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स(cid:198)यमेव जयते
SIXTEENTH FINANCE COMMISSION
Report for 2026-31
Volume I - Main ReportCONTENTS
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Constitution and Composition of the Commission 1
Office Setup and Initial Challenges 3
Digital Infrastructure and Public Interface 3
Secretariat Structure and Technical Expertise 4
Engagement with States and Stakeholders 5
Data Sources and Analytical Methodology 6
Advisory Council and Expert Support 12
Structure of the Report 12
Conclusion 13
15
Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
Vertical Sharing of Resources 17
Horizontal Devolution 19
Grants-in-Aid and Assessment of Revenues and Expenditures over
20
the Award Period
Local Body Grants 21
Disaster Relief Grants 23
Reforms for Sound Public Finances 25
Concluding Remarks 28
31
Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
Review Period and the Two Disruptions 32
Government Finances: An Overview 33
Revenues 34
Expenditure 38
Deficits 43
Debt and Other Liabilities 45
Concluding Remarks 47
49
Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
Union Finances: An Overview 49
Union Revenues 51
Union Expenditures 57
Outstanding Liabilities 67
Extra-Budgetary Resources 69
Concluding Remarks 70
i73
Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
State Finances: An Overview 73
Trends in Receipts 75
Trends in Expenditure 79
Deficit and Debt 85
Inter-State Comparison 90
Concluding Remarks: The Big Picture 106
Chapter 6: Union Finances During the Award Period: An Assessment 109
Views of the Union Government 109
Economic Outlook 110
Base Year Estimates and Norms for Assessment 112
Assessment of Revenues 112
Assessment of Expenditure 115
Grants-in-Aid and Transfers to States and Union Territories 118
Capital Expenditure 120
Deficits and Debt 121
Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution 123
Genesis of Fiscal Federalism in Pre-Independence India 123
The Constitutional Provisions 124
Vertical Devolutions by Successive Finance Commissions 126
(cid:47)ong‑Term Trends in Vertical Sharing of Fiscal Resources 128
Implications for the Union and State Revenues 130
Trends in Post-Transfer Revenues of the Union and States 131
Two Issues 132
Views of the State Governments 136
Views of the Union Government 138
The Commission’s Analysis 138
Recommendation 143
Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution 145
Equity and Efficiency as Guides to Horizontal Devolution 145
Equity-Based Criteria of Horizontal Devolution 148
Efficiency-Based Criteria of Horizontal Devolution 151
Horizontal Devolution by Successive Finance Commissions 154
State-wise Shares: Eleventh to Fifteenth Finance Commissions 159
Views of the State Governments 164
Views of the Union Government 167
Devolution Criteria and Recommendations 167
Recommendation 171
Technical Note: Horizontal Devolution Formula 173
iiChapter 9: Assessment of State Finances & Grants-in-Aid 177
Brief Background 178
The Principles Governing Grants-in-Aid 181
Assessments by the Past Finance Commissions 182
Views of the State Governments 184
Views of the Union Government 185
Our Approach 185
Revenue Deficit Grants 191
Chapter 10: Local Body Grants 193
Past Finance Commissions: A Review 194
Stakeholder Consultations 199
Issues, Analysis and Approach 204
Accounts and Audit 211
Grants for Local Bodies 213
Treatment of Exempted Areas 216
Conditionalities for Availing Grants 216
Timely Release of Grants 224
Summary of Recommendations 225
Chapter 11: (cid:41)(cid:76)nanc(cid:76)n(cid:74) of (cid:39)(cid:76)sas(cid:87)er Mana(cid:74)e(cid:80)en(cid:87)(cid:3031) 231
Institutional Framework 232
Recommendations by the Past Finance Commissions 233
Trends in Allocation for States 234
Trends in Releases from the National Funds to the States 235
Stakeholder Consultation 236
Studies Commissioned 238
Implementation and Outcomes of Recommendations of FC-15 239
Our Approach 241
Risk Assessment – The Disaster Risk Index 243
State and National Level Allocations 245
Norms of Assistance 247
List of Notified Disasters 247
Capacity Constraints and Systems Development 248
Use of Technology in Disaster Management 249
Accounting Norms and Procedures 250
Alternative Instruments of Disaster Financing 251
Summary of Recommendations 252
Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability 255
Fiscal Consolidation and Past Commissions 256
Views of the State Governments 256
Fiscal Roadmap 257
iiiOff-Budget Borrowings 258
Legal Framework 260
Debt Management 262
Long-Term Fiscal Roadmap 267
Summary of Recommendations 268
Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector 271
