advance Estimates (SAE) released by of the economy. Sustained foreign portfolio outflows the National Statistics Office (NSO) project a steady exerted significant pressures on domestic equity 6.5 per cent growth for 2024-25. The latest quarterly markets in February and engendered currency data further underscores this strength, with real depreciation. As discussed in more detail in Section GDP expanding by 6.2 per cent in Q3:2024-25, IV, domestic investors have, however, increased their shaking off the sluggishness of the previous quarter. Private consumption expenditure is on an upward 6 Agricultural Crop Production (kharif and rabi): Second Advance Estimates of 2024-25. 5 Short-Term Economic Outlook, US Energy Information Administration, 7 HSBC India Manufacturing PMI, February 2025. March 7, 2025. 8 HSBC India Services PMI, February 2025. 24 RBI Bulletin March 2025State of the Economy ARTICLE holdings, acting as a counterbalancing force, leading which would act as a bulwark to ward off the myriad to a shift in ownership patterns. of external challenges. Set against this backdrop, the remainder of India’s financial landscape is also navigating these the article is structured into four sections. Section external risks manifested through various channels II covers the rapidly evolving developments in while addressing domestic funding needs. The Reserve the global economy. An assessment of domestic Bank has remained agile, swiftly tackling liquidity macroeconomic conditions is set out in Section III. shortages triggered by government tax flow dynamics, Section IV encapsulates financial conditions in India, currency leakages and foreign portfolio investor while the last Section sets out the conclusions. (FPI) outflows. The Reserve Bank has deployed a II. Global Setting strategic mix of interventions, including open market operations (OMO), daily variable rate repo (VRR) Persistent trade and geopolitical uncertainties auctions, and dollar/rupee buy-sell swap auctions. continue to test the global economy’s resilience. In its Global Economic Outlook interim report of March These proactive measures have helped stabilise market 2025, the Organization for Economic Co-operation liquidity conditions, ensuring financial resilience in and Development (OECD) revised its global GDP an unpredictable global environment. growth forecast downward by 20 basis points (bps) to Headline CPI inflation moderated to a seven- 3.1 per cent for 2025 and by 30 bps to 3.0 per cent for month low of 3.6 per cent in February 2025 as food 2026 (from their December 2024 projections). Among prices, especially vegetables, recorded a sharp decline the advanced economies (AEs), the US is projected to driven by the arrival of winter crops in the market. outperform other AEs in the near term and emerging Core (CPI excluding food and fuel) inflation, however, market economies (EMEs) are expected to remain increased to 4.1 per cent. The decline in overall key drivers of global growth (Chart II.1). It has been inflation is expected to further support recovery in found that policy uncertainty has emerged as a major consumption and bolster macroeconomic strength, risk for global economic prospects (Box II.1) Chart II.1: Global GDP Growth Projections Notes: 1. *: PPP weighted #: India’s data is on a fiscal year basis. 2. Darker (lighter) shaded circles pertain to 2025 (2026) forecasts. Source: The OECD Global Economic Outlook, March 2025. RBI Bulletin March 2025 25 )tnec rep( noitcejorp htworG 2024 growth estimate (per cent) World* United Kingdom Japan India# Russia United Stated Euro area China Brazil South AfricaARTICLE State of the Economy Box II.1: Impact of Trade Policy Uncertainty on Global Economic Activity There has been a resurgence of policy uncertainty The impact of heightened trade policy uncertainty recently, particularly relating to geopolitics and trade reverberates across key economic variables, as evidenced (Chart II.B1a). The World Trade Policy Uncertainty by their impulse responses to an increase in TPU in a Index (TPU)9, which was relatively low and stable Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework. World exports until 2016, experienced a significant spike in 2018, experience a significant decline in response to increased driven by tariff wars between the US and China, as TPU, highlighting the adverse effects on global trade well as the US ending tariff exemptions for key trading flows (Chart II.B2a). For EMEs, an increase in TPU leads to a notable decline in industrial production partners, which prompted retaliatory measures. This (Chart II.B2b). This is particularly concerning for EMEs heightened uncertainty subsided post-2020 but re- that rely heavily on exports as an engine of economic emerged in late 2024, driven by concerns about new trade growth. restrictions, tariff increases, and tighter immigration policies following the US presidential elections (Chart In the commodity markets, the Energy Price Index II.B1b). shows a temporary increase in response to surging TPU, Chart II.B1: Global Policy Uncertainty Index a. Overall Policy Uncertainty 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 b. Trade Policy Uncertainty Note: In Chart II.B1a, the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) measures overall uncertainty across the globe, using frequency counts of "uncertainty" (and its variants) in the quarterly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports. The index is an unbalanced GDP-weighted average for 142 countries. Sources: Ahir et al. (2022); Caldara et al. (2019); and RBI authors’ illustration. (Contd.) 9 The trade policy uncertainty index (TPU) is constructed by staff in the International Finance Division of the Federal Reserve Board and measures media attention to news related to trade policy uncertainty. The index reflects automated text-search results of the electronic archives of 7 leading newspapers discussing trade policy uncertainty: Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Guardian, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post (accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers and ProQuest Newsstream). The index is scaled so that 100 indicates that 1 per cent of news articles contain references to TPU. 26 RBI Bulletin March 2025 xedni ytniatrecnu dlroW 1q1002 2q2002 3q3002 4q4002 1q6002 2q7002 3q8002 4q9002 1q1102 2q2102 3q3102 4q4102 1q6102 2q7102 3q8102 4q9102 1q1202 2q2202 3q3202 4q4202 US fiscal cliff and sovereign US - China trade Coronavirus debt crisis in Europe US presidential tensions, elections and Brexit US election and sovereign debt geopolitical risks US recession Iraq war and crisis in Europe Brexit War in and 9/11 outbreak of Ukraine financial SARS credit crunch FED tightening and political geopolitical tensions and collapse of Silicon Valley risk in Greece and Ukraine Bank, Signature Bank, and Credit Suisse 250 200 150 100 50 0 1Q1002 2Q2002 3Q3002 4Q4002 1Q6002 2Q7002 3Q8002 4Q9002 1Q1102 2Q2102 3Q3102 4Q4102 1Q6102 2Q7102 3Q8102 4Q9102 1Q1202 2Q2202 3Q3202 4Q4202 China put customs duties on A series of tariffs by the US and China goes into effect. US$60 billion of US goods The US also ends tariff exemptions for EU, Canada, and Mexico. EU and Canada impose tariff on the US. US announces plans to impose a 10 per cent The US imposes Safeguard Tariffs as tariff on US$300 billion of well as steel and aluminium tariffs. Chinese goods xedni ytniatrecnu ycilop edarTState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart II.B2: VAR Impulse Responses to One Standard Deviation Shock in TPU a. World Exports b. Industrial Production - EMEs TPU (cid:31) EMEs Industrial Production 95% Cl c. Energy Price Index d. Stock Market – S&P 500 0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.010 -0.015 -0.025 -0.030 0 Notes: 1. Monthly data from January 2000 to December 2024 were used for the analysis. 2. The data were log transformed and detrended using the HP filter. A generalised VAR model, with a one standard deviation increase in TPU, was used with optimal lags determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 3. The shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals (CI). Sources: Caldara et al. (2019); World Bank; CEIC; S&P Global; World Bank Pink Sheet; and RBI staff estimates. reflecting heightened risk perceptions and potential References: supply disruptions (Chart II.B2c). Similarly, the equity Ahir, H., Bloom, N., and Furceri, D. (2022). World market, as measured by the S&P 500 index for the US, Uncertainty Index. NBER Working Paper. reacts negatively to rising TPU, indicating a decline in Caldara, D., Iacoviello, M., Molligo, P., Prestipino, A., and investor confidence (Chart II.B2d). These responses Raffo, A. (2019). Does Trade Policy Uncertainty affect underscore the broad and interconnected impact of TPU Global Economic Activity? FEDS Notes. Washington, on various facets of the global economy. DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2445. Our model-based nowcast of global GDP mixed signals as the Baltic Dry Index reached a indicates a significant deceleration in global growth three-month high in February, reversing the decline momentum in Q1:2025 (Chart II.2). seen during the Lunar New Year period in Asia (Chart II.3c). Meanwhile, the Drewry World Container Global supply chain pressures recorded an Index continued to decline due to increased shipping uptick in February, inching towards historical capacity (Chart II.3d). average levels (Chart II.3a). The geopolitical risk indicator rose in February 2025 due to rising trade In February 2025, consumer sentiments protectionism and simmering political tensions worsened in the US, Japan, and Brazil while improving despite the fragile ceasefire in the Middle East (Chart marginally in the Euro area and the UK (Chart II.4a II.3b). Indicators of global shipping costs showed and II.4b). Financial conditions eased in major AEs, RBI Bulletin March 2025 27 esnopseR 0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.010 -0.015 -0.020 -0.025 0 -0.020 6 12 18 24 Time Period (in month) esnopseR 0.002 TPU (cid:31) World exports 95% Cl 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 6 12 18 24 0 Time Period (in month) TPU (cid:31) Energy Index 95% Cl esnopseR 6 12 18 24 Time Period (in month) 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0 esnopseR TPU (cid:31) S&P 500 95% Cl 6 12 18 24 Time Period (in month)ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart II.2: Global GDP Growth Nowcast (Q-o-Q) 2.5 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.2 -0.5 Sources: CEIC; OECD; and RBI staff estimates. but among EMEs, they tightened in China and Brazil The global composite purchasing managers’ index (Chart II.4c and 4d). (PMI) moderated to a 14-month low in February 2025, 28 RBI Bulletin March 2025 tnec reP 1202-3Q 1202-4Q 2202-1Q 2202-2Q 2202-3Q 2202-4Q 3202-1Q 3202-2Q 3202-3Q 3202-4Q 4202-1Q 4202-2Q 4202-3Q 4202-4Q 5202-1Q 47 Countries OECD + actual 38 Countries OECD + actual 43 Countries CEIC Nowcast 43 Countries CEIC Actual 86 Countries CEIC actual 86 Countries CEIC Nowcast Chart II.3: Trends in Global Supply Chain Pressures and Geopolitical Risks a. Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) b. Geopolitical Risk Indicator 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 c. Baltic Dry Index d. Drewry World Container Index Notes: 1. GSCPI reflects data on transportation costs and manufacturing indicators. 2. The Baltic Dry Index provides a benchmark for the price of moving the major raw materials by sea and consists of three sub-indices that measure different sizes of dry bulk carriers. 3. Drewry's weekly WCI assessment reports actual spot container freight rates for major east-west trade routes. The composite index represents a weighted average of the eight shipping routes by volume and is reported in USD per 40-foot container. Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; BlackRock Investment Institute, February 2025; and Bloomberg. 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 morf snoitaived dradnatS eulav egareva xednI 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1424 1000 500 0 xednI 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 52-raM 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2541 2000 1000 0 reniatnoc teef 04 rep $ SU 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 52-raMState of the Economy ARTICLE as the upturn in the manufacturing sector was offset (Chart II.5a). Global manufacturing PMI picked up pace by a deceleration in the service sector business activity as growth of output and new orders strengthened, Chart II.5: Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) a. Global PMI b. PMI (Regional Comparisons) 54 51.6 52 51.5 50.6 50 48 Note: A level of 50 corresponds to no change in activity, and a reading above 50 denotes expansion and vice versa. Source: S&P Global. RBI Bulletin March 2025 29 xednI 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 62 60 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 xednI aidnI aibarA iduaS lizarB eropagniS niapS SU EAU labolG gnoK gnoH anihC KU ylatI aissuR adanaC ailartsuA enoZ oruE napaJ ynamreG ecnarF Chart II.4: Consumer Sentiment and Financial Conditions a. Consumer Sentiments (AEs) b. Consumer Sentiments (EMEs) 100 0 90 -5 -13.6 -10 80 -15 70 -20 -20 60 64.7 -25 50 -30 -35 40 -40 30 35 -45 20 -50 c. Financial Conditions Index (AEs) d. Financial Conditions Index (EMEs) Notes: 1. Japan: A score above 50 indicates consumer optimism, below 50 shows a lack of consumer confidence, and 50 indicates neutrality. 2. Eurozone and UK: -100 indicates extreme lack of confidence, 0 denotes neutrality, and 100 indicates extreme confidence. 3. India and the US: The higher the index value, the higher the consumer confidence. 4. For the financial condition index (pertaining to EMEs constructed by Goldman Sachs), a reading below 100 is accommodative and vice versa. As for the AEs, the index constructed by Bloomberg is a z-score where a positive value indicates accommodative/easy financial conditions and vice versa. Source: Bloomberg. Composite Manufacturing Services Feb-25 Jan-25 xednI 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF US Japan Eurozone (RHS) UK (RHS) xednI 100 98 96 94 92 93.7 90 88 86 84 86.4 82 83.6 80 xednI 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF Brazil China India 2 1.6 1 1.1 0.7 0 -1 -2 -3 xednI 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF 106 104 103.8 102 100 101.3 98 96 96.3 94 US UK Euro zone xednI 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF China India BrazilARTICLE State of the Economy while slower new orders growth and flagging business on a month-on-month (m-o-m) basis (Chart II.7a). optimism led to a deceleration in the global services Food prices measured by the FAO’s food price index PMI. Across regions, India outperformed other major increased by 1.6 per cent in February 2025, primarily emerging markets, while growth remained weak in driven by increase in the prices of sugar, dairy and Europe, and Canada’s downturn intensified (Chart vegetable oil partially offset by decrease in prices of II.5b). meat (Chart II.7b). Crude oil prices declined by 4.6 per cent (m-o-m) driven by a significant build-up in The composite PMI for new export orders recorded US crude stockpiles and tariff uncertainty raising a sequential pick-up, albeit remaining in the negative global growth concerns (Chart II.7c). Crude oil prices territory, as the rate of contraction in manufacturing continued to decline in March following OPEC plus export orders narrowed. Services export orders decision to proceed with its output increase in April. continued to expand despite a sequential deceleration. Base metal prices increased in February and early Across major economies, Japan, India, and China March, supported by expectations of additional recorded an expansion in export orders, while the US stimulus in China and weakening of the US dollar. and the UK witnessed a contraction (Chart II.6a and Gold prices also surged in February (Chart II.7d), II.6b). The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Goods bolstered by safe-haven demand and purchases by Trade Barometer index at 102.8 for January indicates central banks. above trend merchandise trade growth, driven by Headline inflation continues to exhibit stickiness accelerated imports in anticipation of potential trade in major economies’ last mile of disinflation. In the policy changes. US, CPI inflation moderated to 2.8 per cent (y-o-y) Global commodity prices remained volatile in in February from 3.0 per cent in January. Headline February, as indicated by the Bloomberg Commodity inflation in the Euro area moderated to 2.4 per cent Index, registering a modest increase of 0.4 per cent in February from 2.5 per cent in January. Inflation Chart II.6: Global PMI: New Export Orders a. PMI b. Regional Comparisons (Composite) 52 51 50.2 50 49.8 49.6 49 48 47 Composite Manufacturing Services Note: A level of 50 corresponds to no change in activity, and a reading above 50 denotes expansion and vice versa. Source: S&P Global. 30 RBI Bulletin March 2025 xednI 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 60 56 55.7 51.8 52 50.1 48 47.3 46.0 44 xednI 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF United States United Kingdom Japan China IndiaState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart II.7: Commodity and Food Prices a. Bloomberg Commodity Index b. Food Prices c. Brent Crude Oil d. Metals Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Pink Sheet; and FAO. in Japan (CPI excluding fresh food) increased to 3.2 than expected economic data10 and heightened per cent in January, while in the UK, it accelerated uncertainty regarding trade policies dented optimism by 50 bps (Chart II.8a). Among EMEs, CPI inflation (Chart II.9a). Yields on the US government securities in China returned to deflationary zone at (-)0.7 per remained volatile with a softening bias tracking these cent in February, marking its lowest level in over a developments (Chart II.9b). Potential negative impact year driven by weak domestic demand (Chart II.8b). of trade restrictions on US growth weighed on the US CPI inflation recorded an increase in Russia and Brazil dollar and the US dollar index (DXY) weakened by 0.7 per cent in February and continued to weaken in in February, and in South Africa in January. Core and March. Concomitantly, the MSCI currency index for services inflation remains above headline in most AEs EMEs increased marginally despite modest capital (Chart II.8c and II.8d). outflows (Chart II.9c and II.9d). The Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Central banks have either lowered their world equity index declined by 0.7 per cent (m-o-m) in policy rates or maintained a status quo in their February as losses in AEs outweighed gains in EMEs. latest policy meetings. Among AE central banks, The index rose in the first half of February, supported the European Central Bank (ECB) and Canada cut by strong quarterly corporate earnings in the US, but declined subsequently extending their decline 10 These include disappointing flash PMI and a sluggish consumer to March so far (up to 14th) as the release of weaker sentiment index. RBI Bulletin March 2025 31 xednI 160 156.0 148.7 140 127.1 120 118.5 118.0 112.6 100 )001=61 - 4102( xednI 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF Food price index Meat Dairy Cereals Vegetable oil Sugar lbb /$SU Price Futures as on Feb 14, 2025 Futures as on Mar 14, 2025 )001=2202 - dne( xednI 165.52 160 150 140 130 120 116.34 110 100 90 80 86.16 70 Gold Copper Iron 32-luJ-10 32-luJ-72 32-guA-22 32-peS-71 32-tcO-31 32-voN-80 32-ceD-40 32-ceD-03 42-naJ-52 42-beF-02 42-raM-71 42-rpA-21 42-yaM-80 42-nuJ-30 42-nuJ-92 42-luJ-52 42-guA-02 42-peS-51 42-tcO-11 42-voN-60 42-ceD-20 42-ceD-82 52-naJ-32 52-beF-81 52-raM-61 108 104.9 103 98 93 32-luJ-10 32-luJ-72 32-guA-22 32-peS-71 32-tcO-31 32-voN-80 32-ceD-40 32-ceD-03 42-naJ-52 42-beF-02 42-raM-71 42-rpA-21 42-yaM-80 42-nuJ-30 42-nuJ-92 42-luJ-52 42-guA-02 42-peS-51 42-tcO-11 42-voN-60 42-ceD-20 42-ceD-82 52-naJ-32 52-beF-81 52-raM-61 95 90 85 80 73.7 75 71.84 70 69.55 65 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raM 52-yaM 52-luJARTICLE State of the Economy their policy rates by 25 bps in March and the UK, their key rates by 25 bps in February. Iceland and Czech Republic, Australia and South Korea lowered New Zealand accelerated their rate cuts to 50 bps Chart II.9: Global Financial Markets a. Equity Indices (MSCI) b. US Government Bond Yields c. Currency Indices d. Portfolio Flows to EMEs Sources: Bloomberg; and IIF. 32 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )001=1202 - dne enuJ( xednI World AEs EMEs tnec reP 10-year 2-year Spread (10yr-2yr) xednI xednI MSCI EME currency index Dollar index (RHS) noillib $SU 130 121.5 120 110 116.1 100 90 80 81.4 70 60 Debt Equity Total 32-luJ-10 32-luJ-72 32-guA-22 32-peS-71 32-tcO-31 32-voN-80 32-ceD-40 32-ceD-03 42-naJ-52 42-beF-02 42-raM-71 42-rpA-21 42-yaM-80 42-nuJ-30 42-nuJ-92 42-luJ-52 42-guA-02 42-peS-51 42-tcO-11 42-voN-60 42-ceD-20 42-ceD-82 52-naJ-32 52-beF-81 52-raM-61 110 1,790 1,770 108 1757.2 1,750 106 1,730 104 1,710 103.7 102 1,690 1,670 100 1,650 98 32-luJ-10 32-luJ-72 32-guA-22 32-peS-71 32-tcO-31 32-voN-80 32-ceD-40 32-ceD-03 42-naJ-52 42-beF-02 42-raM-71 42-rpA-21 42-yaM-80 42-nuJ-30 42-nuJ-92 42-luJ-52 42-guA-02 42-peS-51 42-tcO-11 42-voN-60 42-ceD-20 42-ceD-82 52-naJ-32 52-beF-81 52-raM-61 15 10 5 0.4 -1 -6 -9.2 -11 -16 -9.6 32-luJ-3 32-guA-3 32-peS-3 32-tcO-4 32-voN-4 32-ceD-5 42-naJ-5 42-beF-5 42-raM-7 42-rpA-7 42-yaM-8 42-nuJ-8 42-luJ-9 42-guA-9 42-peS-9 42-tcO-01 42-voN-01 42-ceD-11 52-naJ-11 52-beF-11 52-raM-41 5.5 45 .. 50 4.31 4.0 3.5 4.02 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.30 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 32-luJ-10 32-luJ-72 32-guA-22 32-peS-71 32-tcO-31 32-voN-80 32-ceD-40 32-ceD-03 42-naJ-52 42-beF-02 42-raM-71 42-rpA-21 42-yaM-80 42-nuJ-30 42-nuJ-92 42-luJ-52 42-guA-02 42-peS-51 42-tcO-11 42-voN-60 42-ceD-20 42-ceD-82 52-naJ-32 52-beF-81 52-raM-61 Chart II.8: Inflation - AEs and EMEs a. Headline - AEs b. Headline - EMEs US (PCE) UK Euro area Japan c. Core d. Services 5.0 3.7 3.1 4.1 3.7 2.6 1.5 1.4 Sources: Bloomberg; and OECD. tnec reP Brazil Russia China South Africa India 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 US UK Euro Area Japan tnec reP tnec reP tnec reP 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3.2 3 3.02.5 2 2.4 1 0 -1 US UK Euro Area Japan 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 10 10.1 9 8 7 6 5 5.1 34 3.23.6 2 1 0 -0.7 -1 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beFState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart II.10: Changes in Policy Rates a. AEs b. EMEs 60 0 0 -25 -25 -100 -75 -75 -100 -125 -150 -150 -200 -175 -175 -225 -300 -300 Source: Bloomberg. in February (Chart II.10a). Israel, however, kept its III. Domestic Developments policy rate unchanged. Among EME central banks, The Indian economy recorded a sequential China, Russia, Hungary, the Philippines, Indonesia pick-up in growth during Q3:2024-25 driven by and Romania kept their policy rates unchanged in private consumption and government spending. February. Malaysia, Peru and Poland kept their policy Supply chain pressures remained below historical rates unchanged in March while Thailand lowered its policy rate by 25 bps, and Mexico cut its benchmark average levels, despite a marginal uptick in February rate by 50 bps (Chart II.10b). (Chart III.1). RBI Bulletin March 2025 33 ailartsuA adanaC dnalreztiwS cilbupeR hcezC kramneD modgniK detinU learsI napaJ yawroN dnalaeZ weN aibreS nedewS setatS detinU aerA oruE 150 150 50 0 -50 -35 -25 -25 -150 -75 -100 -75 -175 -250 -200 -350 -325 -350 -450 Q1:2024 Q2:2024 Q3:2024 Q4:2024 Q1:2025 (till 16 Mar, 2025) stniop sisaB stniop sisaB lizarB elihC anihC aibmoloC aisenodnI aidnI ocixeM aisyalaM ureP senippilihP aibarA iduaS acirfA htuoS Q1:2024 Q2:2024 Q3:2024 Q4:2024 Q1:2025 (till 16 Mar, 2025) Chart III.1: Index of Supply Chain Pressures (ISPI) Source: RBI staff estimates. egareva morf snoitaived dradnatS 3 2 1 0 -0.41 -1 -2 -3 01-beF 01-guA 11-beF 11-guA 21-beF 21-guA 31-beF 31-guA 41-beF 41-guA 51-beF 51-guA 61-beF 61-guA 71-beF 71-guA 81-beF 81-guA 91-beF 91-guA 02-beF 02-guA 12-beF 12-guA 22-beF 22-guA 32-beF 32-guA 42-beF 42-guA 52-beFARTICLE State of the Economy Aggregate Demand investment, however, moderated to 5.7 per cent, as mirrored in its proximate indicators – steel The second advance estimates (SAE) of national consumption and import of capital goods. Despite income released by the National Statistical Office headwinds to global trade and world demand, exports (NSO) on February 28, 2025 placed India’s real gross recorded a growth of 10.4 per cent, primarily supported domestic product (GDP) growth at 6.5 per cent in by services. With growth in exports surpassing that 2024-25 – an upward revision of 10 bps from the of imports, the net exports contributed positively to first advance estimates (FAE) despite a higher base. GDP growth by 2.5 percentage points in Q3:2024-25 This reflects an upward revision of 120 bps in net (Chart III.2). exports to 7.1 per cent and 30 bps in private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) to 7.6 per cent. High frequency indicators suggest that Growth for 2023-24 was also revised upwards by 100 aggregate demand continued to remain resilient in bps to 9.2 per cent from the provisional estimates Q4:2024-25. Activity indicators such as E-way bills (PE). and toll collections recorded double digit (y-o-y) growth in February 2025 (Chart III.3a and Chart In terms of quarterly trajectory, growth III.3b). accelerated to 6.2 per cent in Q3:2024-25 from 5.6 per cent in Q2. PFCE growth accelerated to 6.9 per Wholesale automobile sales contracted by 6.4 cent during Q3, owing to a sustained momentum per cent (y-o-y) in February (Chart III.4a). The two- in rural consumption and a revival in urban wheeler segment declined by 9.0 per cent (y-o-y), consumption. Government final consumption mainly due to a fall in motorcycle sales (Chart III.4b). expenditure (GFCE) growth improved to 8.3 per cent Tractor sales registered double-digit growth for during Q3 as expenditure by both the Union and the third consecutive month. Vehicle registrations the State governments picked up. Growth in fixed recorded a contraction in February, driven by a Chart III.2: Weighted Contribution to GDP Growth Notes: 1. #: Implicit growth. 2. Others include change in stock, valuables and statistical discrepancies. Source: NSO. 34 RBI Bulletin March 2025 stniop egatnecreP 20 15 10 7.6 5 0 -5 -10 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4# 2023-24 2024-25 Privatefinalconsumption expenditure Government final consumptionexpenditure Others Gross fixed capital formation Netexports GDP(Y-o-Ygrowth,per cent)State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.3: E-way Bills and Toll Collections a. E-way Bills b. Toll Collections GST E-way bill inter-state E-way bills growth (RHS) GST E-way bill intra-state Sources: GSTN; and RBI. decline in both non-transport and transport vehicles decreased by 2.1 per cent (y-o-y) in February (Chart segments (Chart III.4c). Petroleum consumption III.4d). RBI Bulletin March 2025 35 stinu noilliM y-o-y ,tnec reP )001=9102( xednI y-o-y ,tnec reP Volume Volume growth (RHS) Value Value growth (RHS) 7.93 0.27 140 25 120 20 100 15 80 14.7 60 10 40 5 20 0 0 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF 5421 289 1400 50 1200 40 1000 30 800 600 20 400 18.3 10 200 0 0 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF 19 Chart III.4: Automobile Sector Indicators a. Automobile Sales b. Rural Demand Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM). Sources: SIAM; and Tractor and Mechanization Association (TMA). c. Vehicle Registrations d. Petroleum Consumption Source: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell. sdnasuohT noillim ni rebmuN y-o-y ,tnec reP y-o-y ,tnec reP snoilliM sennot noilliM sdnasuohT y-o-y ,tnec reP 3000 35 30 2500 25 2000 1,774 20 15 1500 10 1000 5 0 500 -6.4 -5 0 -10 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 2.5 160 140 2.0 120 1.5 58.8 100 80 1.0 57.8 60 0.84 40 0.5 0.5 20 0.0 0 Total automobile sales Automobile sales growth (RHS) 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF Motorcycle sales Three wheeler sales (RHS) Scooters Tractor sales (RHS) 3.5 45 3.0 35 2.5 25 2.0 1.7 15 1.5 5 1.0 0.5 -7.3 -5 0.0 0.2 -15 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 14 12 12 10 8 10 3.1 6 8 4 6 2 7.3 0 4 -2 2 -2.1 -4 0 0.7 -6 Non-transport vehicles Total registrations growth (RHS) Transport vehicles 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF ATF Petrol Diesel Growth in average daily petroleum consumption (RHS)ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.5: PMI Employment Indices Note: A PMI value above 50 indicates expansion. Source: S&P Global. In February 2025, job creation in the organised Exports of 17 out of 30 major commodities manufacturing sector recorded the second fastest rate (accounting for 75.3 per cent of export basket in of expansion since the inception of the PMI survey. 2023-24) contracted on y-o-y basis in February. Employment in the services sector also continued to Petroleum products, engineering goods, chemicals expand at a robust pace (Chart III.5) and gems and jewellery contributed negatively, while electronic goods, rice, mica, coal and other ores As per the latest quarterly Periodic Labour supported export growth in February (Chart III.9). Force Survey (PLFS), urban unemployment rate during October-December 2024 was at 6.4 per cent, unchanged from the previous quarter and lowest in the PLFS series. The Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) and the Worker Population Ratio (WPR) remained steady (Chart III.6). After recording sequential increase for four consecutive months, the demand for work under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) declined by 3.1 per cent (m-o-m) in February 2025, coinciding with the onset of Rabi harvesting (Chart III.7). India’s merchandise exports at US$ 36.9 billion contracted by 10.9 per cent (y-o-y) in February 2025, driven by an unfavourable base effect which more than offset the positive momentum (Chart III.8). 36 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )egnahc oN = 05( xednI 58 57 56.2 56 55 54 54.5 53 52 51 50 49 48 Manufacturing Services 42 beF 42 raM 42 rpA 42 yaM 42 nuJ 42 luJ 42 guA 42 peS 42 tcO 42 voN 42 ceD 52 naJ 52 beF Chart III.6: PLFS Quarterly (age 15 and above) Source: MOSPI. tnec reP tnec reP Labour Force Participation Rate Unemployment Rate (RHS) Worker Population Ratio 4.05 55 25 50 20 47.2 45 15 40 10 6.4 35 5 30 0 91-ceD 02-raM 02-nuJ 02-peS 02-ceD 12-raM 12-nuJ 12-peS 12-ceD 22-raM 22-nuJ 22-peS 22-ceD 32-raM 32-nuJ 32-peS 32-ceD 42-raM 42-nuJ 42-peS 42-ceD Chart III.7: Households Demand for Work under MGNREGS 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Source: Ministry of Rural Development. tnec reP 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.8: India's Merchandise Exports a. Trend in Exports b. Decomposition of Sequential Change in Export Growth (y-o-y) Note: POL: Petroleum, oil and lubricants. Sources: PIB; DGCI&S; and RBI staff estimates. During April-February 2024-25, India’s out of 20 major destinations expanded during April- merchandise exports expanded by 0.1 per cent February 2024-25, with the US, the UAE and the to US$ 395.6 billion, primarily led by electronic Netherlands being the top three export destinations. goods, engineering goods, rice and drugs and The merchandise imports at US$ 51.0 billion pharmaceuticals, while petroleum products, gems decreased by 16.3 per cent (y-o-y) in February mainly and jewellery and iron ore dragged exports down. due to a fall in oil and gold imports, after expanding for 10 consecutive months. Out of 30 major Exports to 14 out of 20 major destinations commodities, 12 commodities (accounting for 56.8 contracted in February 2025, while exports to 13 per cent of import basket) registered a contraction on y-o-y basis (Chart III.10). Petroleum, crude and products, gold, silver, coal, coke and briquettes, etc., and pearls, and precious and semi-precious stones dragged imports down, while electronic goods, chemical material and products, vegetable oil, machinery, electrical and non-electrical, and non-ferrous metals contributed positively (Chart III.11). During April-February 2024-25, India’s merchandise imports at US$ 656.7 billion increased by 5.7 per cent (y-o-y), mainly led by gold, electronic goods, petroleum, crude and products, and machinery while coal, coke and briquettes, etc., pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, and iron and steel, contributed negatively. RBI Bulletin March 2025 37 noillib $SU tnec rep ni htworG tnec reP 40 30 20 10 1.3 0 -10 -10.9 -20 Non-POL Y-o-y, growth (RHS) POL M-o-m, growth (RHS) Base effect Momentum ∆ in y-o-y growth 1.13 8.5 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF 25 20 15 10 5 1.3 0 -10.4 -5 -10 -9.0 -15 -20 -25 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF Chart III.9: India's Merchandise Exports – Relative Contribution (February 2025 over February 2024) Electronic goods 1.9 Rice 0.3 Mica, coal and other ores 0.2 RMG of all textiles 0.1 Coffee 0.1 Iron ore -0.5 Gems and jewellery -1.6 Organic and inorganic chemicals -1.7 Engineering goods -2.1 Petroleum products -5.8 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 24 Percentage point Sources: PIB; and RBI staff estimates.ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.10: India's Merchandise Imports a. Trend in Imports b. Decomposition of Sequential Change in Import Growth (y-o-y) Imports from 13 out of 20 major source in both oil and non-oil deficit. The share of oil deficit countries contracted in February 2025, while imports in trade deficit fell to 43.3 per cent in February from from 11 out of 20 major source countries expanded 44.5 per cent a year ago owing to a larger decline during April-February 2024-25. Major import source (Chart III.12). countries, viz., China, Russia and the UAE witnessed During April-February 2024-25, India’s imports growth during the period. merchandise trade deficit widened to US$ 261.1 Merchandise trade deficit fell to its lowest level billion from US$ 225.8 billion a year ago. Petroleum since August 2021 to US$ 14.1 billion driven by a fall 38 RBI Bulletin March 2025 noillib $SU tnec reP Non-POL non-gold Y-o-y, growth (RHS) Gold M-o-m, growth (RHS) POL Base effect Momentum ∆ in y-o-y growth Sources: PIB; DGCI&S; and RBI staff estimates. tnec rep ni htworG 30 20 10 0 -12 -10 -15 -20 -30 -28 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF -20 7.63 9.11 -14.2 -16.3 3.2 80 60 70 50 60 40 50 30 40 20 30 10 20 0 10 -10 0 22-ceD 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF Chart III.11: India's Merchandise Imports – Chart III.12: Decomposition of India’s Relative Contribution Merchandise Trade Deficit (February 2025 over February 2024) Electronic goods 1.0 Chemical material & products 0.7 Vegetable oil 0.4 Machinery, electrical & non-electrical 0.4 Non-ferrous metals 0.3 Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones -1.5 Coal, Coke and Briquettes, etc. -1.9 Silver -2.1 Gold -6.3 Petroleum, crude and products -8.2 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 Percentage points Sources: PIB; and RBI staff estimates. Sources: PIB; and DGCI&S. noillib $SU tnec reP Non-oil deficit Share of oil in trade deficit (RHS) Oil deficit 9.6 6.9 7.8 8.01 9.01 4.4 5.9 7.9 8.11 2.01 6.9 3.11 7.8 2.51 4.6 1.72 4.01 8.31 5.41 1.11 3.21 5.91 6.11 1.31 0.8 43.3 7.8 9.9 1.6 40 80 35 70 30 60 25 50 20 40 15 30 10 20 5 10 0 0 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beFState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.13: Commodity-wise Merchandise Trade Deficit products were the largest source of deficit, followed During April-January 2024-25, the gross fiscal deficit (GFD) and revenue deficit (RD) as a per by electronic goods and gold (Chart III.13). cent of revised estimate (RE) stood higher than In January 2025, services exports grew by 12.0 the corresponding period of the previous year per cent (y-o-y) to US$ 34.7 billion, and services mainly due to the pickup in both revenue and imports increased by 12.6 per cent (y-o-y) to US$ 16.7 capital expenditure of the Union government in billion (Chart III.14). Net services export earnings recent months (Chart III.15a).11 Tax collections also recorded a growth of 11.5 per cent (y-o-y) in January. continued to remain robust. The key fiscal indicators 11 As per the latest data released by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA). RBI Bulletin March 2025 39 noillib $SU Chart III.14: Services Exports and Imports: Growth Rates 350 300 261.1 250 225.8 200 150 100 50 0 2023-24 (April-February) 2024-25 (April-February) Petroleum products Electronic goods Others Coal, coke and briquettes Gold Note: Coal, coke and briquettes exports in January and February 2025 are assumed to be at the same level as in December 2024. Gold exports are estimated. Sources: PIB; DGCI&S; and RBI staff estimates. Source: RBI. )y-o-y( tnec reP 35 30 25 20 15 12.6 10 12.0 5 0 -5 -10 -15 Exports Imports 32-naJ 32-beF 32-raM 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ Chart III.15: Major Fiscal Indicators during April-January 2024-25 a. Deficit Indicators b. Receipts and Expenditure ER fo tnec reP ER fo tnec reP 100 100 90 90 80 72.4 74.5 80 75.1 74.476.1 78.3 75.9 74.4 81.782.2 76.8 67.8 70 68.5 70 61.1 63.6 61.1 60 60 49.5 49.4 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 Revenue Capital Revenue Non-debt 0 expenidture expenditure receipts capital Revenue deficit Gross fiscal deficit receipts 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Sources: Union budget documents; and CGA.ARTICLE State of the Economy such as revenue receipts, revenue expenditure and capital expenditure remained broadly in line with the previous year (as per cent of RE), barring the non- debt capital receipts which have been lower than the previous year (Chart III.15b). The total expenditure of the Union government grew at 6.4 per cent vis-à-vis 5.9 per cent in the corresponding period of the previous year as both capital and revenue expenditure expanded. Within the Centre’s revenue expenditure, the outgo on major subsidies increased by 7.0 per cent driven by higher food subsidy, as compared to a contraction of 21.0 per cent last year. The capital expenditure incurred during April- January 2024-25 stood at 74.4 per cent of its RE for The gross tax revenue and total receipts of the 2024-25, broadly in line with the previous year. Centre recorded a growth of 10.3 per cent and 6.6 per Centre’s capex witnessed consistent pick up from cent, respectively, in April-January 2024-25. Income October 2024, compensating for the sluggishness tax and GST continued to be the major drivers for witnessed during H1:2024-25 (Chart III.16a). Ministries the Centre’s robust tax collections in 2024-25. While with highest budgeted capex target for 2024-25 have the performance of corporation tax remained sub- attained substantial progress in achieving their revised par, there has been an improvement in the growth capital expenditure target of 2024-25 (Chart III.16b). of customs duty and union excise duty (Chart III.17). 40 RBI Bulletin March 2025 ER fo tnec reP Chart III.17: Tax Revenue during April-January 30 27.3 25 22.0 20.1 20 15 11.4 9.0 8.6 10 5 1.0 0 -0.6 -1.3 -5 -6.0 -10 Corporation Income GST Customs Union tax tax duties excise duties Direct tax Indirect tax 2023-24 2024-25 Sources: Union budget documents; and CGA. Chart III.16: Expenditure of Union Government during April-January 2024-25 a. Monthly Expenditure b. Ministry-wise Capex Sources: Union budget documents; and CGA. )tnec rep( htworg y-o-Y ER fo tnec reP 120 100 80 60 40 51.4 20 5.1 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 lirpA yaM enuJ yluJ tsuguA rebmetpeS rebotcO rebmevoN rebmeceD yraunaJ Capital expenditure Revenue expenditure 2023-24 2024-25 0.08 4.17 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 daoR fo yrtsiniM syawhgiH dna tropsnarT syawliaR fo yrtsiniM ecnaniF fo yrtsiniM ecnefeD fo yrtsiniM noitacinummoC fo yrtsiniM gnisuoH fo yrtsiniM sriaffA nabrU dnaState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.18: Monthly Trends in STT and GST a. GST (Centre plus States) b. STT Sources: CGA; Press Information Bureau (PIB); and GST Portal. The GST receipts (Centre plus States) grew by 9.1 supported by higher tax revenue, even as growth in per cent (y-oy) in February 2025 (Chart III.18a). The non-tax revenue moderated (Chart III.20a). Within cumulative GST collection for April-February 2024-25 States’ own tax revenues, States’ goods and services amounted to ₹20.13 lakh crore, 9.4 per cent higher tax (SGST) witnessed robust growth and sales tax/ than a year ago. During April-January 2024-25, the VAT collections showed signs of recovery from a tax collection from securities transaction tax (STT) contraction during the same period in the previous has recorded a substantial growth of 75.3 per cent year. raising its share in direct tax receipts to 2.6 per cent from 1.6 per cent last year (Chart III.18b). Non-tax revenue collection registered a robust growth on the back of surplus transfer of ₹2.11 lakh crore from the Reserve Bank of India. On the other hand, the performance of non-debt capital receipts remains tepid, partly on account of lower disinvestment receipts. As per provisional accounts data for April-January 2024-25, States’ GFD as a per cent of the budget estimates was marginally lower than last year on account of an improvement in revenue performance and a compression in capital expenditure (Chart III.19). Revenue receipts posted a robust growth, RBI Bulletin March 2025 41 erorc dnasuoht ₹ erorc ₹ 250 200 184 150 100 50 0 rpA yaM nuJ luJ guA peS tcO voN ceD naJ beF raM rpA yaM nuJ luJ guA peS tcO voN ceD naJ beF 6000 5000 4405 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 2023-24 2024-25 rpA yaM nuJ luJ guA peS tcO voN ceD naJ beF raM rpA yaM nuJ luJ guA peS tcO voN ceD naJ 2023-24 2024-25 )tnec reP (EB ni erahS Chart III.19: States’ Fiscal Indicators (April-January) 120 97.5 100 92.6 80 63.1 61.3 60 53.9 48.9 40 20 0 Revenue deficit Gross fiscal deficit Primary deficit 2023-24 2024-25 Note: Data pertains to 21 States. Source: Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG).ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.20: Key Fiscal Performance Indicators (April-January) a. Growth in Receipts b. Growth in Expenditure On the expenditure side, growth in revenue and chemicals industries contributed the most to expenditure picked up during April-January 2024- the growth together accounting for 38 per cent in 25, while capital expenditure declined (Chart total GVA. In contrast, iron and steel, petroleum and III.20b). The rise in revenue expenditure, alongside cement industries contributed negatively to overall a contraction in capital outlay has weakened the GVA growth (Chart III.22). quality of States’ spending, with the ratio of revenue expenditure to capital outlay (RECO) rising to 7.1 in Agriculture, forestry and fishing expanded by April-January 2024-25 from 6.1 in the same period 5.6 per cent in Q3:2024-25, owing to robust kharif last year. Aggregate Supply Real gross value added (GVA) at basic prices is estimated to grow at 6.4 per cent in 2024-25 as per the SAE, similar to that in the FAE. In Q3:2024-25, real GVA growth accelerated to 6.2 per cent (y-o-y) from 5.8 per cent in the preceding quarter (Chart III.21). The growth was propelled by the agriculture and services sector, while the industry sector performed modestly. The nominal GVA growth of listed private manufacturing companies remained unchanged from the previous quarter at 5.0 per cent (y-o-y) during Q3:2024-25. Pharmaceuticals, automobiles, 42 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )tnec rep ni( etar htworg y-o-Y )tnec rep ni( etar htworg y-o-Y 30 27.0 35 32.1 22.6 30 19.7 20 13.315.5 14.1 25 11.5 10 7.1 20 4.4 3.1 0 15 11.811.8 12.3 12.2 10.3 Revenue Tax Non-tax Grants 8.8 8.9 10 Receipts Revenue Revenue -10 5 -0.6 -15.0 -20 0 Total Revenue Capital -30 -27.1 -5 Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Note: Data pertains to 21 States. Source: CAG. Chart III.21: Weighted Contribution to GVA Growth Note: #: Implicit growth. Sources: NSO; and RBI staff estimates stniop egatnecreP 9.9 10 9.2 8.0 8 7.3 6.5 5.8 6.8 6 6.2 4 2 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4# 2023-24 2024-25 Services Agriculture, forestry and fishing Industry GVA at basic prices (Y-o-Y growth, per cent)State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.22: Nominal GVA Growth of Manufacturing Sector: Industry Contribution Note: Results are based on 1,675 listed private manufacturing for Q3: 2024-25. Sources: Capitaline database; and RBI staff calculations. foodgrains production and higher horticulture cent, driven by stronger trade activity. Financial, real production.12 The industrial sector showed a estate, and professional services maintained a 7.2 per cent growth rate, while public administration, modest recovery in Q3 after a muted performance defence, and other services (PADO) grew by 8.8 per in the preceding quarter. Manufacturing sector – the cent, supported by robust growth in other services. primary driver of industrial GVA growth – registered In its outlook for seasonal temperature during a growth of 3.5 per cent, aided by improved the hot weather season, the IMD has projected profitability of the listed corporate manufacturing above-normal maximum temperatures over most firms. The activity in mining and quarrying parts of the country during March to May 2025. recuperated, recording a growth of 1.4 per cent in Above-normal temperatures may lead to an increase Q3:2024-25 from a contraction in Q2. Electricity, gas, in power demand. However, India’s rising focus on water supply and other utility services grew at 5.1 the electricity generation from renewable sources per cent in Q3:2024-25 as against 3.0 per cent growth especially solar, may help in meeting increased power demand during the summer season (Chart recorded in the preceding quarter. The services III.23). sector remained steady in Q3:2024-25. Construction Solar energy remains the dominant contributor growth moderated to 7.0 per cent compared with accounting for 47 per cent of the total installed the preceding quarter, as reflected in moderation in renewable energy capacity. Recently, India achieved a steel consumption, while growth in trade, hotels, historic milestone of surpassing 100 GW of installed transport, and related services improved to 6.7 per solar power capacity which increased from 2.82 GW 12 Kharif food production was growth 6.8 per cent higher in 2024-25. in 2014 to 100 GW in 2025.13 With the objective to As per the first advance estimates, the production of horticultural crops supply solar power to one crore households by March during 2024-25 is placed at 362.1 million tonnes, 2.1 per cent higher than the final estimates of 2023-24 and 1.9 per cent higher than the first advance estimates of 2023-24. 13 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2100603 RBI Bulletin March 2025 43 y-o-y ,tnec reP 20 14.5 15 11.7 10 5.7 5.0 5 5.0 0 -5 -10 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2023-24 2024-25 Others Cement Food Products Automobiles Iron and Steel Textiles Electrical Machinery Pharmaceuticals Petroleum Non-Ferrous Metals Chemicals Manufacturing GVAARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.23: Electricity Generation from Renewable Resources Note: * Up to January 2025. Source: Central Electricity Authority. 2027, PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana (PMSGMBY) previous year. Area under all the major crops was facilitates the installation of rooftop solar panels. higher than last year, except for oilseeds for which As of March 10, 2025, there were 10.09 lakh it was at slightly lower level than a year ago (Chart households with rooftop solar installations. Gujarat, III.26). Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, and Rajasthan Reservoir levels (based on 155 major reservoirs) together accounting for more than 84 per cent of the are in a comfortable position at 47 per cent of total total installations as per the state-wise data available up to January 27, 2025 (Chart III.24). The second advance estimates of the agriculture crop production (kharif and rabi)14 placed total foodgrains production at 330.9 million tonnes in 2024-25, 4.8 per cent higher than the final estimates of 2023-24 due to increase in both kharif and rabi production, by 6.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent, respectively (Chart III.25). Wheat (major rabi staple cereal) production has been estimated at record 115.4 million tonnes which is 1.9 per cent higher than the final estimates of the previous year. As on March 07, 2025, the summer acreage was 21.1 per cent higher than the same during the 14 The estimates exclude the production for the summer (zaid) season of which the sowing is currently under progress. 15 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2102149 44 RBI Bulletin March 2025 tnec reP tnec reP 25 23 22.6 23 20 9.4 22 8.3 15 22 0.6 21 10 7.5 21 5 20 4.8 0 20 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 *52 -4202 Chart III.24: Rooftop Solar Panels Installations under PMSGMBY (as of January 27, 2025) 4,00,000 3,51,273 3,50,000 3,00,000 2,50,000 1,92,936 2,00,000 1,50,000 1,37,008 1,00,000 73,602 65,423 50,000 26,622 Wind Solar Biomass and Bagasse Large and small hydro others Total Renewable (RHS) 0 Gujarat Maharashtra Uttar Kerala Rajasthan Other Pradesh States Source: PIB. sdlohesuoH fo rebmuN Chart III.25: Agriculture Production in 2024-25 (SAE) Note: Production estimates excludes the summer (zaid) crops. #: Million bales of 170 kg each. Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. sennot noilliM tnec reP 500 10 450 8.4 8 6.7 6.8 400 6 350 3.8 4 1.9 2 300 0 250 -2 200 -4.0 -4 150 -6 100 -9.5 -8 50 -10 0 -12 Wheat Rice Pulses Coarse Oilseeds Sugar Cotton# cereals cane 2024-25 (SAE) Over 2023-24 (Final) [RHS]State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.26: Weekly Summer (zaid) Sowing Progress (as on March 7) 40 37.5 35 31.0 30 27.1 24.3 25 20 15 10 5.0 5 2.1 2.02.9 2.62.5 0 Rice Pulses Coarse Oilseeds Total Cereals 2024 2025 Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. reservoir capacity (as of March 13, 2025) which is summer season (March to May) in most part of the higher than the previous year as well as the decadal country (Chart III.28). average levels (Chart III.27). This partially allays The overall public stock of foodgrains held concerns for the standing rabi crops emanating by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) stood at 3.8 from the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD’s) projection of anomaly in temperature and above times the buffer requirements, mainly due to a normal number of heatwave days for the whole higher stock of rice (Chart III.29). Rice stocks are RBI Bulletin March 2025 45 eratceh hkaL Chart III.27: Reservoir Level (as on March 13) Source: Central Water Commission. level riovreser lluf fo tnec reP 70 58 60 50 50 46 45 47 41 40 40 27 30 20 10 0 Last 10years average 2024 2025 nrehtroN nretsaE nretseW lartneC nrehtuoS aidnI llA Chart III.28: Maximum Temperature Chart III.29: Procurement and Outlook for March 2025 Stocks of Foodgrains Note: Colours illustrates the most likely categories of temperatures and their probabilities. Note: *: As on March 11; #: As on March 01. Source: India Meteorological Department. Source: Food Corporation of India. sennot hkaL 800 675.3 700 579.9 600 500 442.2 464.4 400 300 262.0 266.1 200 134.1 100 96.9 0 KMS 2023-24 KMS 2024-25 RMS 2023-24 RMS 2024-25 Rice Wheat Procurement* Stock#ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.30: Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) a. Manufacturing b. Services at 8.9 times the buffer requirement. Wheat stocks Among the high frequency indicators of are higher than last year by 38.3 per cent and are industrial activity, growth in port traffic accelerated above the buffer norm. Rice procurement during the in February 2025, driven by higher growth in other miscellaneous cargo and containerised cargo current marketing season at 464.4 lakh tonnes (as on (Chart III.31). March 11, 2025) is 5.0 per cent higher than last year. In the construction sector, steel consumption For the upcoming rabi marketing season (2025- growth accelerated to 11.2 per cent (y-o-y) in February 26) commencing from April 01, 2025, the estimates for wheat procurement have been fixed at 310 lakh tonnes.16 Similarly, the estimates for rabi rice procurement and rabi coarse grains (including millets) have been fixed at 70 lakh tonnes and 16 lakh tonnes, respectively. India’s manufacturing PMI moderated to a 14-month low in February due to a slowdown in new orders and output (Chart III.30a). The services PMI, recorded a sequential acceleration in February, aided by robust increase in new business (Chart III.30b). 16 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=2107076&reg= 3&lang=1 46 RBI Bulletin March 2025 egnahc oN = 05 Note: A level of 50 corresponds to no change in activity and a reading above 50 denotes expansion and vice versa. Source: S&P Global. egnahc oN = 05 70 64.9 65 60 56.3 55 50 45 PMI Future output PMI Future activity 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 70 65 61.8 60 59.0 55 50 45 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF Chart III.31: Port Cargo Source: Indian Ports Association. y-o-y ,tnec reP 80 60 41.0 40 20 6.6 6.8 3.9 0 4.7 2.6 -20 -40 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF POL Raw fertiliser Total Containerised cargo Thermal coal Other miscellaneous cargoState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.32: Steel Consumption and Cement Production 45 25 40 33.8 20 35 30 14.5 15 25 11.2 10 20 12.4 15 5 10 0 5 0 -5 Sources: Joint Plant Committee; Office of the Economic Adviser; and Ministry of Commerce and Industry. while the cement production levels reached a Available high frequency indicators for the 15-month high, growing by 14.5 per cent in January services sector reflect resilience in economic activity (Chart III.32). (Table III.1). RBI Bulletin March 2025 47 sennot noilliM 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF y-o-y ,tnec reP Cement production Steel consumption growth (RHS) Steel consumption Cement production growth (RHS) Table III.1: High Frequency Indicators- Services (y-o-y, per cent) Sector Indicator Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 May-24 Jun-24 Jul-24 Aug-24 Sep-24 Oct-24 Nov-24 Dec-24 Jan-25 Feb-25 Urban demand Passenger Vehicles Sales 9.5 8.9 1.2 4.3 4.9 -2.0 -1.6 -0.4 1.1 4.4 11.4 3.5 3.7 Two-Wheeler Sales 34.6 15.3 30.8 10.1 21.3 12.5 9.3 15.8 14.2 -1.1 -8.8 2.1 -9.0 Rural demand Three-Wheeler Sales 8.3 4.3 14.5 14.4 12.3 5.1 8.0 6.7 -0.7 -1.3 3.5 8.6 4.7 Tractor Sales -30.6 -23.1 -3.0 0.0 3.6 1.6 -5.8 3.7 22.4 -1.3 14.0 11.4 35.9 Commercial Vehicles Sales -3.8 3.5 -11.0 1.3 Railway Freight Traffic 10.1 8.6 1.4 3.7 10.1 4.5 0.0 -5.8 1.5 1.2 Port Cargo Traffic 3.0 2.7 1.3 3.8 6.8 5.9 6.7 5.8 -3.4 -4.9 3.4 7.6 6.8 Domestic Air Cargo Traffic 11.5 8.7 0.3 10.3 10.3 8.8 0.6 14.0 8.9 0.3 4.3 6.9 International Air Cargo Traffic 30.2 22.5 16.2 19.2 19.6 24.4 20.7 20.5 18.4 16.1 10.5 7.1 Trade, hotels, Domestic Air Passenger Traffic * 5.8 4.7 3.8 5.9 6.9 7.6 6.7 7.4 9.6 13.8 10.8 14.1 16.4 transport, International Air Passenger Traffic* 19.3 15 16.8 19.6 11.3 8.8 11.1 11.2 10.3 10.7 9.0 11.1 11.7 communication GST E-way Bills (Total) 18.9 13.9 14.5 17.0 16.3 19.2 12.9 18.5 16.9 16.3 17.6 23.1 14.7 GST E-way Bills (Intra State) 21.1 15.8 17.3 18.9 16.4 19.0 13.1 19.0 18.3 5.4 17.9 23.3 14.9 GST E-way Bills (Inter State) 15.0 10.7 9.6 13.6 16.3 19.6 12.5 17.7 14.4 44.1 17.1 22.8 14.4 Hotel occupancy 1.8 2.7 -1.4 -2.6 -3.1 3.6 0.7 2.1 -5.3 11.1 -0.2 1.2 Average revenue per room 7.8 6.7 4.8 1.8 2.8 7.6 5.2 3.5 4.8 10.7 8.9 8.7 Tourist Arrivals 15.8 8.0 7.7 0.3 9.0 -1.3 -4.2 0.4 -1.4 -0.1 -6.6 Steel Consumption 7.3 11.2 11.5 11.9 21.1 13.8 10.3 10.9 8.8 8.9 7.7 9.1 11.2 Construction Cement Production 7.8 10.6 0.2 -0.6 1.8 5.1 -2.5 7.6 3.1 13.5 4.6 14.5 PMI Index# Services 60.6 61.2 60.8 60.2 60.5 60.3 60.9 57.7 58.5 58.4 59.3 56.5 59.0 <<Contraction--------------------------------------------------------------- Expansion>> Note: #: Data in levels. *: February 2025 data are based on the monthly average of daily figures. The Heat-map is constructed for each indicator for the period July-2021 till date. Sources: SIAM; Ministry of Railways; Tractor and Mechanisation Association; Indian Ports Association; Office of Economic Adviser; GSTN; Airports Authority of India; HVS Anarock; Ministry of Tourism; Joint Plant Committee; and IHS Markit.ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.33: Trends and Drivers of CPI Inflation a. CPI Inflation (y-o-y) Inflation Spices continued to remain in deflation, although at a lower rate (Chart III.34). Headline inflation, as measured by y-o-y changes in the all-India consumer price index (CPI)17, declined Fuel and light deflation narrowed to (-)1.3 per to a seven-month low of 3.6 per cent in February 2025 cent in February from (-) 1.5 per cent in January, from 4.3 per cent in January (Chart III.33). The 70 on account of a lower rate of deflation in kerosene bps decline in inflation was on account of a negative prices, and a higher rate of inflation in electricity price momentum of around 50 bps which was further prices. LPG prices continued to record a steady rate aided by a favourable base of around 20 bps. The food of deflation. group recorded a negative momentum of around Core inflation increased to 4.1 per cent in (-)1.6 per cent during the month while momentum February from 3.6 per cent in January. Inflation in CPI fuel and core (excluding food and fuel) groups increased in pan, tobacco and intoxicants, housing, was positive at 0.1 and 0.7 per cent, respectively. health, transport and communication, and personal Food inflation declined to 3.8 per cent (y-o-y) in care and effects, while it remained unchanged in February from 5.7 per cent in January. In terms of sub- sub-groups such as clothing and footwear, household groups, vegetables, pulses and eggs recorded a sharp goods and services, recreation and amusement, and correction in prices and entered the deflationary zone education (Chart III.35). while inflation moderated in cereals, meat and fish, In terms of regional distribution, rural and and milk and products. On the other hand, inflation urban inflation eased to 3.8 per cent and 3.3 per in oils and fats, fruits, sugar and confectionary, non- cent, respectively, in February 2025. At the state alcoholic beverages and prepared meals picked up. level, inflation rate ranged from 1.3 per cent to 7.3 per cent. Majority of the states recorded inflation 17 As per the provisional data released by the National Statistical Office (NSO) on March 12, 2025. less than 6 per cent (Chart III.36). 48 RBI Bulletin March 2025 tnec reP b. Contributions Sources: National Statistical Office (NSO); and RBI staff estimates. stniop egatnecrep ni noitubirtnoC Food and beverages CPI excluding food and fuel Food and beverages CPI excluding food and fuel Fuel and light CPI Headline (y-o-y, per cent) Fuel and light CPI Headline (y-o-y, per cent) 8.1 9.1 7 5 3.6 3 1 -0.1 -1 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beF 12 10 8 6 4.1 4 3.8 2 3.6 0 -2 -1.3 -4 -6 32-beF 32-rpA 32-nuJ 32-guA 32-tcO 32-ceD 42-beF 42-rpA 42-nuJ 42-guA 42-tcO 42-ceD 52-beFState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.34: Annual Inflation (y-o-y) and Momentum (m-o-m) across Sub-groups Sources: NSO; and RBI staff estimates. High frequency food price data for March so far sunflower oil. Pulses prices, on the other hand, (up to 17th) show an increase in cereal prices, both continued to show broad-based moderation. Prices of for rice and wheat. Edible oil prices have firmed key vegetables including potato, onion and tomato up as well - mainly driven by palm, soybean and witnessed further correction (Chart III.37). Chart III.35: Annual Inflation across Sub-groups (February 2025 versus January 2025) Sources: NSO; and RBI staff estimates. RBI Bulletin March 2025 49ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart III.36: Spatial Distribution of Inflation Table III.2: Petroleum Products Prices February 2025 Item Unit Domestic Month-over- (CPI-Combined, y-o-y), (per cent) Prices month (per cent) Jan-25 Feb-25 Mar-25^ Feb-25 Mar-25^ Petrol ₹/litre 101.02 101.02 101.02 0.0 0.0 Diesel ₹/litre 90.48 90.48 90.48 0.0 0.0 Kerosene ₹/litre 43.93 46.37 46.23 5.6 -0.3 (subsidised) LPG ₹/cylinder 813.25 813.25 813.25 0.0 0.0 (non-subsidised) Notes: 1. ^: For the period March 1-17, 2025. 2. Other than kerosene, prices represent the average Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) prices in four major metros (Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai). For kerosene, prices denote the average of the subsidised prices in Kolkata, Mumbai and <4 4-6 6-8 Chennai. Note: Map is for illustrative purposes only. Sources: IOCL; Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC); and RBI staff Sources: NSO; and RBI staff estimates. estimates. Retail selling prices of petrol, diesel and LPG As per the PMIs, input costs recorded a slower remained unchanged in March thus far (up to 17th) rate of expansion in February for both manufacturing while kerosene prices moderated (Table III.2). and services sector. Selling price pressures, on Chart III.37: DCA Essential Commodity Prices Sources: Department of Consumer Affairs, GoI; and RBI staff estimates. 50 RBI Bulletin March 2025 margolik rep ₹ a. Cereals b. Pulses margolik rep ₹ c. Vegetables d. Edible Oils (packed) margolik rep ₹ Urad dal Tur/ Arhar dal Moong dal Rice Wheat Masoor dal Gram dal Potato Onion Tomato (RHS) Groundnut oil Mustard oil Sunflower oil margolik rep ₹ margolik rep ₹ 50 45 42.5 135.0 40 119.9 34.8 112.3 35 89.2 88.2 30 25 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raM 190 175 160 145 130 115 100 85 70 55 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raM 80 160 192.7 70 140 60 120 170.4 50 100 40 35.7 80 155.7 30 60 20 22.0 40 10 20 19.2 0 0 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raM 200 190 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raMState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart III.38: PMI: Input and Output Prices a. Manufacturing Note: A level of 50 corresponds to no change in activity and a reading above 50 denotes expansion and vice versa. Source: S&P. the other hand, slowed down marginally across IV. Financial Conditions manufacturing firms but increased for services firms System liquidity remained in deficit in the latter (Chart III.38). half of February and early March (up to March 13, The all-India house price index (HPI), based 2025) amidst the seasonal pick-up in currency in on property registration data from ten major cities, circulation (CiC). Since mid-February, the Reserve increased by 3.1 per cent (y-o-y) in Q3:2024-25 as Bank conducted three open market operation (OMO) purchase auctions (on February 20, March 12 and compared to 4.3 per cent in the previous quarter and March 18, 2025) of a cumulative amount of ₹1.4 lakh 3.8 per cent a year ago (Chart III.39). crore, and a 45-day variable rate repo (VRR) auction of ₹57,951 crore on February 21, 2025 to inject durable liquidity. Additionally, rupee liquidity was injected through a three-year USD/INR Buy/Sell swap auction of USD 10 billion on February 28, 2025. During the quarter so far, the Reserve Bank has injected around ₹5.5 lakh crore of durable liquidity into the banking system through a combination of OMO purchases, longer-duration VRR auctions and forex swaps (Table IV.1). Furthermore, the Reserve Bank has been conducting daily VRR auctions since January 16 to tide over transient liquidity tightness, with standalone primary dealers (SPDs) being allowed to participate in these daily auctions. An aggregate amount of ₹9.68 lakh crore was injected into the banking system RBI Bulletin March 2025 51 )egnahc oN=05( xednI )egnahc oN=05( xednI b. Services 65 65 60 60 54.7 55 53.5 55 54.2 51.5 50 50 45 45 Input prices Output prices Input prices Prices charged 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ Chart III.39: Movement of House Price Index Note: Q3:2024-25(P) data are provisional. Sources: Registration authorities of State governments; and RBI. )001=11-0102( xednI tnec reP 350 30 25 300 20 250 15 10 200 5 150 0 61-5102:1Q 61-5102:3Q 71-6102:1Q 71-6102:3Q 81-7102:1Q 81-7102:3Q 91-8102:1Q 91-8102:3Q 02-9102:1Q 02-9102:3Q 12-0202:1Q 12-0202:3Q 22-1202:1Q 22-1202:3Q 32-2202:1Q 32-2202:3Q 42-3202:1Q 42-3202:3Q 52-4202:1Q )P(52-4202:3Q All-India HPI Y-o-Y Growth (right scale)ARTICLE State of the Economy through two main and twenty-two fine-tuning VRR Despite the prevailing liquidity deficit, banks’ operations of maturities ranging from 1 to 8 days placement of funds under the standing deposit facility during February 16 to March 17, 2025. This slew (SDF) averaged ₹1.15 lakh crore between February of measures undertaken by the Reserve Bank aided 16, 2025, and March 13, 2025, higher than ₹0.85 in moderating the liquidity deficit. Consequently, lakh crore in the previous month. The co-existence the average daily net injection under the liquidity of deficit liquidity conditions and substantial fund adjustment facility (LAF) stood at ₹1.41 lakh crore placements under the SDF suggests the asymmetric during February 16 to March 13, 2025, as compared distribution of liquidity within the banking system to ₹1.92 lakh crore during January 16 to February 15, as well as increased liquidity preference on the 2025 (Chart IV.1). part of banks. Meanwhile, daily average borrowings Chart IV.1: Liquidity Operations Daily SDF Variable rate reverse repo Net LAF MSF Variable rate repo Total absorption Source: RBI. 52 RBI Bulletin March 2025 erorc hkal ₹ 3.5 2.5 1.1 1.5 0.5 -0.5 -1.5 -2.5 -1.5 -3.5 -4.5 42-raM-41 42-raM-82 42-rpA-11 42-rpA-52 42-yaM-9 42-yaM-32 42-nuJ-6 42-nuJ-02 42-luJ-4 42-luJ-81 42-guA-1 42-guA-51 42-guA-92 42-peS-21 42-peS-62 42-tcO-01 42-tcO-42 42-voN-7 42-voN-12 42-ceD-5 42-ceD-91 52-naJ-2 52-naJ-61 52-naJ-03 52-beF-31 52-beF-72 52-raM-31 Table IV.1: Durable liquidity measures during Q4:2024-25 Measure Description Auction Date Amount injected (in ₹ crores) OMO Purchase Through NDS-OM January 2025 38,825 January 30, 2025 20,020 February 13, 2025 40,000 OMO Purchase auction February 20, 2025 40,000 March 12, 2025 50,000 March 18, 2025 50,000 56-day VRR auction February 07, 2025 50,010 Term Repo Auctions 49-day VRR auction February 14, 2025 75,003 45-day VRR auction February 21, 2025 57,951 Tenor: 6 months January 31, 2025 Approx. 44,000 (USD 5.10 Billion) USD/INR Buy Sell swap auction Tenor: 3 years February 28, 2025 Approx. 88,000 (USD 10.06 Billion) Total Approx. 5,53,809 Source: RBI.State of the Economy ARTICLE under the marginal standing facility (MSF) declined bills (T-bill) and 3-month commercial paper (CP) marginally to ₹0.03 lakh crore during February 16, issued by non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) 2025 and March 13, 2025 from ₹0.04 lakh crore in recording a moderation during February 16 - March the previous period. 13, 2025 over the previous month (Chart IV.2b). The yields on certificates of deposit (CDs), however, The weighted average call rate (WACR) – the marginally increased from 7.49 per cent to 7.52 per operating target of monetary policy – remained cent during the same period. The average risk premia within the policy corridor and the spread of the WACR over the policy repo rate averaged 5 basis in the money market (3-month CP [NBFC] minus points (bps) during February 16 and March 13, 2025, 91-day T-bill) increased to 142 bps during February same as during January 16 to February 15, 2025 16 - March 13, 2025 from 137 bps during Janaury (Chart IV.2a). Rates in the collateralised segment, 18 - February 14, 2025. Similarly, the spread of the however, moderated below the policy repo rate 3-month CD rate over the 91-day T-bill rate edged up amidst improving liquidity conditions. (Chart IV.2c). Across the term money market segment, rates The weighted average discount rate (WADR) have declined with yields on 3-month treasury of CPs and the weighted average effective interest Chart IV.2: Policy Corridor and Money Market Rates Sources: RBI; CCIL; and Bloomberg. RBI Bulletin March 2025 53 erorc hkal ₹ Repo rate WACR MSF SDF tnec reP tnec reP a. Policy Corridor and Call Rate b. Money Market Rates Tri-party repo Market repo 3-month T-bill 3-month CD 3-month CP (NBFC) c. Spread of 3-months CP and CD Rate over 91-day T-bill Rate stniop sisaB 180 4 160 144 3 140 2 120 119 1 100 80 113 0 -1 60 40 -2 20 -3 0 -4 Net LAF (RHS) Spread of 3M CD Rate over 91 day T-bill Rate Spread of CP NBFC 3M Rate over 91 day T-bill Rate Spread of CP Non-NBFC 3M Rate over 91 day T-bill Rate 22-peS 22-voN 32-naJ 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 52-raM 8.7 8.4 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.0 32-ceD-91 42-naJ-81 42-beF-71 42-raM-81 42-rpA-71 42-yaM-71 42-nuJ-61 42-luJ-61 42-guA-51 42-peS-41 42-tcO-41 42-voN-31 42-ceD-31 52-naJ-21 52-beF-11 52-raM-31 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.33 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.25 5.9 5.7 5.5 42-yaM-32 42-nuJ-6 42-nuJ-02 42-luJ-4 42-luJ-81 42-guA-1 42-guA-51 42-guA-92 42-peS-21 42-peS-62 42-tcO-01 42-tcO-42 42-voN-7 42-voN-12 42-ceD-5 42-ceD-91 52-naJ-2 52-naJ-61 52-naJ-03 52-beF-31 52-beF-72 52-raM-31ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart IV.3: WADR and WAEIR Note: *: up to March 10, 2025. Sources: RBI; and CCIL- FTRAC. rate (WAEIR) of CDs remained lower than the levels 2024-25 (up to March 7, 2025) [Chart IV.4]. Similarly, recorded a year ago (Chart IV.3). CP issuances at ₹13.90 lakh crore were higher by 13.5 per cent during 2024–25 (up to February 28, 2025) Banks continue to rely on CDs to meet their compared with the corresponding period a year ago. funding requirements on account of the persisting gap in credit and deposit growth. In the primary The yield on the 10-year G-sec benchmark broadly market, issuances of CDs grew by 34 per cent (y-o-y) remained range-bound and was at 6.70 per cent on to reach an all-time high of ₹10.58 lakh crore during March 13, 2025, as compared to 6.71 per cent on 54 RBI Bulletin March 2025 erorc dnasuoht ₹ tnec reP 800 9 7.80 8 600 7 7.60 400 6 74 5 200 56 4 0 3 2 -200 1 -400 0 Net LAF CP Issuance (Monthly) CD Issuance (Monthly) WADR (RHS) WAEIR (RHS) 12-beF 12-raM 12-rpA 12-yaM 12-nuJ 12-luJ 12-guA 12-peS 12-tcO 12-voN 12-ceD 22-naJ 22-beF 22-raM 22-rpA 22-yaM 22-nuJ 22-luJ 22-guA 22-peS 22-tcO 22-voN 22-ceD 32-naJ 32-beF 32-raM 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF *52-raM Chart IV.4: Certificates of Deposit (CDs) and Commercial Paper (CP) - Fortnightly Issuances Source: RBI. erorc dnasuoht ₹ erorc dnasuoht ₹ 100 120 90 80 100 70 64.9 60 80 50 40 60 30 30.1 20 40 10 0 20 Certificates of deposit Commercial paper (RHS) 32-naJ 32-beF 32-raM 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beFState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.5: Developments in the G-sec Market a. Movement in 10-year G-sec Yield b. G-sec Yield Curve Sources: Bloomberg; CCIL; and RBI staff estimates. February 14, 2025 (Chart IV.5a). The domestic yield The spread of the 10-year Indian G-sec yield over curve softened in the very short and mid-segment the 10-year US bond increased in the latter half of while remaining stable for all other tenors (Chart February, mainly due to a fall in US bond yields. The IV.5b). Between February 16 and March 13, 2025, the volatility of yields in India remained low relative to US treasuries (Chart IV.6). average term spread (10-year G-sec yield minus 91- day T-bills yield) increased by 8 bps as compared to Corporate bond issuances at ₹7.94 lakh crore the previous period. were 18.0 per cent higher during 2024-25 (up to RBI Bulletin March 2025 55 tnec reP tnec reP India US (RHS) tnec reP stniop sisaB 7.3 5.5 4.27 7.2 5.0 7.1 4.5 7.0 4.0 6.9 6.70 3.5 6.8 3.0 6.7 6.6 2.5 Tenor (years) 13-02-2025 13-03-2025 Change (March 13, 2025 over Feb 13, 2025) (RHS) 42-nuJ-61 42-luJ-4 42-luJ-22 42-guA-9 42-guA-72 42-peS-41 42-tcO-2 42-tcO-02 42-voN-7 42-voN-52 42-ceD-31 42-ceD-13 52-naJ-81 52-beF-5 52-beF-32 52-raM-31 4 7.9 2 7.7 0 7.5 -2 7.3 7.07 -4 7.1 6.9 7.05 -6 6.7 -8 6.5 -10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 Chart IV.6 : Volatility and Spread-Bond Market Note: *: 12-months rolling standard deviation. Sources: Bloomberg; and RBI staff calculations. *noitaived dradnatS stniop sisaB 0.5 400 350 0.4 300 0.3 243 250 0.2 200 0.1 150 0 100 Volatility-US 10 year bond Volatility- India 10 year bond Spread of 10 year Indian G-sec over US 10 year bond (RHS) 32-luJ-30 32-luJ-13 32-guA-82 32-peS-52 32-tcO-32 32-voN-02 32-ceD-81 42-naJ-51 42-beF-21 42-raM-11 42-rpA-80 42-yaM-60 42-nuJ-30 42-luJ-10 42-luJ-92 42-guA-62 42-peS-32 42-tcO-12 42-voN-81 42-ceD-61 52-naJ-31 52-beF-01 52-raM-01ARTICLE State of the Economy Table IV.2: Financial Markets - Rates and Spread Instrument Interest Rates Spread (bps) (per cent) (Over Corresponding Risk-free Rate) Jan 16, 2025 – Feb 16, 2025 – Variation Jan 16, 2025 – Feb 16, 2025 – Variation Feb 15, 2025 Mar 12, 2025 Feb 15, 2025 Mar 12, 2025 1 2 3 (4 = 3-2) 5 6 (7 = 6-5) Corporate Bonds (i) AAA (1-year) 7.87 7.86 -1 116 122 6 (ii) AAA (3-year) 7.64 7.67 3 90 97 7 (iii) AAA (5-year) 7.50 7.62 12 73 85 12 (iv) AA (3-year) 8.43 8.44 1 169 175 6 (v) BBB- (3-year) 12.10 12.09 -1 536 540 4 Note: Yields and spreads are computed as averages for the respective periods. Sources: FIMMDA; and Bloomberg. January) compared to last year. Corporate bond yields cent (y-o-y) as of March 7, 2025, as compared with 3.5 exhibited mixed trends while the corresponding risk per cent a year ago. premia increased across ratings and tenor spectrums On the sources side (assets), RM comprises net during the second half of February till March 12, domestic assets (NDA) and net foreign assets (NFA) of 2025 (Table IV.2). the Reserve Bank. Growth in foreign currency assets Reserve money (RM), excluding the first-round accelerated to 3.9 per cent (y-o-y) on March 7, 2025, impact of change in the cash reserve ratio (CRR), from 1.6 per cent (y-o-y) at the end of January 2025 recorded a growth of 6.8 per cent (y-o-y) as of March (Chart IV.8). Gold – the other major component of 7, 2025 (5.5 per cent a year ago) [Chart IV.7]. Growth NFA – grew by 53.8 per cent mainly due to revaluation in CiC, the largest component of RM, stood at 5.5 per gains on gold prices, leading to a steady rise in its Chart IV.7: Reserve Money and Currency in Circulation Reserve money (CRR adjusted) Currency in circulation N ote: The latest data for reserve money pertains to March 07, 2025. Source: RBI. 56 RBI Bulletin March 2025 y-o-y ,tnec reP 12 10 8 6.8 6 5.5 4 2 0 32-nuJ-20 32-nuJ-03 32-luJ-82 32-guA-52 32-peS-22 32-tcO-02 32-voN-71 32-ceD-51 42-naJ-21 42-beF-90 42-raM-80 42-rpA-50 42-yaM-30 42-yaM-13 42-nuJ-82 42-luJ-62 42-guA-32 42-peS-02 42-tcO-81 42-voN-51 42-ceD-31 52-naJ-01 52-beF-70 52-raM-70State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.8: RBI's Net Foreign Exchange Assets (NFA) Growth NFA Foreign currency assets Gold (RHS) Source: RBI. share in NFA from 8.3 per cent as of end-March 2024 M , increased by 10.1 per cent (11.9 per cent a year 3 to 11.7 per cent as of March 7, 2025. ago). Scheduled commercial banks’ (SCBs’) credit growth moderated to 12.0 per cent as of February 21, As of February 21, 2025, the money supply (M ) had increased by 9.6 per cent (year over year) 2025 (16.6 per cent a year ago) due to an unfavourable 3 (10.9 per cent a year ago).18 Aggregate deposits base effect, partly offset by positive momentum with banks, accounting for around 86 per cent of (Chart IV.9). 18 Excluding the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank (with effect from July 1, 2023). RBI Bulletin March 2025 57 y-o-y ,tnec reP y-o-y ,tnec reP 25 70 60 20 50 53.8 15 40 30 10 8.0 20 5 10 3.9 0 0 32-nuJ-20 32-nuJ-03 32-luJ-82 32-guA-52 32-peS-22 32-tcO-02 32-voN-71 32-ceD-51 42-naJ-21 42-beF-90 42-raM-80 42-rpA-50 42-yaM-30 42-yaM-13 42-nuJ-82 42-luJ-62 42-guA-32 42-peS-02 42-tcO-81 42-voN-51 42-ceD-31 52-naJ-01 52-beF-70 52-raM-70 Chart IV.9: M Growth and Credit Growth of SCBs – Base and Momentum Effect 3 Source: RBI. y-o-y ,tnec reP stniop egatnecreP 18 3 17 2 16 15 1 14 0.2 13 0 12 -0.5 12.0 -1 11 10 -2 9 9.5 8 -3 SCBs' credit growth M growth 3 SCBs' credit momentum effect (RHS) SCBs' credit base effect (RHS) 32-beF-42 32-raM-42 32-rpA-12 32-yaM-91 32-nuJ-61 32-luJ-41 32-guA-11 32-peS-8 32-tcO-6 32-voN-3 32-ceD-1 32-ceD-92 42-naJ-62 42-beF-32 42-raM-22 42-rpA-91 42-yaM-71 42-nuJ-41 42-luJ-21 42-guA-9 42-peS-6 42-tcO-4 42-voN-1 42-voN-92 42-ceD-72 52-naJ-42 52-beF-12ARTICLE State of the Economy Based on the latest available quarterly data, loan segment following the increase in risk weights credit continues to grow at a healthy pace despite announced in November 2023. the recent deceleration across various sectors during SCBs’ lending to the private corporate sector, Q3:2024-25 (Chart IV.10). Credit growth within which accounted for nearly a quarter of the total the personal loans segment remained the primary bank credit, moderated in Q3:2024-25. However, driver of overall credit expansion, even though credit to public sector entities continued to rise there has been a moderation in unsecured personal (Chart IV.11a). Growth in working capital loans 58 RBI Bulletin March 2025 y-o-y ,tnec reP Chart IV.10: Annual Growth in Bank Credit - Major Sectors 35 25 15.6 15 12.0 11.8 10.7 5 8.1 -5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Agriculture Industry Housing Personal Loans (non-housing) Total Note: For comparability, growth figures of Q2, Q3, Q4 of 2023-24 and Q1 of 2024-25 are calculated by adjusting the merger of a bank with a non-bank. Source: RBI. Chart IV.11: Annual Credit Growth Source: RBI. y-o-y ,tnec reP y-o-y ,tnec reP a. Major Ownership Category of Borrowers b. Loan Types 25 23 20 18 14.6 16.4 13 15 12.9 11.8 8 10 5.4 9.4 3 5 -2 0 -7 -5 Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3 Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Public Sector Private Corporate Sector Household Sector Working Capital Loans Term Loans TotalState of the Economy ARTICLE SCBs' deposit momentum effect (RHS) SCBs' deposit base effect (RHS) SCBs' deposit growth Source: RBI. accelerated, indicating a pick-up in economic activity Consequently, the share of term deposits in total (Chart IV.11b). deposits rose to 62.1 per cent from 60.3 per cent a year ago. As on February 21, 2025, SCBs’ deposit growth The share of deposits bearing an interest rate of (excluding the impact of the merger) remained at its 7 per cent or above (in total term deposits) increased end-January 2025 level of 10.6 per cent (Chart IV.12). to 70.8 per cent in December 2024, up from 61.4 per Term deposits’ growth continued to outpace cent in December 2023 and 33.7 per cent in March growth in saving deposits in Q3:2024-25 (Chart IV.13). 2023 (Chart IV.14). RBI Bulletin March 2025 59 y-o-y ,tnec reP Chart IV.12: SCBs' Deposit Growth - Base and Momentum Effect stniop egatnecreP 14 4 13 3 12 2 11 1 10.6 10 0 9 -0.08 -0.18 -1 8 -2 7 6 -3 5 -4 22-rpA-80 32-rpA-12 32-yaM-91 32-nuJ-61 32-luJ-41 32-guA-11 32-peS-80 32-tcO-60 32-voN-30 32-ceD-10 32-ceD-92 42-naJ-62 42-beF-32 42-raM-22 42-rpA-91 42-yaM-71 42-nuJ-41 42-luJ-21 42-guA-90 42-peS-60 42-tcO-40 42-voN-10 42-voN-92 42-ceD-72 52-naJ-42 52-beF-12 Source: RBI. y-o-y ,tnec reP Chart IV.13: Annual Growth in Aggregate Deposits - Type of Deposits 25 20 14.1 15 10.9 10 9.2 5 5.1 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Current Savings Term TotalARTICLE State of the Economy Chart IV.14: Interest Rate wise Share of Term Deposits of Banks Mar-2022 34.3 51.4 9.8 2.8 1.7 Mar-2023 7.0 31.8 27.5 30.3 3.4 Jun-2023 4.8 20.1 29.7 41.0 4.4 Sep-2023 4.1 12.6 28.6 50.0 4.7 Dec-2023 3.5 9.7 25.4 56.3 5.1 Mar-2024 5.3 8.1 22.2 58.9 5.5 Jun-2024 2.8 7.1 23.1 61.3 5.6 Sep-2024 2.9 6.1 22.2 62.9 5.9 Dec-2024 2.9 5.5 20.8 64.9 5.9 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Per cent < 5 5-6 6-7 7-8 > 8 Source: RBI. SCBs’ incremental credit-deposit ratio increased marginal cost of funds-based lending rates (MCLRs) from 80.7 per cent as at end-October 2024 to 88.2 per of SCBs rose by 178 bps during May 2022 to January cent as on February 21, 2025 (Chart IV.15). 2025. The weighted average lending rate (WALR) on fresh and outstanding rupee loans increased by In response to the 25-bps cut in the policy repo rate during the February Policy, banks have reduced 181 bps and 115 bps, respectively, during the same their repo-linked external benchmark-based lending period (Chart IV.16a). In case of deposits, the weighted rates (EBLRs) by a similar magnitude. The 1-year average domestic term deposit rate (WADTDR) on Chart IV.15: Incremental Credit-Deposit Ratio Source: RBI. 60 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )tnec rep( oitaR 26 120 24 110 21.3 22 100 20 88.2 90 18.8 18 80 16 70 14 60 Incremental credit-deposit ratio (RHS) Incremental credit Incremental deposit )erorc hkal ₹( eulaV 32-beF-42 32-raM-42 32-rpA-12 32-yaM-91 32-nuJ-61 32-luJ-41 32-guA-11 32-peS-8 32-tcO-6 32-voN-3 32-ceD-1 32-ceD-92 42-naJ-62 42-beF-32 42-raM-22 42-rpA-91 42-yaM-71 42-nuJ-41 42-luJ-21 42-guA-9 42-peS-6 42-tcO-4 42-voN-1 42-voN-92 42-ceD-72 52-naJ-42 52-beF-12State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.16: Transmission to Bank’s Lending and Deposit Rates a. Lending Rates b. Deposit Rates 280 250 240 181 200 160 115 120 80 40 0 Source: RBI. fresh deposits of SCBs, which include both retail and sector banks (PVBs). In case of outstanding rupee bulk deposits, increased by 253 bps. The WADTDR on loans, however, the transmission in PSBs was lower. On the other hand, transmission to deposit rates was outstanding deposits also increased by 199 bps during higher for PSBs during May 2022 to January 2025 May 2022 to January 2025 (Chart IV.16b). (Chart IV.17a and b). Transmission across bank groups indicates that The corporate sector showed signs of recovery the increase in the WALR on fresh rupee loans was during Q3:2024-25, following a subdued performance higher for public sector banks (PSBs) vis-à-vis private during Q2. Sales of listed private non-financial RBI Bulletin March 2025 61 stniop sisaB 22-yaM 22-luJ 22-peS 22-voN 32-naJ 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ 254 280 240 250 200 199 160 120 80 40 0 Repo Rate WALR-Fresh Loans WALR-Outstanding stniop sisaB 22-yaM 22-luJ 22-peS 22-voN 32-naJ 32-raM 32-yaM 32-luJ 32-peS 32-voN 42-naJ 42-raM 42-yaM 42-luJ 42-peS 42-voN 52-naJ Repo Rate WADTDR- Fresh Deposit WADTDR- Outstanding Chart IV.17: Transmission across Bank Groups (May 2022 to January 2025) a. Lending Rates b. Deposit Rates Source: RBI stniop sisaB stniop sisaB 350 320 300 274 282 276 300 250 250 210 204 200 200 182 175 185 175 178 167 138 150 150 130 97 100 100 50 50 0 WALR WALR 1- Year Median 0 (Fresh Rupee (Outstanding MCLR WADTDR WADTDR Loans) Loans) (Fresh Deposit) (Outstanding Deposit) PSBs PVBs Foreign banks PSBs PVBs Foreign banksARTICLE State of the Economy companies increased by 8.0 per cent (y-o-y) during Q3:2024-25, an improvement from 5.4 per cent in the previous quarter and 5.5 per cent in the corresponding quarter a year ago. Sales growth (y-o-y) of listed private manufacturing companies improved during Q3:2024-25 (Chart IV.18). The turnaround in growth was mainly driven by higher sales in automobiles, chemicals, food products and electrical machinery industries whereas sales in the petroleum, iron and steel, and cement industries continued to contract on an annual basis during Q3, though the pace of contraction moderated (Chart IV.19). The information technology (IT) sector recorded a higher sales growth, as compared with the previous aggregate level during Q3:2024-25, leading to a quarter and a year ago. Sales growth of non-IT services sequential improvement of 50 bps in the operating companies continued to grow in double digits despite profit margin. Margin improved across all major a deceleration. This growth was mainly driven by sectors during the quarter, aligning with their the ‘Wholesale and Retail Trade’ and ‘Transport and improved sales growth (Chart IV.20). Storage Services’ segments. Indian equity markets continued to experience With operating expenses growing at a slower pressure in the latter half of February and early pace than sales, operating profit expanded at the March, following persistent selling by foreign Chart IV.19: Sales Growth of Major Industries in Manufacturing Sector 20 16.7 16.7 13.7 15 11.9 11.8 11.6 10.7 10.3 9.3 10 5.0 5.9 5.4 4.2 5 1.7 0 -0.8 -1.1 -5 -2.2 -5.0 -4.8 -10 -8.1 Note: Results are based on 1,675 listed private manufacturing for Q3:2024-25; numbers in parenthesis are sales share of industry. Sources: Capitaline database; and RBI staff estimates. 62 RBI Bulletin March 2025 y-o-y ,tnec reP yrenihcaM lacirtcelE )6( slateM suorreF-noN )5( slacimehC )3.11( slacituecamrahP )9.5( stcudorP dooF )8.8( selitxeT )5.3( selibomotuA )3.51( tnemeC )4.4( leetS dna norI )2.21( muelorteP )9.11( Chart IV.18: Sales Growth 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 12.511.5 10 6.8 7.7 0 6.6 3.3 -10 -20 Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Manufacturing Services (IT) Services (non-IT) Note: Based on the results of 2,924 listed private non-financial companies. Sources: Capitaline database; and RBI staff estimates. Q2:2024-25 Q3:2024-25 y-o-y ,tnec rePState of the Economy ARTICLE 17, 2025. The equity market correction in recent Chart IV.20: Operating Profit Margin (Per cent of Sales) months has been broad-based, resulting in declines 30 across sectoral indices (Chart IV.21a). The broader 23.2 25 22.9 market indices have experienced sharper falls, as 20 22.6 reflected in a higher proportion of their constituents 20.4 16.2 15.7 hitting 52-week lows in the recent period and notably, 15 14.1 14.0 on March 3, 2025, 31 per cent of the constituent 10 members of the NSE 500 index touched a fresh 52- 5 week low, compared to 22 per cent of the Nifty 50 0 members (Chart IV.21b). Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 As per Prime Database, persistent selling by FIIs has reduced their ownership in NSE-listed companies Note: Based on the results of 2,924 listed private non-financial companies. to 17.2 per cent by end-December 2024, marking a Sources: Capitaline database; and RBI staff calculations. multi-year low. In contrast, domestic institutional investors (DIIs) have increased their holdings, institutional investors (FIIs), uncertainty pushing the FII-to-DII ownership ratio to its lowest surrounding the US government tariff policies and level since June 2009 (Chart IV.22).19 concerns over corporate earnings amid mixed global cues. Overall, the BSE Sensex declined by 2.3 per cent The recent market correction, coupled with since February 14, 2025, to close at 74,170 on March regulatory measures in the equity derivatives 19 https://www.business-standard.com/markets/stock-market-news/diis-close-india-inc-ownership-gap-with-foreign-portfolio-investors-125020401430_1. html RBI Bulletin March 2025 63 tnec reP Manufacturing Services (IT) Services (non-IT) Aggregate Chart IV.21: Correction in Equity Markets a. Correction from 52 Week High b. Index Members with New 52 Week Lows Per cent Note: Data up to March 13, 2025. Calculations are based on daily closing data. Source: Bloomberg. secidnI tnec reP Realty -30.9 35 Power -29.9 Utilities -28.8 Oil & Gas -28.3 30 Industrials -26.6 PSU -26.4 25 Energy -25.9 Auto -25.7 Consumer Discretionary -25.4 20 BSE Smallcap -24.0 Capital Goods -23.6 15 Telecom -23.5 Consumer Durable -23.1 IT -22.5 10 4.2 FMCG -21.8 Services -21.5 BSE Midcap -21.3 5 Communication -15.4 0 Metal -14.1 0 BSE Sensex -14.0 Healthcare -13.9 Financial Services -11.7 Bankex -10.4 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 Nifty 50 NSE 500 4202 voN 41 4202 voN 12 4202 voN 82 4202 ceD 50 4202 ceD 21 4202 ceD 91 4202 ceD 62 5202 naJ 20 5202 naJ 90 5202 naJ 61 5202 naJ 32 5202 naJ 03 5202 beF 60 5202 beF 31 5202 beF 02 5202 beF 72 5202 raM 60 5202 raM 31ARTICLE State of the Economy Chart IV.22: FII-DII Ownership Ratio across all NSE-Listed Companies 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.02 1.0 0.8 Source: Prime Database. segment, has led to a decline in turnover across both Weak sentiments in the secondary market also the equity derivatives and cash segments in recent affected fund-raising activity in the primary market months (Chart IV.23).20 in January 2025 (Chart IV.24).21 20 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/markets/cash-market-turnover-slips-below-rs1-lakh-crore-in-february-hits-15-month-low-f-o-volume- lowest-since-december-23-12948385.html 21 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/ipos/fpos/unwilling-to-bear-a-bearscare-companies-halt-ipo-fair/articleshow/118614369. cms?from=mdr 64 RBI Bulletin March 2025 oitaR 9002-nuJ-03 9002-ceD-13 0102-nuJ-03 0102-ceD-13 1102-nuJ-03 1102-ceD-13 2102-nuJ-03 2102-ceD-13 3102-nuJ-03 3102-ceD-13 4102-nuJ-03 4102-ceD-13 5102-nuJ-03 5102-ceD-13 6102-nuJ-03 6102-ceD-13 7102-nuJ-03 7102-ceD-13 8102-nuJ-03 8102-ceD-13 9102-nuJ-03 9102-ceD-13 0202-nuJ-03 0202-ceD-13 1202-nuJ-03 1202-ceD-13 2202-nuJ-03 2202-ceD-13 3202-nuJ-03 3202-ceD-13 4202-nuJ-03 4202-ceD-13 Chart IV.23: Declining Turnover in Equity Segments a. Average Daily Turnover in Cash Segment b. Average Daily Turnover in Derivative Segment (Notional) Sources: SEBI; BSE; and NSE. erorc ₹ erorc hkal ₹ 180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 91,661 80000 60000 40000 20000 4974 0 BSE NSE BSE NSE 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF 600 500 400 184 300 200 100 103 0 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beFState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.24: Equity Market Resource Mobilisation Source: SEBI. In light of recent correction in equity markets, mutual funds (MFs) and systematic investment it is noteworthy that 60.8 per cent of retail plans (SIPs). investors’ equity assets have been held for more than Three recent developments hold signficant 24 months (Chart IV.25).22 This indicates that retail potential for enhancing the financialisation of investors have demonstrated persistence in holding household savings. First, the introduction of micro onto their equity investments, particularly through SIP schemes23, which will make MF products more 22 https://www.amfiindia.com/Themes/Theme1/downloads/home/FolioandTicketSize.pdf 23 https://www.financialexpress.com/money/mutual-funds-explainer-building-the-equity-culture-with-micro-sip-3761507/ RBI Bulletin March 2025 65 erorc ₹ 80000 60000 40000 20000 6119 3961 3572 0 Apr-24 May-24 Jun-24 Jul-24 Aug-24 Sep-24 Oct-24 Nov-24 Dec-24 Jan-25 IPO/FPO/Rights QIP Preferential Allotment Chart IV.25: Holdings in Mutual Funds a. Holding Period of MF Investors b. Change in Share of SIP AUM across Holding Periods (as at end-December 2024) between March 2019 and March 2024 Sources: AMFI; and Crisil Intelligence. tnec reP tnec reP 60 55.1 120 50 100 39.8 12 21 40 80 41.6 30 60 51 40 20 20 46.4 10 28 0 0 March 2019 March 2024 0-1 Month 1-3 Month 3-6 Month 6-12 Month 12-24 Month >24 Months Equity Non-Equity Less than 1 year More than 5 years 1 to 5 yearsARTICLE State of the Economy accessible to a wider audience. Second, the launch more than 60 per cent of the flows. Over 75 per cent of specialised investment funds24, designed to offer of the flows were from Singapore, Mauritius, the US, investors greater flexibility and serve as a bridge the UAE and the Netherlands during the period. between MFs and portfolio management services In terms of globally annouced greenfield FDI (PMS). Third, the establishment of a centralised projects, India ranked second after the US during database for corporate bonds, which would provide 2024, up from sixth position in 2020. Of the total an authentic source of information on corporate FDI projects announced worldwide worth US$ 1.8 bonds in India.25 trillion in 2024, India accounted for around 6 per cent (over US$ 100 billion). Emerging sectors – Gross inward foreign direct investment (FDI) renewables, communications, semiconductors, and continues to remain strong, growing by 12.4 per metals – remained the most attractive FDI sectors cent (y-o-y) to US$ 67.7 billion during 2024-25 globally during 2024 (Chart IV.26b). In India, metals, (April-January) from US$ 60.2 billion over the renewable energy and semiconductors were the top corresponding period a year ago (Chart IV.26a). industries, accounting for about 60 per cent of the However, net FDI declined to US$ 1.4 billion during total annouced FDI projects in 2024. 2024-25 (April-January) from US$ 11.5 billion a year ago, owing to higher repatriation and outward FDI Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows from India. Sector-wise, manufacturing received continued to experience outflows in February 2025. the highest share of equity inflows, followed by Net FPI outflows worth US$ 4.0 billion were recorded financial services, electricity and other energy, and in February, with net equity outflows of US$ 5.4 billion communication services - together accounting for (Chart IV.27a). Furthermore, Global FPI flows during Chart IV.26: Foreign Direct Investment Flows a. India b. Top Sectors by Globally Annouced FDI Projects in 2024 Net outward FDI Repatriation/Disinvestment Gross FDI Net FDI Sources: RBI; and fDi Markets. 24 https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/feb-2025/regulatory-framework-for-specialized-investment-funds-sif-_92299.html 25 https://www.sebi.gov.in/media-and-notifications/press-releases/feb-2025/launch-of-bond-central-a-centralised-database-portal-for-corporate- bonds_92306.html 66 RBI Bulletin March 2025 noillib $SU 80 60 40 20 Semicondu 0 Real estate, 12% ctors, 7% -20 Renewable energy, 17% Transpo -40 rtation Autom & otive -60 Wareho OEM, Coal, oil & using, 4% -80 gas, 7% 4% Software Electronic & IT compon services, ents, 3% 3% Communications, 16% Metals, 4% 32-2202 42-3202 42-3202 )naJ-rpA( 52-4202 )naJ-rpA( 71.4 71.3 67.7 60.2 28.0 11.5 10.1 1.4 -29.3 -36.9 -46.1 -44.5 -14.0 -11.8 -16.7 -20.2State of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.27: Net Portfolio Investments a. India b. Equity Flows in Peer Economies (February 2025) Notes: 1. Debt also includes investments under the hybrid instruments. 2. *: Data up to March 12, 2025. Sources: National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL); and Institute of International Finance. the month were significantly redirected towards corresponding period of the previous year (Chart Chinese equities, amidst increasing optimism about IV.28). revival of the Chinese economy through monetary Of the total ECBs registered during April 2024 - and fiscal stimulus (Chart IV.27b). In India, FPI January 2025, nearly 44 per cent were intended for outrush continued in March 2025 with net outflows capital expenditure purposes (Chart IV.29). of US$ 0.9 billion (up to March 17). The continued decline in the secured overnight Net accretion to non-resident deposits (NRD) at financing rate (SOFR) since August 2024 has US$ 14.3 billion during 2024-25 (April-January) were higher from US$ 10.2 billion a year ago, with higher accretion to all three accounts, namely, Non-Resident (External) Rupee Accounts [NR(E)RA], Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) and Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Banks) [FCNR(B)] accounts. External commercial borrowing (ECB) registrations (US$ 47.3 billion) and disbursements (US$ 42.3 billion) during April 2024 – January 2025 on a cumulative basis, were significantly higher than those recorded in the corresponding period of the previous year. ECB outflows due to principal repayments stood at US$ 23.9 billion during this period, resulting in robust net inflows of US$ 18.4 billion — more than twice the level observed in the RBI Bulletin March 2025 67 noillib $SU noillib $SU 12 8 4 1.4 0 -0.7 -2.1 -4 -8 -12 Equity Debt Total 32-naJ 32-beF 32-raM 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF *52-aM 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -5.4 -6 anihC lizarB yekruT senippilihP dnaliahT manteiV aisyalaM acirfAhtuoS aisenodnI aeroK nawiaT aidnI Chart IV.28: External Commercial Borrowings – Registrations and Flows Source: Form ECB, RBI. noillib $SU 50 47.3 45 42.3 40 35 30 25 18.4 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -23.9 -30 Registrations Principal Repayments Gross Disbursements Net inflows 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 52-naJ 42 naJ-rpA 52 naJ-rpAARTICLE State of the Economy Chart IV.29: End-use of the Registered ECBs Apr-Jan 25 3.7 6.7 10.4 9.3 17.2 Apr-Jan 24 10.3 10.5 6.2 5.3 6.8 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 US $ billion Import/ local sourcing of capital goods Modernisation/ new project/infrastructure development On-lending/sub-lending (Capex) Refinancing of ECB/rupee loans Others (including working capital and general corporate purpose) Source: Form ECB, RBI. contributed to a reduction in the overall cost of ECBs. depreciation of the INR, however, was lower than In January 2025, the overall cost of ECBs declined by the previous month. In addition, the INR remained 129 bps compared with the corresponding period of one of the least volatile major currency. the previous year (Chart IV.30). The INR depreciated by 2.4 per cent (m-o-m) in The Indian rupee (INR) depreciated by 0.9 terms of the 40-currency real effective exchange rate per cent (m-o-m) during February 2025, weighed (REER) in February 2025 due to depreciation of the by heavy FPI outflows (Chart IV.31). The extent of INR in nominal effective terms and narrowing of Chart IV.30: Overall Cost of ECBs Secured overnight financing rate (SOFR) for US dollar Weighted average interest margin Source: Form ECB; and RBI staff estimates. 