Distribution within the Electricity Sector 272
The Early Reforms: 1995-2010 274
More Reforms and Bailouts: 2011-25 277
Financial Assistance and Reforms Outside the Targeted Schemes 279
The Past Finance Commissions’ Views and the Current Scenario 279
Impact on State Finances 280
DISCOM Losses and Borrowings 282
The Conundrum of Sustained Reforms, Repeated Loss, Debt and
286
Bailout Cycles
Way Forward and Recommendations 287
Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient 293
The Challenge of Defining Subsidies 293
Approach to Measuring State Subsidies 295
Total Subsidies by States 296
State Subsidies: Sectoral Shares 297
Unconditional Transfers by States 301
Interstate Comparison 303
Extra-Budgetary Subsidies by States 306
Transparency in Accounting 306
Trends in Subsidies by the Union Government 307
Composition of Union Subsidies 308
Observations by the Past Finance Commissions 310
Recommendations 310
Concluding Remarks 311
Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprise Reforms 313
State Public Sector Enterprises 314
Central Public Sector Enterprises 321
The Way Forward 326
Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations 329
ivList of Tables
Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
Table 3.1 Receipts, Expenditure and Deficit of Union and States Combined
Table 3.2 General Government Taxes and FC Devolution (percentage of
GDP)
Table 3.3 Composition of General Government Expenditure (percentage of
GDP)
Table 3.4 Composition of General Government Revenue Expenditure
(percentage of GDP)
Table 3.5 Composition of General Government Committed Expenditure
(percentage of GDP)
Table 3.6 Deficits of General Government (percentage of GDP)
Table 3.7 General Government Debt (percentage of GDP)
Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
Table 4.1 GDP, Revenue, Expenditure and Fiscal Deficit
Table 4.2 Growth Rates of GDP, Revenue and Expenditure (percentage)
Table 4.3 Receipts of the Union (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.4 Shares of Major Union Taxes (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.5 Major Components of Non-tax Revenue
Table 4.6 Trends in Non-debt Capital Receipts (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.7 Comparison of Actual and Estimated Proceeds from
Disinvestment
Table 4.8 Trends in Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.9 Profile of Revenue Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.10 Major Items of Revenue Expenditure of the Union (percentage of
GDP)
Table 4.11 Components of Subsidies on the Revenue Account (percentage of
GDP)
Table 4.12 Major Components of Capital Expenditure of the Union
(percentage of GDP)
Table 4.13 Capital Expenditure of the Union and GIA for Creation of Capital
Assets (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.14 Deficit Indicators of the Union (percentage of GDP)
Table 4.15 Profile of Debt and Liabilities of the Union (percentage of GDP)
vChapter 5: Review of State Finances
Table 5.1 GDP, States’ Combined Expenditure, Revenue and Fiscal Deficit
Table 5.2 Revenue and Capital Receipts of the States (percentage of GDP)
Table 5.3 Components of Revenue Receipts of the States
(percentage of GDP)
Table 5.4 An Overview of the States’ Expenditures (percentage of GDP)
Table 5.5 Interest-free Loans from the Union Government for Capital
Expenditure
Table 5.6 Components of Revenue Expenditure of States (percentage of
GDP)
Table 5.7 Expenditures on Health and Education (percentage of GDP)
Table 5.8 Components of Capital Expenditures (percentage of GDP)
Table 5.9 Trends in Aggregate Fiscal Indicators of States (percentage of
GDP)
Table 5.10 Revenue and Capital Expenditure in 2023-24 (percentage of
GSDP)
Table 5.11 Composition of Debt and Fiscal Deficit in 2023-24 (percentage of
GSDP)
Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Table 7.1 Shares of States in the Proceeds from Income Tax and Union
Excise Duties (1952-2000)
Table 7.2 Tax Devolution and Grants (percentage of GTR)
Table 7.3 Devolution and Grants (percentage of GDP)
Table 7.4 Devolution to States: Due and Actual (₹ crore)
Table 7.5 Devolution and FC Grants (percentage of GTR)
Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
Table 8.1 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: First to Seventh FCs
Table 8.2 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: Eighth to Tenth FCs
Table 8.3 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: Eleventh to Fifteenth
FCs
Table 8.4 Population and Devolution Shares under the Eleventh to Fifteenth
FCs: Non-NEH States
Table 8.5 Ratios of Share in Devolution to Share in Population: Non‑NEH
States