68 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )tnec rep ni( nigram dna etar tseretnI 8 6 1.4 4 5.0 2 0 22-voN 22-ceD 32-naJ 32-beF 32-raM 32-rpA 32-yaM 32-nuJ 32-luJ 32-guA 32-peS 32-tcO 32-voN 32-ceD 42-naJ 42-beF 42-raM 42-rpA 42-yaM 42-nuJ 42-luJ 42-guA 42-peS 42-tcO 42-voN 42-ceD 42-naJ 42 naJ-rpA 52 naJ-rpAState of the Economy ARTICLE India’s inflation differential with its major trading witnessed drawdown in forex reserves during partners (Chart IV.32). Q3:2024-25, with some signs of recovery in 2025 (Chart IV.33b). As on March 7, 2025, India held foreign exchange reserves worth US$ 654.0 billion, sufficient Payment Systems for over 11 months of imports and 91 per cent of India’s digital payment ecosystem expanded external debt outstanding at end-September 2024 in February 2025, led by the Bharat Bill Payment (Chart IV.33a). The top reserves-holding economies System (BBPS) and Unified Payments Interface (UPI) RBI Bulletin March 2025 69 tnec reP tnec reP Chart IV.31: Movements of the Indian Rupee and Major Currencies against the US Dollar (February 2025 over January 2025) 6 3 4 2 2 1 0 0 -0.9 -2 -1 Percentage change (+ appreciation/ - depreciation) Volatility (RHS) Note: US dollar (DXY) measures the movements of the US dollar against a basket of major currencies (Euro, Japanese yen, British pound, Canadian dollar, Swedish krona, Swiss franc). Sources: FBIL; Thomson Reuters; and RBI staff estimates. )YXD( ralloD SU xednI ycnerruC EME laer nailizarB ney esenapaJ dnuop KU thab iahT dnar nacirfA htuoS osep enippilihP oruE osep nacixeM tiggnir naisyalaM nauy esenihC rallod esenawiaT haipur naisenodnI eepur naidnI osep enitnegrA Chart IV.32: Movements in the 40-Currency Real Effective Exchange Rate a. Monthly Changes b. Decomposition of Monthly Changes Change in REER (RHS) REER Source: RBI. )001=61-5102( xednI tnec reP Relative price effect Nominal exchange rate effect Change in REER tnec reP 110 4 108 106 2 104 102 102.4 100 0 98 96 -2 94 92 -2.4 90 -4 32-naJ 32-nuJ 32-voN 42-rpA 42-peS 52-beF 4 2 0 -1.7 -2 -0.7 -2.4 -4 32-naJ 32-nuJ 32-voN 42-rpA 42-peS 52-beFARTICLE State of the Economy Chart IV.33: Foreign Exchange Reserves a. India b. Change in Reserves during 2024-25 (Top Reserves Holding Economies) Notes: 1. *: Data for March 7. 2. The import cover data since December 2024 is based on annualised merchandise imports for the quarter ending September 2024 as per the balance of payments statistics. 3. ^: Data for India and Russia are for March 7, 2025, end- January 2025 for Switzerland and end-February 2025 for other countries. Sources: RBI; respective central banks; and RBI staff estimates. (Table IV.4). The growing role of digital payments in enterprises (MSMEs) are increasingly being met boosting entrepreneurship and business expansion through the Trade Receivables Discounting System in India is evident from the rise in person-to- (TReDS), as reflected in the sharp rise in factoring merchant (P2M) transactions, comprising 62.5 per units26 (FU) financed— which recorded a growth of 78 cent of total UPI transactions in February 2025, up from 60.8 per cent a year ago. per cent in volume and 68 per cent in value (y-o-y) in January 2025. The average number of MSME sellers27 In the digital finance segment, the working capital requirements of micro, small and medium registered on TReDS rose to 41,094 in January 2025 Table IV.4: Growth in Select Payment Systems (y-o-y in per cent) Payment Modes Transaction Volume Transaction Value Jan-24 Jan-25 Feb-24 Feb-25 Jan-24 Jan-25 Feb-24 Feb-25 RTGS 13.1 16.1 18.8 2.5 17.1 19.1 21.2 10.2 NEFT 43.4 24.5 47.3 11.0 19.8 14.3 25.1 2.0 UPI 51.8 39.3 60.6 33.1 41.7 27.5 47.9 20.2 IMPS 7.2 -12.7 19.4 -24.3 18.6 7.1 21.2 -0.9 NACH 22.8 17.2 13.1 6.8 21.5 22.5 15.6 20.0 NETC 10.2 14.8 12.1 18.7 15.5 19.0 19.2 18.3 BBPS 24.6 97.4 29.8 87.3 75.4 276.4 85.8 240.6 Note: RTGS: Real Time Gross Settlement, NEFT: National Electronic Funds Transfer, UPI: Unified Payments Interface, IMPS: Immediate Payment Service, NACH: National Automated Clearing House, NETC: National Electronic Toll Collection, BBPS: Bharat Bill Payment System. Source: RBI. 26 A Factoring Unit is a nomenclature used in TReDS for invoice(s) or bill(s) of exchange. Each FU represents a confirmed obligation of the corporates or other buyers, including Government Departments and PSUs. 27 Average number of MSME sellers is calculated as the total number of MSME sellers registered with the top three top entities under TReDS divided by three. 70 RBI Bulletin March 2025 noillib $SU shtnoM noillib $SU 750 14 11.1 12 650 10 654 8 550 6 4 450 2 350 0 China Japan Russia Foreign exchange reserves Import cover (RHS) Switzerland India 32-raM 32-nuJ 32-peS 32-ceD 42-raM 42-nuJ 42-peS 42-ceD 52-naJ 52-beF *52-raM 120 90 60 43 30 30 23 0 1 88 -30 -60 -90 -120 42-raM 42-nuJ 42-peS 42-ceD ^52-raMState of the Economy ARTICLE Chart IV.34: Use of Internet for Entrepreneurial Purposes a. Internet Use b. Internet for Financial Activities (as Share of Internet Users) Sources: Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; and RBI staff estimates. from 24,081 a year ago. The transformation is also limits, further enhancing user experience, especially reflected in the rising proportion of unincorporated for offline29 transactions.30,31 sector enterprises utilising the internet for V. Conclusion entrepreneurial activities. At the national level, The immediate course of the global economy internet adoption increased from 21 per cent in is likely to be shaped by escalating trade tensions, 2022-23 to 26.7 per cent in 2023-24, with a faster inflationary pressures stemming from tariffs, and uptake among urban enterprises (Chart IV.34a). attendant financial market volatility. Recently Additionally, the share of enterprises using the announced fiscal stimulus is expected to provide internet for financial activities has increased (Chart a short-term boost to growth in the euro area, IV.34b). although sharp spikes in yields witnessed after such announcements indicate that resulting increases On the policy front, the Reserve Bank has issued in long-term borrowing costs are likely to constrain the Framework for Recognising Self-Regulatory very large expansions. Commodity prices have a Organisations (SROs) for the Account Aggregator benign outlook as a baseline case in line with the Ecosystem (SRO-AA) and invited applications for their expected moderation in demand in an environment recognition.28 The National Payments Corporation of of growth slowdown. The pass-through of higher tariffs to consumer prices, however, remains a key India (NPCI) introduced addendums to improve the UPI Lite functionality, including transfer-out, balance reconciliation, app passcode, and enhanced UPI 28 RBI Press Releases. March 12, 2025. Invitation of applications for recognition of Self-Regulatory Organisation(s) for the Account Aggregator Ecosystem. RBI Bulletin March 2025 71 tnec reP tnec reP 40 37.0 70 66.7 35 61.2 30.2 60 30 50 25 40 20 17.9 29.0 30 15 13.5 23.5 20 10 5 10 0 0 Internet Banking Other Digital Rural Urban Financial Services 2022-23 2023-24 2022-23 2023-24 29 ‘Offline’ as defined in the RBI Circular No. RBI/2021-22/146 CO.DPSS. POLC.No.S1264/02-14-003/2021-2022 dated December 04, 2024 - ‘Framework for Facilitating Small Value Digital Payments in Offline Mode’ 30 NPCI Circular. February 21, 2025. Addendum to Introduction of UPI LITE. 31 NPCI Circular. February 27, 2025. Addendum to Enhancement in UPI LITE Limits.ARTICLE State of the Economy risk to inflation, which is already exhibiting signs 2025. Robust kharif production, better rabi sowing of stubbornness in many AEs. Central banks in coupled with higher reservoir levels and seasonal AEs would have to factor in such pressures while winter correction in vegetable prices augur well for calibrating policy responses in an environment of food inflation, although volatility in commodity potential slowdown in growth. EMEs, on the other prices and weather anomalies remain potential hand, are likely to record higher growth than their upside risks to the overall inflation outlook. AE counterparts, although capital outflows and While facing challenges from weakening global potential currency depreciation remain major risks. trade and tariff uncertainty, India’s external sector Domestically, macroeconomic fundamentals continues to find support from resilient services remain strong, and economic growth is poised to exports, which remain less affected by global sustain momentum driven by robust domestic disruptions. Going forward, India’s structural demand, steady investment activity, and ongoing strengths—sound fiscal policies, a well-calibrated policy-driven infrastructure development along monetary framework, and digital transformation with a pick-up in government spending. Headline initiatives—are expected to provide a strong inflation has moderated significantly from above 6 foundation for long-term sustainable economic per cent in October 2024 to 3.6 per cent in February growth. 72 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon GDP and employing 42.3 per cent of the workforce.1 Consequently, rainfall influences macroeconomic and Agricultural Production policies. Fiscal policy is linked to various price support systems and agricultural subsidies, while monetary by Abhinav Narayanan and policy is affected by mechanisms aimed at maintaining Harendra Kumar Behera^ price stability, which are influenced by food prices. In a country like India, with its vast landmass and This study examines spatial distribution of rainfall diverse agroclimatic conditions, crop production varies and its influence on Kharif crop cultivation in India. significantly across regions. Although various policies By utilizing matched longitudinal data on rainfall and over time have incentivized farmers to cultivate agricultural output at the district level, the study exploits specific crops, production remains largely influenced variations in rainfall to assess its impact on crop production. by local agroclimatic factors. For instance, crops such The results underscore the importance of rainfall for all as paddy, certain pulses, and oilseeds are primarily crops; however, extreme weather events – such as excessive grown in areas that receive substantial southwest or insufficient rainfall – disrupt production processes, monsoon rainfall. Else, the production process will be leading to crop damage and reduced yield quality. The heavily irrigation-dependent that puts pressure on the timing of these extreme weather events is also crucial due alternative sources of water (groundwater, reservoirs, to differing crop production cycles. Insufficient rainfall etc.). This paper uses spatial variation of rainfall across in June and July adversely affects cereal and pulses districts and estimate its impact on the production production, while oilseeds are particularly vulnerable to process of different Kharif crops. This study also excessive rainfall during the harvesting period. estimates the effects of deficient or excess rainfall in districts cultivating these crops, and how these Introduction variations disrupt the production processes. Due to Rainfall plays a crucial role in the production of the nature of these crops, it is crucial to recognize that Kharif crops, mainly because irrigation alone cannot inadequate or excessive rainfall during the sowing or meet the water needs of these crops. Despite decades harvesting stages can have differing impacts on final of research leading to the development of high-yield production outcomes. Thus, this study tries to identify crop varieties, climate-resilient varieties and cropping the extreme weather events in specific months that technologies, much of the production still relies on may have an impact on the different crops. Given rainfall. Climate change has altered weather patterns that southwest monsoon rainfall occurs from June to globally, resulting in extreme conditions such as September, we focus on this timeframe and the spatial floods, droughts, and heatwaves in India in recent distribution of rainfall in specific months to evaluate years. In this context, this study examines the role of its effects on production. rainfall in crop production, particularly focusing on The remaining part of the article is broadly the effects of both excessive and insufficient rainfall. structured as follows. Section II presents relevant Agricultural production is vital for the country’s literature on the rainfall-agriculture relationship. economy as the sector is contributing 18.2 per cent to Section II examines the stylised facts regarding spatial distribution of rainfall and agricultural production ^ The authors are from the Department of Economic and Policy Research. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Reserve Bank of India 1 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2034943 RBI Bulletin March 2025 73ARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production in India. While methodology to study the impact to identify the effects of rainfall in particular months of spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall on of the monsoon season to account for the varying agricultural production is discussed in Section IV, the cropping cycles of different crops. empirical results are provided in Section V. Section VI III. Data and Stylized Facts concludes the study. This paper uses data from India Meteorological II. Select Literature Department (IMD) for spatial analysis of rainfall The relationship between rainfall and agriculture which are available at a daily and monthly frequency. in India is widely studied. For brevity, we focus on The district-level agricultural production data are selected studies that have used granular data to study from Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India this topic. Prasanna (2014) found that monsoon rainfall and collected from the Centre for Monitoring Indian has a direct and positive effect on yields in the Kharif Economy (CMIE) Commodities database to maintain season, while post monsoon rainfall affects Rabi crops consistency across years and districts. by influencing water and soil moisture. Galle and The south-west monsoon in India is a seasonal Kazenberger (2024) used the predictions of the global wind pattern that brings the majority of the country’s climate models to estimate the impact of climate annual rainfall between June and September. It change on crop yield and found that, depending on originates from the Indian Ocean and moves towards different emission scenarios affecting rainfall and the Indian subcontinent, drawn by the heat of the temperature, there could be a 3-22 per cent loss in landmass during summer. This monsoon is a critical rice yields between 2021-2100. Focusing on the state part of India’s climate and agriculture, providing of Maharashtra, Zachariah et al. (2020) observed that essential rainfall for crops, especially during the rainfall deficit has a relatively stronger effect on crop Kharif season (June to October), which includes crops production compared to rising temperatures. Ghosh like rice, cotton, and pulses. After bouts of extreme and Kaustubh (2023) noted that that rainfall has a heatwaves during the summer months, the south- non-linear relationship with inflation mainly through west monsoon season in 2024 started with a deficit its effects on agricultural GVA. Gupta et al. (2023) in June 2024 followed by an excess rainfall in July, analysed state-level production and rainfall data to August and September 2024. The spatial distribution evaluate the importance of south-west monsoon of rainfall was uneven during the first two months on Kharif crops in the context of improvement in but improved during the next two months. Districts irrigation infrastructure and found that irrigation with excess rainfall increased in 2024, while districts mitigates the impact of deficient rainfall. Other with deficient and normal rainfall decreased relative studies that focus on the relationship between rainfall to 2023. and agricultural crop production include Meher et al. (2015); Auffhammer et al. (2012); Fishman (2016); The spatial distribution of south-west monsoon Revadekar and Preethi (2012). At the aggregate level, rainfall in India for 2023 and 2024 shows that there Kapur (2018) show that excess/scanty rainfall has was a decrease in number of districts experiencing significant impact on agricultural activity. This paper normal rainfall in 2024 relative to 2023 (Chart 1a). extends the analysis by examining the effects of both However, the number of districts experiencing insufficient and excessive rainfall during the monsoon deficient rainfall became fewer while the number of season, utilizing district-level data to better reflect the districts with excess rainfall increased in 2024. The spatial distribution of rainfall. Furthermore, we aim district dynamics show that 59 districts with normal 74 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE Chart 1: Rainfall Distribution 2023 vs. 2024 a. Rainfall Distribution by Categories b. Rainfall Distribution by Districts and Categories 2024 (No. of Districts) Normal Deficient Excess 2023 Normal 170 59 121 (No. of Districts) Deficient 96 81 35 Excess 38 8 64 Notes: The categories of rainfall are based on the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) definition. See https://mausam.imd.gov.in/imd_latest/monsoonfaq.pdf. Source: IMD. rainfall in 2023 experienced deficient rainfall in 2024, districts with normal rainfall shifting to excess rainfall while 121 districts that received normal rainfall in is 83, comparing 2024 to 2023. 2023 saw excess rainfall in 2024 (Chart 1b). On the The difference in production pattern of different other hand, 96 districts that had deficient rainfall crop groups as compared to their targets shows that in 2023 recorded normal rainfall in 2024. Based on rice is the only crop that roughly meets the target the underlying dynamics of spatial distribution, the net increase in districts with normal rainfall shifting production every year (Chart 2a). On the other hand, from deficient conditions is 37, while net decrease in oilseeds and pulses consistently fall below the target RBI Bulletin March 2025 75 stcirtsiD fo .oN Chart 2: Production (Actual vs. Target) and Rainfall Deviation a. Crop-wise Production Deviation b. Crop-wise Production Growth Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare and IMD. )%( tegraT morf lautcA fo noitaiveD )%( htworG noitcudorPARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production production. The annual growth of the production respectively. The variable of interest is β which tells of these four crop groups during the Kharif season us the marginal impact of rainfall on crop1 production. indicates that there is a general trend of higher Coefficients β and β provide the marginal impact of production during years when the south-west rainfall if a d2istrict 3experiences deficient or excess monsoon is better across all crops (Chart 2b). While rainfall in the particular year. So, if all districts rice production seems to follow a consistent pattern, experienced normal rainfall in a particular year, the other crops have a high dependence on monsoon marginal effect of rainfall will be β . But if there are rainfall, especially oilseeds and pulses. This is a districts that experience deficient (o1r excess) rainfall known fact based on Indian agricultural pattern, while during that year, the impact of rainfall is β β the consistency of rice production can be attributed to (or β β ). 1 2 + the high percentage of land under irrigation for rice 1 3 W +e include district fixed effects (α ) that control production. d for any time invariant characteristics (e.g., soil The above observations indicate that the spatial characteristics, long-term agroclimatic conditions), distribution of rainfall fluctuates from year to year. and any unobserved district level conditions that While it is clear that rainfall is important for Kharif may influence production of a particular crop. The crops, its effects on production differ among various specification includes state specific year fixed effects crops depending on the magnitude and pattern of (θ ) that control for any macroeconomic events rainfall. This study seeks to examine the spatial st like policy changes (e.g., minimum support prices, distribution of rainfall and shed light on how it affects fertilizer subsidies, trade polices) or climatic changes the production of different crops. (e.g., El Nino, La Nina) that may occur in a particular IV. Empirical Strategy year in a particular state which affect all districts in We match annual production data for each crop a state at the same time. The state specific year fixed with rainfall at the district-level during the monsoon effects also control for any state-level variables (e.g., season. Additionally, we identify the month-year State GDP, credit, irrigation infrastructure at the state- combinations during which the rainfall was deficient level, etc.) that may influence the production process. or excess. To gauge the impact spatial pattern of Since the cropping cycle differs across crops, we rainfall on crop production, we first use the following attempt to tease out the impact of deficient or excess specification: rainfall in a particular month for each of the crops. (production) To do this, we augment the first specification by cdst α θ β (Rainfall) β (Rainfall) including month wise interaction terms: ln d st dst Defi cient 1 β (Rainfall) 2 Excess β dst = + +ds t * ln + * ln dst * (production) cdst (Area Sown)3 ϵ dst 4 ... (1) + ds t* lncdst * + * lnα θ β (Rainfall) β Wlnhere (produ c+t ion) refers to the production (log) d st dst cdst m Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep 1 2,m of crop c in district d, state s in year . (Rainfall) = + + * ln + = ∑ ln dst (Rainfall) Deficient β and (Area Sown) refer to the actual rainfall and dstm m Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep m dst t ln * l(nRainfall) dst E* xcess β + (A=r ea∑ Sown)3, *ϵ ... (2) area sown in district , state and year . Deficient dst dstm cdst ln dst 4 dst and Excess takes the value 1 if there is deficient or lHnere, Deficie*n t (if m+ *ju lnn) takes the v+alue 1 if dst d s t dstm excess rainfall in district d in year otherwise zero, district ‘d’ in year ‘t’ experienced deficient rainfall = t 76 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE in the month of June. Similarly for the other months Table 1: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production and for the excess rainfall. Rest of the variables carry (Cereals) the same interpretation as in equation 1. In this (1) (2) (3) specification, we try to delve deeper to see whether Cereals Paddy Maize excess of deficient rainfall in a particular month during ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.038* 0.031* 0.159** (0.019) (0.017) (0.071) the monsoon seasons matters for crop production. ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.007*** -0.005** 0.0002 Specifically, what is the aggregate marginal effect of (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) rainfall on crop production if districts experience ln Rainfall*Excess -0.003 0.002 -0.011* deficient or excess rainfall in the June, July, August or (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) ln AreaSown 1.049*** 1.066*** 1.065*** September. This is important because the water and (0.040) (0.040) (0.026) soil moisture requirement are different across crops. Constant 14.205*** 14.245*** 13.511*** For example, excess rainfall during the harvesting (0.245) (0.229) (0.499) District FE Yes Yes Yes season generally leads to crop damages and is harmful State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes for most crops. In fact, for pulses, excess rainfall N 4165 3807 3278 during the flowering season and deficient rainfall R2 0.95 0.96 0.97 during sowing season are harmful for the crops. Since Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. this analysis requires both production and rainfall * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: Authors’ estimates. data at the district level, the time period is confined to 2012-2022 based on consistent data availability across rise in paddy production, and a 0.16 per cent increase districts. One advantage of keeping a recent period in maize production. These results indicate that maize of data compared to historical data is the possibility is more responsive to changes in rainfall than paddy, of factoring out any long-term changes that may likely due to the crop’s dependency on natural water influence crop production at the district level. In all sources in rainfed areas. our specifications, we cluster the standard errors at The results also highlight the asymmetric effects the district level to account for any serial correlation of rainfall deviations. Deficient rainfall has marginally within districts. negative impact on total cereals and paddy production. Since actual production of a crop in a district may Paddy’s limited sensitivity to rainfall shortages can depend on previous year’s production, a dynamic be attributed to the widespread use of irrigation panel specification is used as a robustnbess check systems in paddy cultivation, which buffers the crop that includes a lagged value of production. The results against deficient rainfall. However, maize production from this specification are presented in the Appendix remains unaffected by deficient rainfall, reflecting its Tables A.1-A.3. adaptability and potential reliance on soil moisture or V. Results farming practices suited to low-rainfall conditions. We estimate Equation 1 for total cereals production Excessive rainfall, on the other hand, emerges and two major crops: paddy and maize. The results as a significant constraint, particularly for maize. reveal that rainfall plays a crucial role in influencing Excess rainfall reduces maize production by 0.011 agricultural output, though its effects differ across per cent from the baseline, indicating waterlogging or crops (Table 1). A one per cent higher rainfall increases prolonged periods of standing water adversely affect cereals production by 0.04 per cent, a 0.03 per cent this crop. This is consistent with maize’s physiological RBI Bulletin March 2025 77ARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production characteristics, as it is highly sensitive to poor drainage rainfall. Thus, it requires the right amount of rainfall and water accumulation. which is neither excess nor deficit. Table 2 reports the regression results from We also estimate equation 1 for oilseeds, focusing equation 1 for pulses. Column 1 reports the results on three major Kharif oilseeds, namely soyabean, for overall pulses production while columns 2, 3 and 4 groundnut and sunflower (Table 3). Rainfall seems to report the results for three major pulses grown during be important for overall oilseeds production with a the Kharif season, namely, Arhar, Moong, and Urad. one per cent increase in rainfall boosting production Results show that rainfall has a large positive impact by 0.3 per cent. However, the individual responses on all pulses, except Moong for which rainfall is not on each of the crops are relatively weak. Deficient statistically significant. A 1 per cent increase in rainfall rainfall negatively affects oilseeds (except Sunflower) increases overall pulses production by 0.33 per cent. but none of the effects are statisticaly significant. Deficient rainfall seem to affect overall pulses and Excess rainfall significantly reduces overall oilseeds Arhar production and has a negative but statistically production, particularly soyabean. insignificant effect on Moong. Defcient rainfall seem to Soybean is a rainfed crop cultivated during the have positive effect on Urad production. Interestingly, Kharif season and is sown only after the monsoon excess rainfall seems to be quite harmful for all kinds of pulses. A pre-requisite for the success of Arhar and arrives. Farmers are advised to plant their crops only Moong is proper drainage. Ridge planting is effective after receiving 100 mm of rainfall to ensure proper in areas where sub-surface drainage is poor. This germination and steady growth. However, excess rain provides enough aeration for the roots during the during the maturity stage can degrade soybean quality. period of excess rainfall. Overall, production of pulses While warm and humid conditions promote healthy seem to be quite sensitive to both deficient and excess growth, cool and wet weather hampers germination Table 2: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production Table 3: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production (Pulses) (Oilseeds) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Pulses Arhar Moong Urad Oilseeds Soyabean Groundnut Sunflower ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.333*** 0.345*** 0.203 0.466*** ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.303** 0.089 0.197 0.382 (0.107) (0.133) (0.206) (0.130) (0.143) (0.084) (0.184) (0.316) ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.017** -0.018* -0.025 0.024*** ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.005 -0.013 -0.023 0.005 (0.008) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.025) (0.020) ln Rainfall*Excess -0.033*** -0.017* -0.054*** -0.038*** ln Rainfall*Excess -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.001 0.0001 (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016) ln AreaSown 1.023*** 1.034*** 1.048*** 1.016*** ln AreaSown 0.911*** 0.910*** 1.075*** 1.028*** (0.023) (0.039) (0.071) (0.030) (0.051) (0.042) (0.093) (0.046) Constant 11.246*** 11.253*** 11.623*** 9.982*** Constant 12.350*** 13.710*** 12.642*** 11.171*** (0.700) (0.894) (1.313) (0.875) (0.963) (0.585) (1.281) (1.888) District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3307 2519 1827 2603 N 2237 1160 1937 315 R2 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 R2 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.96 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: Authors’estimates. Source: Authors’ estimates. 78 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE and increases the risk of seed rot. Although we do Chart 3: Marginal Effect of Spatial Rainfall not find any significant effect of deficient or excess on Production rainfall on groundnut, its production is sensitive to extreme conditions such as frost, severe drought, or standing water. Adequate rainfall is crucial during the flowering, pegging, and pod formation stages to achieve maximum yield and high-quality groundnuts. Tables A.1-A.3 present the results from a dynamic panel specification. The impact of rainfall on production seems to be consistent with our baseline specification. The impact of deficient or excess rainfall, although being consistent in the direction of the effect, there are minor deviations in terms of Note: The chart plots the monthly coefficient estimates along with the statistical significance. For example, while excess confidence intervals, based on latter equation specification. ‘Def‘ and ‘Exc’ refer to the dummies for Deficient and Excess rainfall at the district level, respectively. rainfall has a statistically significant negative impact Source: Authors’ estimates. on pulses production in our baseline results, the To account for the temporal aspect of rainfall dynamic panel estimation results are not statistically while preserving its spatial variation, Equation 2 significant. On the other hand, deficient rainfall introduces monthly dummy variables for deficient shows no significant impact on oilseeds production or excess rainfall during the southwest monsoon in our baseline specfication, but shows a negative and season. The monthly coefficients show the marginal statistically significant effect in the dynamic panel effect of deficient or excess rainfall in a particular specification. Considering these minor deviations, month (Chart 3). The dots represent the point overall the results are found to be consistent across the two types of specifications. estimates while the vertical lines represent the 95 per cent confidence interval. The estimates show The results in Table 1, 2 and 3 show how overall that the spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall rainfall affect production of different crops while significantly affects crop production. For cereals highlighting their vulnerability to deficient or excess production, deficient rainfall in July adversely impacts rainfall. These estimates show the average of impact of production. Production of pulses is vulnerable to deficient or excess rainfall during the entire monsoon season. However, the crop cycles are different for deficient rainfall during the sowing season, while each of the crops based on the water requirement, soil excess rainfall in August and September is harmful moisture and the duration of the production cycle. for oilseeds production. Thus, depending on the For example, paddy fields must remain filled with sowing, germination and harvesting time of the crops, sufficient water depths for at least 10 weeks during deficient or excess rainfall has a differential impact on the growing season of the crop life cycle. On the other the production. hand, maize must be sown at the optimum time when VI. Conclusion there is less chance of waterlogging. Similarly, pulses and oilseeds are grown during the Kharif season, This article examines how rainfall affects Kharif although being dependent on rainfall, the timing and crop production, with an emphasis on the spatial intensity of the rainfall matter. distribution of southwest monsoon. Our analysis RBI Bulletin March 2025 79 noitcudorP no llafniaR fo tceffE lanigraMARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production highlights the critical role of rainfall in determining the As climate change causes extreme weather events, production outcomes of various crops, emphasising crop production faces growing risks. In a diverse the differential effects of timing, intensity, and country like India, the impact of climate change distribution. The findings indicate that, on average, will differ across regions. Thus, further research is rainfall is crucial for crop production. While cereals, necessary to explore how the spatial distribution of pulses, and oilseeds benefit from timely and adequate these extreme events affects agricultural production rainfall, deviations in the form of deficiency or excess and cropping cycles. This study is an attempt towards during key growth stages can lead to significant this end. losses. Given that crop cycles vary across crops, References inadequate or excessive rainfall during the sowing Auffhammer, M., Ramanathan, V. and Vincent, J.R. and harvesting periods negatively affects overall Climate change, the monsoon, and rice yield in India. production. Climatic Change 111, 411–424 (2012). Our findings suggest that in areas prone to Fishman, R. (2016). More uneven distributions heavy rainfall, early planting is recommended so that overturn benefits of higher precipitation for crop maize plants reach a more robust stage of growth, yields. Environmental Research Letters, 11(2), 024004. making them better equipped to withstand such adverse conditions. Interestingly, given paddy’s Gallé, J., and Katzenberger, A. (2024). Indian agriculture high water requirement, excessive rainfall may not under climate change: The competing effect of significantly impact its production. Paddy’s ability to temperature and rainfall anomalies. Economics of tolerate standing water could be the reason behind its Disasters and Climate Change, 1-53. resilience to excessive rainfall. Gupta, K., Kumar, S., and Gulati, S. (2023). Agriculture’s dependency on monsoon rainfall in India. Reserve Overall, the results underscore the need for Bank of India Bulletin. August. region-specific and crop-specific water management strategies. While rainfall generally boosts production, Ghosh, S., Kaustubh. (2023). Weather events and their excess rainfall poses significant challenges, particularly impact on growth and inflation in India. Reserve Bank for maize, pulses and oilseeds. Policymakers and of India Bulletin. June. agricultural extension services could use these Kapur, M. (2018). Macroeconomic policies and insights to promote crop diversification, improve transmission dynamics in India. MPRA Working Paper drainage infrastructure, and encourage planting No. 88566, August. strategies that mitigate the risks of waterlogging, Meher, J. K., Das, L., and Dutta, M. (2015). Recent trends thereby enhancing resilience to rainfall variability. in monsoon rainfall and its effect on yield of Kharif Policymakers and agricultural practitioners must rice in five subdivisions of North India. Journal of focus on improving irrigation systems and adopting Agroecology and Nature Resource Management, 2(3), resilient crop varieties to mitigate the adverse effects 192-196. of rainfall variability. By addressing these challenges, farmers can achieve more stable and sustainable crop Prasanna, V. (2014). Impact of monsoon rainfall on yields despite the uncertainties posed by changing the total foodgrain yield over India. Journal of Earth monsoon patterns. System Science, 123(5), 1129-1145. 80 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE Revadekar, J. V., and Preethi, B. (2012). Statistical Zachariah, M., Mondal, A., Das, M., AchutaRao, analysis of the relationship between summer K. M., and Ghosh, S. (2020). On the role of rainfall monsoon precipitation extremes and foodgrain yield deficits and cropping choices in loss of agricultural over India. International Journal of Climatology, 32(3), yield in Marathwada, India. Environmental Research 419-429. Letters, 15(9), 094029. RBI Bulletin March 2025 81ARTICLE Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production Appendix Table A.1: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production (Cereals): Dynamic Panel Estimates (1) (2) (3) Cereals Paddy Maize ln Production(lagged) 0.929*** 0.954*** 0.888*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.058*** 0.034* 0.181*** (0.018) (0.020) (0.052) ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.008*** -0.004* -0.007 (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) ln Rainfall*Excess -0.000 0.003 -0.007 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) ln AreaSown 0.206*** 0.133*** 0.287*** (0.020) (0.016) (0.035) District FE Yes Yes Yes State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes N 3575.00 3248.00 2737.00 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: Authors’ estimates. Table A.2: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production (Pulses): Dynamic Panel Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) Pulses Arhar Moong Urad ln Production(lagged) 0.797*** 1.021*** 0.894*** 0.809*** (0.041) (0.069) (0.084) (0.078) ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.245*** -0.162 0.004 0.292* (0.094) (0.152) (0.179) (0.168) ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.026** -0.050*** -0.046** 0.027** (0.011) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) ln Rainfall*Excess -0.010 0.005 -0.005 -0.026* (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.015) ln AreaSown 0.480*** 0.205*** 0.314*** 0.323*** (0.043) (0.069) (0.084) (0.064) District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes N 2741.00 2078.00 1447.00 2149.00 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: Authors’ estimates. 82 RBI Bulletin March 2025Spatial Distribution of Monsoon and Agricultural Production ARTICLE Table A.3: Impact of Rainfall on Crop Production (Oilseeds): Dynamic Panel Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) Oilseeds Soyabean Groundnut Sunflower ln Production(lagged) 0.940*** 0.768*** 1.157*** 0.721*** (0.042) (0.054) (0.094) (0.050) ln Rainfall(Actual) 0.118 0.362*** -0.292 0.534*** (0.083) (0.114) (0.188) (0.104) ln Rainfall*Deficient -0.020* -0.002 -0.085** -0.071*** (0.012) (0.012) (0.041) (0.024) ln Rainfall*Excess -0.014 -0.050*** 0.057* 0.005 (0.010) (0.012) (0.031) (0.022) ln AreaSown 0.183*** 0.340*** -0.073 0.614*** (0.051) (0.059) (0.099) (0.068) District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes N 2426.00 966.00 1564.00 238.00 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district * year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Source: Authors’ estimates. RBI Bulletin March 2025 83Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Changing Dynamics of India’s receipts have generally remained higher than India’s gross inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, Remittances – Insights from the thus establishing their importance as a stable source Sixth Round of India’s of external financing. Furthermore, following a Remittances Survey pandemic-induced contraction of 3.6 per cent during 2020-21, remittances to India in the post pandemic by Dhirendra Gajbhiye, Sujata Kundu, period (2021-22 to 2023-24) recorded a resurgence Alisha George, Omkar Vinherkar, with an average annual growth of 14.3 per cent. Yusra Anees and Jithin Baby^ Against this backdrop, this article presents the results of the sixth round of the survey on India’s This article analyses results of the sixth round of inward remittances conducted for 2023-24.2 It India’s remittances survey conducted for 2023-24. Key captures various dimensions of inward remittances findings suggest that the share of advanced economies to India – country-wise source of remittances, state- in India’s inward remittances has risen, surpassing the wise destination of remittances, transaction-wise share of Gulf economies, reflecting a shift in migration size of remittances, prevalent modes of transmission, pattern towards skilled Indian diaspora. Maharashtra, cost of sending remittances to India and share of followed by Kerala and Tamil Nadu continue to be the remittances transmitted through the digital modes dominant recipient states. The cost of sending remittances vis-à-vis cash. The survey results are based on to India is lower than the global average cost, driven by responses received from 30 authorised dealer (AD) digitalisation but remains higher than the SDG target of banks (covering around 99 per cent of the total 3 per cent for US$ 200. Furthermore, fintech companies value of inward remittances reported under family offer affordable cross-border remittance services, fostering maintenance and savings3). The survey also covered competition among different remittance service providers. two major Money Transfer Operators (MTOs)4 and Introduction two fintech companies5 operating in cross-border remittances business. This round of survey has the India’s remittances have more than doubled following enhancements over the previous rounds to from US$ 55.6 billion in 2010-11 to US$ 118.7 billion in 2023-24. While financing around half of India’s improve the coverage and data quality: (i) expanding merchandise trade deficit1, net remittance receipts the coverage of source countries; (ii) classifying the have been an important absorber of external shocks coverage of Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) into during this period. Moreover, India’s remittance exchange houses/MTOs and fintechs; (iii) expanding the range and number of remittance size brackets; (iv) ^ The authors are from the Department of Economic and Policy Research of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The views expressed in this article 2 The fifth round of the survey conducted for 2020-21 was published in are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the RBI. The the July 2022 issue of the RBI Monthly Bulletin. Earlier survey results were authors are grateful to Shri Muneesh Kapur and Dr. Sunil Kumar for their published in November 2006, April 2010, December 2013 and November valuable comments and guidance. The authors are also grateful for the 2018 issues of the RBI Monthly Bulletin. inputs received from the Authorized Persons and Remittances Division and the External Payments Division of the Foreign Exchange Department, 3 Pertaining to Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting Central Office, RBI. System (FETERS). 1 India’s net remittance receipts have financed around 42.0 per cent of 4 Western Union Financial Services Inc. and MoneyGram Payment the merchandise trade deficit on an annual average basis during 2010-11 Systems Inc. to 2023-24 (barring the pandemic year of 2020-21). 5 Remitly Inc. and Remitbee. RBI Bulletin March 2025 85ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey covering cash/digital transfers undertaken by MTOs; different channels of receiving remittances in India. and v) including two leading fintech companies Section IV details the findings of the sixth round of providing cross-border remittance services to assess the survey. Section V concludes the article with some the growing impact of digitalisation. policy suggestions. Globally, inward remittances represent the flow II. Stylised Facts of cross-border household income, arising from the World remittances are estimated to reach US$ temporary or permanent movement of people to 905 billion in 2024, with low-and middle-income foreign economies. Moreover, as defined by the countries (LMICs) receiving more than 75 per cent International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009), two items (around US$ 685 billion) [Ratha et al., 2024]. According in an economy’s balance of payments (BoP) statistics to the World Bank, India has continued to remain the relate to remittances – compensation of employees top recipient of remittances since 2008, with its share under primary income account and personal transfers in world remittances rising from around 11 per cent under secondary income account. In the case of India, in 2001 to about 14 per cent in 2024. Going forward, personal transfers, primarily comprising inward remittances to India are likely to remain elevated remittances for family maintenance from Indian and are projected to increase to around US$ 160 workers residing abroad, and local withdrawals billion in 2029 (RBI, 2024).6 Other major recipients from non-resident deposit accounts, form the major of remittances include Mexico, China, Philippines, portion of cross-border inward remittances. France, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Chart 1). While The rest of the article is organised as follows – the flow of remittances to India remained resilient Section II presents the stylised facts on global and albeit with some year-on-year contraction during the India’s inward remittances. Section III describes the pandemic year 2020-21, its resurgence since then has Chart 1: Top Remittance Receiving Countries 6 Chapter 4 - Open Economy Digitalisation: Challenges and Opportunities, Report on Currency and Finance (RCF), 2023-24, RBI. 86 RBI Bulletin March 2025 noillib $SU 130 India 120 110 100 90 80 70 Mexico 60 50 China 40 Philippines France 30 Pakistan Bangladesh 20 Germany 10 0 Note: 1. E – Estimate. 2. In the case of cross-country comparison, remittances have been considered to be the sum of compensation of employees under primary income account and personal transfers under secondary income account in BoP statistics. Source: RBI; and World Bank. 1002 2002 3002 4002 5002 6002 7002 8002 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 4102 5102 6102 7102 8102 9102 0202 1202 2202 3202 E4202Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey been driven by a recovery in employment conditions As a ratio to GDP, India’s remittances have in the advanced economies (AEs). hovered around 3 per cent of GDP since 2000, while in the case of China, the ratio has remained below 0.3 India’s stock of international migrants has per cent (Chart 2b). Philippines, on the other hand, tripled from 6.6 million in 1990 to 18.5 million in has received much higher remittances as a percentage 2024, with its share in global migrants rising from 4.3 of GDP during the last ten years. per cent to over 6 per cent during the same period.7 Indian migrants in the Gulf Cooperation Council With the increased flow of labour across countries, (GCC) countries account for around half of the total remittances have become a major source of foreign Indian migrants in the world (Chart 2a). Following earnings for many developing countries, especially the competitive edge and the penetration of Indian for small countries where they comprise a large IT services overseas at the start of the century, the share of their GDP (Ratha et al., 2024). As indicated number of skilled emigrants to AEs, especially to earlier, in the case of India, inward remittances the US, has risen significantly (Chakravorty et al., fund a significant per cent of the merchandise trade 2016; Khanna and Morales, 2023). Thus, besides deficit (Chart 3a). Further, inward remittances have GCC countries, AEs have also emerged as a major generally surpassed India’s gross inward FDI since the source of inward remittances to India over the years, beginning of the century, and has therefore, emerged reflecting the changing dynamics of India’s diaspora. as a stable source of foreign earnings (Chart 3b). As India’s working age population is expected to rise Cost of Remittances till 2048, India would be the world’s leading supplier of labour (RBI, 2024). Thus, the continuous upskilling The cost of a remittance transaction includes and reskilling of the workforce would be crucial to two elements – the fees charged at any stage of the leverage its potential. transaction and the exchange rate conversion from Chart 2: India's Migrant Stock and Inward Remittances a. Country-wise Share of India’s Migrant Stock 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024 Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). RBI Bulletin March 2025 87 noillim ni rebmuN b. Inward Remittances: Major Countries UAE USA Saudi Arabia Kuwait UK Canada Australia Oman Qatar Nepal Singapore Others World Note: Data for all countries, excluding India, are on a calendar year basis. Source: RBI; and World Bank. PDG fo tnec reP noillib $SU 14 140 12 120 10 100 8.9 8 80 6 60 3.7 4 40 3.4 2 20 1.2 0.2 0 0 India Mexico China Philippines France India's Remittances (RHS) 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 7 Department of Economic and Social Affairs Database (2024), United Nations.ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Chart 3: India’s Inward Remittances vis-à-vis Merchandise Trade Deficit and Foreign Direct Investment Flows a. Trade Deficit Financed through Remittances b. Remittances Remain Higher than FDI Inflows Source: RBI. local currency to the currency of the recipient country is not only below the world average cost, but has also (World Bank and BIS, 2007). Given the fact that inward met the initial G20 target9 reflecting the changing remittances are largely for family maintenance, dynamics of remittance costs. Moreover, India the cost of sending cross-border remittances has continues to remain one of the low-cost countries for socio-economic impact and therefore, reducing this sending US$ 200. cost has been a crucial policy agenda globally for Cash and Digital Transfers over a decade. The World Bank’s Remittance Prices The World Bank definition of digital remittances Worldwide (RPW) database monitors more than encompasses all such transactions wherein the 350 corridors to measure the progress towards the payment is made online or in self-assisted manner and sustainable development goals (SDG) target.8 The received into a transaction account (bank or non-bank global average cost of sending US$ 200 witnessed deposit taking institution), mobile money or e-money a secular decline from 9.67 per cent in Q1:2009 to account. The proliferation of digital remittances has 6.65 per cent in Q2:2024, however, it continues been rapid over the past few years especially after to be higher than both the initial G20 objective (5 the COVID-19 pandemic. The MTOs have further per cent) and SDG target (3 per cent) [World Bank, enabled digital funding and disbursement. Mobile 2024]. However, in the case of India, it is pertinent to money-enabled international remittance transfers mention that with a 4.9 per cent cost of sending US$ gained traction during the pandemic period globally, 200 in 2023, the cost of sending remittances to India and the Global System for Mobile Communications 8 The importance of low cost of remittances was reinforced with Association (GSMA) estimated that their value more its inclusion in the SDG with a target to bring down the average cost than doubled from US$ 8 billion in 2019 to US$ 17 of migrant remittances to 3 per cent or less by 2030, and to eliminate corridors where cost is higher than 5 per cent. The targeted indicator is the global average cost of sending US$ 200 (or equivalent in local sending currency) expressed as a per cent of amount sent. 88 RBI Bulletin March 2025 tnec reP noillib $SU 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Gross FDI to India Remittances 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 125 100 75 50 25 0 Trade deficit financed through remittances Average [excluding 2020-21] 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 42.2 9 The average cost of sending US$ 200 to India for Q1:2024 and Q2:2024 stood at 5.01 per cent and 5.02 per cent, respectively (World Bank, 2024).Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Chart 4: Cost of Sending Inward Remittances (US$ 200) - World vis-à-vis India 7.5 7.0 6.65 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 Sources: RPW Database (2024), World Bank. billion in 2021, and stood at US$ 29 billion in 2023 Nations (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and (GSMA, 2024). Globally, it has been observed that the Thailand) [RBI, 2025]. average cost of receiving US$ 200 through remtechs10 III. Different Channels of Transmitting Inward is significantly lower than that of the banks (RBI, Remittances to India 2024). The cost of digital remittance transfers, which accounted for 30 per cent of the total transactions in The remitting country can transfer remittances the RPW database during Q2:2024, was 5.3 per cent, to India through three channels - (i) overseas banks; 136 basis points lower than the global average cost (ii) MTOs; and (iii) fintechs (also known as remtechs (Chart 4). Similarly, the cost of digital remittances in or digital only MTOs11) [Chart 5]. The overseas India was 4.0 per cent as of Q2:2024, around 100 basis banks may either maintain a NOSTRO account points lower than the average cost of 5.0 per cent of the correspondent bank or open a VOSTRO for India, reflecting the rising role of digitalisation account with their partner bank in India. The in optimising remittance costs. This underscores the instruction to transfer remittances may be sent importance of leveraging digital public infrastructure using the Society for Worldwide Interbank in home and host countries. India has been at the Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging forefront of the efforts to enhance cross-border service or the bank’s own application programming payments with multiple bilateral arrangements interface (API). The funds received by the for interlinking India’s Unified Payments Interface correspondent bank / partner bank can be further (UPI) with other fast payment systems (FPSs) across sent to the beneficiaries’ account via various the world and its participation in Project Nexus to payment arrangements such as National Electronic facilitate multilateral linkage of FPSs of four ASEAN 11 A digital-only MTO refers to money transfer operators that send remittances through digital channels (World Bank, 2024). RBI Bulletin March 2025 89 tnec reP 2Q-6102 3Q-6102 4Q-6102 1Q-7102 2Q-7102 3Q-7102 4Q-7102 1Q-8102 2Q-8102 3Q-8102 4Q-8102 1Q-9102 2Q-9102 3Q-9102 4Q-9102 1Q-0202 2Q-0202 3Q-0202 4Q-0202 1Q-1202 2Q-1202 3Q-1202 4Q-1202 1Q-2202 2Q-2202 3Q-2202 4Q-2202 1Q-3202 2Q-3202 3Q-3202 4Q-3202 1Q-4202 2Q-4202 World Average World Digital India Average India Digital 10 Fintechs specialising in transferring remittances.ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Funds Transfer (NEFT), Immediate Payment Service transfer funds to India via two schemes – Money (IMPS) and Bharat Bill Payment System (BBPS). MTOs Transfer Service Scheme (MTSS)12 and Rupee Drawing Chart 5: Channels of Transmitting Inward Remittances to India – A Schematic Representation a. Bank Overseas Bank b. MTOs c. Fintechs Note: 1. AD-I and AD-II: Authorised Dealer- Category I and Category II, respectively; FFMC: Full-fledged Money Changer and SCB: Scheduled Commercial Bank. 2. For inter-bank transfers, NOSTRO/ VOSTRO relationships are applicable in the case of different banking jurisdictions. Domestic payment settlements may be used in the case of same banking jurisdictions. 3. Eligible non-resident entities permitted to enter into RDA as Exchange Houses (RBI, 2022b). 4. The schematic representation does not include transmission channel as envisaged under interlinking of FPSs. Source: RBI staff illustration. 90 RBI Bulletin March 2025 gnittimeR yrtnuoC India Country- Recipient NOSTRO Account In Tt re ar n-b sfa en rk CorO rev se pr ose na ds ent CorrI en sd pi oa nn dent Be An ce cofi uci na try Bank/s Bank Beneficiary Bank VOSTRO Account Money Trasfer Service Scheme (MTSS) MTOs Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) gnittimeR yrtnuoC India Country- Recipient Indian Agents Cash (AD-I, AD-II, FFMC, Disbursement to SCB, Dept. of Posts) the Beneficiary Indian Sub-agents NEFT RTGS Beneficiary Account at Own Bank / IMPS Recipient Bank other than Own Bank (Received through BBPS NEFT/ RTGS) VOSTRO Account with Partner Bank (AD Cat-1) Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) Fintechs gnittimeR yrtnuoC India Country- Recipient NEFT Beneficiary Account at VOSTRO RTGS Own Bank / Recipient Account with IMPS Bank other than own Partner Bank bank (Received BBPS through NEFT/ RTGS) 12 MTSS permits only personal remittances, with a cap of US$ 2,500 per transaction and 30 remittances per beneficiary annually. Transfers for trade, property purchases, investments, or charitable donations are prohibited. It involves tie-ups between overseas money transfer companies (overseas principals) and domestic entities (Indian agents) authorised by the RBI under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Arrangement (RDA)13, while fintechs14 can operate Table 1: Source Country-wise Share in India’s only through the RDA channel.15 Inward Remittances (Banks) IV. India’s Inward Remittances: Insights from the Source Country 2016-17 2020-21 2023-24 United States 22.9 23.4 27.7 Sixth Round of the Survey United Arab Emirates 26.9 18.0 19.2 The sixth round of the survey on inward United Kingdom 3.0 6.8 10.8 remittances16 for 2023-24 covered 30 AD banks Saudi Arabia 11.6 5.1 6.7 Singapore 5.5 2.4 6.6 (capturing around 99 per cent of the value of total Kuwait 6.5 1.5 3.9 inward remittances reported under the purpose of Qatar – 5.7 4.1 family maintenance and savings), two major MTOs, Canada 3.0 1.6 3.8 Oman 1.0 0.6 2.5 and two fintech companies operating in cross-border Australia – – 2.3 remittance business. With the growing digitalisation Bahrain 0.7 0.7 1.5 of remittances, technological innovation is changing Hong Kong - - 1.3 Germany 0.6 0.6 1.0 the landscape of how remittances are transferred or Belgium 0.9 1.1 0.4 received. Malaysia – – 0.6 New Zealand 2.3 0.7 0.5 Source of Remittances Ireland – – 0.4 Netherlands – – 0.5 The results of the survey highlight the gradual Japan – – 0.3 shift in dominance of India’s remittances from the Switzerland – – 0.4 GCC countries to the AEs particularly the US, the France 0.1 0.1 0.2 Italy – – 0.1 UK, Singapore, Canada and Australia which together Indonesia – – 0.2 accounted for more than half of the remittances Thailand – – 0.2 in 2023-24. The share of the US in India’s total South Africa – – 0.1 Spain – – 0.1 remittances remained largest, rising to 27.7 per cent Others 14.8 31.6 4.4 Note: For 2023-24, shares are derived based on two major components of 13 RDA enables cross-border remittances through tie-ups between AD inward remittances – (a) transfers for family maintenance and savings; Category-I banks in India and non-resident exchange houses through their (b) local withdrawals from non-resident deposit accounts. Rupee Vostro accounts in Gulf countries, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia Source: Data for 2016-17 and 2020-21 are sourced from the RBI’s remittance (for Malaysia only under Speed Remittance Procedure) and all other surveys - RBI (2018) and RBI (2022a), respectively. countries which are Financial Action Task Force (FATF) compliant (only under Speed Remittance Procedure). While such non-resident exchange in 2023-24 from 23.4 per cent in 2020-21 (Table 1), houses could be fintechs too as per their classification in the remitting jurisdiction, fintechs as a specific category is not envisaged in the RDA reflecting a steady recovery in the US job market. In scheme. RDA allows private remittances between individuals, with limited the US labour force, the percentage rise in the foreign- provisions for trade-related transactions capped at ₹15 lakh. Unlike MTSS, RDA has no limit on the amount or frequency of personal remittances and born workers stood at 6.3 per cent in 2022 from 0.7 is exclusively for inward transfers. per cent in the pre-pandemic year of 2019; however, 14 Fintechs that hold valid licenses issued by the local monetary/ in the case of native-born workers the share largely supervisory authority concerned and have necessary authority/license to transact currency exchange/money transfer business. remained unchanged at 1.0 per cent.17 Furthermore, 15 More recently, the RBI is also exploring the interlinking of FPSs. For 78 per cent Indian migrants in the US are employed in example, the UPI-PayNow linkage is a pertinent example of how Singapore and India have leveraged the open banking APIs to allow account holders of high earning sectors such as management, business, participating financial institutions in the respective countries to conduct science, and arts occupations (Greene and Batalova, seamless transactions using their individual FPSs. (RBI, 2024). 16 The details of the compilation methodology of inward remittances of top remittance receiving emerging economies along with their remittances 17 Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor. Foreign-Born surveys, if any, are mentioned in Annex Table A1. Workers: Labor Force Characteristics. RBI Bulletin March 2025 91ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey 2024).18 The share of inward remittances received Table 2: State-wise/UT-wise Share of India’s from the UK has also increased to 10.8 per cent in Inward Remittances 2023-24 2023-24 from 6.8 per cent in 2020-21, which may be Destination State 2016-17 2020-21 2023-24 attributed to the ‘Migration and Mobility Partnership’ Maharashtra 16.7 35.2 20.5 (May 2021) between India and the UK.19 The number Kerala 19.0 10.2 19.7 Tamil Nadu 8.0 9.7 10.4 of Indians emigrating to the UK every year has more Telangana – – 8.1 than tripled from 76,000 as on end-2020 to about Karnataka 15.0 5.2 7.7 Andhra Pradesh 4.0 4.4 4.4 250,000 as on end-2023, of which about half were Delhi NCT 5.9 9.3 4.3 for work-related purpose.20 There was also a notable Punjab 1.7 3.0 4.2 Gujarat 2.1 3.2 3.9 uptick in the share of remittances from Singapore Uttar Pradesh 3.1 3.7 3.0 (6.6 per cent), Canada (3.8 per cent) and Australia (2.3 Haryana 0.8 1.2 2.9 West Bengal 2.7 1.4 2.3 per cent) in 2023-24, when compared especially with Rajasthan 1.2 1.2 1.5 the pandemic year (2020-21). In recent years, Canada Bihar 1.3 1.4 1.3 Uttarakhand 0.2 0.7 1.1 continues to remain a preferred destination for Goa 0.8 1.1 0.9 Indian students pursuing higher education abroad. Madhya Pradesh 0.4 0.5 0.9 As on January 2024, out of a total of 13.4 lakh Indian Odisha 0.4 0.5 0.6 Jharkhand 0.3 1.9 0.4 students studying abroad, the share of students Jammu and Kashmir 0.2 0.3 0.4 studying in Canada stood at 32.0 per cent followed Chandigarh 0.2 0.4 0.4 Puducherry 0.2 0.2 0.3 by the US (25.3 per cent), the UK (13.9 per cent) and Himachal Pradesh 0.1 0.1 0.2 Australia (9.2 per cent).21 Assam 0.1 0.2 0.2 Chhattisgarh 0.1 0.3 0.1 United Arab Emirates (UAE) maintained its Dadra & Nagar Haveli – 0.1 0.08 and Daman & Diu position as the second largest source of India’s Tripura – 1.1 0.04 remittances, with its share increasing from 18 per Manipur – – 0.03 Meghalaya – – 0.03 cent in 2020-21 to 19.2 per cent in 2023-24. UAE is Mizoram – – 0.03 the largest hub for Indian migrant workers engaged Ladakh – – 0.02 Sikkim – – 0.02 primarily in blue-collar jobs which are dominated by Nagaland – – 0.02 the construction industry followed by healthcare, Lakshwadeep – – 0.01 Arunachal Pradesh – 0.1 0.01 hospitality, and tourism industry.22 This is in stark Andaman & Nicobar – – 0.01 contrast to the US where Indian migrants are mainly Note: (i) For 2023-24, shares are derived based on two major components employed in the white-collar jobs, thus explaining of inward remittances – (a) transfers for family maintenance and savings; (b) local withdrawals from non-resident deposit ac- counts. 18 https://datausa.io/profile/soc/management-business-science-arts- (ii) In 2023-24, the data for all States/UTs are presented which were occupations otherwise classified under the ‘Others’ category in previous 19 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-india-agree-partnership-to- rounds of the survey. boost-work-visas-for-indian-nationals Source: Data for 2016-17 and 2020-21 are sourced from RBI (2018) and RBI 20 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ (2022a), respectively. populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/ the higher remittances received from US despite the longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingdecember2023 21 Data available from the Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No-894, Ministry lower number of migrants as compared to the UAE. of External Affairs, Government of India. The GCC countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 22 https://www.news18.com/business/indian-migrant-workers-middle- east-uae-saudi-arabia-oman-kuwait-jobs-8945228.html Oman and Bahrain) together contributed 38 per cent 92 RBI Bulletin March 2025Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey to total remittances received by India in 2023-24, opportunities, which is reflected in the increasing higher than its share recorded in 2020-21 (COVID-19 share of these states in India’s inward remittances. pandemic year).23 Lower remittances from the GCC The Kerala Migration Survey highlights that there was region during the pandemic year was due to the a considerable rise in the number of students among mass return of contractual migrant workers from the the total emigrants from Kerala in 2023, reflecting region back to India. a rising trend of younger individuals migrating overseas, especially for educational purpose (Rajan, Destination of Remittances 2024). Additionally, the report suggests that there has Turning to State-wise/Union Territory (UT)-wise been a significant shift in student migration patterns, destinations of remittances in 2023-24, Maharashtra with a growing preference for non-GCC countries as received the largest share of 20.5 per cent, albeit destinations. Tamil Nadu and Karnataka also send a lower than 2020-21 (35.2 per cent) [Table 2].24 Kerala large number of students and workers abroad. followed closely with its share increasing to 19.7 Remittances: Mode and Size per cent from about 10 per cent during the same period, followed by Tamil Nadu (10.4 per cent), As described in Section III, banks may receive Telangana (8.1 per cent), and Karnataka (7.7 per cent). remittances through different modes, among which Maharashtra, Telangana and Punjab accounted for the the RDA channel has the highest share, followed by largest number of Indian students migrating abroad direct Vostro transfers by overseas banks and the RDA for education and staying back for employment channel operated by fintechs (Chart 6a). The choice Chart 6: Mode-wise and Size-wise Distribution of India’s Inward Remittances during 2023-24 a. Mode-wise Distribution b. Size-wise Distribution 60 54.8 < ₹16,500 (~US$ 200) 50 ₹16,500 - 40 ₹50,000 30 ₹50,000 - 22.1 ₹1,00,000 20 17.8 ₹1,00,000 - ₹3,00,000 10 5.2 ₹3,00,000 - 0 ₹5,00,000 > ₹5,00,000 Source: RBI. RBI Bulletin March 2025 93 tnec reP ADR )sesuoH egnahcxE( ortsoV RNI ADR )hcetniF( TFIWS )YCF( 40.6 4.6 31.4 15.6 14.5 15.7 10.7 26.3 1.5 9.2 1.4 28.6 0 10 20 30 40 50 Share by Count Share by Value 23 Considering the common set of source countries across the surveys, AEs comprised 51.0 per cent of India’s inward remittances, while the share of GCC countries stood at 33.7 per cent in 2023-24. 24 Owing to the pandemic-led reverse migration to India, the share of the traditional remittance recipient states largely dependent on the GCC countries, such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, almost halved in 2020-21, thereby causing a distributional shift in the state-wise share in remittances (RBI, 2022a).ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey of channel used by the sender depends on various Cost of Inward Remittance factors including the penetration of formal banking As per the latest round of survey, it is found channels, charges and speed of delivery (IMF, 2009). that the cost varies widely depending on the mode Another important factor is the implicit cost in the of transfer and the size of remittance (Chart 7). The form of difference in exchange rates. In terms of weighted average cost of inward remittance to India value (size) of transactions, remittances amounting to stood at 4.6 per cent for transaction size of less than more than ₹5 lakhs had the highest share of around US$ 200 and 2.4 per cent for US$ 200-500 transaction 29 per cent in 2023-24 (Chart 6b). Conversely, the brackets. The weighted average cost of remittance highest number of transactions were in the category for amounts less than US$ 200 was highest amongst of remittances size of less than US$ 200 and the share all the transaction brackets recorded in the survey. of larger remittances followed a decreasing trend Furthermore, within the brackets, the cost was thereon. Since the highest number of remittances are highest for foreign currency transactions through sent in lower values, the SDG goal of bringing down correspondent banks’ Nostro accounts, followed by the average cost of sending US$ 200 to 3 per cent or INR transactions through Vostro accounts. The cost of less by 2030 is critical. remittances was the lowest through RDA (MTOs and Chart 7: Mode-wise and Size-wise Total Cost of India's Inward Remittances < ₹16,500 (US$ 200) ₹ 16,500 to ₹50,000 ₹ 50,0000 to ₹ 1 lakh 0 2 4 68 1 0 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 SWIFT (FCY) 11.9 6.3 3.1 INR Vostro (Banks) 10.6 5.3 2.4 RDA (Exchange Houses) 2.6 1.4 0.7 RDA (Fintech) 1.0 0.7 0.5 Weighted Cost 4.6 2.4 1.1 ₹1 lakh to ₹ 3 lakh ₹3lakhto₹5lakh >₹5lakh 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 68 1 0 12 SWIFT (FCY) 1.2 0.6 0.6 INR Vostro (Banks) 1.0 0.5 0.5 RDA (Exchange Houses) 0.3 0.1 0.1 RDA (Fintech) 0.4 0.3 0.3 Weighted Cost 0.5 0.3 0.3 Note: 1. Figures represent total cost as per cent of the total value of transactions. 2. Weighted average is calculated using the shares of mode of transfer as weights for each bracket. Source:RBI. 94 RBI Bulletin March 2025Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Chart 8: Cash-Digital Share of Remittances (MTOs) Saudi Arabia 7.3 92.7 Australia 10.5 89.5 Qatar 23.8 76.2 United Arab Emirates 23.9 76.1 Average 26.5 73.5 United States 31 69 United Kingdom 34.8 65.2 Kuwait 36.8 63.2 New Zealand 37.7 62.3 Germany 44.9 55.1 Canada 60 40 Italy 65 35 0 20 40 60 80 100 Per cent Cash Digital Source: RBI. fintechs), irrespective of the size of the remittance. from the GCC countries as the pre-dominant source The weighted average cost of remittance drops as the economies to the advanced economies. State-wise amount of remittance increases on account of lower data revealed that Maharashtra remained the largest fixed costs as a ratio to total cost. Fintech companies recipient, followed by Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana are found to offer affordable cross-border remittance and Karnataka. Furthermore, the RDA channel services, thereby fostering competition among dominated the mode of transfer for banks. The cost different remittance service providers. of sending remittances varies widely depending on the mode of transfer and the transaction amount. It The current survey round also included the was found that the weighted average cost of sending share of digital remittance transactions of MTOs, remittances for amounts less than US$ 200 was the and it was found that, on an average, 73.5 per cent highest amongst all the transaction brackets recorded of total remittances were received through the digital in the survey. Importantly, on an average, 73.5 per mode during 2023-24 (Chart 8). The highest digital cent of total remittances received by the MTOs were share of transactions was observed for remittances through digital mode during 2023-24. This, alongside received from Saudi Arabia (92.7 per cent), followed the lower cost of digital remittances vis-à-vis cash by Australia (89.5 per cent), Qatar (76.2 per cent) and remittances, reflects the significance of the rising UAE (76.1 per cent). penetration of digital infrastructure globally in the IV. C onclusion remittance landscape. Moreover, the interlinking of India’s remittances displayed a resurgence during cross-border fast payment systems may increase the the post-pandemic period, thereby providing a stable ease and efficiency of such transactions. Although source of external financing. The results of the sixth India’s performance with regard to the reduction round of the survey on India’s remittances for 2023-24 in the cost of sending remittances is encouraging, highlight the changing dynamics of India’s diaspora achieving the SDG target would require an integrated RBI Bulletin March 2025 95ARTICLE Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey policy focus on leveraging India’s digital public Ratha, D., Plaza, S., and Kim, E. J. (2024). In 2024, infrastructure. Additionally, in order to leverage remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries the potential of the changing dynamics of Indian are expected to reach $685 billion, larger than FDI diaspora, there is a need for a continuous up-skilling and ODA combined. World Bank Blogs, December 18. and re-skilling of the growing Indian workforce. RBI. (2018). Globalising People: India’s Inward Remittances. RBI Bulletin (November). References RBI. (2022a). Headwinds of COVID-19 and India’s Chakravorty, S., Kapur, D. and Singh, N. (2016). The Inward Remittances. RBI Bulletin (July). Other One Percent: Indian’s in America. Oxford University Press. RBI. (2022b). Master Direction - Opening and Maintenance of Rupee / Foreign Currency Vostro Greene, M. and Batalova, J. (2024). Indian Immigrants Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses (updated in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. as on December 22, 2022). GSMA. (2024). The State of the Industry Report on RBI (2024). Report on Currency and Finance (RCF) Mobile Money 2024. 2023-24: India’s Digital Revolution. IMF. (2009). International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users. RBI. (2025). Payment Systems Report. International Monetary Fund. World Bank. (2024). Remittance Prices Worldwide: Khanna, G., and Morales, N. (2023). Did US Issue 50 (June). Immigration Policy Influence India’s IT Boom? World Bank and BIS (Committee on Payment and Economic Brief, No. 23-42. Federal Reserve Bank of Settlement Systems). (2007). General principles Richmond. for international remittance services. Bank for Rajan, S.I. (2024). Kerala Migration Survey 2023. International Settlements. Kerala Economy. Vol. 5, No. 3, pp 1-13. 96 RBI Bulletin March 2025Changing Dynamics of India’s Remittances – Insights from the ARTICLE Sixth Round of India’s Remittances Survey Annex Annex Table A1: Compilation Methodology of Inward Remittances - Top Six Remittances Receiving Emerging Economies Sl. Country Compilation Methodology of Inward Latest Remittance Survey/Details No Remittances 1 India Remittance figures for compilation of https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=21141 Balance of Payments are captured by the Bank through its International Transaction Reporting System (ITRS) called Foreign Exchange Transaction reporting System (FETERS). 2 Mexico Banco de México in 2012 has made https://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do?accion= it mandatory for the firms (financial consultarCuadro&idCuadro=CE81&locale=en institutions and money transfer entities) involved in the business of personal money transfers to submit a set of monthly reports for the compilation of data on remittances. 3 China The State Administration of Foreign Exchange https://dsbb.imf.org/sdds/dqaf-base/country/CHN/category/BOP00 (SAFE) compiles China’s remittances as a part of the balance of payments data based on the methodology and standards outlined in the Balance of Payments Manual (BPM) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 4 Philippines Remittances which are part of Secondary https://psa.gov.ph/statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-filipinos Income in the Balance of Payments is captured through ITRS and complemented by the Cross-border Transactions Survey (CBTS). 5 Pakistan The Statistics and Data Warehouse https://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/stats/AdvanceNotice.pdf Department of the State Bank of Pakistan https://easydata.sbp.org.pk/apex/f?p=10:211:18595026959410::NO:RP:P211_DATASET_ (SBP) compiles and disseminates data on TYPE_CODE,P211_PAGE_ID:TS_GP_BOP_WR_M,210&cs=1F743692A58FE97CD79141 Workers’ Remittances on a monthly basis. 7EFAE146503 The data are collected from banks, exchange companies and Pakistan Post Office. 6 Bangladesh Remittance figures for compilation of https://www.bb.org.bd/en/index.php/econdata/wageremitance Balance of Payments are captured by the Bank through its International Transaction Reporting System (ITRS). Source: RBI; IMF SDSS; and central bank websites. RBI Bulletin March 2025 97Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: ARTICLE A LMDI Decomposition Analysis Decoupling Economic Growth contributions (NDCs) every five years delineating their climate action plans in the short to medium term from Emissions: A LMDI horizon. Central to most NDCs is reducing emissions Decomposition Analysis intensity, aiming to decouple economic growth from carbon emissions without compromising growth. by Madhuresh Kumar, Shobhit Goel, The falling prices of renewables have sparked Manu Sharma and Muskan Garg^ a hope that this transition towards net zero could turn out to be much less painful than previously imagined. Yet, despite the fervent focus on renewable This article analyses the factors driving India’s deployment; the solar, wind and other renewables CO2 emissions growth from 2012 to 2022 using LMDI (excluding large hydro and nuclear) currently account decomposition. During this time, energy-related CO2 for a mere 2.1 per cent of India’s total primary energy emissions increased by 706 million tons. The main consumption (Energy Statistics, 2024). Outside of the contributor was economic growth (+1073 Mt), with a power sector, the direct use of renewables is virtually smaller impact from the change in fuel mix of the economy non-existent, and the indirect use through green (+78 Mt). However, gains in energy efficiency (-399 hydrogen, particularly in manufacturing, remains in Mt), structural changes (-15 Mt), and improvements its infancy and will require time to mature. While in emission intensity of electricity due to increased use the deployment of renewables will play a crucial role of renewables (-30 Mt) helped curb emissions. India’s going forward, global economies have historically energy efficiency improved by 1.9 percent annually, achieved decoupling by improving energy efficiency exceeding the global average. Additionally, India’s and shifting from dirtier fuels like coal to cleaner growth decoupled from emissions, with a decoupling alternatives such as natural gas. Additionally, many elasticity of 0.59, comparable to other lower-middle- countries, especially advanced economies, have income countries. transitioned from emission-intensive manufacturing Introduction to less emission-intensive service sectors. The mounting body of scientific evidence on In its updated NDC, India has committed to climate change has catalysed a global discourse significantly decouple emission from growth by reshaping policies, economies, and societies. The reducing the emission intensity of its GDP by 45 percent mitigating actions against climate change have by 2030, from 2005 level (UNFCCC, 2022). Against this accelerated in recent years with the world pivoting background, this paper aims to examine the drivers of away from fossil fuels. More than 140 countries emission growth in India during the last decade and covering 90 per cent of global emissions have pledged ascertain the decoupling elasticity that India achieved net zero along with thousands of companies, cities during the period. Structural Decomposition Analysis and financial institutions (United Nations, 2023). (SDA) and Index Decomposition Analysis (IDA) are Notwithstanding, the long-term goals of reaching net two widely used methods for examining the factors zero, the countries update their nationally determined influencing CO2 emissions. SDA, which is rooted in input-output analysis, breaks down changes in ^ Madhuresh Kumar is Assistant General Manager in the Department of Economic and Policy Research. Shobhit Goel and Manu Sharma are from emissions into contributions from various economic the Department of Supervision. Muskan Garg has worked as an intern in the Department of Economic Policy and Research. The views expressed in sectors, allowing for a detailed examination of the this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the structural changes in the economy (Miller and Blair, Reserve Bank of India. RBI Bulletin March 2025 99ARTICLE Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis 2009). IDA, on the other hand, uses index number II. Literature Review theory to decompose changes in emissions into Index decomposition analysis (IDA) is a critical factors such as energy intensity, economic activity, tool in energy and environmental economics, used to and energy mix. It is particularly valued for its decompose changes in energy consumption, carbon simplicity and ease of application in policy analysis emissions, or other aggregate indicators into their (Ang and Zhang, 2000). In this paper, the increase in contributing factors. Over the years, various methods CO2 emissions during 2012-22 has been decomposed have been developed and refined to improve the using logarithmic mean divisia index (LMDI) which is accuracy and reliability of these decompositions. a part of the IDA method of decomposition. Emissions The earliest methods for decomposition analysis, growth has been decomposed into five factors viz., including methods like the Laspeyres index, were output effect, structural effect, energy intensity effect, limited by their inability to avoid residual terms, fuel mix effect and emission factor effect. Although which could complicate interpretation and lead to global research on LMDI decomposition has expanded inaccuracies (Ang and Zhang, 2000). The refined significantly, and India has been included in numerous Laspeyres index approaches, such as the Fisher ideal cross-country studies, there remains a notable lack of index and the Shapley and Sun approach, provide literature specifically focused on LMDI decomposition complete decomposition, resulting in more accurate for the Indian economy. It is important to approach final outcomes. The Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index the results of cross-country studies cautiously, as the (LMDI) and the Arithmetic Mean Divisia Index data used are often not fully homogeneous or directly (AMDI) are key methods within the Divisia index comparable, and many lack access to more granular, family. Ang (2004) outlines four tests from index detailed datasets. This paper tries to fill this gap in number theory—factor-reversal, time-reversal, literature using the latest data sourced from energy proportionality, and aggregation— to evaluate the statistics of India published by MoSPI. suitability of a decomposition method. Among these, the factor-reversal test is most critical when The rest of the article is organised in five sections. selecting an appropriate method. Table 1 presents the Section II covers the literature review while data and properties of various decomposition methods. methodology are described in section III. Sections IV and V discuss the empirical results and decoupling The factor-reversal test ensures a complete analysis, respectively. Concluding remarks are set out decomposition with no unexplained residue. The in the last section. time-reversal test indicates that reversing the Table 1: Properties of IDA methods IDA method Factor reversal Time reversal Proportionality Aggregation Zero value Negative value test test test test robust robust Laspeyres No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Modified Fisher decomposition Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Shapley and Sun Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes AMDI No Yes Yes No No No LMDI Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Note: The LMDI referenced here pertains to the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Method I (LMDI I). A related variant, LMDI II, features a slightly more complex weighting scheme compared to LMDI I (Ang et al., 2003). Source: Ang (2004). 100 RBI Bulletin March 2025Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: ARTICLE A LMDI Decomposition Analysis time period should yield reciprocal results. The (2016); Kangyin et al. (2019); Henriques and Kander proportionality test implies that if the determinants (2010); Inglesi-Lotz (2018); Kanitkar et al. (2015); Lima change by a factor of , the index value will also et al. (2017); Marcucci and Fragkos (2015); Solaymani change by . Consistency in aggregation means that (2019) and Voigt et al. (2014)). However, caution λ results obtained for sub-groups can be aggregated to a is needed when interpreting the findings of these λ higher level consistently (Vartia 1976, Balk 1996, Ang studies, as the data used are not fully homogeneous 2000). Additionally, the zero-value robust test (Ang or directly comparable. Moreover, many of these and Choi, 1997) and the negative-value robust test studies lack access to more detailed, granular data. (Chung and Rhee, 2001) are used to determine the Surprisingly studies pertaining to Indian most appropriate decomposition method. economy using LMDI decomposition analysis is very LMDI decomposition passes most tests except few. G. Ortega-Ruiz et al., (2018) using LMDI have the negative value robust test. However, in our found that the economic growth of India has been the dataset there are no negative values and hence LMDI dominating driving force contributing to the increase has been used in this study for decomposition. in CO2 emissions, while the improvement in energy The number of terms in the Shapley/Sun method intensity has been the major factor in reducing the formulation increases significantly as the number emissions. The time period of the study spans from of factors grows, making it difficult to implement. 1990-2015 and uses data from International Energy Consequently, LMDI is more commonly used for Agency, the United States Environmental Protection decomposition if there are more than three factors Agency and the International Agency for Atomic (Ang, 2004). Energy. Das and Roy (2020) also used LMDI technique to decompose the drivers of CO2 emissions for Indian The literature on LMDI decomposition has economy using energy data from energy statistics proliferated after the seminal paper by Ang et al., published by MoSPI. Their study spanned from 1990- (1998) which laid the groundwork for the application 2013. However, during that period the renewables of the LMDI method in energy-related carbon deployment in India was in its infancy and therefore emissions analysis. The authors applied the LMDI couldn’t capture the effects of rapid renewables method to decompose changes in carbon emissions deployment which picked up post 2015 in India. in Singapore and found that energy intensity was III. Data and Methodology the main driver of carbon emissions reduction, while economic activity contributed to the increase in III.1 Data emissions. Several other studies also observed this For the purpose of present study, the economy general trend with improvements in energy intensity has been broadly classified into primary sector being the primary driver of emission reduction (Zhang (agriculture, forestry and fishing), secondary sector et al., (2009); Wang et al., (2005); Li et al., (2018); (Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, Electricity, Matisoff and Edwards (2014); Raupach et al., (2007); gas, water supply and other utility services and Nag and Parikh (2000); Vazhayil and Balasubramanian construction) and the rest of the economic activities (2019); Azevedo et al., (2011); Achour and Belloumi have been clubbed as Tertiary sector. MoSPI publishes (2016); Román-Collado and Colinet (2018)). energy statistics of India annually which provides India has been featured in several cross-country fuel wise sectoral final energy consumption. The studies (Andreoni and Galmarini (2016); Shuang et al. sectoral emissions have been estimated from energy RBI Bulletin March 2025 101ARTICLE Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis Table 2: Emission Factor of Fuels Table 3: Decomposition of CO2 Emissions Fuel Emission Factor (Kg of CO2 per Kwh) Decomposed Description component Coal 0.323 Output effect The variation in energy-related CO2 emissions Oil Products 0.25 attributable to changes in the scale of economic Natural Gas 0.2106 activity. Electricity 0.741 (2012); 0.739 (2017); 0.713 (2022) Structural effect The change in emissions explained by shifts in the Source: US EPA; and Our world in data. structure of the economy, specifically the change in the individual sector’s share of contribution in overall GDP. consumption using emission intensities of fuel1. Energy intensity The change in emissions due to variations in energy Emission factor per type of fuel is taken from the effect intensity within individual sectors is defined as the energy consumed per unit of GVA output. This US EPA (2019) which is assumed to represent long- change reflects enhancements in production and term average values (Table 2). The emission factor for consumption efficiency or the adoption of more advanced capital equipment. grid electricity has been obtained from our world in Fuel mix effect The change in emissions that can be attributed to the data. CO2 emissions are calculated using the simple changes in the fuel composition. formula: Emission factor The change in emissions that can be attributed to the effect changes in the emission factor or carbon intensity of fuel. (3.1) where, = CO2 emissions for fuel type j and sector (3.2) i in time period t, Where C is the total CO emissions and is the 2 = Energy consumption for fuel type j and sector CO emissions emanating from consumption of fuel 2 i in time period t, j by sector i; denotes the output effect; is the structural effect; is the energy = Emission factor for fuel type j in time period t. intensity effect; is the energy consumption from The timeframe for this study spans from 2012- fuel j in sector i, where is the total energy 13 to 2022-23. The focus is solely on energy-related consumed by sector i from all fuels; the fuel-mix emissions, with process emissions being excluded variable is given by and the CO emission from consideration. 2 factor by . III.2 Methodology C C C C C C C C (3.3) tot T out str int mix emf According to energy identity analysis, CO2 0 emissions can be attributed to five factors: the output Δ T=h e s–u bs =cr Δipts i+n dΔicat +e Δoutp +u tΔ effe +ct ,Δ structural effect, structural effect, energy intensity effect, fuel- effect, energy intensity effect, fuel mix effect and mix effect, and emission-factor effect (Ang, 2003) emission factor effect. The LMDI formulae for these (Table 3). effects are: The overall emissions are further broken down by (3.4) economic sectors and fuel types. The decomposition identity can be represented as follows: (3.5) 1 This approach ensures that scope 1 and scope 2 emissions of the sectors are accounted for while avoiding the risks of double counting. Scope 3 (3.6) emissions are excluded to prevent the occurrence of multiple counting of emissions. 102 RBI Bulletin March 2025Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: ARTICLE A LMDI Decomposition Analysis study, we are interested in income elasticity of CO2 (3.7) emissions which is defined as follows: (3.8) Elasticity = (Percentage Change in CO2 Emissions)/ (Percentage Change in GDP) (3.9) In the calculations, it is assumed that the Based on the elasticity coefficient, the Tapio emission factors of fuels do not change, except for model categorises the relationship into nine states electricity. Since electricity is a secondary energy (Table 4). source, its emission factor changes over time due to IV. Empirical Results variations in its fuel mix and technical parameters. Total energy related emissions increased by 706 Since LMDI method relies on logarithmic million tons during the period 2012-13 to 2022-23. functions, it cannot handle zero values. However, this issue can be resolved by substituting very small The LMDI decomposition shows that total change positive numbers (e.g., 10^-20) for zeros. Ang and in CO2 emission can be decomposed into a positive Choi (1997) have demonstrated that LMDI tends to output effect (+1073 mt) and fuel mix effect (+78 converge when small positive numbers replace zero mt), which is partially offset by a negative energy values in the dataset. Another limitation of LMDI is intensity effect (–399 mt)2. The structural (–15 mt) its inability to process negative values. However, in and emission factor effects (-30 mt) were slightly our dataset, no negative values are present. negative (Chart 1a). We break down the 10-year long period into two equal sub-periods 2012-17 and 2017- III.3 Decoupling Analysis 22 to investigate the individual effects. We observe Tapio decoupling analysis is a method used similar trends that output effect is driving the to assess how changes in economic performance emissions while improvements in energy intensity and environmental impact are related, focusing has been mitigating the rise in emissions (Chart 1b particularly on the decoupling of economic growth and c). from carbon emissions. It helps to understand if an economy is growing while simultaneously reducing We have also decomposed the sector wise changes its environmental footprint. In the context of present in CO2 emissions into four factors viz., Output effect, Table 4: Tapio Decoupling Analysis Percentage Change in CO2 Percentage Change in Decoupling Elasticity (e) Decoupling Status Emissions GDP < 0 > 0 e < 0 SD (Strong Decoupling) > 0 > 0 e = 0 WD (Weak Decoupling) < 0 < 0 0.8 ≤ e < 1.2 RC (Recessive Coupling) > 0 > 0 e > 1.2 END (Expansive Negative Decoupling) > 0 < 0 e < 0 SND (Strong Negative Decoupling) < 0 < 0 0 < e ≤ 0.8 WND (Weak Negative Decoupling) > 0 > 0 0.8 ≤ e < 1 ED (Expansive Decoupling) > 0 > 0 e = 1 EC (Expansive Coupling) < 0 < 0 e > 1.2 RD (Recessive Decoupling) 2 The results of the LMDI decomposition could be interpreted as ceteris paribus effects. RBI Bulletin March 2025 103ARTICLE Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis Chart 1: Additive Decomposition of CO2 Emissions a. Period 2012-2022 b. Period 2012-2017 c. Period 2017-2022 1200 1,073 1000 800 706 600 400 200 78 0 -15 -30 -200 -400 -399 -600 Total OutputStructural EI Fuel EF CO2 Effect Effect effect Mix Effect Change effect Source: Authors' calculations. energy intensity effect, fuel mix and emission factor align with the vast body of research, which indicates effects to investigate the dynamics within the sectors that output growth plays a significant role in driving (Chart 2). increased energy consumption and CO2 emissions. In the 2012-2017 period, the absolute magnitude IV.1 Output Effect of output effect was larger than the latter period as The Output effect denotes the increase in energy- India grew much more rapidly during this period as related CO2 emissions attributable to changes in the compared to the second half which was plagued by scale of economic activity. The findings of this study COVID-19. At the sectoral level, only agriculture saw 104 RBI Bulletin March 2025 )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC 700 631 500 457 600 400 461 500 300 245 400 200 300 200 100 61 100 0 6 21 0 -25 -33 -100 -2 -100 -200 -200 -196 -216 -300 -300 CT hCo aOt na 2 gl e O Eu fft ep cu tt Str Eu ffc etu ctral efE feI ct eF M fu feie x cl t EfE feF ct CT hCo aOt na 2 gl eO Eu fft ep cu ttStr Eu ffc etu ctral efE feI cteF M fu feie x cl tEfE feF ct Million Tonnes Million Tonnes Million Tonnes Chart 2: Sector wise Decomposition of CO2 Emissions a. Primary Sector b. Secondary Sector c. Tertiary Sector )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC )snot noillim( snoissimE 2OC 70 700 600 60 56 60 600 575 500 473 500 50 400 400 366 40 38 315 333 34 300 300 279 217 231 30 24 21 200 200 197 204 20 100 84 128 24 37 12 0 100 10 7 4 23 -100 -9 -17-1 -18 0 3622 15 0 0 -200 -126 -151 -100 -66 -150-18 -10 -7 -7 -8 -300 -267 -96 -20 -400 -200 -161 Cout Cint Cfm Cef Total Cout Cint Cfm Cef Total Cout Cint Cfm Cef Total Change Change Change P 2012-22 P 2012-17 P 2017-22 S 2012-22 S 2012-17 S 2017-22 T 2012-22 T 2012-17 T 2017-22 Source: Authors' calculations.Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: ARTICLE A LMDI Decomposition Analysis a rise in its output effect in the 2017-22 period as it Table 5: Trend of Energy Efficiency was less affected by COVID-19 than the rest of the Region Improvement Region Improvement sectors. in Energy in Energy Efficiency Efficiency [2000 - 2023 [2000 - 2023 IV.2 Structural Effect (%/year)] (%/year)] The share of the tertiary sector has grown during World 1.35 Germany 2.38 OECD 1.91 United States 2.10 this period, reducing the shares of both primary and G7 1.91 China 1.81 secondary sectors. While the decline in the emission- BRICS 1.62 India 1.86 intensive secondary sector would typically lead to European Union 2.13 Australia 1.92 a negative structural effect, this was offset by the North America 2.00 Vietnam 0.37 decreasing share of the primary sector, which is the Latin America 0.67 United Kingdom 3.22 least emission-intensive. As a result, only a minor Sources: World bank; Ourworldindata; and Authors’ calculations. negative structural effect was observed overall. the total emissions during that time, compared to 42 percent in the previous period. During 2012-22, IV.3 Energy Intensity Effect India’s energy efficiency improved with a CAGR of The energy intensity (EI) effect alone contributed 1.67 percent for primary energy3 and 2.15 percent for to a reduction of 399 MT of CO2 emissions, accounting final energy consumption which is broadly in line for 56 percent of the total 706 MT emissions between with its long-term average of 1.9 per cent (Chart 3). 2012 and 2022. This effect was particularly significant The energy efficiency of India has been improving at during the 2017-22 period, where it resulted in a a higher rate than that of the world average during reduction of 216 MT, representing 88 percent of 2000-23 (Table 5). Chart 3: Energy Intensity Trends a. India b. Sector wise Energy Intensity Note: GDP for various years is reported at 2011-12 prices. Sources: Authors’ Calculation use; and Energy Statistics of India. 3 Primary energy refers to energy sources as they are found in nature before undergoing any conversion or transformation. A significant portion of primary energy is being lost in transformation and distribution. Final consumed energy is the energy that has been delivered to end users for consumption. It represents the energy that is actually used in homes, businesses, and industries. RBI Bulletin March 2025 105 )PDG₹ rep hwK( ytisnetnI ygrenE )PDG₹ rep hwK( ytisnetnI ygrenE 0.1 0.09 0.079 0.08 0.076 0.08 0.069 0.07 0.067 0.06 0.06 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.04 0.05 0.043 0.04 0.02 0.03 0 2012 2015 2018 2022 2012 2015 2018 2022 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 Primary Energy Final Consumed Energy Primary Secondary TertiaryARTICLE Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis IV.4 Fuel mix effect efficiency of existing thermal power plants. The large-scale deployment of renewables is a relatively India’s final energy consumption is shifting recent development, which explains why the towards electricity, reducing the share of coal emission factor effect during 2012-2017 was minimal (Table 6)4. Although oil and natural gas have seen and only became significant in the latter half of the slight increases, electricity, which is more emission- study period. Currently, solar and wind accounted for intensive than other fuels, has led to a net positive change in the fuel mix effect. just 2.1 percent of the total primary energy supply. However, going ahead, renewables are expected to play The situation with electricity warrants closer a much larger role as their falling costs increasingly examination. Electrification in transport and industry displace fossil fuels, not only in the power sector but is often hailed as a major step forward in the fight also through the indirect electrification of industries against climate change. Electricity is indeed a highly via green hydrogen. India has already auctioned a efficient form of delivered energy compared to other substantial amount of green hydrogen capacity under fossil fuels. However, in countries that rely heavily the National Green Hydrogen Mission, which is on coal or lignite to power their thermal plants, CO2 expected to come online soon. emissions per kilowatt-hour (kWh) are significantly higher. In India, for example, 1 kWh of grid electricity V. Decoupling Analysis consumed emits 0.741 kg of CO2, which is three Tapio decoupling analysis indicates that India has times more polluting than other energy sources. In a achieved weak decoupling during this period, with a traditional coal-fired power plant, about 70-73 percent decoupling elasticity of 0.59, which is similar to that of the energy from coal is lost in the conversion of other lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). process from chemical to heat to electrical energy. Rapid urbanisation and the demand for infrastructure Additionally, 21 percent of the remaining electricity is development, including roads, buildings, and lost during transmission and distribution. However, energy facilities, increases energy consumption and the higher efficiency of electricity somewhat offsets emissions, leading to higher elasticity. However, its higher emission factor. upper middle income and high-income countries IV.5 Emission Factor Effect have achieved much lower elasticities during the The negative emission factor effect is primarily period (Table 7). driven by the deployment of renewables, with The primary sector initially demonstrated a additional contributions from improvements in the worsening relationship between economic growth Table 6: Fuel Mix of India* Fuel 2012 2017 2022 Table 7: Country Group Wise Decoupling Elasticity Coal 36.0 33.4 30.6 Entity Decoupling C Q Oil 40.1 41.5 41.2 C 𝒕 𝒊 𝒕 𝒊 Elasticity NG 6.0 5.7 6.4 𝛿 0 𝛿 0 India 0.4𝒊3 0.7𝒊3 0.59 Q Electricity 17.9 19.4 21.9 High-income countries -0.08 0.20 -0.41 *: Based on final energy consumption. Lower-middle-income countries 0.34 0.58 0.59 Sources: Energy Statistics of India; and Authors’ calculations. Upper-middle-income countries 0.12 0.54 0.23 4 The falling share of coal in final consumed energy should not be Low-Income Countries 0.17 0.29 0.61 construed as the share of coal has fallen in the primary energy supply. In World 0.06 0.31 0.20 India, bulk of the electricity is being produced by coal power and the share of renewables is picking up only recently. Sources: World Bank; Ourworldindata; and Authors’ calculations. 106 RBI Bulletin March 2025Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: ARTICLE A LMDI Decomposition Analysis Table 8: Decoupling of CO2 emissions from Growth Sector Period Decoupling Elasticity Score C Q C 𝒕 𝒕 𝒊 𝒊 𝛿 𝛿 0 0 Overall GDP 2012-22 0.4𝒊3 0.7𝒊3 0.59 WD Q 2012-17 0.34 0.21 1.65 END Primary Sector 2017-22 0.14 0.23 0.61 WD 2012-22 0.53 0.49 1.09 EC 2012-17 0.23 0.39 0.59 WD Secondary Sector 2017-22 0.07 0.18 0.37 WD 2012-22 0.31 0.64 0.49 WD 2012-17 0.34 0.49 0.69 WD Tertiary Sector 2017-22 0.16 0.26 0.62 WD 2012-22 0.55 0.87 0.64 WD Sources: MoSPI; and Authors’ calculations. and carbon emissions. While this trend improved in The structural effect (-15 Mt) was slightly negative, the second half of the period, emissions continued as the GDP share of the less emission-intensive to outpace GDP growth. The secondary sector tertiary sector increased at the expense of the more experienced the most rapid decoupling, followed emission-intensive secondary sector. However, a by the tertiary sector. Moreover, India’s overall decline in the low-emission primary sector’s share limited the potential emission reductions from carbon intensity decreased at an accelerated pace structural changes. Additionally, the emission factor during the latter part of the study, corresponding to effect (-30 Mt) was also negative, driven by the increased renewable energy adoption and growing reduction in emission intensity of grid electricity due environmental consciousness among businesses and to the growing share of renewable energy in the grid. the public (Table 8). It’s worth noting that this effect was minimal from VI. Conclusion 2012-2017 but became more significant in the latter This paper has analysed the factors driving half of the decade. emission growth in India over the last decade Despite the emphasis on renewables, solar (2012-2022) using LMDI decomposition. During and wind accounted for only 2.1 per cent of total this period, energy-related CO2 emissions rose primary energy in 2022-23. However, going ahead, by 706 million tons. The primary driver of this the emission factor effect is expected to play a more increase was the output effect (+1073 Mt), with a prominent role as renewables increasingly replace minor contribution from the fuel mix effect (+78 fossil fuels and green hydrogen usage expands in Mt), which was influenced by the growing share of industries. electricity—a highly emission-intensive source in India achieved a decoupling elasticity of 0.59 India. However, the energy intensity effect (-399 Mt) during this period, a figure that aligns with the helped to moderate the rise in emissions, reflecting a decoupling elasticities observed in other lower- 1.9 percent annual improvement in energy efficiency. middle-income countries. While upper-middle and This rate of improvement is consistent with India’s high-income countries have achieved much lower long-term trend from 2000-2023 and exceeds the decoupling elasticities, India’s figure is commendable global average for the same period. given its development needs which includes RBI Bulletin March 2025 107ARTICLE Decoupling Economic Growth from Emissions: A LMDI Decomposition Analysis rapid urbanisation and significant investments in Ang, B. W., & Zhang, F. Q. (2000). A survey of index infrastructure and construction. decomposition analysis in energy and environmental studies. Energy, 25(12), 1149-1176. 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Existing studies have found that countries that obtain by Shruti Joshi and PSS Vidyasagar^ IMF assistance usually have weak macroeconomic fundamentals, such as higher current account deficit, low international reserves, high fiscal deficit, low per The article analyses the availing of International capita income, and exchange rate imbalances, and their Monetary Fund (IMF) loans by various countries and vulnerability can be exacerbated by global factors such establishes a link between market access and dependence on as global business cycle, a steep rise in international IMF’s funds over the period 2000-2023. It is found that commodity prices and world interest rates (Bird and Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) Orne, 1986; Cornelieus, 1987; Joyce, 1992; Bird and continue to rely on IMF resources for managing liquidity Rowlands, 2002; Joyce, 2004; Elekdag, 2008). However, pressures on account of their limited access to international with increased access to international capital markets financial markets and alternate sources of funding. and alternative funding sources such as swap lines and Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), countries Introduction now have more options to address external funding Since the mid-1980s, the world has witnessed a needs. Moreover, the non-concessional IMF loans are remarkable acceleration in global trade and financial offered at market-determined rates, which, although integration on the back of increased cross-border potentially lower than market rates1, may still be trade, investments, and financial flows (IMF, 2016). unappealing because of the performance conditions While this increased integration offers benefits such and the associated stigma (Kawai, 2010). as growth, innovations, and economies of scale, It is observed, however, that a host of emerging it also presents risks (Villaverde and Maza, 2011; market and developing economies (EMDEs) continue Ahmad, 2019). The higher interconnectedness can to rely on IMF loan arrangements, also known as IMF lead to cross-border contagion of financial stress and Programs. For instance, in the last decade (during periods of amplified distress in vulnerable countries 2014-2024), EMDEs entered a total of 329 IMF through sudden swings in financial flows, which can arrangements, of which, nearly half of the programs/ lead to a significant change in countries’ gross and arrangements were non-concessional loans. On the net foreign asset positions worldwide (Giglio, et al., other hand, advanced economies (AEs) have not 2016; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006) and/or through entered the IMF arrangements since 2014. In the trade disruptions, which can reduce financial flows to new millennium, while the dependence of EMDEs on countries (Attinasi, et al., 2022). In the post-pandemic IMF loans has been greater, several fast growing large years, a confluence of factors such as geo-economic EMDEs, including India and China did not have to take fragmentation, elevated global debt, and heightened recourse to the IMF loans. In fact, these economies had macroeconomic policy uncertainty poses balance-of- been the primary drivers of global growth, barring the payments (BoP) risks for countries with weak buffers COVID period, where nearly the entire globe recorded and high foreign currency debt (GFSR, 2024). negative growth. The fast growing EMs continue to be global drivers of growth and are characterized ^ The authors are from the International Department, Reserve Bank of India. The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Reserve Bank of India. 1 https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-Lending. RBI Bulletin March 2025 111ARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe by relatively robust macroeconomic fundamentals. Chart 1: Number of IMF Arrangements In fact, several large and fast growing EMDEs had turned creditors to the IMF in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In the backdrop, this article aims at identifying the key factors driving the recourse to IMF programs by countries. The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section II gives an overview of access of IMF loans across regions; Section III analyses the link between the demand for the Fund’s loans and market access of countries; and section IV contains the concluding observations. II. Demand for IMF Loans Historically, it is observed that demand for IMF loans increases during global downturns. For instance, during the global recession of 1983 triggered by oil Source: IMF Country Finance data. shock and a subsequent debt crisis in Latin America, general resource account (GRA) that provides loans at many EMDEs, especially in Latin America and Sub- market-based rates, and the Trust-based concessional Saharan Africa (SSA), suffered long-lasting slowdown support to eligible countries (predominantly low- in growth (Kose et al., 2020). As a result, IMF stepped income countries), of which the Poverty Reduction up its lending programs during 1982-83 to these regions. For instance, around 85 per cent of the Fund and Growth Trust (PRGT) is the predominant source. lending in 1983 was to Latin America and SSA. Next, Both these have different lines of credit facilities with IMF lending increased during the Gulf war, where 50 similar conditionalities and provide short-term to per cent of the lending in 1991 was to the Asia-Pacific long-term financing support. Region (APR), which was affected adversely by the The access to IMF loans is determined by increased crude prices. Similarly, during the GFC and members’ quotas, with the loan quantum typically Eurozone crisis, there was a rise in IMF arrangements being a multiple of the quota.3 As the PRGT countries to some European countries, while the COVID crisis are low-income developing countries, the quantum resulted in demand for Fund resources across the of loans availed by them is significantly smaller than world (Chart 1). the loans availed by other members through GRA The IMF has multiple instruments/windows to (little less than 12 per cent of GRA amount accessed meet the funding requirements of member countries. in 2023), though the number of PRGT arrangements The “reserve tranche,” which is the member’s is nearly equal to GRA arrangements (Chart 2c). The unconditional drawing right on the IMF,2 allows a quantum of IMF support as well as the number of member country to draw from the IMF at short notice IMF arrangements availed by members increased in need of balance of payments financing. Further, substantially during the new millennium, particularly IMF’s loans are extended under two heads, viz., the 3 Currently, the normal access limit is 145 per cent; and cumulative access 2 The reserve tranche is created by the foreign exchange portion of is 435 per cent of quota. In 2023, access limits were increased temporarily the quota subscription, plus increase (decrease) through the IMF’s sale to meet the demands arising from COVID pandemic with normal access (repurchase) of the member’s currency to meet the demand for use of IMF limit at 200 per cent, and cumulative access limit at 600 per cent of quota. resources by other members in need of balance of payments financing. This temporary increase in access limits is set to expire at the end of 2024. 112 RBI Bulletin March 2025 stnemegnarra FMI fo rebmuN 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 5791 7791 9791 1891 3891 5891 7891 9891 1991 3991 5991 7991 9991 1002 3002 5002 7002 9002 1102 3102 5102 7102 9102 1202 3202 COVID Second oil shock GFC Gulf War Euro-Zone CrisisMarket Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Chart 2: IMF Loans to All Members a. Amount Agreed b. Amount Drawn Note: Amount agreed refers to the sanctioned amount under an arrangement and amount drawn is the amount of money drawn/utilised by the member. Sources: IMF Country Finance data; and Authors’ own calculations. during periods of shocks (Chart 2a and 2b). This is America - is the largest borrower, whereas SSA6 is in line with the increased global interconnectedness the largest borrower from PRGT (Chart 3). Moreover, which seems to have accelerated transmission of some countries within WHR, SSA and APR7 have global spillovers resulting in external financing repeatedly borrowed from the IMF. problem in member countries (Chart 2d).4 The temporal distribution of IMF loans across II.1 Region-wise Borrowing from IMF regions reveals that in the initial period of IMF operations, they were availed mostly by what In terms of number of arrangements as well as quantum of loans under GRA, the Western 6 SSA comprises: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Hemisphere Region (WHR5) - predominantly Latin Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo DR, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 4 The correlation between trade to GDP ratio and total amount drawn from Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, IMF during 1970 to 2024 is 0.54 indicating that greater interconnectedness Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South is associated with greater amounts drawn from IMF. Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 5 WHR comprises the Americas and Caribbean and includes Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 7 APR comprises of Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Cambodia, China, Fiji, Korea, Hong-Kong India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos, Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Nepal, New Zealand. Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the Unite Singapore Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Taiwan States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. RBI Bulletin March 2025 113 RDS noilliM RDS noilliM RDS noilliM c. No of Arrangements (1952-2024) d. Global Trade to GDP Ratio stnemegnarrA fo .oN RDS noilliM PDG fo tnec rep a sa edarT 120000 7000 100000 6000 5000 80000 4000 60000 3000 40000 2000 20000 1000 0 0 GRA PRGT(RHS) GRA PRGT(RHS) GRA PRGT 2591 8591 2691 6691 0791 4791 8791 2891 6891 0991 4991 8991 2002 6002 0102 4102 8102 2202 45000 7000 40000 6000 35000 5000 30000 25000 4000 20000 3000 15000 2000 10000 1000 5000 0 0 2591 8591 2691 6691 0791 4791 8791 2891 6891 0991 4991 8991 2002 6002 0102 4102 8102 2202 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2591 8591 2691 6691 0791 4791 8791 2891 6891 0991 4991 8991 2002 6002 0102 4102 8102 2202 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0791 3791 6791 9791 2891 5891 8891 1991 4991 7991 0002 3002 6002 9002 2102 5102 8102 1202ARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe Chart 3: Worldwide Distribution of IMF Arrangements a. No. of GRA arrangements (1952-2024) b. No. of PRGT arrangements (1952-2024) c. No. of IMF arrangements(1952-2024) d. Quantum of IMF loans Sources: IMF Country Finance data; and Authors’ own calculations. are now the AEs. However, the demand for IMF 2003 (even before the onset of GFC) and remained loans from AEs waned over the period, barring the weak thereafter (Chart 4). exceptional case of GFC-Eurozone crisis, where II.2 Role of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs) some AEs (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus) availed In the face of BoP issues, the first line of defence extraordinarily large amounts of loans from the is country’s own resources, such as forex reserves, IMF. One of the driving factors for obtaining IMF followed by other options such as swaps - both financing is the deteriorating external funding/ bilateral and from RFAs - and market borrowings liquidity position (as proxied by indicators such which are more likely to be preferred to meet BoP as the import cover of forex reserves, the share of financing needs, as these financing options do not short-term debt, debt service ratio, etc.) for low- have the stigma that is attached to borrowing from income countries (as identified by their eligibility for the IMF. Finally, countries tend to resort to IMF support of International Development Agency (IDA) loans and/or official bilateral loans when other of the World Bank). The import cover for AEs (proxied options do not appear to be feasible. As stated above, by OECD countries) has improved consistently from import cover of AEs remained comfortable and their 1995, barring dips during crisis periods, whereas the credit ratings have generally been in the investment same has turned weak for low-income countries from grade, leading to comfortable liquidity access from 114 RBI Bulletin March 2025 stnemegnarra FMI fo rebmuN 450 405 400 350 300 277 232 250 200 176 155 150 124 100 59 41 44 50 12 0 Asia Europe Middle east Sub-Saharan Westerm and central Africa Hemisphere asia Region GRA PRGT GRA PRGT RDS noillib nI 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Asia Europe Middle east Sub-Saharan Westerm and central Africa Hemisphere asia RegionMarket Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Chart 4: Import Cover - Reserves as Months of Import Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. international capital markets. The sovereign ratings countries have entered into the BRICS contingent for most of the low income countries (LICs) and reserve arrangement (CRA) in 2015 and since then EMDEs, on the other hand, have been non-investible only South-Africa entered into Fund’s arrangement grade, with several LICs not having country ratings, during COVID crisis. In 2002, the European Union thereby, severely restricting their market access. formed the EU-BoP facility for non-eurozone However, the relatively better postioned EMDEs, countries9 and in 2012 post the Eurozone crisis, such as ASEAN region, BRICS and some Latin the European Stability Mechanism10 (ESM) was put American countries had access to RFAs or currency into place which led to a drop in IMF borrowings by swap agreements (Annex Tables A2, A3 and A4). the member countries. Likewise, in 1978, the FLAR The access to alternative sources of funding - Latin American Reserve Fund11 - was established, through RFAs or currency swap arrangements for leading to a fall in the number of IMF arrangements these fast-growing economies reduced their reliance for its member countries (Chart 5). However, the on IMF loans. For instance, ASEAN+3 countries8 drop in IMF borrowing amongst the members was launched the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation not as steep for FLAR as compared to the members of (CMIM), which came into effect in 2010, to address other RFAs. Nevertheless, there were no withdrawals short term liquidity needs in the region. Since its from IMF arrangements for countries like Colombia, formation, the CMIM member countries did not Peru and Paraguay. borrow from the IMF, whereas prior to 2010 few ASEAN countries such as Korea and Philippines were repeat borrowers from the IMF. Similarly, BRICS 8 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Hong Kong. RBI Bulletin March 2025 115 shtnoM fo .oN 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0891 1891 2891 3891 4891 5891 6891 7891 8891 9891 3991 4991 5002 6002 7002 8002 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 4102 5102 6102 7102 8102 9102 0202 1202 2202 3202 Low incomeCountries OECD members 9 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 10 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 11 Members include Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.ARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe Chart 5: IMF Loan Arrangements and RFA Membership a. No of IMF Loan Arrangement of Countries b. No of IMF Loan Arrangement of Countries before RFA Membership after RFA Membership Sources: IMF Country Finance data; and Authors’ own calculations. III. Market Access and IMF Arrangements period, made available by Damodaran (2024), reveals that most of the countries that availed IMF loans are Higher country risk profiles lead to higher countries with non-investible grade sovereign ratings, borrowing costs as market demand higher returns to and hence, are considered high-risk borrowers in compensate for the additional risk. Therefore, factors the international capital markets which restricted such as poor sovereign ratings, or even absence of their market access. These borrowers are mostly sovereign ratings as well as high credit default spreads, for a given country limit their access to international concentrated in WHR, SSA and APR, and are mostly capital markets. Under such circumstances, borrowing low-income countries and EMDEs. For instance, in from the IMF may be the only feasible option available WHR, countries like Ecuador, Honduras and Jamaica for such countries, apart from borrowing from borrowed from the IMF multiple times, and had non- official bilateral creditors. However, borrowings from investible grade ratings resulting in higher country official bilateral creditors may also not be a preferred risk premium (CRP) and default spreads. Similarly, option for countries, as some of the heavily indebted many countries of SSA availing loan under PRGT such countries such as Zambia faced debt distress, leading as, Madagascar, Malawi and São Tomé and Príncipe to difficult debt restructuring process in the G20 amongst others, do not have any country ratings Common Framework for Debt Treatments. available (Table 1). The market access of countries and recourse to Coming to specific episodes of stress in the new IMF loans by countries which availed loans from the millennium during the GFC, although AEs were at IMF is analysed in this context, with focus on select the epicenter of the crisis, there was a spillover to the episodes of global turbulence such as the GFC (2008- rest of the world, followed by a period of slowdown 2010), Eurozone Crisis (2012-14) and COVID crisis in growth (Kose et al., 2020). Next, during the (2020-2021). Eurozone-crisis, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and A disaggregated analysis of data on country Spain were the major crisis hit countries in Europe default spreads and risk premium for the post 2000 (Gourinchas et al., 2023). Most of the countries which 116 RBI Bulletin March 2025Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Table 1: Multiple Borrowers during 2000-2023 (> 5 times) GRA PRGT Country CRP Default Spread CRP Default Spread (in per cent) (in per cent) (in per cent) (in per cent) Ecuador 14 42 WHR Honduras 7.1 29 Jamaica 7.3 23 Madagascar N.A. N.A. SSA Malawi N.A. N.A. São Tomé and Príncipe N.A. N.A. Notes: 1. Default spread is estimated using the local currency sovereign rating from Moody’s and it is calculated as the difference over a default free government bond rate. CRP is calculated by scaling up the default spread by relative equity market volatility, which in turn is calculated as the ratio of the S&P Emerging Market Equity Index standard deviation to the BAML Emerging Public Bond index standard deviation. 2. The CRP estimated using the above methodology are directly available from database made available by Damodaran (2024). 3. N.A. represents no country rating available. Source: Damodaran (2024) availed IMF loans during the GFC and Eurozone crisis by the GFC and Eurozone crisis, remained stable as periods were rated Baa or lower on Moody’s rating they enjoyed investible grade ratings.These, inter alia, scale or did not have any ratings available. For instance, included Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and the Armenia, Colombia, El salvador, Bangladesh, Jamaica USA. The average default spread for countries which and Morocco, among others, had speculative grade or borrowed money from IMF during 2009-2014 was low investment grade ratings, while Angola, Congo, in the range of 3 to 5 percent whereas it was 0.6 to Comoros, Ethiopia and Ghanna, among others had 1 percent for those countries which did not borrow no ratings available (Annex Tables A2 and A3). On the from IMF. Similarly, the CRP were in the range of 4 to other hand, the credit-worthiness of countries which 8 percent, and 0.9 to 1.9 percent for these two groups did not borrow from the IMF, despite being affected of countries (Chart 6). Chart 6: GFC and Eurozone Crisis Period a. Average Default Spread across Countries b. Average CRP across Countries Note: The CRP and sovereign default spread data are available from Damodaran (2024). It is a comprehensive data set updated every year providing country wise and regional breakdown of sovereign ratings, default spread, credit default swaps and country risk premiums. This data is available from 2000 until 2023. Sources: Damodaran (2024); and Authors’ own calculations. RBI Bulletin March 2025 117 tnec rep ni daerpS tluafeD tnec rep ni PRC 6 9 8 5 7 4 6 5 3 4 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries opting for IMF loans Countries opting for IMF loans Countries not opting for IMF loans Countries not opting for IMF loansARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe Secondly, some AEs, viz., Greece, Portugal, and for countries which may have some vulnerabilties Ireland entered the IMF loan arrangements during which preclude them from FCL, though otherwise 2008-11 due to their mounting public and private they may have reasonable macrofundamentals. sector debts. During this period, these countries Nevertheless, access to PLL also acts as a market faced rating downgrades, leading to curtailed market signal about assured IMF funds. However, the CRP access. For instance, Greece was downgraded from A2 for Morocco did not decline even after grant of the to Ba1 from 2009 to 2010 and Ireland was downgraded PLL, possible on account of the fact that PLL does from Aa1 to Baa1 in the same period. Portugal was not send a market signal that the country has strong downgraded from A1 in 2010 to Ba2 in 2011. Iceland macroeconomic fundamentals. On the other hand, and Latvia had also drawn money from IMF in 2008 the CRP increased for Morocco, after the PLL expired. following their rating downgrades in 2007. Iceland (Table 2). was downgraded from Aaa in 2007 to Baa1 in 2008 During the COVID pandemic (2020 – 2021), and Latvia was downgraded from A2 to A3 (Annex borrowing countries from the WHR and SSA regions Table A2). Similarly, African countries such as Angola, were more as compared to other regions (Annex Djibouti, Dominican Republic Congo, Ghana, Mali, Table A4). Countries in this region had higher risk Niger, Togo, availed IMF PRGT financing and did not premium and lower ratings vis-à-vis non-borrowers. have sovereign ratings for the relevant period. On For instance, the average CRP for countries whch the other hand, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, despite borrowed from IMF was 5.1 and 5.4 per cent in 2020 being downgraded from medium investment grade to and 2021, respectively, whereas it was 2.7 and 2.8 non-investible grade between 2012-14, did not enter per cent for the non-borrowers. In fact, these regions into the Fund’s loan arrangement due to availability have also been repeated borrowers from IMF due to of financial assistance from the European Financial their poor market access. For instance, Latin America Stability Facility(EFSF)12, which was formed in 2012. and Caribbean had the highest CRP (5.0 per cent) and Additionally, some countries signed IMF a higher default spread (3.7 per cent) after Africa, programs to enhance their market access, and did not whereas EMDEs from Asia had a lower CRP (3.6 per need to take recourse to borrowals from the IMF. The cent) and default spread (2.6 per cent). AEs had the IMF’s flexible credit line (FCL) is designed for this lowest avergae default spread (0.7 per cent) and CRP purpose for countries with strong macroeconomic fundamentals such as sustainable external position, Table 2: Country Risk Premium (in per cent) low inflation and sound public finances13. The IMF Country FCL certification that these countries have very strong Pre-FCL CRP During FCL CRP After FCL CRP macroeconomic fundamentals has a positive market (2008) (2009-11) (2012) Colombia 3.9 3.0 3.0 announcemnt effect leading to easier access to Mexico 3.0 2.3 2.3 funding from international capital markets. Similarly, Poland 2.4 1.5 1.0 the precautionary and liquidity line (PLL) is available PLL Pre PLL During PLL After PLL (2011) (2012) (2013) 12 EFSF disbursement dashboard. 13 https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Flexible-Credit- Morocco 3.6 3.6 3.7 Line-FCL. Sources: Damodaran (2024); and Authors’ own calculations. 118 RBI Bulletin March 2025Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Chart 7: Regional Default Spread and CRP a. Average Default Spread (2000-2023) b. Average CRP (2000-2023) Sources: Damodaran (2024); and Authors’ own calculations. (0.8 per cent), and thus, they did not need recourse The sample comprises of an unbalanced panel15 of to IMF loans (Chart 7). Also, some of the fast-growing 124 countries which have borrwed from IMF during EMDEs, especially in the APR region, had better 2000 to 2024. This regression is run for the whole sample period with country fixed effects which takes market access and did not need to borrow from the into account the country-specific factors. In model 1, IMF. the impact of CRP is examined without controling for A panel regression with country fixed effects the global schocks. In model 2, 3, 4 and 5, separate model has been estimated to establish the link dummies are added to account for the three shocks between market access and IMF loans. The regression viz GFC, Euro-Zone and COVID. And in model 5 all the is estimated on the amount of loans drawn by three shock dummies are added together. countries with the relevant country risk premium The regression results reveal that countries with as the explanatory variable14, and has the following lower market access as indicated by a higher country specification: risk preimum availed greater financial support from Amount Drawn α βCRP Global Shock the IMF. These results were significant across all the it it Country Fixed Effects five models which indicates that it is the lack of market = + + + access which drives countries to borrow more from In the above equation, IMF. The regression parameter for CRP without time amount drawn refers to the amount of IMF dummies is significant at 90% confidence interval. On loan support availed by country i in year t in SDR the other hand, the estimated parameters for CRP with million; market access is measured through country time dummies turns significant at 99% confidence risk premium (CRP), and global shock indicates time interval. This appears to indicate that while higher dummies for GFC, Euro-zone and COVID crisis. CRPs (i.e., lack of market access) is a significant factor 14 Since CRP is calculated using the default spreads, we only include CRP 15 All 124 countries have not borrowed in a given year, and hence, the in the regression analysis to avoid multicollinearity. sample is an unbalanced panel. RBI Bulletin March 2025 119 )tnec rep ni( daerpS tluafeD )tnec rep ni( PRC 4 6 3.5 5 3 4 2.5 2 3 1.5 2 1 1 0.5 0 0 Africa Asia Latin Advanced Eastern Africa Asia Latin Advanced Eastern America Economies Europe & America Economies Europe & and Russia and Russia Caribbean CaribbeanARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe V. Conclusion Table 3: Panel Regression Results This article shows that there has been an Amount Drawn (2000-2024) increased dependence on IMF loans in the last Model 1: Without Global Shock Dummies three decades across regions, particularly for the Country Risk Premium 149.2*(2.5) LICs and some EMDEs, in conjunction with rising Country Fixed Effects Yes economic integration across the globe. Countries Number of Obervations 312 with availability of alternate sources of funding Model 2: Global Financial Crisis Dummy (2008-2010) including swap lines and RFAs, and had market Country Risk Premium 143.5* (2.4) access through better ratings usually did not avail GFC Dummy 8.2 (1.0) IMF loans. On the other hand, the borrowers from Country Fixed Effects Yes IMF generally had weak ratings and limited market Number of Obervations 312 access. Further, shock events appear to increase the Model 3: Euro Zone Crisis Dummy (2012-2014) dependence of countries on IMF loans as these event Country Risk Premium 160.2***(2.6) appear to restrict market of crisis affected countries Euro-Zone Crisis Dummy -4.9 (-0.9) through increased CRPs. Some IMF programs such as Country Fixed Effects Yes FCL and PCL, which are designed for the purpose of Number of Obervations 312 enhancing market access for countries with robust Model 4: COVID(2020-2021) macroeconomic fundamentals, appear to have served Country Risk Premium 185.8***(2.8) their purpose. Predominantly, the countries without COVID Dummy 5.3 (0.1) or limited market access and alternate resources avail Country Fixed Effects Yes IMF loans, which points to the role of the IMF as the Number of Obervations 312 global lender of last resort and highlights its central Model 5: All Global Shocks role in the GFSN. Country Risk Premium 189.9*** (2.9) GFC Dummy 8.7* (1.7) References Euro-Zone Crisis Dummy -2.5 (-0.4) Ahmad, M. (2019). Globalisation, economic growth, COVID Dummy 6.0 (0.1) and spillovers: A spatial analysis. Margin: The Journal Country Fixed Effects Yes of Applied Economic Research, 13(3), 255-276. Number of Obervations 312 Attinasi, M. G., Balatti, M., Mancini, M., & Metelli, L. t-statistics in parentheses. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, and ***: p<0.01 (2022). Supply chain disruptions and the effects on in driving countries’ recourse to the IMF loans, the the global economy. Economic Bulletin Boxes, 8. shock events accentuate the countries’ recourse to Bird, G., & Bird, G. (1988). An analysis of drawings IMF loans (Table 3). on the International Monetary Fund by developing countries. Managing Global Money: Essays in As stated before, the recourse of countries International Financial Economics, 104-112. to IMF loans has increased during crisis periods. This is probably on account of the fact that crisis Bird, G., & Rowlands, D. (2002). The pattern of IMF episodes leads to worsening of macroeconomic lending: an analysis of prediction failures. The Journal fundamentals and an increase in the country risk of Policy Reform, 5(3), 173-186. preimum of the affected countries, which in turn Cornelius, P. (1987). The demand for IMF credits by sub- reduces their market access and makes them resort Saharan African countries. Economics Letters, 23(1), to IMF loans. 99-102. 120 RBI Bulletin March 2025Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Damodaran, A. (2024). Country risk: determinants, Joyce, J. P. (1992). The economic characteristics of IMF measures and implications Measures and Implications- program countries, Economics Letters, 38(2), 237-242. The 2024 Edition. SSRN Electron. J. Joyce, J. P. (2004). Adoption, implementation and Elekdağ, S. (2008). How does the global economic impact of IMF programmes: A review of the issues and environment influence the demand for IMF evidence. Comparative Economic Studies, 46, 451-467. resources. IMF Staff Papers, 55(4), 624-653. Kawai, M. (2010). Reform of the international financial International Monetary Fund. Monetary, & Capital architecture: An Asian perspective. The Singapore Markets Department. (2004). Global Financial Stability Economic Review, 55(01), 207-242. Report, April 2004: Market Developments and Issues. Lane, P. R., & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007). The International Monetary Fund. external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and IMF. (2016). Adequacy of the global financial safety extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, net. IMF Policy Papers, International Monetary Fund, 1970–2004. Journal of international Economics, 73(2), Washington DC. 223-250. IMF. (2017). Collaboration between the Regional Villaverde, J., & Maza, A. (2011). Globalisation, Financing Arrangements and IMF. IMF Policy Papers, growth and convergence. The World Economy, 34(6), International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 952-971. RBI Bulletin March 2025 121ARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe Annex Tables Table A1: Moody’s Rating Scale Aaa Prime Aa1, Aa2 and Aa31 High Grade Investible Grade A1, A2 and A3 Upper Medium Grade Baa1, Baa2 and Baa3 Lower Medium Grade Ba1, Ba2 and Ba3 Non-Investment grade speculative B1, B2 and B3 Highly Speculative Speculative Grade Caa1, Caa2 and Caa3 Substantial Risk Ca Extremely Speculative C Default D 122 RBI Bulletin March 2025Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Table A2: Global Financial Crisis Countries which borrowed from IMF during 2008-11 Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Angola na na Armenia Ba2 6 Ba2 4.5 Ba2 4.125 Colombia Baa3 3 Baa3 3 Baa3 3 Comoros na na Congo na na Djibouti na na Dominican Republic B2 8.25 El Salvador Ba1 3.75 WR* 15 Ethiopia na na Ghana na na Greece A2 1.57 Ba1 3.6 Iceland Baa1 3 Ireland A 0.45 Baa1 2.25 Jamaica B3 9 Latvia A3 2.625 Malawi na na Mali na na Niger na na Portugal A1 1.275 Ba2 4.125 Togo na na Note: *WR: Rating withdrawn; na: no ratings available. Source: Damodaran (2024). Select Countries which did not borrow from IMF during 2008-11 Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Austria Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Belgium Aa1 1.05 Aa1 0.45 Aa1 0.375 Aa3 1.05 Denmark Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Finland Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 France Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Germany Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Italy Aa2 1.5 Aa2 0.9 Aa2 0.75 A2 1.5 Sweden Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 United Kingdom Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 United States of America Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Aaa 0 Source: Damodaran (2024). RBI Bulletin March 2025 123ARTICLE Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe Table A3: Euro-Zone Crisis Countries which borrowed from IMF during 2012-14 Country 2012 2013 2014 Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Albania B1 6.75 Armenia Ba2 4.50 Bangladesh Ba3 4.88 Burkina Faso B2 8.25 Bosnia and Herzegovina B3 9.00 Colombia Baa3 3.30 Cyprus B3 9.00 Caa3 15 B3 9.75 Georgia Ba3 4.88 Ba3 5.40 Greece Caa3 15.00 Caa3 15 Caa1 11.25 Honduras B3 9.75 Jamaica Caa3 15 Jordan Ba2 4.13 Mexico Baa1 2.25 A3 1.80 Morocco Ba1 3.60 Ba1 3.75 Pakistan Caa1 11.25 Poland A2 1.28 Romania Baa3 3.30 St. Vincent & the Grenadines B3 9.75 Tunisia Ba3 5.40 Ukraine Caa3 15 Source: Damodaran (2024). Countries which did not borrow from IMF during 2012-14 Country 2012 2013 2014 Rating CRP Rating CRP Rating CRP Ireland Ba1 3.60 Ba1 3.75 Baa1 2.40 Portugal Ba3 4.88 Ba3 5.40 Ba1 3.75 Spain Baa3 3 Baa3 3.30 Baa2 2.85 Source: Damodaran (2024). 124 RBI Bulletin March 2025Market Access and IMF Arrangements: Evidence from Across the Globe ARTICLE Table A4: COVID Crisis Select Countries which Borrowed from IMF Country 2020 2021 Ratings CRP Ratings CRP Bahamas Ba2 2.91 Ba3 3.56 Benin B2 5.33 B1 4.45 Bolivia B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Bosnia and Herzegovina B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Burkina Faso B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Cameroon B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Cape Verde B2 5.33 B3 6.43 Congo (Democratic Republic of) Caa1 7.26 Caa1 7.41 Costa Rica B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Côte d’Ivoire Ba3 3.49 Ba3 3.56 Dominican Republic Ba3 3.49 Ba3 3.56 Ecuador Caa3 9.68 Caa3 9.89 El Salvador B3 6.30 Caa1 7.41 Ethiopia B2 5.33 Caa2 8.90 Gabon Caa1 7.26 Caa1 7.41 Ghana B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Guatemala Ba1 2.42 Ba1 2.47 Jamaica B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Jordan B1 4.36 B1 4.45 Kenya B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Mali Caa1 7.26 Caa1 7.41 Moldova B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Mongolia B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Montenegro B1 4.36 B1 4.45 Mozambique Caa2 8.72 Caa2 8.90 Namibia Ba3 3.49 Ba3 3.56 Nicaragua B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Niger B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Nigeria B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Pakistan B3 6.30 B3 6.43 Panama Baa1 1.55 Baa2 1.88 Papua New Guinea B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Paraguay Ba1 2.42 Ba1 2.47 Peru A3 1.16 Baa1 1.58 Rwanda B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Senegal Ba3 3.49 Ba3 3.56 Solomon Islands B3 6.30 Caa1 7.41 South Africa Ba2 2.91 Ba2 2.97 Tunisia B2 5.33 Caa1 7.41 Uganda B2 5.33 B2 5.44 Source: Damodaran (2024). RBI Bulletin March 2025 125CURRENT STATISTICS Select Economic Indicators Reserve Bank of India Money and Banking Prices and Production Government Accounts and Treasury Bills Financial Markets External Sector Payment and Settlement Systems Occasional SeriesCURRENT STATISTICS Contents No. Title Page 1 Select Economic Indicators 129 Reserve Bank of India 2 RBI – Liabilities and Assets 130 3 Liquidity Operations by RBI 131 4 Sale/ Purchase of U.S. Dollar by the RBI 132 4A Maturity Breakdown (by Residual Maturity) of Outstanding Forwards of RBI (US$ Million) 133 5 RBI's Standing Facilities 133 Money and Banking 6 Money Stock Measures 134 7 Sources of Money Stock (M) 135 3 8 Monetary Survey 136 9 Liquidity Aggregates 137 10 Reserve Bank of India Survey 138 11 Reserve Money – Components and Sources 138 12 Commercial Bank Survey 139 13 Scheduled Commercial Banks' Investments 139 14 Business in India – All Scheduled Banks and All Scheduled Commercial Banks 140 15 Deployment of Gross Bank Credit by Major Sectors 141 16 Industry-wise Deployment of Gross Bank Credit 142 17 State Co-operative Banks Maintaining Accounts with the Reserve Bank of India 143 Prices and Production 18 Consumer Price Index (Base: 2012=100) 144 19 Other Consumer Price Indices 144 20 Monthly Average Price of Gold and Silver in Mumbai 144 21 Wholesale Price Index 145 22 Index of Industrial Production (Base: 2011-12=100) 149 Government Accounts and Treasury Bills 23 Union Government Accounts at a Glance 149 24 Treasury Bills – Ownership Pattern 150 25 Auctions of Treasury Bills 150 Financial Markets 26 Daily Call Money Rates 151 27 Certificates of Deposit 152 28 Commercial Paper 152 29 Average Daily Turnover in Select Financial Markets 152 30 New Capital Issues by Non-Government Public Limited Companies 153 RBI Bulletin March 2025 127CURRENT STATISTICS No. Title Page External Sector 31 Foreign Trade 154 32 Foreign Exchange Reserves 154 33 Non-Resident Deposits 154 34 Foreign Investment Inflows 155 35 Outward Remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for Resident Individuals 155 36 Indices of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) of the Indian Rupee 156 37 External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs) – Registrations 157 38 India’s Overall Balance of Payments (US $ Million) 158 39 India's Overall Balance of Payments (` Crore) 159 40 Standard Presentation of BoP in India as per BPM6 (US $ Million) 160 41 Standard Presentation of BoP in India as per BPM6 (` Crore) 161 42 India’s International Investment Position 162 Payment and Settlement Systems 43 Payment System Indicators 163 Occasional Series 44 Small Savings 165 45 Ownership Pattern of Central and State Governments Securities 166 46 Combined Receipts and Disbursements of the Central and State Governments 167 47 Financial Accommodation Availed by State Governments under various Facilities 168 48 Investments by State Governments 169 49 Market Borrowings of State Governments 170 50 (a) Flow of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households - Instrument-wise 171 50 (b) Stocks of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households- Select Indicators 174 Notes: .. = Not available. – = Nil/Negligible. P = Preliminary/Provisional. PR = Partially Revised. 128 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 1: Select Economic Indicators 2023-24 2024-25 Item 2023-24 Q2 Q3 Q2 Q3 1 2 3 4 5 1 Real Sector (% Change) 1.1 GVA at Basic Prices 8.6 9.2 8.0 5.8 6.2 1.1.1 Agriculture 2.7 3.7 1.5 4.1 5.6 1.1.2 Industry 11.0 15.3 12.6 2.0 3.5 1.1.3 Services 9.2 8.3 8.5 7.4 7.3 1.1a Final Consumption Expenditure 5.9 5.1 5.3 5.6 7.1 1.1b Gross Fixed Capital Formation 8.8 11.7 9.3 5.8 5.7 2023 2024 2025 2023-24 Dec. Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 1.2 Index of Industrial Production 5.9 4.4 4.2 3.5 5.0 2 Money and Banking (% Change) 2.1 Scheduled Commercial Banks 2.1.1 Deposits 12.9 12.6 12.5 10.2 11.6 (13.5) (13.3) (13.2) (9.8) (11.3) 2.1.2 Credit # 16.3 15.6 16.1 12.4 12.9 (20.2) (20.0) (20.3) (11.2) (11.8) 2.1.2.1 Non-food Credit # 16.3 15.8 16.2 12.4 12.9 (20.2) (20.1) (20.4) (11.1) (11.8) 2.1.3 Investment in Govt. Securities 11.1 15.6 13.2 11.1 10.4 (12.8) (17.6) (15.0) (10.1) (9.6) 2.2 Money Stock Measures 2.2.1 Reserve Money (M0) 5.6 6.0 6.3 4.9 4.4 2.2.2 Broad Money (M3) 11.1 11.0 11.0 9.3 9.6 (11.6) (11.5) (11.5) (9.0) (9.3) 3 Ratios (%) 3.1 Cash Reserve Ratio 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.00 3.2 Statutory Liquidity Ratio 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 3.3 Cash-Deposit Ratio 5.0 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.6 (5.0) (5.2) (5.1) (4.7) (4.5) 3.4 Credit-Deposit Ratio 78.1 77.1 77.7 78.7 78.6 (80.3) (79.5) (80.0) (80.4) (80.3) 3.5 Incremental Credit-Deposit Ratio # 95.8 89.1 95.6 86.1 83.8 (113.4) (111.9) (117.5) (82.6) (81.0) 3.6 Investment-Deposit Ratio 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.8 29.4 (29.8) (29.8) (29.8) (29.9) (29.5) 3.7 Incremental Investment-Deposit Ratio 25.8 24.7 24.5 32.6 27.7 (28.4) (28.2) (27.7) (30.8) (26.3) 4 Interest Rates (%) 4.1 Policy Repo Rate 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 4.2 Fixed Reverse Repo Rate 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 4.3 Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) Rate * 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 4.4 Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) Rate 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 4.5 Bank Rate 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 4.6 Base Rate 9.10/10.25 8.95/10.25 9.10/10.25 9.10/10.40 9.10/10.40 4.7 MCLR (Overnight) 8.00/8.60 7.95/8.50 8.00/8.60 8.15/8.45 8.15/8.45 4.8 Term Deposit Rate >1 Year 6.50/7.25 6.50/7.25 6.50/7.25 6.00/7.25 6.00/7.25 4.9 Savings Deposit Rate 2.70/3.00 2.70/3.00 2.70/3.00 2.70/3.00 2.70/3.00 4.10 Call Money Rate (Weighted Average) 6.85 6.81 6.77 6.71 6.57 4.11 91-Day Treasury Bill (Primary) Yield - 6.93 7.04 6.55 6.56 4.12 182-Day Treasury Bill (Primary) Yield 7.28 7.16 7.18 6.70 6.67 4.13 364-Day Treasury Bill (Primary) Yield 7.31 7.13 7.15 6.69 6.63 4.14 10-Year G-Sec Par Yield (FBIL) 7.31 7.20 7.15 6.76 6.71 5 Reference Rate and Forward Premia 5.1 INR-US$ Spot Rate (Rs. Per Foreign Currency) 83.37 83.12 83.12 85.59 86.64 5.2 INR-Euro Spot Rate (Rs. Per Foreign Currency) 90.22 92.00 90.42 89.11 90.01 5.3 Forward Premia of US$ 1-month (%) 1.00 1.23 1.30 3.70 2.80 3-month (%) 1.11 1.65 1.59 2.91 2.69 6-month (%) 1.31 1.51 1.60 2.61 2.30 6 Inflation (%) 6.1 All India Consumer Price Index 5.4 5.7 5.1 5.2 4.3 6.2 Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers 5.19 4.9 4.6 3.5 3.1 6.3 Wholesale Price Index -0.7 0.9 0.3 2.6 2.3 6.3.1 Primary Articles 3.5 5.7 4.1 6.0 4.7 6.3.2 Fuel and Power -4.7 -1.4 -0.4 -2.6 -2.8 6.3.3 Manufactured Products -1.7 -0.8 -1.2 2.1 2.5 7 Foreign Trade (% Change) 7.1 Imports -5.3 -6.6 2.0 1.9 10.3 7.2 Exports -3.1 0.8 4.3 -1.2 -2.4 Note : Financial Benchmark India Pvt. Ltd. (FBIL) has commenced publication of the G-Sec benchmarks with effect from March 31, 2018 as per RBI circularFMRD.DIRD. 7/14.03.025/2017-18 dated March 31, 2018. FBIL has started dissemination of reference rates w.e.f. July 10, 2018. #: Bank credit growth and related ratios for all fortnights from December 3, 2021 to November 18, 2022 are adjusted for past reporting errors by select scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with a bank. *: As per Press Release No. 2022-2023/41 dated April 08, 2022. RBI Bulletin March 2025 129CURRENT STATISTICS Reserve Bank of India No. 2: RBI - Liabilities and Assets * (₹ Crore) Item As on the Last Friday/ Friday 2024-25 2024 2025 Feb. Jan. 31 Feb. 07 Feb. 14 Feb. 21 Feb. 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Issue Department 1.1 Liabilities 1.1.1 Notes in Circulation 3482333 3423265 3564965 3596638 3606046 3615412 3615574 1.1.2 Notes held in Banking Department 11 13 12 15 14 12 14 1.1/1.2 Total Liabilities (Total Notes Issued) or Assets 3482344 3423278 3564977 3596653 3606060 3615424 3615588 1.2 Assets 1.2.1 Gold 162996 148980 217109 223243 227652 228657 226730 1.2.2 Foreign Securities 3318885 3274006 3347525 3373139 3378001 3386454 3388603 1.2.3 Rupee Coin 463 293 343 271 407 313 255 1.2.4 Government of India Rupee Securities - - - - - - - 2 Banking Department 2.1 Liabilities 2.1.1 Deposits 1782333 1656495 1446595 1382908 1433291 1530307 1445017 2.1.1.1 Central Government 101 101 101 100 100 101 101 2.1.1.2 Market Stabilisation Scheme - - - - - 2.1.1.3 State Governments 42 42 42 42 43 42 42 2.1.1.4 Scheduled Commercial Banks 1008618 909400 924083 878388 953498 888462 927189 2.1.1.5 Scheduled State Co-operative Banks 10092 8520 7772 7929 7798 7826 7452 2.1.1.6 Non-Scheduled State Co-operative Banks 6412 5127 4567 5154 4873 5018 4814 2.1.1.7 Other Banks 48725 47991 46275 46118 45756 46181 46630 2.1.1.8 Others 545400 540867 362067 346482 327887 482446 363484 2.1.1.9 Financial Institution Outside India 162944 144448 101688 98695 93336 100231 95305 2.1.2 Other Liabilities 1804747 1712392 2034572 2124837 2110913 2125676 2173208 2.1/2.2 Total Liabilities or Assets 3587080 3368888 3481167 3507746 3544204 3655983 3618225 2.2 Assets 2.2.1 Notes and Coins 11 13 12 15 14 12 14 2.2.2 Balances Held Abroad 1480408 1315955 1344426 1420016 1341554 1364059 1402695 2.2.3 Loans and Advances 2.2.3.1 Central Government - - - - - - - 2.2.3.2 State Governments 2300 14809 19332 35454 25646 22112 22937 2.2.3.3 Scheduled Commercial Banks 266021 256374 256989 185420 261331 301901 229480 2.2.3.4 Scheduled State Co-op.Banks - 35 - - - 35 - 2.2.3.5 Industrial Dev. Bank of India - - - - - - - 2.2.3.6 NABARD - - - - - - - 2.2.3.7 EXIM Bank - - - - - - - 2.2.3.8 Others 12398 9066 20988 18951 23894 26632 28827 2.2.3.9 Financial Institution Outside India 162650 142640 101053 98469 93021 99679 94847 2.2.4 Bills Purchased and Discounted 2.2.4.1 Internal - - - - - - - 2.2.4.2 Government Treasury Bills - - - - - - - 2.2.5 Investments 1365425 1364312 1319974 1319818 1360558 1401314 1401615 2.2.6 Other Assets 297868 265683 418394 429601 438187 440241 437810 2.2.6.1 Gold 272028 247933 396899 408114 416172 418010 414488 * Data are provisional. 130 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 3: Liquidity Operations by RBI (₹ Crore) Date Standing OMO (Outright) Net Injection (+)/ Liquidity Absorption (-) Liquidity Adjustment Facility Facilities (1+3+5+7+9-2-4-6 -8) Sale Purchase Variable Variable Reverse Rate Repo Rate MSF SDF Repo Reverse Repo Repo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Jan. 1, 2025 - - - - 666 115712 - - - -115046 Jan. 2, 2025 - - - - 15 152048 -543 - - -152576 Jan. 3, 2025 - - - - 2179 99805 - - - -97626 Jan. 4, 2025 - - - - 1398 94806 - - - -93408 Jan. 5, 2025 - - - - 342 94235 - - - -93893 Jan. 6, 2025 - - - - 15860 54274 - - - -38414 Jan. 7, 2025 - - 50007 - 24676 66630 57 - - 8110 Jan. 8, 2025 - - - - 44652 48937 -408 - - -4693 Jan. 9, 2025 - - 50004 - 20639 56581 980 - - 15042 Jan. 10, 2025 - - 275011 - 17638 76178 - - - 216471 Jan. 11, 2025 - - - - 5712 50540 - - - -44828 Jan. 12, 2025 - - - - 5882 53734 - - - -47852 Jan. 13, 2025 - - 50008 - 539 84042 - - - -33495 Jan. 14, 2025 - - - - 2069 77450 1020 - - -74361 Jan. 15, 2025 - - 3980 - 794 66409 -635 - 2570 -59700 Jan. 16, 2025 - - 30760 - 1138 84506 611 - 4480 -47517 Jan. 17, 2025 - - 33467 - 4096 80248 24 - 3125 -39536 Jan. 18, 2025 - - - - 14661 83219 - - - -68558 Jan. 19, 2025 - - - - 13064 71692 - - - -58628 Jan. 20, 2025 - - 75772 - 4461 78650 -10 - 4980 6553 Jan. 21, 2025 - - 71900 - 8207 43894 - - 1355 37568 Jan. 22, 2025 - - 125009 - 3349 75393 - - 4045 57010 Jan. 23, 2025 - - 145683 - 2831 67458 - - 3900 84956 Jan. 24, 2025 - - 362107 - 3232 92874 - - 6570 279035 Jan. 25, 2025 - - - - 3351 53731 - - - -50380 Jan. 26, 2025 - - - - 3459 54345 - - - -50886 Jan. 27, 2025 - - 193661 - 682 55881 0 - 4710 143172 Jan. 28, 2025 - - 139281 - 1779 61541 - - 3080 82599 Jan. 29, 2025 - - 166833 - 522 83366 - - - 83989 Jan. 30, 2025 - - 117354 - 3099 69667 - - - 50786 Jan. 31, 2025 - - 100013 - 6311 102895 - - 20020 23449 RBI Bulletin March 2025 131CURRENT STATISTICS No. 4: Sale/ Purchase of U.S. Dollar by the RBI i) Operations in onshore / offshore OTC segment Item 2024 2025 2023-24 Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 1 Net Purchase/ Sale of Foreign Currency (US $ Million) (1.1-1.2) 41271 1950 -15150 -11139 1.1 Purchase (+) 194296 10400 53898 49145 1.2 Sale (–) 153025 8450 69048 60284 2 ₹ equivalent at contract rate (₹ Crores) 339528 16205 -128753 -95388 3 Cumulative (over end-March) (US $ Million) 41271 19465 -36106 -47245 (₹ Crore) 339528 158524 -306406 -401795 4 Outstanding Net Forward Sales (-)/ Purchase (+) at the end of month (US -541 9974 -67938 -77528 $ Million) ii) Operations in currency futures segment Item 2024 2025 2023-24 Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 1 Net Purchase/ Sale of Foreign Currency (US $ Million) (1.1-1.2) 0 0 0 0 1.1 Purchase (+) 7930 1050 3552 3703 1.2 Sale (–) 7930 1050 3552 3703 2 Outstanding Net Currency Futures Sales (-)/ Purchase (+) at the end of -1080 0 -3450 -2683 month (US $ Million) 132 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 4 A : Maturity Breakdown (by Residual Maturity) of Outstanding Forwards of RBI (US $ Million) Item As on January 31 , 2025 Long (+) Short (-) Net (1-2) 1 2 3 1. Upto 1 month 5100 26045 -20945 2. More than 1 month and upto 3 months 0 25978 -25978 3. More than 3 months and upto 1 year 0 30605 -30605 4. More than 1 year 0 0 0 Total (1+2+3+4) 5100 82628 -77528 No. 5: RBI’s Standing Facilities (₹ Crore) Item As on the Last Reporting Friday 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. 23 Sep. 20 Oct. 18 Nov. 29 Dec. 27 Jan. 24 Feb. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 MSF 49906 144270 21731 4216 18513 31127 3232 500 2 Export Credit Refinance for Scheduled Banks 2.1 Limit - - - - - - - - 2.2 Outstanding - - - - - - - - 3 Liquidity Facility for PDs 3.1 Limit 9900 9900 9900 9900 9900 9900 9900 9900 3.2 Outstanding 9810 9066 8547 7223 8428 8459 9556 9096 4 Others 4.1 Limit 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 76000 4.2 Outstanding - - - - - - - - 5 Total Outstanding (1+2.2+3.2+4.2) 59716 153336 30278 11439 26941 39586 12788 9596 RBI Bulletin March 2025 133CURRENT STATISTICS Money and Banking No. 6: Money Stock Measures (₹ Crore) Item Outstanding as on March 31/last reporting Fridays of the month/ reporting Fridays 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 1 Currency with the Public (1.1 + 1.2 + 1.3 – 1.4) 3410276 3323406 3459977 3497219 3503602 1.1 Notes in Circulation 3477795 3386177 3524608 3553367 3563413 1.2 Circulation of Rupee Coin 32689 32144 34940 34940 34940 1.3 Circulation of Small Coins 743 743 743 743 743 1.4 Cash on Hand with Banks 101185 95801 101225 92748 96376 2 Deposit Money of the Public 2681424 2578240 2812342 2722910 2756006 2.1 Demand Deposits with Banks 2586888 2497829 2710713 2619285 2651712 2.2 'Other' Deposits with Reserve Bank 94536 80411 101629 103625 104294 3 M1 (1 + 2) 6091700 5901646 6272318 6220129 6259608 4 Post Office Saving Bank Deposits 195777 218498 200889 200889 200889 5 M2 (3 + 4) 6287477 6120144 6473207 6421018 6460497 6 Time Deposits with Banks 18739918 18399864 20240455 20425953 20369151 (18848160) (18516165) (20307146) (20491381) (20433390) 7 M3 (3 + 6) 24831618 24301509 26512774 26646082 26628759 (24939860) (24417811) (26579464) (26711510) (26692999) 8 Total Post Office Deposits 1313366 1268920 1379283 1379283 1379283 9 M4 (7 + 8) 26144984 25570429 27892057 28025365 28008042 (26253226) (25686731) (27958747) (28090793) (28072282) Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with a bank. 134 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 7 : Sources of Money Stock (M) 3 (₹ Crore) Sources Outstanding as on March 31/last reporting Fridays of the month/reporting Fridays 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 1 Net Bank Credit to Government 7512016 7116700 7850250 7987492 7937526 1 Net Bank Credit to Government (Including Merger) (7603571) (7210188) (7901119) (8038367) (7988402) 1.1 RBI’s net credit to Government (1.1.1–1.1.2) 1193213 934359 1000891 1104710 1047893 1.1.1 Claims on Government 1370428 1372005 1276034 1270175 1309316 1.1.1.1 Central Government 1363828 1359195 1254193 1255555 1288822 1.1.1.2 State Governments 6600 12810 21841 14620 20495 1.1.2 Government deposits with RBI 177215 437646 275143 165465 261423 1.1.2.1 Central Government 177172 437603 275101 165423 261381 1.1.2.2 State Governments 42 42 42 42 42 1.2 Other Banks’ Credit to Government 6318803 6182341 6849360 6882782 6889633 1.2 Other Banks Credit to Government (Including Merger) (6410358) (6275829) (6900228) (6933657) (6940509) 2 Bank Credit to Commercial Sector 16672145 16239988 18090813 18156833 18230417 2 Bank Credit to Commercial Sector (Including Merger) (17202832) (16793224) (18529356) (18589884) (18672006) 2.1 RBI’s credit to commercial sector 14406 5237 10519 10512 22760 2.2 Other banks’ credit to commercial sector 16657739 16234750 18080294 18146321 18207657 2.2 Other banks credit to commercial sector (Including Merger) (17188426) (16787986) (18518837) (18579372) (18649246) 2.2.1 Bank credit by commercial banks 15901477 15490356 17304495 17367609 17426890 2.2.1 Bank credit by commercial banks (Including Merger) (16432164) (16043592) (17743037) (17800660) (17868479) 2.2.2 Bank credit by co-operative banks 738194 726809 757258 759628 761677 2.2.3 Investments by commercial and co-operative banks in other securities 18068 17586 18541 19085 19091 2.2.3 Investments by commercial and co-operative banks in other securities (Including Merger) (18068) (17586) (18541) (19085) (19091) 3 Net Foreign Exchange Assets of Banking Sector (3.1 + 3.2) 5567504 5275455 5691089 5592318 5638730 3.1 RBIs net foreign exchange assets (3.1.1 - 3.1.2) 5241083 4975898 5324382 5225611 5272023 3.1.1 Gross foreign assets 5241083 4975899 5324384 5225611 5272019 3.1.2 Foreign liabilities 0 1 2 0 -4 3.2 Other banks’ net foreign exchange assets 326421 299557 366707 366707 366707 4 Government’s Currency Liabilities to the Public 33432 32887 35683 35683 35683 5 Banking Sector’s Net Non-monetary Liabilities 4953478 4363521 5155062 5126245 5213597 5 Banking Sectors Net Non-monetary Liabilities (Including Merger) (5467477) (4893943) (5577783) (5544742) (5641822) 5.1 Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 1790134 1721382 1891177 1910748 1986997 5.2 Net non-monetary liabilities of other banks (residual) 3163344 2642139 3263885 3215497 3226600 5.2 Net non-monetary liabilities of other banks (residual) (Including Merger) (3677343) (3172560) (3686606) (3633995) (3654825) M₃(1+2+3+4–5) 24831618 24301509 26512774 26646082 26628759 M3 (1+2+3+4-5) (Including Merger) (24939860) (24417811) (26579464) (26711510) (26692999) Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with bank. RBI Bulletin March 2025 135CURRENT STATISTICS No. 8: Monetary Survey (₹ Crore) Item Outstanding as on March 31/last reporting Fridays of the month/reporting Fridays 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 Monetary Aggregates NM₁ (1.1+1.2.1+1.3) 6091700 5901646 6272318 6220129 6259608 NM₂ (NM₁ + 1.2.2.1) 14424855 14090468 15252461 15282992 15296176 NM2 (NM1 + 1.2.2.1) (Including Merger) (14473564) (14142803) (15282471) (15312435) (15325083) NM₃ (NM₂ +1.2.2.2 + 1.4 = 2.1 + 2.2 + 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5) 25387764 24909855 27183290 27283273 27294849 NM3 (NM2 + 1.2.2.2 + 1.4 = 2.1 + 2.2 + 2.3 - 2.4 - 2.5) (Including Merger) (25496006) (25026157) (27249981) (27348701) (27359088) 1 Components 1.1 Currency with the Public 3410276 3323406 3459977 3497219 3503602 1.2 Aggregate Deposits of Residents 21105009 20695211 22666584 22758981 22732973 1.2 Aggregate Deposits of Residents (Including Merger) (21213252) (20811512) (22733275) (22824409) (22797212) 1.2.1 Demand Deposits 2586888 2497829 2710713 2619285 2651712 1.2.2 Time Deposits of Residents 18518121 18197382 19955872 20139696 20081261 1.2.2 Time Deposits of Residents (Including Merger) (18626364) (18313684) (20022562) (20205125) (20145500) 1.2.2.1 Short-term Time Deposits 8333155 8188822 8980142 9062863 9036567 1.2.2.1 Short-term Time Deposits (Including Merger) (8381864) (8241158) (9010153) (9092306) (9065475) 1.2.2.1.1 Certificates of Deposits (CDs) 369399 353658 499061 494242 503843 1.2.2.2 Long-term Time Deposits 10184967 10008560 10975729 11076833 11044693 1.2.2.2 Long-term Time Deposits (Including Merger) (10244500) (10072526) (11012409) (11112819) (11080025) 1.3 'Other' Deposits with RBI 94536 80411 101629 103625 104294 1.4 Call/Term Funding from Financial Institutions 777942 810828 955100 923448 953980 2 Sources 2.1 Domestic Credit 25295986 24461941 27103156 27346110 27384392 2.1 Domestic Credit (Including Merger) (25918227) (25108664) (27592567) (27830036) (27876856) 2.1.1 Net Bank Credit to the Government 7512016 7116700 7850250 7987492 7937526 2.1.1 Net Bank Credit to the Government (Including Merger) (7603571) (7210188) (7901119) (8038367) (7988402) 2.1.1.1 Net RBI credit to the Government 1193213 934359 1000891 1104710 1047893 2.1.1.2 Credit to the Government by the Banking System 6318803 6182341 6849360 6882782 6889633 2.1.1.2 Credit to the Government by the Banking System (Including Merger) (6410358) (6275829) (6900228) (6933657) (6940509) 2.1.2 Bank Credit to the Commercial Sector 17783970 17345240 19252905 19358618 19446866 2.1.2 Bank Credit to the Commercial Sector (Including Merger) (18314656) (17898476) (19691448) (19791669) (19888454) 2.1.2.1 RBI Credit to the Commercial Sector 14406 5237 10519 10512 22760 2.1.2.2 Credit to the Commercial Sector by the Banking System 17769564 17340003 19242386 19348106 19424106 2.1.2.2 Credit to the Commercial Sector by the Banking System (Including Merger) (18300250) (17893239) (19680929) (19781157) (19865694) 2.1.2.2.1 Other Investments ( Non-SLR Securities) 1089184 1087256 1146977 1189681 1201967 2.2 Government's Currency Liabilities to the Public 33432 32887 35683 35683 35683 2.3 Net Foreign Exchange Assets of the Banking Sector 5111079 4952946 5300371 5247997 5321759 2.3.1 Net Foreign Exchange Assets of the RBI 5241083 4975898 5324382 5225611 5272023 2.3.2 Net Foreign Currency Assets of the Banking System -130004 -22951 -24011 22386 49737 2.4 Capital Account 3912897 3977586 4396751 4403935 4467201 2.5 Other items (net) 1653834 1090755 1281889 1361080 1408009 Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with a bank. 136 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 9: Liquidity Aggregates (₹ Crore) Aggregates 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. Nov. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 1 NM₃ 25387764 24909855 27122450 27183290 27294849 (25496006) (25026157) (27191610) (27249981) (27359088) 2 Postal Deposits 729246 713503 732774 732774 732774 3 L₁ ( 1 + 2) 26117010 25623358 27855224 27916064 28027623 (26225252) (25739660) (27924384) (27982755) (28091862) 4 Liabilities of Financial Institutions 85150 76805 66263 73559 75298 4.1 Term Money Borrowings 2375 1990 26 16 16 4.2 Certificates of Deposit 70245 61750 52765 59920 61430 4.3 Term Deposits 12531 13065 13473 13622 13852 5 L₂ (3 + 4) 26202160 25700164 27921487 27989623 28102921 (26310403) (25816465) (27990647) (28056313) (28167160) 6 Public Deposits with Non-Banking Financial Companies 102994 .. .. 116921 .. 7 L₃ (5 + 6) 26305155 .. .. 28106544 .. Note : 1. Figures in the columns might not add up to the total due to rounding off of numbers. 2. Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with a bank. RBI Bulletin March 2025 137CURRENT STATISTICS No. 10: Reserve Bank of India Survey (₹ Crore) Item Outstanding as on March 31/last reporting Fridays of the month/reporting Fridays 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 1 Components 1.1 Currency in Circulation 3511461 3419207 3561202 3589967 3599978 1.2 Bankers’ Deposits with the RBI 1025449 994201 1000260 988744 948414 1.2.1 Scheduled Commercial Banks 956011 933808 939428 930602 889895 1.3 ‘Other’ Deposits with the RBI 94536 80411 101629 103625 104294 Reserve Money (1.1 + 1.2 + 1.3 = 2.1 + 2.2 + 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5) 4631446 4493820 4663090 4682337 4652687 2 Sources 2.1 RBI’s Domestic Credit 1147066 1206417 1194202 1331790 1331978 2.1.1 Net RBI credit to the Government 1193213 934359 1000891 1104710 1047893 2.1.1.1 Net RBI credit to the Central Government (2.1.1.1.1 + 2.1.1.1.2 + 2.1.1.1.3 + 2.1.1.1.4 – 2.1.1.1.5) 1186655 921591 979092 1090132 1027441 2.1.1.1.1 Loans and Advances to the Central Government - - - - - 2.1.1.1.2 Investments in Treasury Bills - - - - - 2.1.1.1.3 Investments in dated Government Securities 1363369 1358899 1253916 1255213 1288414 2.1.1.1.3.1 Central Government Securities 1363369 1358899 1253916 1255213 1288414 2.1.1.1.4 Rupee Coins 459 296 278 342 408 2.1.1.1.5 Deposits of the Central Government 177172 437603 275101 165423 261381 2.1.1.2 Net RBI credit to State Governments 6557 12768 21798 14578 20452 2.1.2 RBI’s Claims on Banks -60553 266820 182792 216568 261325 2.1.2.1 Loans and Advances to Scheduled Commercial Banks -60553 266820 182792 216568 261325 2.1.3 RBI’s Credit to Commercial Sector 14406 5237 10519 10512 22760 2.1.3.1 Loans and Advances to Primary Dealers 9358 3174 8459 8546 9556 2.1.3.2 Loans and Advances to NABARD - - - - - 2.2 Government’s Currency Liabilities to the Public 33432 32887 35683 35683 35683 2.3 Net Foreign Exchange Assets of the RBI 5241083 4975898 5324382 5225611 5272023 2.3.1 Gold 439319 394644 566843 583572 600379 2.3.2 Foreign Currency Assets 4801764 4581255 4757541 4642039 4671640 2.4 Capital Account 1589134 1670689 1803583 1812997 1870465 2.5 Other Items (net) 201000 50693 87594 97750 116532 No. 11: Reserve Money - Components and Sources (₹ Crore) Item Outstanding as on March 31/last Fridays of the month/Fridays 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Jan. 3 Jan. 10 Jan. 17 Jan. 24 Jan. 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Reserve Money (1.1 + 1.2 + 1.3 = 2.1 + 2.2 + 2.3 + 2.4 + 2.5 – 2.6) 4631446 4493820 4632320 4682337 4653249 4652687 4689418 1 Components 1.1 Currency in Circulation 3511461 3419207 3561655 3589967 3594621 3599978 3600982 1.2 Bankers' Deposits with RBI 1025449 994201 967198 988744 954987 948414 982697 1.3 ‘Other’ Deposits with RBI 94536 80411 103468 103625 103641 104294 105739 2 Sources 2.1 Net Reserve Bank Credit to Government 1193213 934359 1177644 1104710 1144445 1047893 1189067 2.2 Reserve Bank Credit to Banks -60553 266820 30725 216568 181949 261325 154192 2.3 Reserve Bank Credit to Commercial Sector 14406 5237 9952 10512 15982 22760 22953 2.4 Net Foreign Exchange Assets of RBI 5241083 4975898 5290108 5225611 5249634 5272023 5305327 2.5 Government's Currency Liabilities to the Public 33432 32887 35683 35683 35683 35683 36017 2.6 Net Non- Monetary Liabilities of RBI 1790134 1721382 1911792 1910748 1974445 1986997 2018138 138 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 12: Commercial Bank Survey (₹ Crore) Item Outstanding as on last reporting Fridays of the month/ reporting Fridays of the month 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 1 Components 1.1 Aggregate Deposits of Residents 20145188 19740368 21711317 21799489 21774443 (20253430) (19856670) (21778008) (21864918) (21838682) 1.1.1 Demand Deposits 2443853 2355015 2569573 2478180 2510913 1.1.2 Time Deposits of Residents 17701334 17385354 19141745 19321310 19263530 (17809577) (17501655) (19208435) (19386738) (19327769) 1.1.2.1 Short-term Time Deposits 7965600 7823409 8613785 8694589 8668588 1.1.2.1.1 Certificates of Deposits (CDs) 369399 353658 499061 494242 503843 1.1.2.2 Long-term Time Deposits 9735734 9561944 10527960 10626720 10594941 1.2 Call/Term Funding from Financial Institutions 777942 810828 955100 923448 953980 2 Sources 2.1 Domestic Credit 23019606 22467590 25002766 25138245 25219289 (23641847) (23114313) (25492177) (25622171) (25711754) 2.1.1 Credit to the Government 6014054 5879874 6544381 6577038 6584147 (6105610) (5973361) (6595249) (6627913) (6635022) 2.1.2 Credit to the Commercial Sector 17005551 16587716 18458385 18561207 18635143 (17536238) (17140952) (18896928) (18994258) (19076731) 2.1.2.1 Bank Credit 15901477 15490356 17304495 17367609 17426890 (16432164) (16043592) (17743037) (17800660) (17868479) 2.1.2.1.1 Non-food Credit 15878397 15444737 17248356 17309886 17370711 (16409083) (15997973) (17686899) (17742937) (17812300) 2.1.2.2 Net Credit to Primary Dealers 22904 18260 15378 12367 14744 2.1.2.3 Investments in Other Approved Securities 949 807 498 513 504 2.1.2.4 Other Investments (in non-SLR Securities) 1080222 1078293 1138015 1180718 1193005 2.2 Net Foreign Currency Assets of Commercial Banks (2.2.1-2.2.2-2.2.3) -130004 -22951 -24011 22386 49737 2.2.1 Foreign Currency Assets 241661 300706 443646 489771 520849 2.2.2 Non-resident Foreign Currency Repatriable Fixed Deposits 221796 202482 284584 286257 287890 2.2.3 Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings 149868 121175 183074 181129 183222 2.3 Net Bank Reserves (2.3.1+2.3.2-2.3.3) 893350 751085 845902 795218 713399 2.3.1 Balances with the RBI 931483 933808 939428 930602 889895 2.3.2 Cash in Hand 89433 84097 89267 81185 84829 2.3.3 Loans and Advances from the RBI 127566 266820 182792 216568 261325 2.4 Capital Account 2299592 2282726 2568998 2566767 2572565 2.5 Other items (net) (2.1+2.2+2.3-2.4-1.1-1.2) 560230 361801 589242 666145 681437 2.5.1 Other Demand and Time Liabilities (net of 2.2.3) 787560 769739 813552 801722 807699 2.5.2 Net Inter-Bank Liabilities (other than to PDs) 197781 194211 132284 144231 153034 Figures in parentheses include the impact of merger of a non-bank with a bank. No. 13: Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Investments (₹ Crore) Item As on 2024 2025 March 22, 2024 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 1 2 3 4 5 1 SLR Securities 6106558 5974168 6595747 6628426 6635526 (6015003) (5880681) (6544879) (6577551) (6584651) 2 Other Government Securities (Non-SLR) 177136 177924 157389 161152 164435 3 Commercial Paper 61175 49323 60941 60955 58059 4 Shares issued by 4.1 PSUs 8475 8879 13264 13168 13078 4.2 Private Corporate Sector 77722 80230 97546 96894 96841 4.3 Others 5624 5616 7491 7481 7505 5 Bonds/Debentures issued by 5.1 PSUs 103070 96460 127702 125328 125694 5.2 Private Corporate Sector 287596 284842 232630 235197 234938 5.3 Others 124690 109879 157698 156511 156608 6 Instruments issued by 6.1 Mutual funds 62499 81790 92068 130665 141035 6.2 Financial institutions 172340 183109 191321 193367 194810 Note: Data against column Nos. (1), (2) & (3) are Final and for column Nos. (4) & (5) data are Provisional. Data since July 14, 2023 include the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank. Figures in parentheses exclude the impact of the merger. RBI Bulletin March 2025 139CURRENT STATISTICS No. 14: Business in India - All Scheduled Banks and All Scheduled Commercial Banks (₹ Crore) Item As on the Last Reporting Friday (in case of March)/ Last Friday All Scheduled Banks All Scheduled Commercial Banks 2024 2025 2024 2025 2023-24 2023-24 Jan. Dec. Jan. Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of Reporting Banks 210 210 208 208 137 137 135 135 1 Liabilities to the Banking System 554117 539209 461496 453754 549351 534661 456515 448167 1.1 Demand and Time Deposits from Banks 298452 269499 296174 282726 294471 265719 291575 277698 1.2 Borrowings from Banks 182566 197881 138393 140165 182429 197782 138334 139948 1.3 Other Demand and Time Liabilities 73100 71829 26929 30863 72452 71160 26606 30521 2 Liabilities to Others 22664868 22220145 24491884 24920355 22190597 21760894 24014317 24436108 2.1 Aggregate Deposits 20932067 20501415 22522349 22944468 20475226 20059152 22062591 22478747 (20823825) (20385113) (22455658) (22880802) (20366984) (19942850) (21995901) (22415081) 2.1.1 Demand 2492916 2403089 2617452 2713641 2443853 2355015 2569573 2665610 2.1.2 Time 18439151 18098326 19904896 20230827 18031373 17704137 19493019 19813137 2.2 Borrowings 782260 815756 959775 905090 777942 810828 955100 900495 2.3 Other Demand and Time Liabilities 950541 902974 1009761 1070797 937428 890914 996626 1056866 3 Borrowings from Reserve Bank 222716 337637 244697 256989 222716 337637 244697 256989 3.1 Against Usance Bills /Promissory Notes - - - - - - - - 3.2 Others 222716 337637 244697 256989 222716 337637 244697 256989 4 Cash in Hand and Balances with Reserve Bank 1043272 1039630 1051004 1040610 1020916 1017905 1028694 1019921 4.1 Cash in Hand 91886 86504 91928 98119 89433 84097 89267 95838 4.2 Balances with Reserve Bank 951386 953126 959076 942491 931483 933808 939428 924083 5 Assets with the Banking System 455057 431114 410612 394465 374474 358710 339609 321252 5.1 Balances with Other Banks 246384 244412 271169 252244 198327 199024 216738 199731 5.1.1 In Current Account 12010 12583 16333 12608 8971 10038 13938 10034 5.1.2 In Other Accounts 234373 231829 254836 239636 189357 188986 202800 189697 5.2 Money at Call and Short Notice 39614 39669 30173 33505 12355 17404 18342 19311 5.3 Advances to Banks 51325 44910 42099 42812 48368 42300 40682 39374 5.4 Other Assets 117734 102122 67172 65903 115424 99982 63847 62835 6 Investment 6256962 6122017 6747371 6785751 6106558 5974168 6595747 6633676 (6165407) (6028529) (6696503) (6734869) (6015003) (5880681) (6544879) (6582794) 6.1 Government Securities 6249319 6115133 6739533 6777484 6105610 5973361 6595249 6633133 6.2 Other Approved Securities 7643 6884 7839 8267 949 807 498 544 7 Bank Credit 16866336 16472360 18194821 18514465 16432164 16043592 17743037 18055619 (16335650) (15919124) (17756278) (18076210) (15901477) (15490356) (17304495) (17617364) 7a Food Credit 75472 94822 106755 105577 23081 45619 56139 54961 7.1 Loans, Cash-credits and Overdrafts 16565348 16190447 17870643 18178056 16134303 15764523 17422048 17722634 7.2 Inland Bills-Purchased 60471 51383 73546 76575 60467 51372 72063 74881 7.3 Inland Bills-Discounted 199761 191500 212904 216741 197358 189237 211819 215621 7.4 Foreign Bills-Purchased 16662 16786 15770 18142 16412 16575 15551 17917 7.5 Foreign Bills-Discounted 24094 22244 21957 24951 23624 21885 21557 24565 Note: Data in column Nos. (4) & (8) are Provisional Data since July 2023 include the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank. Figures in parentheses exclude the impact of the merger. 140 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 15: Deployment of Gross Bank Credit by Major Sectors (₹ Crore) Outstanding as on Growth(%) Mar. 22, Financial Sector 2024 2024 2025 year so far Y-o-Y Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 24 2024-25 2025 1 2 3 4 % % I. Bank Credit (II + III) 16432164 16043592 17742873 17874756 8.8 11.4 (15901477) (15490356) (17304330) (17433167) (9.6) (12.5) II. Food Credit 23081 45619 56139 56179 143.4 23.1 III. Non-food Credit 16409083 15997973 17686734 17818577 8.6 11.4 (15878397) (15444737) (17248192) (17376988) (9.4) (12.5) 1. Agriculture & Allied Activities 2071251 2009090 2239028 2253510 8.8 12.2 2. Industry (Micro and Small, Medium and Large) 3652804 3586425 3854429 3874601 6.1 8.0 (3635810) (3569346) (3842044) (3862535) (6.2) (8.2) 2.1 Micro and Small 726315 710740 771039 778391 7.2 9.5 2.2 Medium 303998 292053 348108 345986 13.8 18.5 2.3 Large 2622490 2583632 2735282 2750224 4.9 6.4 3. Services 4592227 4457085 4962520 5013597 9.2 12.5 (4490467) (4341029) (4888308) (4941743) (10.0) (13.8) 3.1 Transport Operators 230175 227091 252966 253917 10.3 11.8 3.2 Computer Software 25917 26312 31582 33729 30.1 28.2 3.3 Tourism, Hotels & Restaurants 77513 76956 80218 81478 5.1 5.9 3.4 Shipping 7067 7104 7102 7180 1.6 1.1 3.5 Aviation 43248 44372 45979 44788 3.6 0.9 3.6 Professional Services 167234 161390 189578 190859 14.1 18.3 3.7 Trade 1025752 987612 1111227 1131031 10.3 14.5 3.7.1. Wholesale Trade¹ 538744 518664 584857 612701 13.7 18.1 3.7.2 Retail Trade 487008 468948 526370 518330 6.4 10.5 3.8 Commercial Real Estate 469013 459751 520913 523535 11.6 13.9 (400470) (377941) (470949) (476106) (18.9) (26.0) 3.9 Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)² of which, 1548027 1503363 1621767 1618650 4.6 7.7 3.9.1 Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) 325626 337673 319910 325646 0.0 -3.6 3.9.2 Public Financial Institutions (PFIs) 226963 210586 218657 219865 -3.1 4.4 3.10 Other Services³ 998281 963135 1101188 1128430 13.0 17.2 (978198) (942207) (1084711) (1112253) (13.7) (18.0) 4. Personal Loans 5331290 5214317 5794866 5831547 9.4 11.8 (4919468) (4794254) (5442956) (5473924) (11.3) (14.2) 4.1 Consumer Durables 23713 24147 24012 23508 -0.9 -2.6 4.2 Housing 2718715 2658077 2931739 2950974 8.5 11.0 (2331935) (2263913) (2601206) (2614403) (12.1) (15.5) 4.3 Advances against Fixed Deposits 125239 116831 140998 135900 8.5 16.3 4.4 Advances to Individuals against share & bonds 8492 7340 9791 9765 15.0 33.0 4.5 Credit Card Outstanding 257016 258503 291087 292084 13.6 13.0 4.6 Education 119380 117186 133140 135864 13.8 15.9 4.7 Vehicle Loans 573398 560968 613302 615236 7.3 9.7 4.8 Loan against gold jewellery⁴ 102562 101115 172581 178861 74.4 76.9 4.9 Other Personal Loans 1402775 1370150 1478217 1489354 6.2 8.7 (1377966) (1344544) (1456900) (1468357) (6.6) (9.2) 5. Priority Sector (Memo) (i) Agriculture & Allied Activities⁵ 2081856 2028944 2236648 2248829 8.0 10.8 (ii) Micro & Small Enterprises⁶ 1974191 1939655 2145252 2191766 11.0 13.0 (iii) Medium Enterprises⁷ 490703 470617 575433 574228 17.0 22.0 (iv) Housing 755222 756997 751317 747261 -1.1 -1.3 (660572) (659871) (667336) (664181) (0.5) (0.7) (v) Education Loans 62235 61682 62993 63056 1.3 2.2 (vi) Renewable Energy 5991 5564 8034 7559 26.2 35.8 (vii) Social Infrastructure 2613 2580 999 983 -62.4 -61.9 (viii) Export Credit 11774 11882 12352 12739 8.2 7.2 (ix) Others 61336 64169 55134 53143 -13.4 -17.2 (x) Weaker Sections including net PSLC- SF/MF 1647778 1619097 1748608 1793997 8.9 10.8 RBI Bulletin March 2025 141CURRENT STATISTICS No. 16: Industry-wise Deployment of Gross Bank Credit (₹ Crore) Outstanding as on Growth(%) Financial 2024 2025 Y-o-Y Mar. 22, year so far Industry 2024 Jan. 26 Dec. 27 Jan. 24 2025-26 2025 1 2 3 4 % % 2 Industries (2.1 to 2.19) 3652804 3586425 3854429 3874601 6.1 8.0 (3635810) (3569346) (3842044) (3862535) (6.2) (8.2) 2.1 Mining & Quarrying (incl. Coal) 54166 52757 53892 53191 -1.8 0.8 2.2 Food Processing 208864 195763 211986 217363 4.1 11.0 2.2.1 Sugar 26383 19920 19889 23147 -12.3 16.2 2.2.2 Edible Oils & Vanaspati 19700 19802 21798 21313 8.2 7.6 2.2.3 Tea 5692 5967 6470 6116 7.5 2.5 2.2.4 Others 157089 150074 163829 166786 6.2 11.1 2.3 Beverage & Tobacco 31136 28624 30669 30468 -2.1 6.4 2.4 Textiles 256048 252975 264055 267676 4.5 5.8 2.4.1 Cotton Textiles 99199 96847 98163 101271 2.1 4.6 2.4.2 Jute Textiles 4280 4233 4340 4328 1.1 2.2 2.4.3 Man-Made Textiles 45111 45854 48251 49071 8.8 7.0 2.4.4 Other Textiles 107458 106041 113303 113005 5.2 6.6 2.5 Leather & Leather Products 12588 12134 12804 12711 1.0 4.8 2.6 Wood & Wood Products 23839 23748 26601 26895 12.8 13.2 2.7 Paper & Paper Products 46426 45875 51508 51885 11.8 13.1 2.8 Petroleum, Coal Products & Nuclear Fuels 132356 129735 139840 154402 16.7 19.0 2.9 Chemicals & Chemical Products 249347 242309 263647 265385 6.4 9.5 2.9.1 Fertiliser 37569 33977 31829 31244 -16.8 -8.0 2.9.2 Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 81036 79658 88026 88010 8.6 10.5 2.9.3 Petro Chemicals 23157 22679 26038 27832 20.2 22.7 2.9.4 Others 107584 105995 117754 118299 10.0 11.6 2.10 Rubber, Plastic & their Products 90420 89863 98914 100175 10.8 11.5 2.11 Glass & Glassware 12090 11732 12507 12611 4.3 7.5 2.12 Cement & Cement Products 59757 59193 61541 60576 1.4 2.3 2.13 Basic Metal & Metal Product 384447 380536 432757 434354 13.0 14.1 2.13.1 Iron & Steel 273803 269707 306185 308145 12.5 14.3 2.13.2 Other Metal & Metal Product 110645 110830 126572 126210 14.1 13.9 2.14 All Engineering 196643 194009 227079 229142 16.5 18.1 2.14.1 Electronics 43175 44413 50108 51243 18.7 15.4 2.14.2 Others 153468 149596 176972 177899 15.9 18.9 2.15 Vehicles, Vehicle Parts & Transport Equipment 113185 109035 115180 117775 4.1 8.0 2.16 Gems & Jewellery 84860 82137 87797 86364 1.8 5.1 2.17 Construction 133520 133824 143789 145199 8.7 8.5 2.18 Infrastructure 1304096 1288823 1314369 1309202 0.4 1.6 2.18.1 Power 644042 636084 656191 664682 3.2 4.5 2.18.2 Telecommunications 138192 136797 124624 124061 -10.2 -9.3 2.18.3 Roads 318072 317275 325833 314494 -1.1 -0.9 2.18.4 Airports 7280 6888 8733 8682 19.3 26.0 2.18.5 Ports 6681 7171 6282 5465 -18.2 -23.8 2.18.6 Railways 13062 12074 13325 13306 1.9 10.2 2.18.7 Other Infrastructure 176767 172534 179380 178513 1.0 3.5 2.19 Other Industries 259016 253352 305493 299228 15.5 18.1 Note: (1) Data since July 28, 2023 include the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank. Figures in parentheses exclude the impact of the merger. 142 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 17: State Co-operative Banks Maintaining Accounts with the Reserve Bank of India (₹ Crore) Last Reporting Friday (in case of March)/Last Friday/ Item Reporting Friday 2023 2024 2023-24 Dec. 29 Oct. 18 Oct. 25 Nov. 01 Nov. 15 Nov. 29 Dec. 13 Dec. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of Reporting Banks 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 1 Aggregate Deposits (2.1.1.2+2.2.1.2) 138788.9 134207.5 131965.1 132037.8 132552.8 138073.1 138154.1 131867.2 140702.2 2 Demand and Time Liabilities 2.1 Demand Liabilities 3022 6.7 28479.2 25419.0 25724.0 25854.5 26021.8 26 562.1 2632 9.5 25817 .1 2.1.1 Deposits 2.1.1.1 Inter-Bank 9101.3 6777.1 7243.0 7210.1 7147.7 7239.1 6670.1 6850.3 6676.5 2.1.1.2 Others 15000.4 14679 .1 13121.6 13179.2 13327.5 13293.6 13187.7 12967.4 13201.0 2.1.2 Borrowings from Banks 130.0 190.0 639.7 574.6 449.8 1454.3 1576.4 997.9 2.1.3 Other Demand Liabilities 5995.0 7023.0 4864.4 4695.0 4804.7 5039.2 5249.9 4935.4 4941.7 2.2 Time Liabilities 198141.8 178662.9 177986.9 177577.6 177539.8 178177.3 176625.0 168281.8 179599.5 2.2.1 Deposits 2.2.1.1 Inter-Bank 72308.4 55648.9 56392.3 56169.6 55653.7 51788.5 50047.3 47748.7 50440.5 2.2.1.2 Others 123788.5 119528.4 118843.5 118858.6 119225.3 124779.5 124966.4 118899.8 127501.2 2.2.2 Borrowings from Banks 673.6 2244.3 1712.2 1460.2 1591.7 651.9 651.9 651.9 651.9 2.2.3 Other Time Liabilities 1371.3 1241.3 1038.9 1089.2 1069.1 957.3 959.5 981.4 1005.9 3 Borrowing from Reserve Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 Borrowings from a notified bank / Government 95914.5 88584.8 89225.0 88927.0 89398.0 173712.9 112111.7 114646.7 112137.9 4.1 Demand 27317.7 22764.0 25217.3 24980.3 25033.3 102827.6 45109.3 44426.4 44100.3 4.2 Time 68596.8 65820.8 64007.2 64224.1 64364.7 70885.3 67002.4 70220.3 68037.6 5 Cash in Hand and Balances with Reserve Bank 16263.7 11065.3 12371.3 11411.6 13169.8 12004.2 11145.5 12024.9 11868.9 5.1 Cash in Hand 960.0 766.3 838.2 818.0 828.9 772.6 821.1 773.9 845.0 5.2 Balance with Reserve Bank 15303.7 10299.0 11533.2 10593.6 12340.9 11231.6 10324.4 11251.0 11023.9 6 Balances with Other Banks in Current Account 2088.1 1645.3 1229.3 1135.9 1084.0 1035.0 1118.1 1287.5 1010.4 7 Investments in Government Securities 77700.5 74036.6 73111.6 73805.6 74545.3 75275.2 75074.9 74143.9 74779.2 8 Money at Call and Short Notice 34355.3 23160.0 17854.6 16692.6 16150.3 15588.7 12457.8 13852.0 12854.5 9 Bank Credit (10.1+11) 135141.9 132527.0 135003.0 136490.2 136802.8 167629.4 166666.0 141596.3 168136.4 10 Advances 10.1 Loans, Cash-Credits and Overdrafts 134936.8 132420.5 134807.4 136282.1 136593.9 167432.0 166480.4 141403.7 167935.8 10.2 Due from Banks 14218 5.2 133287.7 141859.4 142706.5 143073.6 1 13950.8 111 546.4 11068 1.2 110877. 6 11 Bills Purchased and Discounted 205.1 106.5 195.6 208.1 208.9 197.4 185.6 192.6 200.6 RBI Bulletin March 2025 143CURRENT STATISTICS Prices and Production No. 18: Consumer Price Index (Base: 2012=100) Group/Sub group 2023-24 Rural Urban Combined Rural Urban Combined Feb.24 Jan.25 Feb.25 (P) Feb.24 Jan.25 Feb.25 (P) Feb.24 Jan.25 Feb.25 (P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 Food and beverages 185.9 192.7 188.4 187.8 198.8 195.4 194.6 204.6 201.3 190.3 200.9 197.6 1.1 Cereals and products 181.4 181.7 181.5 188.6 199.8 200.6 188.3 197.5 198.6 188.5 199.1 200.0 1.2 Meat and fish 213.0 221.3 215.9 214.8 220.9 219.2 223.9 230.8 228.9 218.0 224.4 222.6 1.3 Egg 185.4 189.5 187.0 201.7 206.0 194.8 204.7 210.8 200.0 202.9 207.9 196.8 1.4 Milk and products 181.4 181.5 181.4 182.9 187.7 187.6 183.2 188.2 188.4 183.0 187.9 187.9 1.5 Oils and fats 165.3 158.7 162.9 160.2 189.0 188.9 155.1 175.6 176.0 158.3 184.1 184.2 1.6 Fruits 172.1 179.9 175.7 169.2 192.0 195.0 174.0 193.8 198.8 171.4 192.8 196.8 1.7 Vegetables 183.9 229.9 199.5 179.8 203.5 181.3 226.1 245.6 217.0 195.5 217.8 193.4 1.8 Pulses and products 192.2 196.5 193.7 200.8 207.7 200.2 206.0 213.0 205.2 202.6 209.5 201.9 1.9 Sugar and confectionery 126.2 128.1 126.9 128.7 129.6 131.4 130.7 132.4 133.8 129.4 130.5 132.2 1.10 Spices 238.0 228.4 234.8 240.7 227.2 224.9 232.0 222.9 222.0 237.8 225.8 223.9 1.11 Non-alcoholic beverages 180.7 168.2 175.5 182.2 187.7 188.3 169.9 176.6 177.2 177.1 183.1 183.7 1.12 Prepared meals, snacks, sweets 193.3 200.9 196.8 195.4 201.7 202.4 204.0 212.9 213.9 199.4 206.9 207.7 2 Pan, tobacco and intoxicants 202.0 207.1 203.3 203.7 208.3 209.0 209.5 212.6 213.2 205.2 209.4 210.1 3 Clothing and footwear 192.9 181.5 188.4 194.8 199.7 199.8 183.4 188.1 188.6 190.3 195.1 195.4 3.1 Clothing 193.5 183.5 189.6 195.4 200.6 200.7 185.5 190.3 190.8 191.5 196.5 196.8 3.2 Footwear 189.4 170.2 181.4 190.9 193.9 194.1 172.0 176.0 176.2 183.0 186.5 186.7 4 Housing -- 176.7 176.7 -- -- -- 178.5 182.6 183.7 178.5 182.6 183.7 5 Fuel and light 183.0 178.9 181.4 183.8 182.8 182.8 175.6 170.6 171.0 180.7 178.2 178.3 6 Miscellaneous 181.7 173.7 177.8 183.8 191.5 192.8 175.5 182.7 183.7 179.8 187.2 188.4 6.1 Household goods and services 181.5 171.8 176.9 183.3 187.3 187.7 173.3 178.8 179.2 178.6 183.3 183.7 6.2 Health 190.8 185.2 188.7 193.8 200.8 201.6 188.3 195.4 196.2 191.7 198.8 199.6 6.3 Transport and communication 171.1 161.4 166.0 172.2 177.3 177.7 162.3 166.1 166.5 167.0 171.4 171.8 6.4 Recreation and amusement 175.8 171.1 173.2 177.4 181.6 182.0 172.5 177.1 177.3 174.6 179.1 179.4 6.5 Education 184.0 179.1 181.1 186.0 192.5 192.6 180.9 188.0 188.2 183.0 189.9 190.0 6.6 Personal care and effects 186.3 187.4 186.8 188.8 208.4 214.1 190.1 210.3 216.3 189.3 209.2 215.0 General Index (All Groups) 185.6 182.4 184.1 187.4 195.9 194.5 184.0 190.6 190.1 185.8 193.4 192.5 Source: National Statistical Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. P: Provisional No. 19: Other Consumer Price Indices Item Base Year Linking 2023-24 2024 2025 Factor Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers 2016 2.88 137.9 138.9 143.7 143.2 2 Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers 1986-87 5.89 1229 1258 1320 1316 3 Consumer Price Index for Rural Labourers 1986-87 - 1240 1268 1331 1328 Source: Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India. No. 20: Monthly Average Price of Gold and Silver in Mumbai Item 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 1 Standard Gold (₹ per 10 grams) 60624 62322 76195 79079 2 Silver (₹ per kilogram) 72243 71723 89265 90020 Source: India Bullion & Jewellers Association Ltd., Mumbai for Gold and Silver prices in Mumbai. 144 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 21: Wholesale Price Index (Base: 2011-12 = 100) Commodities Weight 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. Dec. Jan.(P) Feb.(P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 ALL COMMODITIES 100.000 151.4 151.2 155.7 154.7 154.8 1.1 PRIMARY ARTICLES 22.618 183.0 181.5 193.8 189.9 186.6 1.1.1 FOOD ARTICLES 15.256 191.3 189.4 207.5 199.9 195.8 1.1.1.1 Food Grains (Cereals+Pulses) 3.462 193.8 201.5 213.7 213.2 212.1 1.1.1.2 Fruits & Vegetables 3.475 210.2 187.7 244.7 210.8 198.1 1.1.1.3 Milk 4.440 180.3 183.5 185.6 187.2 186.4 1.1.1.4 Eggs, Meat & Fish 2.402 172.1 169.0 174.7 174.7 171.5 1.1.1.5 Condiments & Spices 0.529 235.4 248.9 240.2 232.6 213.1 1.1.1.6 Other Food Articles 0.948 189.5 197.6 216.3 217.1 223.0 1.1.2 NON-FOOD ARTICLES 4.119 162.4 159.1 166.2 167.4 166.8 1.1.2.1 Fibres 0.839 168.0 159.6 159.3 161.7 161.8 1.1.2.2 Oil Seeds 1.115 185.0 178.7 182.8 183.0 178.9 1.1.2.3 Other non-food Articles 1.960 134.9 133.3 140.7 142.7 143.1 1.1.2.4 Floriculture 0.204 279.7 297.9 349.3 343.7 349.2 1.1.3 MINERALS 0.833 217.7 225.0 230.1 230.1 227.2 1.1.3.1 Metallic Minerals 0.648 204.2 209.7 219.1 219.1 216.3 1.1.3.2 Other Minerals 0.185 265.0 278.9 268.7 268.8 265.5 1.1.4 CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS 2.410 153.6 155.0 141.9 150.9 148.7 1.2 FUEL & POWER 13.152 152.0 154.9 151.8 150.6 153.8 1.2.1 COAL 2.138 136.4 136.0 135.6 135.6 135.6 1.2.1.1 Coking Coal 0.647 143.4 143.4 143.4 143.4 143.4 1.2.1.2 Non-Coking Coal 1.401 124.8 125.8 125.8 125.8 125.8 1.2.1.3 Lignite 0.090 267.6 241.8 231.2 231.2 231.0 1.2.2 MINERAL OILS 7.950 159.0 159.2 153.9 155.0 157.9 1.2.3 ELECTRICITY 3.064 145.0 157.0 157.5 149.7 156.1 1.3 MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS 64.231 140.2 139.8 143.0 143.2 143.8 1.3.1 MANUFACTURE OF FOOD PRODUCTS 9.122 160.5 160.1 176.8 177.0 177.8 1.3.1.1 Processing and Preserving of meat 0.134 145.3 147.4 155.7 156.8 158.1 1.3.1.2 Processing and Preserving of fish, Crustaceans, Molluscs and products thereof 0.204 142.9 143.2 143.5 145.1 146.0 1.3.1.3 Processing and Preserving of fruit and Vegetables 0.138 130.4 130.0 133.3 132.8 132.3 1.3.1.4 Vegetable and Animal oils and Fats 2.643 145.0 141.1 185.6 186.6 188.5 1.3.1.5 Dairy products 1.165 179.1 179.1 182.1 182.0 182.8 1.3.1.6 Grain mill products 2.010 175.6 181.8 189.5 189.6 189.8 1.3.1.7 Starches and Starch products 0.110 157.1 165.7 165.1 164.5 162.8 1.3.1.8 Bakery products 0.215 165.4 166.0 173.7 174.7 174.9 1.3.1.9 Sugar, Molasses & honey 1.163 134.6 136.9 136.0 138.3 141.4 1.3.1.10 Cocoa, Chocolate and Sugar confectionery 0.175 139.8 143.6 167.2 168.3 172.2 1.3.1.11 Macaroni, Noodles, Couscous and Similar farinaceous products 0.026 149.9 149.3 166.4 161.0 159.2 1.3.1.12 Tea & Coffee products 0.371 176.2 150.1 173.0 161.8 156.1 1.3.1.13 Processed condiments & salt 0.163 192.1 196.9 192.5 193.8 192.1 1.3.1.14 Processed ready to eat food 0.024 146.3 148.1 154.7 155.5 154.7 1.3.1.15 Health supplements 0.225 179.1 179.7 189.0 189.6 188.1 1.3.1.16 Prepared animal feeds 0.356 208.3 203.7 201.7 200.4 197.4 1.3.2 MANUFACTURE OF BEVERAGES 0.909 131.5 132.3 134.5 134.4 134.5 1.3.2.1 Wines & spirits 0.408 133.3 133.9 137.0 136.9 137.4 1.3.2.2 Malt liquors and Malt 0.225 135.6 136.1 139.0 138.9 138.9 1.3.2.3 Soft drinks; Production of mineral waters and Other bottled waters 0.275 125.5 126.8 127.2 127.1 126.5 1.3.3 MANUFACTURE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS 0.514 173.5 175.2 180.3 177.4 180.0 1.3.3.1 Tobacco products 0.514 173.5 175.2 180.3 177.4 180.0 RBI Bulletin March 2025 145CURRENT STATISTICS No. 21: Wholesale Price Index (Contd.) (Base: 2011-12 = 100) Commodities Weight 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. Dec. Jan.(P) Feb.(P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.3.4 MANUFACTURE OF TEXTILES 4.881 134.6 134.4 136.8 136.9 137.0 1.3.4.1 Preparation and Spinning of textile fibres 2.582 120.1 119.8 120.7 120.6 120.8 1.3.4.2 Weaving & Finishing of textiles 1.509 157.5 156.5 161.2 160.9 161.1 1.3.4.3 Knitted and Crocheted fabrics 0.193 120.0 120.3 123.7 124.1 124.8 1.3.4.4 Made-up textile articles, Except apparel 0.299 156.6 157.5 161.5 161.7 160.4 1.3.4.5 Cordage, Rope, Twine and Netting 0.098 139.2 139.9 144.4 146.1 147.8 1.3.4.6 Other textiles 0.201 129.6 132.5 133.7 136.7 136.5 1.3.5 MANUFACTURE OF WEARING APPAREL 0.814 150.8 151.7 154.4 154.1 154.3 1.3.5.1 Manufacture of Wearing Apparel (woven), Except fur Apparel 0.593 148.7 148.8 151.6 151.4 151.8 1.3.5.2 Knitted and Crocheted apparel 0.221 156.6 159.3 161.9 161.3 161.2 1.3.6 MANUFACTURE OF LEATHER AND RELATED PRODUCTS 0.535 124.1 123.7 126.0 126.3 125.8 1.3.6.1 Tanning and Dressing of leather; Dressing and Dyeing of fur 0.142 107.3 103.6 108.6 108.9 107.7 1.3.6.2 Luggage, HandbAgs, Saddlery and Harness 0.075 140.9 140.9 142.4 142.4 143.0 1.3.6.3 Footwear 0.318 127.7 128.5 129.9 130.3 129.9 1.3.7 MANUFACTURE OF WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 0.772 146.6 149.5 148.3 149.3 148.8 1.3.7.1 Saw milling and Planing of wood 0.124 137.8 140.0 140.7 141.6 141.6 1.3.7.2 Veneer sheets; Manufacture of plywood, Laminboard, Particle board and Other panels and Boards 0.493 146.1 149.9 147.5 148.7 147.5 1.3.7.3 Builder's carpentry and Joinery 0.036 206.4 210.3 214.6 214.5 215.1 1.3.7.4 Wooden containers 0.119 139.8 139.7 139.5 140.4 141.7 1.3.8 MANUFACTURE OF PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 1.113 140.3 137.9 138.3 139.4 140.8 1.3.8.1 Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 0.493 147.6 145.4 143.2 143.9 145.2 1.3.8.2 Corrugated paper and Paperboard and Containers of paper and Paperboard 0.314 140.9 142.1 148.9 149.6 150.8 1.3.8.3 Other articles of paper and Paperboard 0.306 128.0 121.3 119.7 121.5 123.7 1.3.9 PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION OF RECORDED MEDIA 0.676 182.3 184.2 188.7 189.8 190.7 1.3.9.1 Printing 0.676 182.3 184.2 188.7 189.8 190.7 1.3.10 MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 6.465 136.9 135.4 136.5 136.7 137.1 1.3.10.1 Basic chemicals 1.433 139.9 136.7 139.7 139.3 140.7 1.3.10.2 Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds 1.485 142.8 142.0 143.0 143.4 143.6 1.3.10.3 Plastic and Synthetic rubber in primary form 1.001 132.3 131.8 132.9 133.5 134.1 1.3.10.4 Pesticides and Other agrochemical products 0.454 132.8 130.0 128.7 129.2 129.2 1.3.10.5 Paints, Varnishes and Similar coatings, Printing ink and Mastics 0.491 143.7 142.9 138.6 139.2 138.5 1.3.10.6 Soap and Detergents, Cleaning and Polishing preparations, Perfumes and Toilet preparations 0.612 139.7 138.6 140.4 140.4 140.8 1.3.10.7 Other chemical products 0.692 134.4 133.2 135.1 135.0 135.1 1.3.10.8 Man-made fibres 0.296 103.6 103.4 103.9 104.3 104.1 1.3.11 MANUFACTURE OF PHARMACEUTICALS, MEDICINAL CHEMICAL AND BOTANICAL PRODUCTS 1.993 142.9 143.9 144.0 145.0 145.0 1.3.11.1 Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal chemical and Botanical products 1.993 142.9 143.9 144.0 145.0 145.0 1.3.12 MANUFACTURE OF RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 2.299 127.5 127.7 129.0 129.3 129.7 1.3.12.1 Rubber Tyres and Tubes; Retreading and Rebuilding of Rubber Tyres 0.609 113.7 113.9 117.1 116.9 117.2 1.3.12.2 Other Rubber Products 0.272 107.3 108.3 112.3 112.4 113.0 1.3.12.3 Plastics products 1.418 137.3 137.4 137.3 137.9 138.3 1.3.13 MANUFACTURE OF OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 3.202 134.7 133.8 131.7 131.8 132.6 1.3.13.1 Glass and Glass products 0.295 163.8 164.2 163.2 163.5 163.8 1.3.13.2 Refractory products 0.223 119.7 119.4 125.2 125.3 126.2 1.3.13.3 Clay Building Materials 0.121 123.9 115.1 123.3 131.9 132.4 1.3.13.4 Other Porcelain and Ceramic Products 0.222 122.3 124.0 124.6 124.9 125.1 1.3.13.5 Cement, Lime and Plaster 1.645 137.3 136.2 130.2 130.0 131.2 146 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 21: Wholesale Price Index (Contd.) (Base: 2011-12 = 100) Commodities Weight 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. Dec. Jan.(P) Feb.(P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.3.13.6 Articles of Concrete, Cement and Plaster 0.292 137.7 137.0 140.2 139.6 140.4 1.3.13.7 Cutting, Shaping and Finishing of Stone 0.234 130.3 131.2 135.9 135.5 136.0 1.3.13.8 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.169 102.4 101.5 94.6 94.1 92.2 1.3.14 MANUFACTURE OF BASIC METALS 9.646 141.0 138.5 137.5 137.1 137.6 1.3.14.1 Inputs into steel making 1.411 140.3 134.9 129.1 129.3 129.2 1.3.14.2 Metallic Iron 0.653 153.6 150.4 133.4 131.8 131.6 1.3.14.3 Mild Steel - Semi Finished Steel 1.274 119.9 116.7 116.8 116.7 117.3 1.3.14.4 Mild Steel -Long Products 1.081 141.3 138.3 139.5 138.7 138.4 1.3.14.5 Mild Steel - Flat products 1.144 143.4 140.3 130.1 129.9 129.6 1.3.14.6 Alloy steel other than Stainless Steel- Shapes 0.067 137.6 133.4 132.3 132.8 132.1 1.3.14.7 Stainless Steel - Semi Finished 0.924 136.4 129.4 129.1 127.7 127.4 1.3.14.8 Pipes & tubes 0.205 169.7 169.5 162.3 164.1 164.1 1.3.14.9 Non-ferrous metals incl. precious metals 1.693 144.8 145.0 157.5 157.3 160.8 1.3.14.10 Castings 0.925 141.0 144.1 145.3 144.8 144.6 1.3.14.11 Forgings of steel 0.271 173.3 172.4 172.1 172.4 169.7 1.3.15 MANUFACTURE OF FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 3.155 138.6 137.6 135.9 135.4 136.2 1.3.15.1 Structural Metal Products 1.031 132.3 130.7 130.8 130.2 132.0 1.3.15.2 Tanks, Reservoirs and Containers of Metal 0.660 157.6 156.0 147.8 147.4 147.0 1.3.15.3 Steam generators, Except Central Heating Hot Water Boilers 0.145 106.3 105.6 107.6 111.1 108.0 1.3.15.4 Forging, Pressing, Stamping and Roll-Forming of Metal; Powder Metallurgy 0.383 141.4 139.5 140.8 137.9 139.6 1.3.15.5 Cutlery, Hand Tools and General Hardware 0.208 108.4 109.4 102.1 102.5 102.5 1.3.15.6 Other Fabricated Metal Products 0.728 143.8 144.0 144.8 144.8 145.6 1.3.16 MANUFACTURE OF COMPUTER, ELECTRONIC AND OPTICAL PRODUCTS 2.009 119.3 119.5 121.3 121.5 121.5 1.3.16.1 Electronic Components 0.402 115.0 114.6 118.3 118.3 119.0 1.3.16.2 Computers and Peripheral Equipment 0.336 135.3 135.1 132.7 132.7 131.0 1.3.16.3 Communication Equipment 0.310 136.1 139.3 146.2 146.3 146.2 1.3.16.4 Consumer Electronics 0.641 103.6 102.7 99.8 100.0 100.6 1.3.16.5 Measuring, Testing, Navigating and Control equipment 0.181 113.8 114.0 121.1 121.9 121.9 1.3.16.6 Watches and Clocks 0.076 157.2 159.8 172.7 172.7 172.2 1.3.16.7 Irradiation, Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic equipment 0.055 108.3 108.3 115.5 116.1 117.0 1.3.16.8 Optical instruments and Photographic equipment 0.008 103.8 105.3 108.9 108.9 108.3 1.3.17 MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 2.930 131.4 131.8 133.9 134.1 134.1 1.3.17.1 Electric motors, Generators, Transformers and Electricity distribution and Control apparatus 1.298 130.1 131.3 133.0 133.1 133.0 1.3.17.2 Batteries and Accumulators 0.236 137.8 139.2 141.3 140.9 141.5 1.3.17.3 Fibre optic cables for data transmission or live transmission of images 0.133 123.4 122.4 118.0 116.8 115.9 1.3.17.4 Other electronic and Electric wires and Cables 0.428 146.1 145.2 154.0 154.8 155.2 1.3.17.5 Wiring devices, Electric lighting & display equipment 0.263 116.8 117.8 117.7 117.9 117.8 1.3.17.6 Domestic appliances 0.366 133.8 133.1 131.5 132.0 132.0 1.3.17.7 Other electrical equipment 0.206 120.9 120.6 125.0 124.7 124.8 1.3.18 MANUFACTURE OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 4.789 129.0 130.0 130.5 131.0 131.2 1.3.18.1 Engines and Turbines, Except aircraft, Vehicle and Two wheeler engines 0.638 128.9 131.2 132.5 133.3 134.5 1.3.18.2 Fluid power equipment 0.162 131.9 132.2 134.9 135.6 135.7 1.3.18.3 Other pumps, Compressors, Taps and Valves 0.552 117.4 118.0 118.9 118.8 119.0 1.3.18.4 Bearings, Gears, Gearing and Driving elements 0.340 127.7 130.5 129.6 129.7 128.6 1.3.18.5 Ovens, Furnaces and Furnace burners 0.008 83.7 85.2 87.0 87.4 87.3 1.3.18.6 Lifting and Handling equipment 0.285 128.6 129.8 129.9 129.6 130.0 RBI Bulletin March 2025 147CURRENT STATISTICS No. 21: Wholesale Price Index (Concld.) (Base: 2011-12 = 100) Commodities Weight 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. Dec. Jan.(P) Feb.(P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.3.18.7 Office machinery and Equipment 0.006 130.2 130.2 130.2 130.2 130.2 1.3.18.8 Other general-purpose machinery 0.437 145.2 144.1 141.5 142.0 140.3 1.3.18.9 Agricultural and Forestry machinery 0.833 142.5 144.1 145.8 146.7 147.0 1.3.18.10 Metal-forming machinery and Machine tools 0.224 122.5 122.6 123.1 123.1 123.3 1.3.18.11 Machinery for mining, Quarrying and Construction 0.371 88.6 88.8 90.0 91.0 91.3 1.3.18.12 Machinery for food, Beverage and Tobacco processing 0.228 124.4 124.3 126.0 126.9 127.1 1.3.18.13 Machinery for textile, Apparel and Leather production 0.192 137.2 137.8 141.3 141.6 145.1 1.3.18.14 Other special-purpose machinery 0.468 144.7 146.0 144.0 143.9 144.2 1.3.18.15 Renewable electricity generating equipment 0.046 70.8 70.0 69.0 69.0 69.3 1.3.19 MANUFACTURE OF MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 4.969 128.4 128.9 130.0 130.1 130.2 1.3.19.1 Motor vehicles 2.600 128.5 129.5 130.8 131.0 131.0 1.3.19.2 Parts and Accessories for motor vehicles 2.368 128.2 128.3 129.1 129.0 129.3 1.3.20 MANUFACTURE OF OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 1.648 143.1 143.5 145.7 145.7 145.9 1.3.20.1 Building of ships and Floating structures 0.117 163.7 163.7 177.9 188.4 188.4 1.3.20.2 Railway locomotives and Rolling stock 0.110 107.4 108.4 108.8 108.4 109.3 1.3.20.3 Motor cycles 1.302 144.7 145.2 146.8 146.0 146.2 1.3.20.4 Bicycles and Invalid carriages 0.117 137.9 137.9 135.1 134.4 134.5 1.3.20.5 Other transport equipment 0.002 159.2 160.5 163.7 165.7 164.9 1.3.21 MANUFACTURE OF FURNITURE 0.727 159.6 158.8 161.3 161.8 162.0 1.3.21.1 Furniture 0.727 159.6 158.8 161.3 161.8 162.0 1.3.22 OTHER MANUFACTURING 1.064 158.2 161.5 183.1 186.9 197.0 1.3.22.1 Jewellery and Related articles 0.996 157.9 161.6 184.6 188.8 199.5 1.3.22.2 Musical instruments 0.001 187.0 191.9 200.6 197.2 199.9 1.3.22.3 Sports goods 0.012 155.2 155.2 167.9 167.7 168.2 1.3.22.4 Games and Toys 0.005 159.6 159.9 163.7 164.4 164.9 1.3.22.5 Medical and Dental instruments and Supplies 0.049 163.1 161.2 158.6 156.5 156.5 2 FOOD INDEX 24.378 179.8 178.4 196.0 191.4 189.0 Source: Office of the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. 148 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 22: Index of Industrial Production (Base:2011-12=100) Industry Weight 2022-23 2023-24 April-January January 2023-24 2024-25 2024 2025 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 General Index 100.00 138.5 146.7 145.3 151.4 153.6 161.3 1 Sectoral Classification 1.1 Mining 14.37 119.9 128.9 125.1 129.3 144.3 150.7 1.2 Manufacturing 77.63 137.1 144.7 143.5 149.5 150.8 159.1 1.3 Electricity 7.99 185.2 198.3 198.8 209.0 197.1 201.9 2 Use-Based Classification 2.1 Primary Goods 34.05 139.2 147.7 146.1 152.0 154.3 162.8 2.2 Capital Goods 8.22 100.3 106.6 104.1 109.7 108.3 116.8 2.3 Intermediate Goods 17.22 149.4 157.3 156.1 163.3 163.8 172.3 2.4 Infrastructure/ Construction Goods 12.34 160.7 176.3 174.1 185.0 186.6 199.6 2.5 Consumer Durables 12.84 114.5 118.6 117.1 127.2 121.4 130.2 2.6 Consumer Non-Durables 15.33 147.7 153.7 154.0 152.0 164.9 164.5 Source : Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. Government Accounts and Treasury Bills No. 23: Union Government Accounts at a Glance (₹ Crore) Financial Year April – January 2024-25 Percentage to Revised Item (Revised 2024-25 2023-24 Estimates (Actuals) (Actuals) Estimates) 2024-25 2023-24 1 2 3 4 5 1 Revenue Receipts 3087960 2371188 2217909 76.8 82.2 1.1 Tax Revenue (Net) 2556960 1903558 1879840 74.4 80.9 1.2 Non-Tax Revenue 531000 467630 338069 88.1 90.0 2 Non Debt Capital Receipt 59000 29224 34219 49.5 61.1 2.1 Recovery of Loans 26000 20205 21664 77.7 83.3 2.2 Other Receipts 33000 9019 12555 27.3 41.9 3 Total Receipts (excluding borrowings) (1+2) 3146960 2400412 2252128 76.3 81.7 4 Revenue Expenditure 3698058 2812595 2633543 76.1 74.4 of which : 4.1 Interest Payments 1137940 875461 821731 76.9 77.9 5 Capital Expenditure 1018429 757359 721187 74.4 75.9 6 Total Expenditure (4+5) 4716487 3569954 3354730 75.7 74.7 7 Revenue Deficit (4-1) 610098 441407 415634 72.4 49.4 8 Fiscal Deficit (6-3) 1569527 1169542 1102602 74.5 63.6 9 Gross Primary Deficit (8-4.1) 431587 294081 280871 68.1 41.3 Source: Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance, Government of India and Union Budget 2025-26. RBI Bulletin March 2025 149CURRENT STATISTICS No. 24: Treasury Bills – Ownership Pattern (₹ Crore) 2023-24 2024 2025 Item Feb. 2 Dec. 27 Jan. 3 Jan. 10 Jan. 17 Jan. 24 Jan. 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 91-day 1.1 Banks 18054 9131 8030 4580 7076 7197 6520 7728 1.2 Primary Dealers 22676 22804 6404 9295 14235 13720 14311 13506 1.3 State Governments 5701 24142 109146 108346 108361 96762 78012 78400 1.4 Others 88670 77464 88165 92226 89489 95883 100968 107166 2 182-day 2.1 Banks 84913 73296 49106 47781 44071 42769 39047 36704 2.2 Primary Dealers 87779 72085 34108 37733 38116 42521 46104 51382 2.3 State Governments 4070 5037 8515 7515 7515 8265 8268 8243 2.4 Others 102311 83623 80386 80087 86713 84110 86549 85014 3 364-day 3.1 Banks 91819 98282 76181 75174 73432 70970 72359 73685 3.2 Primary Dealers 159085 166658 104156 109132 107108 108408 108412 109263 3.3 State Governments 41487 44282 35184 35185 35341 35656 34014 36794 3.4 Others 165095 179060 160663 155695 158461 158622 156229 153053 4 14-day Intermediate 4.1 Banks 4.2 Primary Dealers 4.3 State Governments 318736 150113 173736 120024 247038 243703 298216 271755 4.4 Others 442 181 449 1764 673 1839 838 694 Total Treasury Bills (Excluding 14 day 871662 855865 760045 762745 769916 764882 750794 760937 Intermediate T Bills) # # 14D intermediate T-Bills are non-marketable unlike 91D, 182D and 364D T-Bills. These bills are ‘intermediate’ by nature as these are liquidated to replenish shortfall in the daily minimum cash balances of State Governments. Note: Primary Dealers (PDs) include banks undertaking PD business. No. 25: Auctions of Treasury Bills (Amount in ₹ Crore) Date of Notified Bids Received Bids Accepted Total Cut- Implicit Yield Auction Amount Total Face Value Total Face Value Issue off at Cut-off Price Number Number (6+7) Price (per cent) Competitive Non- Competitive Non- ( ₹ ) Competitive Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 91-day Treasury Bills 2024-25 Jan. 1 12000 95 32115 26 16 11974 26 12000 98.38 6.5961 Jan. 8 12000 109 27051 6243 54 11957 6243 18200 98.38 6.5940 Jan. 15 12000 108 31166 13435 53 11966 13435 25401 98.38 6.6036 Jan. 22 12000 130 32847 7452 77 11948 7452 19400 98.38 6.6089 Jan. 29 12000 138 39833 2879 44 11959 2879 14838 98.39 6.5625 182-day Treasury Bills 2024-25 Jan. 1 8000 96 21130 42 38 7958 42 8000 96.76 6.7199 Jan. 8 8000 124 25863 1332 38 7968 1332 9300 96.77 6.6995 Jan. 15 8000 89 19631 780 48 7970 780 8750 96.76 6.7186 Jan. 22 8000 102 20279 980 42 7978 980 8958 96.76 6.7068 Jan. 29 8000 84 25022 1019 41 7981 1019 9000 96.78 6.6691 364-day Treasury Bills 2024-25 Jan. 1 8000 111 22719 176 34 7986 176 8162 93.74 6.6998 Jan. 8 8000 119 27817 203 52 7968 203 8172 93.75 6.6895 Jan. 15 8000 119 24784 1309 50 7967 1309 9276 93.73 6.7038 Jan. 22 8000 131 38752 1036 19 7989 1036 9025 93.76 6.6789 Jan. 29 8000 138 41006 2931 27 7990 2931 10921 93.79 6.6345 150 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS Financial Markets No. 26: Daily Call Money Rates (Per cent per annum) Range of Rates Weighted Average Rates As on Borrowings/ Lendings Borrowings/ Lendings 1 2 January 1, 2025 5.10-6.70 6.52 January 2, 2025 5.10-6.60 6.47 January 3, 2025 5.10-6.75 6.50 January 4, 2025 5.75-6.60 6.12 January 6, 2025 5.10-6.80 6.64 January 7, 2025 5.10-6.95 6.73 January 8, 2025 5.10-7.05 6.74 January 9, 2025 5.10-7.05 6.82 January 10, 2025 5.10-7.10 6.87 January 13, 2025 5.70-7.10 6.81 January 14, 2025 5.50-6.75 6.52 January 15, 2025 5.10-6.70 6.45 January 16, 2025 5.10-6.80 6.55 January 17, 2025 5.50-6.80 6.54 January 18, 2025 5.75-6.70 6.12 January 20, 2025 5.10-6.85 6.62 January 21, 2025 5.10-6.90 6.57 January 22, 2025 5.10-6.70 6.56 January 23, 2025 5.10-6.75 6.57 January 24, 2025 5.10-6.70 6.56 January 27, 2025 5.10-6.65 6.57 January 28, 2025 5.10-6.65 6.55 January 29, 2025 5.10-6.65 6.58 January 30, 2025 5.10-6.65 6.58 January 31, 2025 5.10-6.70 6.59 February 01 ,2025 5.50-6.65 6.23 February 03 ,2025 5.10-6.65 6.55 February 04 ,2025 5.10-6.65 6.49 February 05 ,2025 5.15-6.60 6.46 February 06 ,2025 5.15-6.60 6.45 February 07 ,2025 5.15-6.55 6.25 February 10 ,2025 5.15-6.45 6.29 February 11 ,2025 5.15-6.42 6.32 February 12 ,2025 5.15-6.40 6.29 February 13 ,2025 5.15-6.50 6.34 February 14 ,2025 5.15-6.50 6.35 February 15 ,2025 5.25-6.50 5.89 Note: Includes Notice Money. RBI Bulletin March 2025 151CURRENT STATISTICS No. 27: Certificates of Deposit 2024 2025 2025 Item Jan. 26 Dec. 13 Dec. 27 Jan. 10 Jan. 24 Feb. 7 Feb. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Amount Outstanding (₹ Crore) 355281.29 488257.46 494416.56 493930.59 499396.94 519276.82 513816.40 1.1 Issued during the fortnight (₹ Crore) 20013.21 74226.34 59838.75 33890.42 30080.60 71093.96 30077.77 2 Rate of Interest (per cent) 7.07-8.02 6.96-7.75 7.02-7.85 7.05-7.48 7.07-7.88 7.03-7.83 7.02-7.93 No. 28: Commercial Paper Item 2024 2025 2025 Jan. 31 Dec. 15 Dec. 31 Jan. 15 Jan. 31 Feb. 15 Feb. 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Amount Outstanding (₹ Crore) 377707.20 463801.30 435779.45 450242.05 456483.15 479257.25 465926.95 1.1 Reported during the fortnight (₹ Crore) 53532.05 98956.25 51524.05 39647.30 69001.15 80693.35 64880.85 2 Rate of Interest (per cent) 7.00-14.74 7.00-11.89 6.98-12.00 7.06-12.12 7.12-13.77 6.97-12.40 6.78-12.24 No. 29: Average Daily Turnover in Select Financial Markets (₹ Crore) Item 2023-24 2024 2025 Feb. 2 Dec. 27 Jan. 3 Jan. 10 Jan. 17 Jan. 24 Jan. 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 Call Money 17761 19483 18396 15234 17914 16683 20631 23225 2 Notice Money 2550 4491 177 4005 376 6107 598 4419 3 Term Money 871 1478 539 1113 1324 217 798 976 4 Triparty Repo 601363 687384 698889 770717 653486 779174 649147 744181 5 Market Repo 574534 635275 452238 614692 536952 661241 525850 606457 6 Repo in Corporate Bond 1817 1980 8475 8232 7738 7717 6711 7411 7 Forex (US $ million) 95115 112243 130014 109915 129738 147970 133491 137918 8 Govt. of India Dated Securities 90992 131234 63621 71586 134354 133314 127533 126216 9 State Govt. Securities 6102 6282 10874 8577 4615 7851 7675 10831 10 Treasury Bills 10.1 91-Day 5378 5796 6006 4367 3821 7629 6107 5708 10.2 182-Day 6079 2837 3089 3330 2701 2031 2691 2525 10.3 364-Day 4307 5371 2669 5103 3959 2288 1893 3326 10.4 Cash Management Bills 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 Total Govt. Securities (8+9+10) 112858 151521 86258 92962 149450 153113 145899 148605 11.1 RBI 492 1705 306 7 329 2452 4307 5572 152 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 30: New Capital Issues by Non-Government Public Limited Companies (Amount in ₹ Crore) 2023-24 2023-24 (Apr.-Jan.) 2024-25 (Apr.-Jan.) * Jan. 2024 Jan. 2025 * Security & Type of Issue No. of Amount No. of Amount No. of Amount No. of Amount No. of Amount Issues Issues Issues Issues Issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 Equity Shares 339 80942 268 61023 411 192589 25 3612 43 3572 1.1 Public 272 65832 217 54292 289 175203 22 3419 28 3066 1.2 Rights 67 15110 51 6731 122 17388 3 194 15 507 2 Public Issue of 44 16342 37 15122 38 7397 5 2190 5 685 Bonds/ Debentures 3 Total (1+2) 383 97284 305 76145 449 199986 30 5802 48 4257 3.1 Public 316 82174 254 69414 327 182599 27 5609 33 3750 3.2 Rights 67 15110 51 6731 122 17388 3 194 15 507 Note : 1. Since April 2020, monthly data on equity issues is compiled on the basis of their listing date. 2. Figures in the columns might not add up to the total due to rounding off numbers. 3. The table covers only public and rights issuances of equity and debt. It does not include data on private placement of debt, qualified institutional placements and preferential allotments. Source : Securities and Exchange Board of India. * : Data is Provisional RBI Bulletin March 2025 153CURRENT STATISTICS External Sector No. 31: Foreign Trade 2024 2025 2023-24 Item Unit Jan. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Exports ₹ Crore 3618952 310239 287698 327476 270300 322469 314229 US $ Million 437072 37324 34328 38972 32040 37944 36426 1.1 Oil ₹ Crore 696850 71607 37790 37000 30517 41187 30726 US $ Million 84157 8615 4509 4403 3617 4846 3562 1.2 Non-oil ₹ Crore 2922102 238632 249908 290476 239783 281283 283503 US $ Million 352915 28709 29819 34568 28422 33097 32864 2 Imports ₹ Crore 5616042 447827 490071 542709 538789 495169 512618 US $ Million 678215 53877 58475 64585 63865 58265 59423 2.1 Oil ₹ Crore 1480232 129050 124924 158683 134207 115546 115868 US $ Million 178733 15526 14906 18884 15908 13596 13432 2.2 Non-oil ₹ Crore 4135810 318777 365147 384026 404583 379623 396750 US $ Million 499482 38351 43569 45701 47957 44669 45992 3 Trade Balance ₹ Crore -1997090 -137588 -202373 -215233 -268490 -172700 -198389 US $ Million -241143 -16553 -24147 -25614 -31825 -20321 -22997 3.1 Oil ₹ Crore -783382 -57443 -87135 -121683 -103689 -74359 -85142 US $ Million -94576 -6911 -10397 -14481 -12291 -8750 -9870 3.2 Non-oil ₹ Crore -1213708 -80145 -115239 -93550 -164800 -98340 -113247 US $ Million -146567 -9642 -13750 -11133 -19534 -11571 -13128 Note: Data in the table are provisional. Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics. No. 32: Foreign Exchange Reserves 2024 2025 Item Unit Mar. 01 Jan. 24 Jan. 31 Feb. 07 Feb. 14 Feb. 21 Feb. 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Total Reserves ₹ Crore 5187144 5426706 5461741 5580726 5519832 5553750 5589313 US $ Million 625626 629557 630607 638261 635721 640479 638698 1.1 Foreign Currency Assets ₹ Crore 4595222 4636524 4656917 4757453 4685135 4715811 4754944 US $ Million 554231 537891 537684 544106 539591 543843 543350 1.2 Gold ₹ Crore 401430 600379 614007 631357 643824 646668 641218 US $ Million 48417 69651 70893 72208 74150 74576 73272 Volume (Metric Tonnes) 816.99 877.14 879.01 879.01 879.01 879.01 879.01 1.3 SDRs SDRs Million 13694 13705 13705 13705 13706 13706 13706 ₹ Crore 150733 153955 154942 156319 155398 155830 157504 US $ Million 18180 17861 17889 17878 17897 17971 17998 1.4 Reserve Tranche Position in IMF ₹ Crore 39760 35848 35875 35597 35476 35441 35646 US $ Million 4798 4154 4141 4069 4083 4090 4078 * Difference, if any, is due to rounding off. Note: Exclude investment in foreign currency denominated bonds issued by IIFC (UK), SDRs transferred by Government of India to RBI and foreign currency received under SAARC and ACU currency swap arrangements. Foreign currency assets in US dollar take into account appreciation/depreciation of non-US currencies (such as Euro, Sterling, Yen and Australian Dollar) held in reserves. Foreign exchange holdings are converted into rupees at rupee-US dollar RBI holding rates. No. 33: Non-Resident Deposits (US $ Million) Scheme Outstanding Flows 2024 2025 2023-24 2024-25 2023-24 Jan. Dec. Jan. (P) Apr.-Jan. Apr.-Jan.(P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 NRI Deposits 151879 147732 161804 161206 10160 14308 1.1 FCNR(B) 25733 23517 32198 32752 4154 7018 1.2 NR(E)RA 98624 97466 99565 98494 2689 3708 1.3 NRO 27522 26749 30041 29961 3317 3582 P: Provisional. 154 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 34: Foreign Investment Inflows (US $ Million) 2023-24 2024-25 (P) 2024 (P) 2025 Item 2023-24 Apr.-Jan. Apr.-Jan. Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.1 Net Foreign Direct Investment (1.1.1-1.1.2) 10129 11523 1393 3677 467 916 1.1.1 Direct Investment to India (1.1.1.1-1.1.1.2) 26807 23308 21592 4548 2257 3719 1.1.1.1 Gross Inflows/Gross Investments 71279 60173 67653 8352 6633 5784 1.1.1.1.1 Equity 45817 39175 44835 6120 4458 3451 1.1.1.1.1.1 Government (SIA/FIPB) 585 474 1864 147 1248 16 1.1.1.1.1.2 RBI 31826 26582 29954 5516 1543 2588 1.1.1.1.1.3 Acquisition of shares 12013 10975 12216 332 1583 759 1.1.1.1.1.4 Equity capital of unincorporated bodies 1394 1143 800 125 85 88 1.1.1.1.2 Reinvested earnings 19768 16213 18113 1777 1792 1854 1.1.1.1.3 Other capital 5694 4785 4704 454 383 479 1.1.1.2 Repatriation/Disinvestment 44472 36865 46061 3804 4377 2065 1.1.1.2.1 Equity 41334 34045 44320 3645 4299 2009 1.1.1.2.2 Other capital 3137 2819 1741 159 77 56 1.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment by India 16678 11785 20198 871 1790 2803 (1.1.2.1+1.1.2.2+1.1.2.3-1.1.2.4) 1.1.2.1 Equity capital 9111 6317 11796 414 1166 1928 1.1.2.2 Reinvested Earnings 5786 4821 5046 482 505 505 1.1.2.3 Other Capital 5406 3801 6155 210 651 561 1.1.2.4 Repatriation/Disinvestment 3624 3154 2799 235 532 191 1.2 Net Portfolio Investment (1.2.1+1.2.2+1.2.3-1.2.4) 44081 32550 2661 -139 1712 -6591 1.2.1 GDRs/ADRs - - - - - - 1.2.2 FIIs 44626 32970 2424 -77 1766 -6683 1.2.3 Offshore funds and others - - - - - - 1.2.4 Portfolio investment by India 544 419 -236 62 54 -91 1 Foreign Investment Inflows 54210 44073 4054 3538 2179 -5676 P: Provisional No. 35: Outward Remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for Resident Individuals (US $ Million) 2024 2025 Item 2023-24 Jan. Nov. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 1 Outward Remittances under the LRS 31735.74 2619.71 1946.43 2315.96 2768.89 1.1 Deposit 916.45 33.88 40.21 48.10 58.20 1.2 Purchase of immovable property 242.51 17.31 23.53 30.14 34.19 1.3 Investment in equity/debt 1510.89 59.87 85.79 179.34 104.98 1.4 Gift 3580.27 209.58 216.51 229.47 232.76 1.5 Donations 11.31 0.82 0.62 0.63 0.63 1.6 Travel 17006.27 1549.97 1113.78 1323.64 1646.74 1.7 Maintenance of close relatives 4611.53 267.02 276.78 279.02 308.76 1.8 Medical Treatment 79.62 9.32 7.49 5.13 4.47 1.9 Studies Abroad 3478.65 449.46 172.40 210.20 368.21 1.10 Others 298.23 22.47 9.32 10.31 9.96 RBI Bulletin March 2025 155CURRENT STATISTICS No. 36: Indices of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) of the Indian Rupee 2024 2025 2022-23 2023-24 Feb Jan Feb Item 1 2 3 4 5 40-Currency Basket (Base: 2015-16=100) 1 Trade-Weighted 1.1 NEER 91.20 90.75 91.94 90.88 89.36 1.2 REER 102.78 103.71 104.71 104.84 102.37 2 Export-Weighted 2.1 NEER 93.01 93.13 94.37 93.26 91.98 2.2 REER 101.10 101.22 102.00 101.77 99.60 6-Currency Basket (Trade-weighted) 1 Base : 2015-16 =100 1.1 NEER 85.93 83.62 83.77 82.02 80.93 1.2 REER 101.80 101.66 101.95 102.29 100.33 2 Base : 2022-23 =100 2.1 NEER 100.00 97.31 97.48 95.45 94.18 2.2 REER 100.00 99.86 100.14 100.48 98.55 Note: Data for 2023-24 and 2024-25 so far is provisional. 156 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 37: External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs) – Registrations (Amount in US $ Million) Item 2024-25 2024 2025 Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 1 Automatic Route 1.1 Number 1188 77 112 108 1.2 Amount 29461 1820 6234 1978 2 Approval Route 2.1 Number 33 5 12 5 2.2 Amount 19748 1270 3309 2020 3 Total (1+2) 3.1 Number 1221 82 124 113 3.2 Amount 49209 3090 9543 3998 4 Weighted Average Maturity (in years) 5.60 3.70 4.50 5.80 5 Interest Rate (per cent) 5.1 Weighted Average Margin over alternative reference rate (ARR) for Floating Rate Loans@ 1.66 1.33 1.45 0.98 5.2 Interest rate range for Fixed Rate Loans 0.00-27.00 0.00-11.00 0.00-10.60 0.00-11.00 Borrower Category I. Corporate Manufacturing 15836 166 3685 242 II. Corporate-Infrastructure 15916 706 533 831 a.) Transport 1505 100 0 0 b.) Energy 3513 55 0 398 c.) Water and Sanitation 33 0 0 0 d.) Communication 6309 0 0 13 e.) Social and Commercial Infrastructure 115 1 0 0 f.) Exploration,Mining and Refinery 2480 550 530 207 g.) Other Sub-Sectors 1961 0 3 213 III. Corporate Service-Sector 1526 13 685 115 IV. Other Entities 1728 0 3 1000 a.) units in SEZ 1 0 3 0 b.) SIDBI 0 0 0 0 c.) Exim Bank 1727 0 0 1000 V. Banks 0 0 0 0 VI. Financial Institution (Other than NBFC ) 20 20 - 0 VII. NBFCs 13361 2145 4614 1792 a). NBFC- IFC/AFC 7734 1437 3042 1370 b). NBFC-MFI 531 0 0 56 c). NBFC-Others 5096 708 1572 366 VIII. Non-Government Organization (NGO) 0 0 0 0 IX. Micro Finance Institution (MFI) 0 0 0 0 X. Others 822 40 23 18 Note: Based on applications for ECB/Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) which have been allotted loan registration number during the period. @ With effect from July 01, 2023, the benchmark rate is changed to Alternative Reference Rate (ARR) RBI Bulletin March 2025 157CURRENT STATISTICS No. 38: India’s Overall Balance of Payments (US$ Million) Jul-Sep 2023 Jul-Sep 2024 (P) Credit Debit Net Credit Debit Net Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall Balance Of Payments (1+2+3) 438441 435922 2519 553557 534943 18614 1 Current Account (1.1+ 1.2) 231670 242956 -11286 245671 256854 -11182 1.1 Merchandise 108254 172799 -64544 103967 179285 -75319 1.2 Invisibles (1.2.1+1.2.2+1.2.3) 123416 70158 53258 141705 77568 64137 1.2.1 Services 83352 43411 39940 93493 48943 44550 1.2.1.1 Travel 7482 8662 -1180 7635 9367 -1732 1.2.1.2 Transportation 7054 7277 -223 8792 9188 -396 1.2.1.3 Insurance 828 821 7 902 786 116 1.2.1.4 G.n.i.e. 140 244 -104 147 316 -169 1.2.1.5 Miscellaneous 67848 26408 41440 76017 29287 46730 1.2.1.5.1 Software Services 39570 4333 35237 44164 4539 39624 1.2.1.5.2 Business Services 21472 13673 7799 25176 15548 9628 1.2.1.5.3 Financial Services 2069 1183 887 2190 1265 926 1.2.1.5.4 Communication Services 887 365 522 519 497 21 1.2.2 Transfers 28147 3221 24926 31938 2829 29109 1.2.2.1 Official 23 267 -244 28 265 -237 1.2.2.2 Private 28124 2954 25170 31910 2564 29346 1.2.3 Income 11917 23526 -11608 16274 25796 -9522 1.2.3.1 Investment Income 10158 22609 -12451 14279 24774 -10494 1.2.3.2 Compensation of Employees 1760 917 843 1995 1023 972 2 Capital Account (2.1+2.2+2.3+2.4+2.5) 205807 192966 12841 307885 277368 30518 2.1 Foreign Investment (2.1.1+2.1.2) 128572 124460 4112 203323 185710 17612 2.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment 16586 17420 -834 21214 23452 -2238 2.1.1.1 In India 15722 12686 3036 20666 15622 5044 2.1.1.1.1 Equity 9877 12278 -2401 13847 15016 -1169 2.1.1.1.2 Reinvested Earnings 4740 4740 5559 5559 2.1.1.1.3 Other Capital 1105 409 697 1261 606 655 2.1.1.2 Abroad 864 4734 -3870 548 7830 -7282 2.1.1.2.1 Equity 864 1683 -820 548 4313 -3765 2.1.1.2.2 Reinvested Earnings 0 1446 -1446 0 1514 -1514 2.1.1.2.3 Other Capital 0 1604 -1604 0 2003 -2003 2.1.2 Portfolio Investment 111986 107040 4947 182108 162258 19850 2.1.2.1 In India 111127 105841 5286 181433 161618 19815 2.1.2.1.1 FIIs 111127 105841 5286 181433 161618 19815 2.1.2.1.1.1 Equity 101529 97937 3593 160273 149590 10683 2.1.2.1.1.2 Debt 9598 7905 1693 21160 12028 9132 2.1.2.1.2 ADR/GDRs 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1.2.2 Abroad 859 1198 -339 675 640 35 2.2 Loans (2.2.1+2.2.2+2.2.3) 29728 26453 3274 38662 31126 7536 2.2.1 External Assistance 2601 1800 802 3727 1581 2146 2.2.1.1 By India 9 49 -40 8 30 -22 2.2.1.2 To India 2592 1751 842 3720 1551 2168 2.2.2 Commercial Borrowings 7464 10422 -2958 17443 15416 2027 2.2.2.1 By India 2853 3926 -1073 5059 8028 -2969 2.2.2.2 To India 4612 6496 -1884 12384 7388 4996 2.2.3 Short Term to India 19662 14232 5430 17492 14129 3363 2.2.3.1 Buyers' credit & Suppliers' Credit >180 days 17632 14232 3400 14817 14129 688 2.2.3.2 Suppliers' Credit up to 180 days 2030 0 2030 2675 0 2675 2.3 Banking Capital (2.3.1+2.3.2) 34020 29686 4333 52432 46345 6087 2.3.1 Commercial Banks 34020 29614 4405 52112 46345 5767 2.3.1.1 Assets 8673 11210 -2538 17627 18853 -1226 2.3.1.2 Liabilities 25347 18404 6943 34485 27492 6993 2.3.1.2.1 Non-Resident Deposits 21257 18048 3209 28921 22753 6167 2.3.2 Others 0 72 -72 319 0 319 2.4 Rupee Debt Service 0 1 -1 0 2 -2 2.5 Other Capital 13488 12365 1123 13469 14184 -716 3 Errors & Omissions 963 0 963 0 722 -722 4 Monetary Movements (4.1+ 4.2) 0 2519 -2519 0 18614 -18614 4.1 I.M.F. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.2 Foreign Exchange Reserves (Increase - / Decrease +) 0 2519 -2519 0 18614 -18614 Note: P: Preliminary. 158 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 39: India’s Overall Balance of Payments (₹ Crore) Jul-Sep 2023 Jul-Sep 2024 (P) Credit Debit Net Credit Debit Net Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall Balance Of Payments (1+2+3) 3624220 3603401 20819 4636946 4481027 155919 1 Current Account (1.1+ 1.2) 1915021 2008316 -93295 2057901 2151571 -93670 1.1 Merchandise 894849 1428380 -533531 870890 1501809 -630919 1.2 Invisibles (1.2.1+1.2.2+1.2.3) 1020172 579936 440236 1187011 649762 537249 1.2.1 Services 688997 358846 330151 783157 409979 373178 1.2.1.1 Travel 61845 71601 -9756 63958 78464 -14506 1.2.1.2 Transportation 58311 60151 -1840 73649 76965 -3316 1.2.1.3 Insurance 6842 6785 57 7553 6581 972 1.2.1.4 G.n.i.e. 1154 2018 -863 1228 2643 -1415 1.2.1.5 Miscellaneous 560846 218292 342554 636769 245326 391443 1.2.1.5.1 Software Services 327091 35818 291272 369945 38026 331920 1.2.1.5.2 Business Services 177488 113019 64469 210894 130244 80650 1.2.1.5.3 Financial Services 17106 9777 7329 18349 10595 7754 1.2.1.5.4 Communication Services 7334 3015 4319 4345 4167 177 1.2.2 Transfers 232665 26623 206042 267531 23696 243835 1.2.2.1 Official 189 2206 -2018 232 2218 -1985 1.2.2.2 Private 232476 24416 208060 267298 21478 245821 1.2.3 Income 98510 194468 -95957 136323 216087 -79763 1.2.3.1 Investment Income 83966 186888 -102922 119611 207519 -87908 1.2.3.2 Compensation of Employees 14544 7579 6965 16712 8568 8145 2 Capital Account (2.1+2.2+2.3+2.4+2.5) 1701234 1595084 106150 2579045 2323409 255635 2.1 Foreign Investment (2.1.1+2.1.2) 1062795 1028803 33993 1703161 1555629 147532 2.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment 137100 143996 -6896 177706 196451 -18745 2.1.1.1 In India 129962 104866 25096 173115 130862 42253 2.1.1.1.1 Equity 81644 101488 -19844 115988 125784 -9796 2.1.1.1.2 Reinvested Earnings 39181 0 39181 46563 0 46563 2.1.1.1.3 Other Capital 9137 3378 5759 10564 5078 5486 2.1.1.2 Abroad 7138 39130 -31992 4591 65589 -60998 2.1.1.2.1 Equity 7138 13916 -6778 4591 36128 -31537 2.1.1.2.2 Reinvested Earnings 0 11956 -11956 0 12680 -12680 2.1.1.2.3 Other Capital 0 13258 -13258 0 16780 -16780 2.1.2 Portfolio Investment 925695 884807 40889 1525455 1359178 166277 2.1.2.1 In India 918597 874902 43695 1519799 1353816 165984 2.1.2.1.1 FIIs 918597 874902 43695 1519799 1353816 165984 2.1.2.1.1.1 Equity 839257 809559 29698 1342550 1253064 89486 2.1.2.1.1.2 Debt 79340 65343 13997 177250 100752 76498 2.1.2.1.2 ADR/GDRs 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1.2.2 Abroad 7099 9905 -2806 5656 5363 293 2.2 Loans (2.2.1+2.2.2+2.2.3) 245733 218667 27066 323859 260732 63127 2.2.1 External Assistance 21502 14877 6626 31222 13242 17979 2.2.1.1 By India 72 404 -331 64 247 -184 2.2.1.2 To India 21430 14473 6957 31158 12995 18163 2.2.2 Commercial Borrowings 61702 86150 -24448 146114 129136 16979 2.2.2.1 By India 23582 32453 -8871 42379 67249 -24870 2.2.2.2 To India 38120 53697 -15577 103735 61887 41849 2.2.3 Short Term to India 162529 117640 44888 146523 118354 28169 2.2.3.1 Buyers' credit & Suppliers' Credit >180 days 145745 117640 28105 124117 118354 5763 2.2.3.2 Suppliers' Credit up to 180 days 16783 0 16783 22406 0 22406 2.3 Banking Capital (2.3.1+2.3.2) 281213 245392 35820 439202 388217 50985 2.3.1 Commercial Banks 281213 244798 36415 436527 388217 48311 2.3.1.1 Assets 71689 92667 -20978 147657 157925 -10268 2.3.1.2 Liabilities 209524 152131 57393 288870 230292 58579 2.3.1.2.1 Non-Resident Deposits 175715 149187 26528 242259 190597 51662 2.3.2 Others 0 594 -594 2675 0 2675 2.4 Rupee Debt Service 0 12 -12 0 15 -15 2.5 Other Capital 111493 102211 9282 112822 118816 -5994 3 Errors & Omissions 7964 0 7964 0 6046 -6046 4 Monetary Movements (4.1+ 4.2) 0 20819 -20819 0 155919 -155919 4.1 I.M.F. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.2 Foreign Exchange Reserves (Increase - / Decrease +) 0 20819 -20819 0 155919 -155919 Note: P: Preliminary. RBI Bulletin March 2025 159CURRENT STATISTICS No. 40: Standard Presentation of BoP in India as per BPM6 (US$ Million) Item Jul-Sep 2023 Jul-Sep 2024 (P) Credit Debit Net Credit Debit Net 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 Current Account (1.A+1.B+1.C) 231670 242934 -11264 245671 256828 -11157 1.A Goods and Services (1.A.a+1.A.b) 191606 216210 -24604 197459 228229 -30769 1.A.a Goods (1.A.a.1 to 1.A.a.3) 108254 172799 -64544 103967 179285 -75319 1.A.a.1 General merchandise on a BOP basis 107367 160246 -52879 103981 161701 -57720 1.A.a.2 Net exports of goods under merchanting 888 0 888 -14 0 -14 1.A.a.3 Nonmonetary gold 12553 -12553 17585 -17585 1.A.b Services (1.A.b.1 to 1.A.b.13) 83352 43411 39940 93493 48943 44550 1.A.b.1 Manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others 283 39 244 276 20 256 1.A.b.2 Maintenance and repair services n.i.e. 56 308 -251 90 263 -172 1.A.b.3 Transport 7054 7277 -223 8792 9188 -396 1.A.b.4 Travel 7482 8662 -1180 7635 9367 -1732 1.A.b.5 Construction 954 677 277 1263 951 312 1.A.b.6 Insurance and pension services 828 821 7 902 786 116 1.A.b.7 Financial services 2069 1183 887 2190 1265 926 1.A.b.8 Charges for the use of intellectual property n.i.e. 422 3341 -2919 448 3877 -3428 1.A.b.9 Telecommunications, computer, and information services 40546 4968 35578 44772 5333 39439 1.A.b.10 Other business services 21472 13673 7799 25176 15548 9628 1.A.b.11 Personal, cultural, and recreational services 1211 2080 -869 1107 1794 -688 1.A.b.12 Government goods and services n.i.e. 140 244 -104 147 316 -169 1.A.b.13 Others n.i.e. 835 140 695 694 237 458 1.B Primary Income (1.B.1 to 1.B.3) 11917 23526 -11608 16274 25796 -9522 1.B.1 Compensation of employees 1760 917 843 1995 1023 972 1.B.2 Investment income 8939 22196 -13257 12849 24336 -11486 1.B.2.1 Direct investment 2322 12281 -9959 2725 13008 -10283 1.B.2.2 Portfolio investment 84 3657 -3573 78 4152 -4074 1.B.2.3 Other investment 520 6040 -5520 1168 6953 -5785 1.B.2.4 Reserve assets 6013 217 5796 8878 223 8655 1.B.3 Other primary income 1219 413 806 1430 438 992 1.C Secondary Income (1.C.1+1.C.2) 28146 3198 24948 31937 2803 29134 1.C.1 Financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations, households, and NPISHs 28124 2954 25170 31910 2564 29346 1.C.1.1 Personal transfers (Current transfers between resident and/non-resident households) 27335 2040 25296 31084 1803 29282 1.C.1.2 Other current transfers 788 914 -126 826 761 64 1.C.2 General government 22 245 -222 27 239 -212 2 Capital Account (2.1+2.2) 151 202 -51 186 192 -6 2.1 Gross acquisitions (DR.)/disposals (CR.) of non-produced nonfinancial assets 9 91 -82 7 68 -61 2.2 Capital transfers 142 110 31 179 124 55 3 Financial Account (3.1 to 3.5) 205657 195305 10352 307700 295815 11885 3.1 Direct Investment (3.1A+3.1B) 16586 17420 -834 21214 23452 -2238 3.1.A Direct Investment in India 15722 12686 3036 20666 15622 5044 3.1.A.1 Equity and investment fund shares 14617 12278 2339 19405 15016 4389 3.1.A.1.1 Equity other than reinvestment of earnings 9877 12278 -2401 13847 15016 -1169 3.1.A.1.2 Reinvestment of earnings 4740 4740 5559 5559 3.1.A.2 Debt instruments 1105 409 697 1261 606 655 3.1.A.2.1 Direct investor in direct investment enterprises 1105 409 697 1261 606 655 3.1.B Direct Investment by India 864 4734 -3870 548 7830 -7282 3.1.B.1 Equity and investment fund shares 864 3130 -2266 548 5827 -5279 3.1.B.1.1 Equity other than reinvestment of earnings 864 1683 -820 548 4313 -3765 3.1.B.1.2 Reinvestment of earnings 1446 -1446 1514 -1514 3.1.B.2 Debt instruments 0 1604 -1604 0 2003 -2003 3.1.B.2.1 Direct investor in direct investment enterprises 1604 -1604 2003 -2003 3.2 Portfolio Investment 111986 107040 4947 182108 162258 19850 3.2.A Portfolio Investment in India 111127 105841 5286 181433 161618 19815 3.2.1 Equity and investment fund shares 101529 97937 3593 160273 149590 10683 3.2.2 Debt securities 9598 7905 1693 21160 12028 9132 3.2.B Portfolio Investment by India 859 1198 -339 675 640 35 3.3 Financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options 5476 7362 -1887 6359 11892 -5533 3.4 Other investment 71609 60964 10645 98018 79598 18419 3.4.1 Other equity (ADRs/GDRs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4.2 Currency and deposits 21257 18120 3137 29240 22753 6487 3.4.2.1 Central bank (Rupee Debt Movements; NRG) 0 72 -72 319 0 319 3.4.2.2 Deposit-taking corporations, except the central bank (NRI Deposits) 21257 18048 3209 28921 22753 6167 3.4.2.3 General government 0 0 3.4.2.4 Other sectors 0 0 3.4.3 Loans (External Assistance, ECBs and Banking Capital) 22828 23788 -960 44362 40589 3773 3.4.3.A Loans to India 19967 19813 153 39295 32531 6764 3.4.3.B Loans by India 2862 3975 -1113 5067 8058 -2991 3.4.4 Insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes 144 10 134 47 3 44 3.4.5 Trade credit and advances 19662 14232 5430 17492 14129 3363 3.4.6 Other accounts receivable/payable - other 7718 4814 2903 6877 2124 4753 3.4.7 Special drawing rights 0 0 0 0 3.5 Reserve assets 0 2519 -2519 0 18614 -18614 3.5.1 Monetary gold 0 0 3.5.2 Special drawing rights n.a. 0 0 0 0 3.5.3 Reserve position in the IMF n.a. 0 0 3.5.4 Other reserve assets (Foreign Currency Assets) 0 2519 -2519 0 18614 -18614 4 Total assets/liabilities 205657 195305 10352 307700 295815 11885 4.1 Equity and investment fund shares 123488 121915 1574 187308 182969 4339 4.2 Debt instruments 74451 66057 8394 113515 92108 21407 4.3 Other financial assets and liabilities 7718 7333 385 6877 20738 -13861 5 Net errors and omissions 963 0 963 0 722 -722 Note: P: Preliminary. 160 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 41: Standard Presentation of BoP in India as per BPM6 (₹ Crore) Jul-Sep 2023 Jul-Sep 2024 (P) Item Credit Debit Net Credit Debit Net 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 Current Account (1.A+1.B+1.C) 1915018 2008132 -93114 2057899 2151355 -93457 1.A Goods and Services (1.A.a+1.A.b) 1583846 1787226 -203380 1654047 1911789 -257742 1.A.a Goods (1.A.a.1 to 1.A.a.3) 894849 1428380 -533531 870890 1501809 -630919 1.A.a.1 General merchandise on a BOP basis 887510 1324618 -437107 871011 1354507 -483496 1.A.a.2 Net exports of goods under merchanting 7339 0 7339 -121 0 -121 1.A.a.3 Nonmonetary gold 0 103763 -103763 0 147303 -147303 1.A.b Services (1.A.b.1 to 1.A.b.13) 688997 358846 330151 783157 409979 373178 1.A.b.1 Manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others 2339 320 2019 2316 169 2147 1.A.b.2 Maintenance and repair services n.i.e. 465 2544 -2078 755 2199 -1444 1.A.b.3 Transport 58311 60151 -1840 73649 76965 -3316 1.A.b.4 Travel 61845 71601 -9756 63958 78464 -14506 1.A.b.5 Construction 7887 5598 2289 10580 7963 2616 1.A.b.6 Insurance and pension services 6842 6785 57 7553 6581 972 1.A.b.7 Financial services 17106 9777 7329 18349 10595 7754 1.A.b.8 Charges for the use of intellectual property n.i.e. 3485 27618 -24133 3754 32473 -28719 1.A.b.9 Telecommunications, computer, and information services 335161 41064 294097 375037 44672 330366 1.A.b.10 Other business services 177488 113019 64469 210894 130244 80650 1.A.b.11 Personal, cultural, and recreational services 10012 17193 -7180 9269 15029 -5760 1.A.b.12 Government goods and services n.i.e. 1154 2018 -863 1228 2643 -1415 1.A.b.13 Others n.i.e. 6902 1160 5742 5815 1982 3834 1.B Primary Income (1.B.1 to 1.B.3) 98510 194468 -95957 136323 216087 -79763 1.B.1 Compensation of employees 14544 7579 6965 16712 8568 8145 1.B.2 Investment income 73890 183473 -109583 107633 203850 -96217 1.B.2.1 Direct investment 19194 101520 -82327 22828 108966 -86138 1.B.2.2 Portfolio investment 692 30227 -29535 653 34776 -34123 1.B.2.3 Other investment 4298 49928 -45630 9783 58239 -48455 1.B.2.4 Reserve assets 49705 1797 47908 74369 1870 72499 1.B.3 Other primary income 10076 3415 6661 11978 3669 8309 1.C Secondary Income (1.C.1+1.C.2) 232662 26438 206224 267528 23480 244048 1.C.1 Financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations, households, and NPISHs 232476 24416 208060 267298 21478 245821 1.C.1.1 Personal transfers (Current transfers between resident and/non-resident households) 225958 16860 209099 260383 15102 245281 1.C.1.2 Other current transfers 6518 7557 -1039 6915 6376 539 1.C.2 General government 186 2022 -1836 230 2002 -1772 2 Capital Account (2.1+2.2) 1245 1668 -423 1558 1611 -53 2.1 Gross acquisitions (DR.)/disposals (CR.) of non-produced nonfinancial assets 74 755 -680 57 570 -513 2.2 Capital transfers 1170 913 257 1501 1041 460 3 Financial Account (3.1 to 3.5) 1699992 1614420 85572 2577489 2477933 99556 3.1 Direct Investment (3.1A+3.1B) 137100 143996 -6896 177706 196451 -18745 3.1.A Direct Investment in India 129962 104866 25096 173115 130862 42253 3.1.A.1 Equity and investment fund shares 120825 101488 19336 162551 125784 36767 3.1.A.1.1 Equity other than reinvestment of earnings 81644 101488 -19844 115988 125784 -9796 3.1.A.1.2 Reinvestment of earnings 39181 0 39181 46563 0 46563 3.1.A.2 Debt instruments 9137 3378 5759 10564 5078 5486 3.1.A.2.1 Direct investor in direct investment enterprises 9137 3378 5759 10564 5078 5486 3.1.B Direct Investment by India 7138 39130 -31992 4591 65589 -60998 3.1.B.1 Equity and investment fund shares 7138 25872 -18734 4591 48809 -44218 3.1.B.1.1 Equity other than reinvestment of earnings 7138 13916 -6778 4591 36128 -31537 3.1.B.1.2 Reinvestment of earnings 0 11956 -11956 0 12680 -12680 3.1.B.2 Debt instruments 0 13258 -13258 0 16780 -16780 3.1.B.2.1 Direct investor in direct investment enterprises 0 13258 -13258 0 16780 -16780 3.2 Portfolio Investment 925695 884807 40889 1525455 1359178 166277 3.2.A Portfolio Investment in India 918597 874902 43695 1519799 1353816 165984 3.2.1 Equity and investment fund shares 839257 809559 29698 1342550 1253064 89486 3.2.2 Debt securities 79340 65343 13997 177250 100752 76498 3.2.B Portfolio Investment by India 7099 9905 -2806 5656 5363 293 3.3 Financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options 45263 60858 -15595 53269 99618 -46349 3.4 Other investment 591934 503940 87993 821059 666767 154291 3.4.1 Other equity (ADRs/GDRs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4.2 Currency and deposits 175715 149782 25933 244933 190597 54337 3.4.2.1 Central bank (Rupee Debt Movements; NRG) 0 594 -594 2675 0 2675 3.4.2.2 Deposit-taking corporations, except the central bank (NRI Deposits) 175715 149187 26528 242259 190597 51662 3.4.2.3 General government 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4.2.4 Other sectors 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4.3 Loans (External Assistance, ECBs and Banking Capital) 188702 196637 -7935 371605 339998 31607 3.4.3.A Loans to India 165048 163780 1267 329162 272501 56660 3.4.3.B Loans by India 23654 32857 -9202 42443 67497 -25054 3.4.4 Insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes 1194 85 1109 393 25 368 3.4.5 Trade credit and advances 162529 117640 44888 146523 118354 28169 3.4.6 Other accounts receivable/payable - other 63794 39797 23998 57605 17794 39811 3.4.7 Special drawing rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5 Reserve assets 0 20819 -20819 0 155919 -155919 3.5.1 Monetary gold 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5.2 Special drawing rights n.a. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5.3 Reserve position in the IMF n.a. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5.4 Other reserve assets (Foreign Currency Assets) 0 20819 -20819 0 155919 -155919 4 Total assets/liabilities 1699992 1614420 85572 2577489 2477933 99556 4.1 Equity and investment fund shares 1020775 1007766 13008 1569010 1532662 36348 4.2 Debt instruments 615423 546038 69385 950874 771559 179316 4.3 Other financial assets and liabilities 63794 60616 3179 57605 173712 -116108 5 Net errors and omissions 7964 0 7964 0 6046 -6046 Note: P: Preliminary. RBI Bulletin March 2025 161CURRENT STATISTICS No. 42: India’s International Investment Position (US$ Million) Item As on Financial Year/Quarter End 2023-24 2023 2024 Sep. Jun. Sep. Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Direct investment Abroad/in India 242271 542931 232097 528679 246248 552865 253530 555484 1.1 Equity Capital* 153343 511142 146159 497612 156225 520706 161504 523010 1.2 Other Capital 88927 31789 85938 31067 90023 32160 92026 32474 2. Portfolio investment 12162 277038 12096 259358 12103 277140 12306 293649 2.1 Equity 10644 162061 8974 154634 10367 160898 10983 170934 2.2 Debt 1517 114977 3122 104723 1736 116242 1323 122715 3. Other investment 132654 575068 120311 546182 140952 589624 146190 617176 3.1 Trade credit 33450 123662 30854 124733 32865 126576 32428 129931 3.2 Loan 17547 221738 11962 208669 20803 224823 22147 240166 3.3 Currency and Deposits 53519 154787 45711 146166 57747 160628 56105 164076 3.4 Other Assets/Liabilities 28138 74880 31784 66615 29537 77597 35510 83002 4. Reserves 646419 587714 651997 705782 5. Total Assets/ Liabilities 1033505 1395036 952218 1334219 1051300 1419629 1117808 1466309 6. Net IIP (Assets - Liabilities) -361531 -382001 -368329 -348501 Note: * Equity capital includes share of investment funds and reinvested earnings. 162 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS Payment and Settlement Systems No.43: Payment System Indicators PART I - Payment System Indicators - Payment & Settlement System Statistics System Volume (Lakh) Value (₹ Crore) FY 2023-24 2024 2025 FY 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. Dec. Jan. Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A. Settlement Systems Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) 1 CCIL Operated Systems (1.1 to 1.3) 43.04 3.74 3.78 4.88 259206893 21705635 27448820 30296790 1.1 Govt. Securities Clearing (1.1.1 to 1.1.3) 16.80 1.42 1.49 1.77 170464587 14658627 16506680 17807347 1.1.1 Outright 9.51 0.79 0.84 1.10 13463848 1100547 1348782 1627265 1.1.2 Repo 4.94 0.43 0.41 0.41 76718788 6039056 6377679 7288494 1.1.3 Tri-party Repo 2.35 0.21 0.24 0.25 80281951 7519024 8780219 8891588 1.2 Forex Clearing 24.92 2.21 2.16 2.94 80984671 6439543 9919285 11164125 1.3 Rupee Derivatives @ 1.31 0.11 0.13 0.17 7757636 607465 1022855 1325318 B. Payment Systems I Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) - - - - - - - - 1 Credit Transfers - RTGS (1.1 to 1.2) 2700.16 230.99 262.29 268.15 170886670 14691625 19163587 17499363 1.1 Customer Transactions 2686.04 229.79 261.11 266.89 152406168 13127720 17161423 15571748 1.2 Interbank Transactions 14.12 1.20 1.17 1.26 18480503 1563905 2002163 1927615 II Retail 2 Credit Transfers - Retail (2.1 to 2.6) 1486106.89 137068.03 183786.41 186538.41 67542859 5945126 6935632 7000487 2.1 AePS (Fund Transfers) @ 3.92 0.36 0.31 0.31 261 24 17 18 2.2 APBS $ 25888.17 2118.74 2451.41 2263.21 390743 42872 58705 52280 2.3 IMPS 60053.35 5087.92 4411.64 4442.23 6495652 566310 601549 606420 2.4 NACH Cr $ 16227.27 948.05 1315.94 1304.72 1525104 127514 135695 145699 2.5 NEFT 72639.50 6882.78 8307.02 8567.93 39136014 3367322 3814966 3848033 2.6 UPI @ 1311294.68 122030.18 167300.09 169960.01 19995086 1841084 2324700 2348037 2.6.1 of which USSD @ 26.19 1.90 1.56 1.38 352 21 16 16 3 Debit Transfers and Direct Debits (3.1 to 3.3) 18249.53 1571.50 1905.47 1878.45 1687658 154405 198303 199535 3.1 BHIM Aadhaar Pay @ 193.59 18.82 17.18 15.79 6112 619 547 486 3.2 NACH Dr $ 16426.49 1440.08 1738.32 1715.83 1678769 153564 197549 198857 3.3 NETC (linked to bank account) @ 1629.45 112.60 149.97 146.83 2777 222 207 193 4 Card Payments (4.1 to 4.2) 58469.79 4934.19 5608.59 5522.42 2423563 211931 228548 223090 4.1 Credit Cards (4.1.1 to 4.1.2) 35610.15 3289.52 4328.50 4305.72 1831134 166444 187949 184126 4.1.1 PoS based $ 18614.08 1725.59 2240.03 2177.43 651911 58532 73048 69429 4.1.2 Others $ 16996.08 1563.93 2088.46 2128.29 1179223 107912 114901 114697 4.2 Debit Cards (4.2.1 to 4.2.1 ) 22859.64 1644.68 1280.10 1216.69 592429 45487 40599 38963 4.2.1 PoS based $ 16477.95 1193.18 964.50 910.91 393589 30383 27609 25999 4.2.2 Others $ 6381.69 451.50 315.60 305.78 198840 15103 12990 12965 5 Prepaid Payment Instruments (5.1 to 5.2) 78775.40 7087.25 6377.99 6547.10 283048 25784 18992 19496 5.1 Wallets 63256.69 5766.67 4830.75 4875.14 234353 21259 14437 14700 5.2 Cards (5.2.1 to 5.2.2) 15518.71 1320.58 1547.24 1671.97 48695 4525 4556 4796 5.2.1 PoS based $ 8429.87 690.67 684.93 701.18 11247 927 991 1000 5.2.2 Others $ 7088.84 629.91 862.31 970.79 37447 3598 3565 3796 6 Paper-based Instruments (6.1 to 6.2) 6632.10 547.17 506.56 516.61 7212333 583653 587879 606756 6.1 CTS (NPCI Managed) 6632.10 547.17 506.56 516.61 7212333 583653 587879 606756 6.2 Others 0.00 – – – – – – – Total - Retail Payments (2+3+4+5+6) 1648233.71 151208.15 198185.02 201003.00 79149461 6920899 7969354 8049363 Total Payments (1+2+3+4+5+6) 1650933.88 151439.14 198447.31 201271.14 250036131 21612523 27132941 25548726 Total Digital Payments (1+2+3+4+5) 1644301.78 150891.97 197940.75 200754.53 242823799 21028871 26545062 24941970 RBI Bulletin March 2025 163CURRENT STATISTICS PART II - Payment Modes and Channels System Volume (Lakh) Value (₹ Crore) FY 2023-24 2024 2025 FY 2023-24 2024 2025 Jan. Dec. Jan. Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A. Other Payment Channels 1 Mobile Payments (mobile app based) (1.1 to 1.2) 1252599.21 117854.93 156762.66 158779.34 30687088 2815296 3455800 3451690 1.1 Intra-bank $ 83000.56 7654.37 9183.14 9234.68 5676805 524854 618347 607529 1.2 Inter-bank $ 1169598.65 110200.56 147579.52 149544.66 25010283 2290441 2837453 2844161 2 Internet Payments (Netbanking / Internet Browser Based) @ (2.1 to 2.2) 45034.98 3837.71 4072.71 4167.05 102117736 9123990 12203095 11639721 2.1 Intra-bank @ 12033.28 1028.04 1155.00 1212.87 53247042 4767036 6414756 6130804 2.2 Inter-bank @ 33001.71 2809.67 2917.71 2954.18 48870694 4356954 5788339 5508917 B. ATMs 3 Cash Withdrawal at ATMs $ (3.1 to 3.3) 66440.72 5306.01 4950.77 4910.07 3259388 260746 252471 251938 3.1 Using Credit Cards $ 95.80 8.26 8.12 7.79 4648 404 429 412 3.2 Using Debit Cards $ 66001.01 5272.19 4923.54 4883.53 3241538 259326 251161 250646 3.3 Using Pre-paid Cards $ 343.90 25.56 19.11 18.75 13202 1016 881 879 4 Cash Withdrawal at PoS $ (4.1 to 4.2) 15.18 0.65 0.29 0.27 148 6 3 3 4.1 Using Debit Cards $ 15.06 0.64 0.26 0.24 147 6 3 3 4.2 Using Pre-paid Cards $ 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.03 1 0 0 0 5 Cash Withrawal at Micro ATMs @ 11754.95 839.66 910.87 915.09 314003 22351 23195 23246 5.1 AePS @ 11754.95 839.66 910.87 915.09 314003 22351 23195 23246 PART III - Payment Infrastructures (Lakh) System As on March 2024 2025 2024 Jan. Dec. Jan. 1 2 3 4 Payment System Infrastructures 1 Number of Cards (1.1 to 1.2) 10667.22 10570.66 10990.04 10909.12 1.1 Credit Cards 1018.03 995.00 1080.56 1088.73 1.2 Debit Cards 9649.19 9575.66 9909.48 9820.39 2 Number of PPIs @ (2.1 to 2.2) 16743.63 17676.26 13269.07 13463.21 2.1 Wallets @ 13381.80 14396.94 8904.25 8954.73 2.2 Cards @ 3361.82 3279.33 4364.82 4508.48 3 Number of ATMs (3.1 to 3.2) 2.58 2.58 2.55 2.57 3.1 Bank owned ATMs $ 2.23 2.24 2.19 2.21 3.2 White Label ATMs $ 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 4 Number of Micro ATMs @ 17.55 17.60 14.67 14.64 5 Number of PoS Terminals 89.03 85.93 100.01 103.53 6 Bharat QR @ 62.50 60.04 63.83 64.43 7 UPI QR * 3434.93 3213.79 6334.39 6400.67 @: New inclusion w.e.f. November 2019 #: Data reported by Co-operative Banks, LABs and RRBs included with effect from December 2021. $ : Inclusion separately initiated from November 2019 - would have been part of other items hitherto. *: New inclusion w.e.f. September 2020; Includes only static UPI QR Code Note : 1. Data is provisional. 2. ECS (Debit and Credit) has been merged with NACH with effect from January 31, 2020. 3. The data from November 2019 onwards for card payments (Debit/Credit cards) and Prepaid Payment Instruments (PPIs) may not be comparable with earlier months/ periods, as more granular data is being published along with revision in data definitions. 4. Only domestic financial transactions are considered. The new format captures e-commerce transactions; transactions using FASTags, digital bill payments and card-to-card transfer through ATMs, etc. Also, failed transactions, chargebacks, reversals, expired cards/ wallets, are excluded. Part I-A. Settlement systems 1.1.3: Tri- party Repo under the securities segment has been operationalised from November 05, 2018. Part I-B. Payments systems 4.1.2: ‘Others’ includes e-commerce transactions and digital bill payments through ATMs, etc. 4.2.2: ‘Others’ includes e-commerce transactions, card to card transfers and digital bill payments through ATMs, etc. 5. Available from December 2010. 5.1: includes purchase of goods and services and fund transfer through wallets. 5.2.2: includes usage of PPI Cards for online transactions and other transactions. 6.1: Pertain to three grids – Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai. 6.2: ‘Others’ comprises of Non-MICR transactions which pertains to clearing houses managed by 21 banks. Part II-A. Other payment channels 1: Mobile Payments – o Include transactions done through mobile apps of banks and UPI apps. o The data from July 2017 includes only individual payments and corporate payments initiated, processed, and authorised using mobile device. Other corporate payments which are not initiated, processed, and authorised using mobile device are excluded. 2: Internet Payments – includes only e-commerce transactions through ‘netbanking’ and any financial transaction using internet banking website of the bank. Part II-B. ATMs ` 3.3 and 4.2: only relates to transactions using bank issued PPIs. Part III. Payment systems infrastructure 3: Includes ATMs deployed by Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and White Label ATM Operators (WLAOs). WLAs are included from April 2014 onwards. 164 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS OOOccccccaaasssiiiooonnnaaalll SSSeeerrriiieeesss No. 44: Small Savings (₹ Crore) Scheme 2023-24 2023 2024 Dec. Oct. Nov. Dec. 1 2 3 4 5 1 Small Savings Receipts 232460 16670 10981 9805 11133 Outstanding 1865029 1789946 1962367 1971752 1982465 1.1 Total Deposits Receipts 161344 12386 8792 7469 8734 Outstanding 1298795 1247555 1379283 1386750 1395484 1.1.1 Post Office Saving Bank Deposits Receipts 17229 2279 1062 20 1090 Outstanding 191692 213964 200889 200909 201999 1.1.2 Sukanya Samriddhi Yojna Receipts 35174 2171 1787 1944 2244 Outstanding 157611 104859 172819 174763 177007 1.1.3 National Saving Scheme, 1987 Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.1.4 National Saving Scheme, 1992 Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.1.5 Monthly Income Scheme Receipts 26696 1713 1033 900 827 Outstanding 269007 263383 280416 281316 282142 1.1.6 Senior Citizen Scheme 2004 Receipts 38167 2197 1699 1609 1531 Outstanding 175472 169033 191465 193074 194605 1.1.7 Post Office Time Deposits Receipts 25341 2429 2121 2109 2125 Outstanding 305776 297989 326679 328786 330912 1.1.7.1 1 year Time Deposits Outstanding 140423 135196 155580 157349 159174 1.1.7.2 2 year Time Deposits Outstanding 11967 11265 13910 14093 14299 1.1.7.3 3 year Time Deposits Outstanding 8932 8472 10033 10166 10308 1.1.7.4 5 year Time Deposits Outstanding 144454 143056 147156 147178 147131 1.1.8 Post Office Recurring Deposits Receipts 18713 1616 1238 1023 1025 Outstanding 197134 196491 205221 206244 207269 1.1.9 Post Office Cumulative Time Deposits Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.1.10 Other Deposits Receipts 8 -19 -149 -137 -108 Outstanding 1754 1488 1440 1303 1195 1.1.11 PM Care for children Receipts 16 0 1 1 0 Outstanding 349 348 354 355 355 1.2 Saving Certificates Receipts 56069 3957 2080 2184 2226 Outstanding 418021 407244 434502 436268 438074 1.2.1 National Savings Certificate VIII issue Receipts 16853 1213 637 524 430 Outstanding 183905 177154 191667 192191 192621 1.2.2 Indira Vikas Patras Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.2.3 Kisan Vikas Patras Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.2.4 Kisan Vikas Patras - 2014 Receipts 20939 1568 783 932 1113 Outstanding 220560 216509 226662 227594 228707 1.2.5 National Saving Certificate VI issue Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.2.6 National Saving Certificate VII issue Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 Outstanding 0 0 0 0 0 1.2.7 M.S. Certificates Receipts 18277 1176 660 728 683 Outstanding 18277 15064 23891 24620 25303 1.2.8 Other Certificates Outstanding -4721 -1483 -7718 -8137 -8557 1.3 Public Provident Fund Receipts 15047 327 109 152 173 Outstanding 148213 135147 148582 148734 148907 Note : Data on receipts from April 2017 are net receipts, i.e., gross receipt minus gross payment. Source: Accountant General, Post and Telegraphs. RBI Bulletin March 2025 165CURRENT STATISTICS No. 45 : Ownership Pattern of Central and State Governments Securities (Per cent) Central Government Dated Securities 2023 2024 Category Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. 1 2 3 4 5 (A) Total (in ₹. Crore) 10538792 10740389 10946860 11271589 11422728 1 Commercial Banks 37.55 37.66 37.52 37.55 37.98 2 Co-operative Banks 1.49 1.47 1.42 1.35 1.36 3 Non-Bank PDs 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.77 0.65 4 Insurance Companies 26.16 25.98 26.11 25.95 26.14 5 Mutual Funds 3.03 2.90 2.87 3.14 3.11 6 Provident Funds 4.57 4.47 4.41 4.25 4.25 7 Pension Funds 4.44 4.52 4.74 4.86 5.05 8 Financial Institutions 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.64 9 Corporates 1.33 1.35 1.44 1.60 1.45 10 Foreign Portfolio Investors 1.92 2.34 2.34 2.80 2.81 11 RBI 12.54 12.31 11.92 11.16 10.55 12 Others 5.74 5.79 5.97 5.92 6.01 12.1 State Governments 2.07 2.04 2.13 2.19 2.21 State Governments Securities 2023 2024 Category Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. 1 2 3 4 5 (B) Total (in ₹. Crore) 5338587 5646219 5727482 5909490 6055711 1 Commercial Banks 33.90 34.14 33.85 34.39 35.11 2 Co-operative Banks 3.53 3.39 3.38 3.29 3.22 3 Non-Bank PDs 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.53 4 Insurance Companies 26.64 26.14 25.85 25.56 25.16 5 Mutual Funds 2.00 2.09 2.08 1.93 1.89 6 Provident Funds 22.00 22.35 22.94 23.02 22.90 7 Pension Funds 4.56 4.76 4.87 4.87 4.82 8 Financial Institutions 1.63 1.59 1.58 1.57 1.58 9 Corporates 2.03 2.02 2.03 1.95 1.97 10 Foreign Portfolio Investors 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 11 RBI 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 12 Others 2.37 2.20 2.17 2.18 2.19 12.1 State Governments 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 Treasury Bills 2023 2024 Category Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. 1 2 3 4 5 (C) Total (in ₹. Crore) 849151 871662 858193 747242 760045 1 Commercial Banks 57.18 58.53 47.79 44.74 40.45 2 Co-operative Banks 1.28 1.67 1.49 1.58 1.22 3 Non-Bank PDs 1.70 1.66 2.69 2.28 1.41 4 Insurance Companies 5.50 5.06 5.78 5.26 4.73 5 Mutual Funds 11.21 11.89 14.50 15.06 15.41 6 Provident Funds 0.08 0.15 0.60 0.26 0.04 7 Pension Funds 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 Financial Institutions 5.34 7.16 6.56 6.36 6.77 9 Corporates 4.58 4.50 4.79 4.66 4.56 10 Foreign Portfolio Investors 0.07 0.01 0.20 0.15 0.12 11 RBI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12 Others 13.06 9.36 15.59 19.65 25.29 12.1 State Governments 9.26 5.88 11.55 14.95 20.11 Note: The table format is revised since monthly Bulletin for the month of June 2023. Central Government Dated Securities include special securities and Sovereign Gold Bonds. State Government Securities include special bonds issued under Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY). Bank PDs are clubbed under Commercial Banks. The category ‘Others’ comprises State Governments, DICGC, PSUs, Trusts, Foreign Central Banks, HUF/ Individuals etc. Data since September 2023 includes the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank. 166 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 46: Combined Receipts and Disbursements of the Central and State Governments (₹ Crore) Item 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 RE 2024-25 BE 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 Total Disbursements 5410887 6353359 7098451 7880522 9110725 9800798 1.1 Developmental 3074492 3823423 4189146 4701611 5514584 5862996 1.1.1 Revenue 2446605 3150221 3255207 3574503 3965270 4195108 1.1.2 Capital 588233 550358 861777 1042159 1453849 1526993 1.1.3 Loans 39654 122844 72163 84949 95464 140895 1.2 Non-Developmental 2253027 2442941 2810388 3069896 3467270 3800321 1.2.1 Revenue 2109629 2271637 2602750 2895864 3266628 3537378 1.2.1.1 Interest Payments 955801 1060602 1226672 1377807 1562660 1711972 1.2.2 Capital 141457 169155 175519 171131 196073 259346 1.2.3 Loans 1941 2148 32119 2902 4569 3597 1.3 Others 83368 86995 98916 109015 128871 137481 2 Total Receipts 5734166 6397162 7156342 7855370 9054999 9650488 2.1 Revenue Receipts 3851563 3688030 4823821 5447913 6379349 7209647 2.1.1 Tax Receipts 3231582 3193390 4160414 4809044 5456913 6142276 2.1.1.1 Taxes on commodities and services 2012578 2076013 2626553 2865550 3248450 3631569 2.1.1.2 Taxes on Income and Property 1216203 1114805 1530636 1939550 2204462 2506181 2.1.1.3 Taxes of Union Territories (Without Legislature) 2800 2572 3225 3943 4001 4526 2.1.2 Non-Tax Receipts 619981 494640 663407 638870 922436 1067371 2.1.2.1 Interest Receipts 31137 33448 35250 42975 49552 57273 2.2 Non-debt Capital Receipts 110094 64994 44077 62716 86733 118239 2.2.1 Recovery of Loans & Advances 59515 16951 27665 15970 55895 45125 2.2.2 Disinvestment proceeds 50578 48044 16412 46746 30839 73114 3 Gross Fiscal Deficit [ 1 - ( 2.1 + 2.2 ) ] 1449230 2600335 2230553 2369892 2644642 2472912 3A Sources of Financing: Institution-wise 3A.1 Domestic Financing 1440548 2530155 2194406 2332768 2619811 2456959 3A.1.1 Net Bank Credit to Government 571872 890012 627255 687904 346483 ... 3A.1.1.1 Net RBI Credit to Government 190241 107493 350911 529 -257913 ... 3A.1.2 Non-Bank Credit to Government 868676 1640143 1567151 1644864 2273328 ... 3A.2 External Financing 8682 70180 36147 37124 24832 15952 3B Sources of Financing: Instrument-wise 3B.1 Domestic Financing 1440548 2530155 2194406 2332768 2619811 2456959 3B.1.1 Market Borrowings (net) 971378 1696012 1213169 1651076 1962969 1983757 3B.1.2 Small Savings (net) 209232 458801 526693 358764 434151 447511 3B.1.3 State Provident Funds (net) 38280 41273 28100 13880 21386 19857 3B.1.4 Reserve Funds 10411 4545 42153 68803 52385 -33653 3B.1.5 Deposits and Advances -14227 25682 42203 51989 35819 -10138 3B.1.6 Cash Balances -323279 -43802 -57891 25152 55726 150310 3B.1.7 Others 548753 347643 399980 163104 57374 -100684 3B.2 External Financing 8682 70180 36147 37124 24832 15952 4 Total Disbursements as per cent of GDP 26.9 32.0 30.1 29.2 30.8 30.0 5 Total Receipts as per cent of GDP 28.5 32.2 30.3 29.1 30.7 29.6 6 Revenue Receipts as per cent of GDP 19.2 18.6 20.4 20.2 21.6 22.1 7 Tax Receipts as per cent of GDP 16.1 16.1 17.6 17.8 18.5 18.8 8 Gross Fiscal Deficit as per cent of GDP 7.2 13.1 9.5 8.8 9.0 7.6 … : Not available; RE: Revised Estimates; BE: Budget Estimates Source : Budget Documents of Central and State Governments. Note: GDP data is based on 2011-12 base. GDP for 2024-25 is from Union Budget 2024-25. Data pertains to all States and Union Territories. 1 & 2: Data are net of repayments of the Central Government (including repayments to the NSSF) and State Governments. 1.3: Represents compensation and assignments by States to local bodies and Panchayati Raj institutions. 2: Data are net of variation in cash balances of the Central and State Governments and includes borrowing receipts of the Central and State Governments. 3A.1.1: Data as per RBI records. 3B.1.1: Borrowings through dated securities. 3B.1.2: Represent net investment in Central and State Governments’ special securities by the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). This data may vary from previous publications due to adjustments across components with availability of new data. 3B.1.6: Include Ways and Means Advances by the Centre to the State Governments. 3B.1.7: Include Treasury Bills, loans from financial institutions, insurance and pension funds, remittances, cash balance investment account. RBI Bulletin March 2025 167CURRENT STATISTICS No. 47: Financial Accommodation Availed by State Governments under various Facilities (₹ Crore) During January-2025 Sr. State/Union Territory Special Drawing Ways and Means Overdraft (OD) No Facility (SDF) Advances (WMA) Average Number Average Number Average Number amount of days amount of days amount of days availed availed availed availed availed availed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Andhra Pradesh 6184.49 31 1653.54 26 1025.05 5 2 Arunachal Pradesh - - - - - - 3 Assam - - - - - - 4 Bihar - - - - - - 5 Chhattisgarh - - - - - - 6 Goa - - - - - - 7 Gujarat - - - - - - 8 Haryana 473.94 8 - - - - 9 Himachal Pradesh - - 386.28 25 164.97 6 10 Jammu & Kashmir UT - - - - - - 11 Jharkhand - - - - - - 12 Karnataka - - - - - - 13 Kerala 1590.49 31 1554.61 29 1645.12 10 14 Madhya Pradesh - - - - - - 15 Maharashtra - - - - - - 16 Manipur 84.61 21 168.80 11 280.07 3 17 Meghalaya 453.99 9 - - - - 18 Mizoram 56.39 7 - - - - 19 Nagaland 308.00 9 - - - - 20 Odisha - - - - - - 21 Puducherry - - - - - - 22 Punjab 4317.04 31 1165.95 10 199.92 2 23 Rajasthan 2317.76 11 - - - - 24 Tamil Nadu - - - - - - 25 Telangana 4703.70 31 1697.94 25 723.84 8 26 Tripura - - - - - - 27 Uttar Pradesh - - - - - - 28 Uttarakhand 1285.81 27 832.80 7 354.10 6 29 West Bengal - - - - - - Notes: 1. SDF is availed by State Governments against the collateral of Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF) & Auction Treasury Bills (ATBs) balances and other investments in government securities. 2. WMA is advance by Reserve Bank of India to State Governments for meeting temporary cash mismatches. 3. OD is advanced to State Governments beyond their WMA limits. 4. Average Availed is the total accommodation (SDF/WMA/OD) availed divided by number of days for which accommodation was extended during the month. 5. - : Nil. Source: Reserve Bank of India. 168 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 48: Investments by State Governments (₹ Crore) As on end of January 2025 Consolidated Guarantee Sr. State/Union Government Auction Treasury Sinking Fund Redemption Fund No Territory Securities Bills (ATBs) (CSF) (GRF) 1 2 3 4 5 1 Andhra Pradesh 11543 1139 0 0 2 Arunachal Pradesh 2743 7 0 4600 3 Assam 9183 90 0 0 4 Bihar 12492 - 0 19000 5 Chhattisgarh 7791 489 0 9495 6 Goa 1050 456 0 0 7 Gujarat 15328 664 0 2000 8 Haryana 2331 1695 0 0 9 Himachal Pradesh - - 0 0 10 Jammu & Kashmir UT 19 18 0 0 11 Jharkhand 2406 - 0 830 12 Karnataka 20254 750 0 29709 13 Kerala 3110 - 0 0 14 Madhya Pradesh - 1274 0 0 15 Maharashtra 71768 1740 0 0 16 Manipur 69 140 0 0 17 Meghalaya 1274 108 0 0 18 Mizoram 458 63 0 0 19 Nagaland 1888 46 0 0 20 Odisha 18171 2046 117 13488 21 Puducherry 578 - 0 1500 22 Punjab 9143 0 0 0 23 Rajasthan 1780 - 0 7700 24 Tamil Nadu 3439 - 0 3616 25 Telangana 7880 1726 0 0 26 Tripura 1220 27 0 0 27 Uttarakhand 5006 210 0 0 28 Uttar Pradesh 10696 415 0 30000 29 West Bengal 13810 1029 0 1500 Total 235431 14134 117 123437 Notes: 1. CSF and GRF are reserve funds maintained by some State Governments with the Reserve Bank of India. 2. ATBs include Treasury bills of 91 days, 182 days and 364 days invested by State Governments in the primary market. 3. - : Not Applicable (not a member of the scheme). RBI Bulletin March 2025 169CURRENT STATISTICS No. 49: Market Borrowings of State Governments (₹ Crore) 2024-25 Total amount 2022-23 2023-24 raised, so far in November December January 2024-25 Sr. No. State Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Gross Net Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised Raised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 Andhra Pradesh 57478 45814 68400 55330 4000 2000 4237 3237 5000 4000 63237 44155 2 Arunachal Pradesh 559 389 902 672 400 400 395 315 - - 795 569 3 Assam 17100 16105 18500 16000 - -500 1800 1100 1000 1000 12050 9400 4 Bihar 36800 27467 47612 29910 6000 3000 6000 3500 8000 5000 40000 24422 5 Chhattisgarh 2000 -2287 32000 26213 - - - - - -700 6500 2300 6 Goa 1350 500 2550 1560 200 100 - - - - 1050 250 7 Gujarat 43000 28300 30500 11947 3000 1000 4500 2000 7000 2700 20500 5700 8 Haryana 45158 28638 47500 28364 4000 3500 2000 1150 6000 3400 33000 23270 9 Himachal Pradesh 14000 11941 8072 5856 500 300 1000 900 - -300 6700 4450 10 Jammu & Kashmir UT 8473 5969 16337 13904 400 400 1600 1600 920 720 12670 11130 11 Jharkhand 4000 -155 1000 -2505 - - - -750 - -2700 - -3450 12 Karnataka 36000 26000 81000 63003 4000 1500 16000 13500 16025 13025 59025 42525 13 Kerala 30839 15620 42438 26638 2249 1249 2755 2455 4000 2500 36002 22302 14 Madhya Pradesh 40158 26849 38500 26264 5000 4250 5000 4250 5000 4000 35000 26900 15 Maharashtra 72000 42815 110000 79738 - -2700 - -3100 18000 15600 85000 57300 16 Manipur 1422 1147 1426 1076 - - 200 200 - -100 1000 640 17 Meghalaya 1753 1356 1364 912 - - 635 535 - -100 1882 1194 18 Mizoram 1315 1129 901 641 80 60 140 40 119 119 930 700 19 Nagaland 1854 1199 2551 2016 - -150 250 250 - - 550 200 20 Odisha 0 -7500 0 -4658 1000 1000 - - 1000 500 2000 - 21 Puducherry 1200 698 1100 475 - -100 350 350 - -300 900 200 22 Punjab 45500 33660 42386 29517 387 387 2500 2200 3900 2500 36830 30676 23 Rajasthan 46057 30110 73624 49718 4265 3015 4800 3800 5000 3000 57565 39483 24 Sikkim 1414 1320 1916 1701 - - - - - - 1000 870 25 Tamil Nadu 87000 65722 113001 75970 9025 5400 11000 10000 10000 7000 88025 60175 26 Telangana 40150 30922 49618 39385 1000 200 3500 2500 6209 4609 46709 36591 27 Tripura 0 -645 0 -550 - - - - - - - - 28 Uttar Pradesh 55612 41797 97650 85335 6000 3500 12000 8422 5000 3000 26000 10713 29 Uttarakhand 3200 1450 6300 3800 500 500 1000 - 1000 350 4400 2750 30 West Bengal 63000 42500 69910 48910 3000 1000 7000 5000 8500 5500 46500 28400 Grand Total 758392 518829 1007058 717140 55006 29311 88662 63454 111673 74323 725820 483815 - : Nil. Note: The State of J&K has ceased to exist constitutionally from October 31, 2019 and the liabilities of the State continue to remain as liabilities of the new UT of Jammu and Kashmir. Source: Reserve Bank of India. 170 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (a): Flow of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households - Instrument-wise (Amount in ` Crore) 2021-22 Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Annual Net Financial Assets (I-II) 3,42,813 3,30,490 4,85,203 5,54,816 17,13,322 Per cent of GDP 6.6 5.9 7.7 8.5 7.3 I. Financial Assets 3,63,395 5,25,419 8,16,484 9,07,366 26,12,664 Per cent of GDP 7.0 9.3 13.0 13.9 11.1 of which: 1.Total Deposits (a)+(b) (81,064) 2,04,486 4,28,035 2,83,634 8,35,091 (a) Bank Deposits (1,06,429) 1,97,105 4,22,393 2,70,025 7,83,094 i. Commercial Banks (1,07,941) 1,95,442 4,18,267 2,62,326 7,68,094 ii. Co-operative Banks 1,512 1,663 4,126 7,699 15,000 (b) Non-Bank Deposits 25,365 7,380 5,642 13,610 51,997 of which: Other Financial Institutions (i+ii) 17,555 (435) (2,178) 5,770 20,712 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 5,578 (1,371) 73 4,021 8,302 ii. Housing Finance Companies 11,977 936 (2,252) 1,748 12,410 2. Life Insurance Funds 1,15,539 1,28,277 1,04,076 1,38,998 4,86,889 3. Provident and Pension Funds (including PPF) 1,24,971 1,12,810 95,493 2,18,719 5,51,993 4. Currency 1,28,660 (68,631) 62,793 1,46,845 2,69,667 5. Investments 24,884 82,260 69,715 50,926 2,27,785 of which: (a) Mutual Funds 14,573 63,151 37,912 44,964 1,60,600 (b) Equity 4,502 13,218 27,808 3,084 48,613 6. Small Savings (excluding PPF) 50,405 66,218 56,372 68,243 2,41,238 II. Financial Liabilities 20,583 1,94,929 3,31,281 3,52,550 8,99,343 Per cent of GDP 0.4 3.5 5.3 5.4 3.8 Loans (Borrowings) from 1. Financial Corporations (a+b) 20,479 1,94,825 3,31,178 3,52,446 8,98,928 (a) Banking Sector 21,428 1,38,720 2,67,955 2,74,181 7,02,284 of which: i. Commercial Banks 26,979 1,40,269 2,65,271 3,37,010 7,69,529 (b) Other Financial Institutions (949) 56,105 63,223 78,266 1,96,644 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies (8,708) 30,151 32,177 40,003 93,623 ii. Housing Finance Companies 7,132 24,404 29,495 37,436 98,467 iii. Insurance Corporations 627 1,550 1,551 827 4,554 2. Non-Financial Corporations (Private 34 34 34 34 135 Corporate Business) 3. General Government 70 70 70 70 279 RBI Bulletin March 2025 171CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (a): Flow of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households - Instrument-wise (Contd.) (Amount in ` Crore) 2022-23 Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Annual Net Financial Assets (I-II) 2,89,980 2,99,395 2,96,132 4,54,240 13,39,748 Per cent of GDP 4.5 4.6 4.3 6.4 5.0 I. Financial Assets 5,79,958 6,34,471 7,50,245 9,71,526 29,36,200 Per cent of GDP 8.9 9.8 10.9 13.6 10.9 of which: 1.Total Deposits (a)+(b) 1,85,429 3,17,361 2,80,233 3,25,853 11,08,876 (a) Bank Deposits 1,63,172 2,99,533 2,56,400 3,07,867 10,26,971 i. Commercial Banks 1,58,613 3,00,565 2,48,460 2,84,968 9,92,606 ii. Co-operative Banks 4,559 (1,032) 7,940 22,899 34,365 (b) Non-Bank Deposits 22,257 17,829 23,833 17,986 81,905 of which: Other Financial Institutions (i+ii) 6,505 2,077 8,082 2,234 18,897 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 4,231 3,267 3,247 3,946 14,690 ii. Housing Finance Companies 2,274 (1,191) 4,835 (1,712) 4,207 2. Life Insurance Funds 73,298 1,51,677 1,67,522 1,56,613 5,49,109 3. Provident and Pension Funds (including PPF) 1,48,915 1,20,367 1,38,584 2,18,709 6,26,575 4. Currency 66,439 (54,579) 76,760 1,48,990 2,37,610 5. Investments 51,503 48,530 49,779 64,151 2,13,962 of which: (a) Mutual Funds 35,443 44,484 40,206 58,955 1,79,088 (b) Equity 13,561 1,378 6,434 1,665 23,038 6. Small Savings (excluding PPF) 54,375 51,115 37,368 57,211 2,00,068 II. Financial Liabilities 2,89,978 3,35,076 4,54,113 5,17,285 15,96,452 Per cent of GDP 4.5 5.2 6.6 7.3 5.9 Loans (Borrowings) from 1. Financial Corporations (a+b) 2,89,781 3,34,880 4,53,917 5,17,089 15,95,667 (a) Banking Sector 2,34,235 2,63,450 3,70,783 3,83,845 12,52,313 of which: i. Commercial Banks 2,30,284 2,61,265 3,68,305 3,31,293 11,91,146 (b) Other Financial Institutions 55,546 71,429 83,134 1,33,244 3,43,354 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 30,532 36,650 55,792 94,565 2,17,539 ii. Housing Finance Companies 22,337 33,031 24,903 36,746 1,17,017 iii. Insurance Corporations 2,678 1,748 2,439 1,933 8,798 2. Non-Financial Corporations (Private 34 34 34 34 135 Corporate Business) 3. General Government 163 163 163 163 650 172 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (a): Flow of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households - Instrument-wise (Concld.) (Amount in ` Crore) 2023-24 Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Annual Net Financial Assets (I-II) 3,53,093 2,89,675 2,98,111 6,11,366 15,52,245 Per cent of GDP 5.0 4.1 3.9 7.8 5.3 I. Financial Assets 6,74,763 8,15,842 8,08,779 11,32,130 34,31,514 Per cent of GDP 9.6 11.5 10.7 14.5 11.6 of which: 1.Total Deposits (a)+(b) 2,68,925 4,12,388 2,99,372 4,10,559 13,91,244 (a) Bank Deposits 2,55,249 5,06,208 2,79,872 3,94,573 14,35,902 i. Commercial Banks 2,46,079 5,06,700 2,82,537 3,87,313 14,22,629 ii. Co-operative Banks 9,170 (492) (2,665) 7,260 13,273 (b) Non-Bank Deposits 13,676 (93,820) 19,499 15,986 (44,658) of which: Other Financial Institutions (i+ii) (485) (1,07,982) 5,338 1,825 (1,01,305) i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 6,119 4,782 4,896 1,943 17,740 ii. Housing Finance Companies (6,605) (1,12,764) 442 (118) (1,19,045) 2. Life Insurance Funds 1,58,358 1,41,413 1,61,192 1,30,036 5,90,999 3. Provident and Pension Funds (including PPF) 1,63,508 1,48,178 1,53,255 2,53,719 7,18,661 4. Currency (48,636) (36,701) 56,719 1,46,644 1,18,026 5. Investments 41,409 73,060 79,633 1,08,732 3,02,834 of which: (a) Mutual Funds 32,086 55,769 60,135 90,973 2,38,962 (b) Equity 3,757 7,146 9,941 8,236 29,080 6. Small Savings (excluding PPF) 91,198 77,504 58,607 82,441 3,09,751 II. Financial Liabilities 3,21,670 5,26,167 5,10,667 5,20,764 18,79,269 Per cent of GDP 4.6 7.4 6.7 6.7 6.4 Loans (Borrowings) from 1. Financial Corporations (a+b) 3,21,520 5,26,016 5,10,516 5,20,613 18,78,666 (a) Banking Sector 2,13,606 8,68,874 4,02,647 3,92,330 18,77,458 of which: i. Commercial Banks 2,08,027 8,75,654 3,89,898 3,82,558 18,56,136 (b) Other Financial Institutions 1,07,914 (3,42,858) 1,07,869 1,28,283 1,208 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 81,449 59,684 85,032 1,00,836 3,27,001 ii. Housing Finance Companies 23,784 (4,04,294) 21,233 25,853 (3,33,424) iii. Insurance Corporations 2,681 1,753 1,604 1,594 7,631 2. Non-Financial Corporations (Private 34 35 35 35 138 Corporate Business) 3. General Government 116 116 116 116 465 Notes : 1. Net Financial Savings of households refer to the net financial assets, which are measured as difference of financial asset and liabilities flows. 2. Preliminary estimates for 2023-24 and revised estimates for 2021-22 and 2022-23. 3. The preliminary estimates for 2023-24 will undergo revision with the release of first revised estimates of national income, consumption expenditure, savings, and capital formation, 2023-24 by the National Statistical Office (NSO). 4. Non-bank deposits apart from other financial institutions, comprises state power utilities, co-operative non credit societies etc. 5. Figures in the columns may not add up to the total due to rounding off. RBI Bulletin March 2025 173CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (b): Stocks of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households- Select Indicators (Amount in ` Crore) Item Jun-2021 Sep-2021 Dec-2021 Mar-2022 Financial Assets (a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h) 2,33,27,377 2,39,99,280 2,47,08,474 2,54,40,650 Per cent of GDP 110.4 108.9 108.2 107.8 (a) Bank Deposits (i+ii) 1,07,90,832 1,09,87,937 1,14,10,330 1,16,80,355 i. Commercial Banks 99,53,044 1,01,48,486 1,05,66,753 1,08,29,079 ii. Co-operative Banks 8,37,788 8,39,451 8,43,577 8,51,276 (b) Non-Bank Deposits of which: Other Financial Institutions 2,06,509 2,06,074 2,03,896 2,09,665 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 67,840 66,469 66,542 70,564 ii. Housing Finance Companies 1,38,669 1,39,605 1,37,353 1,39,102 (c) Life Insurance Funds 49,29,725 51,42,279 52,13,527 53,57,350 (d) Currency 27,42,897 26,74,266 27,37,059 28,83,904 (e) Mutual funds 18,55,000 20,64,364 21,26,112 21,52,141 (f) Public Provident Fund (PPF) 7,57,398 7,62,264 7,67,287 8,34,148 (g) Pension Funds 6,16,517 6,67,379 6,99,173 7,36,592 (h) Small Savings (excluding PPF) 14,28,499 14,94,717 15,51,089 15,86,496 Financial Liabilities (a+b) 77,43,630 79,38,456 82,69,633 86,22,079 Per cent of GDP 36.6 36.0 36.2 36.5 Loans/Borrowings (a) Banking Sector 61,80,377 63,19,097 65,87,052 68,61,233 of which: i. Commercial Banks 56,47,239 57,87,508 60,52,779 63,89,789 ii. Co-operative Banks 5,31,728 5,30,164 5,32,833 4,69,989 (b) Other Financial Institutions 15,63,253 16,19,358 16,82,581 17,60,847 of which: i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 7,36,312 7,66,463 7,98,641 8,38,643 ii. Housing Finance Companies 7,21,510 7,45,914 7,75,408 8,1 2,845 iii. Insurance Corporations 1,05,431 1,06,981 1,08,532 1,09,359 174 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (b): Stocks of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households- Select Indicators(Contd.) (Amount in ` Crore) Item Jun-2022 Sep-2022 Dec-2022 Mar-2023 Financial Assets (a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h) 2,56,21,348 2,64,23,992 2,71,87,716 2,78,44,981 Per cent of GDP 102.8 102.6 103.2 103.3 (a) Bank Deposits (i+ii) 1,18,43,527 1,21,43,060 1,23,99,459 1,27,07,326 i. Commercial Banks 1,09,87,692 1,12,88,257 1,15,36,717 1,18,21,685 ii. Co-operative Banks 8,55,835 8,54,803 8,62,742 8,85,641 (b) Non-Bank Deposits of which: Other Financial Institutions 2,16,170 2,18,247 2,26,328 2,28,562 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 74,794 78,061 81,308 85,254 ii. Housing Finance Companies 1,41,376 1,40,185 1,45,020 1,43,308 (c) Life Insurance Funds 53,25,967 55,59,682 57,86,593 57,95,431 (d) Currency 29,50,343 28,95,764 29,72,524 31,21,514 (e) Mutual funds 20,48,097 22,60,210 23,55,316 23,67,793 (f) Public Provident Fund (PPF) 8,51,913 8,58,591 8,64,731 9,39,449 (g) Pension Funds 7,44,459 7,96,454 8,53,412 8,98,343 (h) Small Savings (excluding PPF) 16,40,871 16,91,985 17,29,353 17,86,563 Financial Liabilities (a+b) 89,11,861 92,46,741 97,00,657 1,02,17,746 Per cent of GDP 35.8 35.9 36.8 37.9 Loans/Borrowings (a) Banking Sector 70,95,468 73,58,918 77,29,701 81,13,546 of which: i. Commercial Banks 66,20,073 68,81,338 72,49,643 75,80,936 ii. Co-operative Banks 4,73,897 4,76,025 4,78,487 5,30,915 (b) Other Financial Institutions 18,16,393 18,87,823 19,70,956 21,04,201 of which: i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 8,69,175 9,05,825 9,61,617 10,56,182 ii. Housing Finance Companies 8,35,181 8,68,213 8,93,116 9,29,862 iii. Insurance Corporations 1,12,037 1,13,785 1,16,223 1,18,157 RBI Bulletin March 2025 175CURRENT STATISTICS No. 50 (b): Stocks of Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households- Select Indicators (Concld.) (Amount in ` Crore) Item Jun-2023 Sep-2023 Dec-2023 Mar-2024 Financial Assets (a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h) 2,87,56,851 2,96,44,299 3,07,47,010 3,19,86,847 Per cent of GDP 104.6 105.4 106.6 108.3 (a) Bank Deposits (i+ii) 1,29,62,575 1,34,68,783 1,37,48,656 1,41,43,228 i. Commercial Banks 1,20,67,764 1,25,74,464 1,28,57,001 1,32,44,314 ii. Co-operative Banks 8,94,811 8,94,319 8,91,655 8,98,914 (b) Non-Bank Deposits of which: Other Financial Institutions 2,28,077 1,20,095 1,25,432 1,27,257 i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 91,373 96,156 1,01,051 1,02,994 ii. Housing Finance Companies 1,36,703 23,939 24,381 24,263 (c) Life Insurance Funds 60,64,437 62,55,801 65,53,726 67,69,272 (d) Currency 30,72,878 30,36,177 30,92,896 32,39,540 (e) Mutual funds 26,26,046 28,29,859 31,56,299 33,87,208 (f) Public Provident Fund (PPF) 9,55,061 9,60,344 9,64,852 10,51,376 (g) Pension Funds 9,70,016 10,17,975 10,91,276 11,72,651 (h) Small Savings (excluding PPF) 18,77,761 19,55,265 20,13,873 20,96,314 Financial Liabilities (a+b) 1,05,39,266 1,10,65,282 1,15,75,799 1,20,96,412 Per cent of GDP 38.3 39.3 40.2 41.0 Loans/Borrowings (a) Banking Sector 83,27,152 91,96,026 95,98,673 99,91,003 of which: i. Commercial Banks 77,88,962 86,64,616 90,54,514 94,37,072 ii. Co-operative Banks 5,36,409 5,29,528 5,42,241 5,51,852 (b) Other Financial Institutions 22,12,114 18,69,256 19,77,126 21,05,409 of which: i. Non-Banking Financial Companies 11,37,631 11,97,315 12,82,347 13,83,183 ii. Housing Finance Companies 9,53,646 5,49,352 5,70,585 5,96,438 iii. Insurance Corporations 1,20,837 1,22,590 1,24,194 1,25,788 Note : 1. Data as ratios to GDP have been calculated based on the Provisional Estimates of National Income 2023-24, released by NSO on May 31, 2024. 2. Pension funds comprises funds with the National Pension Scheme. 3. Outstanding deposits with Small Savings are sourced from the Controller General of Accounts, Government of India. 4. Non-bank deposits apart from other financial institutions, comprises state power utilities, co-operative non credit societies etc. Data for outstanding deposits are available only for other financial institutions. 5. Figures in the columns may not add up to the total due to rounding off. 176 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS Explanatory Notes to the Current Statistics Table No. 1 1.2& 6: Annual data are average of months. 3.5 & 3.7: Relate to ratios of increments over financial year so far. 4.1 to 4.4, 4.8,4.9 &5: Relate to the last friday of the month/financial year. 4.5, 4.6 & 4.7: Relate to five major banks on the last Friday of the month/financial year. 4.10 to 4.12: Relate to the last auction day of the month/financial year. 4.13: Relate to last day of the month/ financial year 7.1&7.2: Relate to Foreign trade in US Dollar. Table No. 2 2.1.2: Include paid-up capital, reserve fund and Long-Term Operations Funds. 2.2.2: Include cash, fixed deposits and short-term securities/bonds, e.g., issued by IIFC (UK). Table No. 4 Maturity-wise position of outstanding forward contracts is available at http://nsdp.rbi.org.in under ‘‘Reserves Template’’. Table No. 5 Special refinance facility to Others, i.e. to the EXIM Bank, is closed since March 31, 2013. Table No. 6 For scheduled banks, March-end data pertain to the last reporting Friday. 2.2: Exclude balances held in IMF Account No.1, RBI employees’ provident fund, pension fund, gratuity and superannuation fund. Table Nos. 7 & 11 3.1 in Table 7 and 2.4 in Table 11: Include foreign currency denominated bonds issued by IIFC (UK). Table No. 8 NM and NM do not include FCNR (B) deposits. 2 3 2.4: Consist of paid-up capital and reserves. 2.5: includes other demand and time liabilities of the banking system. Table No. 9 Financial institutions comprise EXIM Bank, SIDBI, NABARD and NHB. L and L are compiled monthly and L quarterly. 1 2 3 Wherever data are not available, the last available data have been repeated. Table No. 13 Data against column Nos. (1), (2) & (3) are Final and for column Nos. (4) & (5) data are Provisional. RBI Bulletin March 2025 177CURRENT STATISTICS Table No. 14 Data in column Nos. (4) & (8) are Provisional. Table No. 17 2.1.1: Exclude reserve fund maintained by co-operative societies with State Co-operative Banks 2.1.2: Exclude borrowings from RBI, SBI, IDBI, NABARD, notified banks and State Governments. 4: Include borrowings from IDBI and NABARD. Table No. 24 Primary Dealers (PDs) include banks undertaking PD business. Table No. 30 Exclude private placement and offer for sale. 1: Exclude bonus shares. 2: Include cumulative convertible preference shares and equi-preference shares. Table No. 32 Exclude investment in foreign currency denominated bonds issued by IIFC (UK), SDRs transferred by Government of India to RBI and foreign currency received under SAARC and ACU currency swap arrangements. Foreign currency assets in US dollar take into account appreciation/depreciation of non-US currencies (such as Euro, Sterling, Yen and Australian Dollar) held in reserves. Foreign exchange holdings are converted into rupees at rupee-US dollar RBI holding rates. Table No. 34 1.1.1.1.2 & 1.1.1.1.1.4: Estimates. 1.1.1.2: Estimates for latest months. ‘Other capital’ pertains to debt transactions between parent and subsidiaries/branches of FDI enterprises. Data may not tally with the BoP data due to lag in reporting. Table No. 35 1.10: Include items such as subscription to journals, maintenance of investment abroad, student loan repayments and credit card payments. Table No. 36 Increase in indices indicates appreciation of rupee and vice versa. For 6-Currency index, base year 2022-23 is a moving one, which gets updated every year. REER figures are based on Consumer Price Index (combined). The details on methodology used for compilation of NEER/REER indices are available in December 2005, April 2014 and January 2021 issues of the RBI Bulletin. Table No. 37 Based on applications for ECB/Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) which have been allotted loan registration number during the period. 178 RBI Bulletin March 2025CURRENT STATISTICS Table Nos. 38, 39, 40 & 41 Explanatory notes on these tables are available in December issue of RBI Bulletin, 2012. Table No. 43 Part I-A. Settlement systems 1.1.3: Tri- party Repo under the securities segment has been operationalised from November 05, 2018. Part I-B. Payments systems 4.1.2: ‘Others’ includes e-commerce transactions and digital bill payments through ATMs, etc. 4.2.2: ‘Others’ includes e-commerce transactions, card to card transfers and digital bill payments through ATMs, etc. 5: Available from December 2010. 5.1: includes purchase of goods and services and fund transfer through wallets. 5.2.2: includes usage of PPI Cards for online transactions and other transactions. 6.1: Pertain to three grids – Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai. 6.2: ‘Others’ comprises of Non-MICR transactions which pertains to clearing houses managed by 21 banks. Part II-A. Other payment channels 1: Mobile Payments – Include transactions done through mobile apps of banks and UPI apps. o The data from July 2017 includes only individual payments and corporate payments initiated, o processed, and authorised using mobile device. Other corporate payments which are not initiated, processed, and authorised using mobile device are excluded. 2: Internet Payments – includes only e-commerce transactions through ‘netbanking’ and any financial transaction using internet banking website of the bank. Part II-B. ATMs 3.3 and 4.2: only relates to transactions using bank issued PPIs. Part III. Payment systems infrastructure 3: Includes ATMs deployed by Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) and White Label ATM Operators (WLAOs). WLAs are included from April 2014 onwards. Table No. 45 (-) represents nil or negligible The table format is revised since monthly Bulletin for the month of June 2023. Central Government Dated Securities include special securities and Sovereign Gold Bonds. State Government Securities include special bonds issued under Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY). Bank PDs are clubbed under Commercial Banks. The category ‘Others’ comprises State Governments, DICGC, PSUs, Trusts, Foreign Central Banks, HUF/ Individuals etc. Data since September 2023 includes the impact of the merger of a non-bank with a bank. RBI Bulletin March 2025 179CURRENT STATISTICS Table No. 46 GDP data is based on 2011-12 base. GDP for 2023-24 is from Union Budget 2023-24. Data pertains to all States and Union Territories. 1 & 2: Data are net of repayments of the Central Government (including repayments to the NSSF) and State Governments. 1.3: Represents compensation and assignments by States to local bodies and Panchayati Raj institutions. 2: Data are net of variation in cash balances of the Central and State Governments and includes borrowing receipts of the Central and State Governments. 3A.1.1: Data as per RBI records. 3B.1.1: Borrowings through dated securities. 3B.1.2: Represent net investment in Central and State Governments’ special securities by the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). This data may vary from previous publications due to adjustments across components with availability of new data. 3B.1.6: Include Ways and Means Advances by the Centre to the State Governments. 3B.1.7: Include Treasury Bills, loans from financial institutions, insurance and pension funds, remittances, cash balance investment account. Table No. 47 SDF is availed by State Governments against the collateral of Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF) & Auction Treasury Bills (ATBs) balances and other investments in government securities. WMA is advance by Reserve Bank of India to State Governments for meeting temporary cash mismatches. OD is advanced to State Governments beyond their WMA limits. Average amount Availed is the total accommodation (SDF/WMA/OD) availed divided by number of days for which accommodation was extended during the month. - : Nil. Table No. 48 CSF and GRF are reserve funds maintained by some State Governments with the Reserve Bank of India. ATBs include Treasury bills of 91 days, 182 days and 364 days invested by State Governments in the primary market. --: Not Applicable (not a member of the scheme). The concepts and methodologies for Current Statistics are available in Comprehensive Guide for Current Statistics of the RBI Monthly Bulletin (https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=17618) Time series data of ‘Current Statistics’ is available at https://data.rbi.org.in. Detailed explanatory notes are available in the relevant press releases issued by RBI and other publications/releases of the Bank such as Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. 180 RBI Bulletin March 2025RREECCEENNTT PPUUBBLLIICCAATTIIOONNSS Recent Publications of the Reserve Bank of India Name of Publication Price India Abroad 1. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin2025 `350 per copy US$ 15 per copy `250 per copy (concessional rate*) US$ 150 (one-year subscription) `4,000 (one year subscription) (inclusive of air mail courier charges) `3,000 (one year concessional rate*) 2. Handbook of Statistics on theIndian `550 (Normal) US$ 24 States 2023-24 `600 (inclusive of postage) (inclusive of air mail courier charges) 3. Handbook of Statistics on theIndian `600 (Normal) US$ 50 Economy 2023-24 `650 (inclusive of postage) (inclusive of air mail courier charges) `450 (concessional) `500 (concessional with postage) 4. State Finances - `600 per copy (over the counter) US$ 24 per copy A Study of Budgets of 2024-25 `650 per copy (inclusive of postal charges) (inclusive of air mail courier charges) 5. Report on Currency and Finance `575 per copy (over the counter) US$ 22 per copy 2023-24 `625 per copy (inclusive of postal charges) (inclusive of air mail courier charges) 6. 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Banking Glossary (English-Hindi) `100 per copy (over the counter) `150 per copy (inclusive of postal charges) Notes 1. Many of the above publications are available at the RBI website (www.rbi.org.in). 2. Time Series data are available at the Database on Indian Economy (https://data.rbi.org.in). 3. The Reserve Bank of India History 1935-2008 (5 Volumes) are available at leading book stores in India. * Concession is available for students, teachers/lecturers, academic/education institutions, public libraries and Booksellers in India provided the proof of eligibility is submitted. RBI Bulletin March 2025 181RREECCEENNTT PPUUBBLLIICCAATTIIOONNSS General Instructions 1. All communications should be addressed to: Director, Division of Reports and Knowledge Dissemination, Department of Economic and Policy Research (DRKD, DEPR), Reserve Bank of India, Amar Building, Ground Floor, Sir P. M. Road, Fort, P. B. No.1036, Mumbai - 400 001. 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Details required for NEFT transfer are as follows: Beneficiary Name Department of Economic and Policy Research, RBI Name of the Bank Reserve Bank of India Branch and address Fort, Mumbai IFSC of Bank Branch RBIS0MBPA04 Type of Account Current Account Account Number 41-8024129-19 b. In case of subscription through non-digital modes, please send the demand draft/cheque payable at Mumbai in favour of Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. 8. Complaints regarding ‘non-receipt of publication’ may be sent within a period of two months. 182 RBI Bulletin March 2025