Table 8.6 Population and Devolution Shares from Eleventh to Fifteenth
FCs: NEH States
Table 8.7 Ratios of Share in Devolution to Share in Population: NEH States
Table 8.8 Formula for Horizontal Devolution
Table 8.9 Inter se Share of States
viChapter 9: Assessment of State Finances & Grants-in-Aid
Table 9.1 Assessment of State Revenue Receipts and Revenue Expenditures
of All States (₹ crore)
Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Table 10.1 (cid:51)revious FCs Grants Recommended versus Actual Releases (₹
crore)
Table 10.2 Criteria and Weights (percentage) for Distribution of Grants for
Local Bodies by Finance Commissions
Table 10.3 Areas Not Covered Under the Provisions of Parts IX/ IX‑A
Table 10.4 Status of Constitution of SFCs
Table 10.5 Local Body Grants of FC-16 (₹ crore)
Table 10.6 Inter-tier RLB Grant Sharing within a State
(cid:38)ha(cid:83)(cid:87)er 11(cid:29) (cid:41)(cid:76)nanc(cid:76)n(cid:74) of (cid:39)(cid:76)sas(cid:87)er Mana(cid:74)e(cid:80)en(cid:87)(cid:3031)
Table 11.1 Allocation and Release of Sub-windows under NDRF (₹ crore)
Table 11.2 Allocation and Release in Sub-windows under NDMF (₹ crore)
Table 11.3 Allocation for National Funds during the FC‑16 Award (cid:51)eriod (₹
crore)
Table 11.4 Cost‑sharing for Assistance under NDRF (other than Relief and
Response Window) and NDMF
Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
Table 12.1 Fiscal Deficit Roadmap of Union and State Governments
(percentage of GDP)
Table 12.2 Maturity Profile of Government Securities (percentage of Amount
Raised)
Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Table 13.1 (cid:51)ower Subsidy for States (₹ crore)
Table 13.2 DISCOM Debt (Top Seven States) and their Annual Growth (as
on 31 March of Each (cid:60)ear, ₹ crore)
Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Table 14.1 Quintile‑wise Percentage of Households Receiving Free
Electricity
Table 14.2 Funding of Subsidies Through Off-budget Borrowing as on 31
March 2023
viiChapter 15: Public Sector Enterprise Reforms
Table 15.1 State-wise Number of Profit and Loss-making SPSEs
Table 15.2 Category-wise Number of CPSEs
Table 15.3 Category‑wise Number of CPSEs for which Financial Data is
Available
Table 15.4 Financial Data of C(cid:51)SEs (₹ crore)
Table 15.5 Profit Earned and Loss Incurred by CPSEs
Table 15.6 Dividends Paid by CPSEs
Note: In some tables of the Report, the totals may not match the sum of individual entries due to
rounding off.
viiiList of Figures
Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
Figure 2.1 Devolution and Grants (percentage of Gross Tax Revenue)
Figure 2.2 Post-transfer Revenue Shares of the Union and States
Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
Figure 3.1 Revenue Receipts of General Government (percentage of GDP)
Figure 3.2 Union and State Taxes (percentage of Total Tax Receipts)
Figure 3.3 Composition of Tax Revenues of General Government (2021-
2024)
Figure 3.4 Non-tax Revenues (percentage of GDP)
Figure 3.5 General Government Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Figure 3.6 Trends of Interest Payments by General Government
Figure 3.7 Trends of Deficits in General Government (percentage of GDP)
Figure 3.8 Components of General Government Fiscal Deficit (percentage
of GDP)
Figure 3.9 Trend of General Government Debt (percentage of GDP)
Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
Figure 4.1 Trends in Capital Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Figure 4.2 Trends in Debt of the Union and Major Sources of Financing
(percentage of GDP)
Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Figure 5.1 Shares of Major Tax Items in States’ Own Tax Revenue: 2018-19
to 2023-24, excluding 2020-21
Figure 5.2 Components of Committed Expenditure of States (percentage of
GDP)
Figure 5.3 Social Sector Revenue Expenditure (percentages of GDP and
Total Revenue Expenditure)
Figure 5.4 Capital expenditure by States (percentage of GDP)
Figure 5.5 High and Rising Cost of Debt Service
Figure 5.6 Composition of Outstanding Liabilities of the States
Figure 5.7 Off-budget Guarantees by the States
Figure 5.8 Components of States’ Own Revenue in 2023-24 (percentage of
GSDP)
Figure 5.9 The Positive Relationship between Per Capita GSDP and Per
Capita Own Tax Revenue of the States, 2023-24
Figure 5.10 Reliance on Devolution and Grants for Revenues in 2023‑24
Figure 5.11 (cid:51)er Capita Expenditure on (cid:51)ension (in ₹)
Figure 5.12 (cid:51)er Capita Expenditure on Salaries (in ₹)
ixFigure 5.13 Capital Expenditure in 2023-24 (percentage of Total Expenditure)
Figure 5.14 SASCI Utilization and Change in Capital Expenditure in non-
NEH States (2021-24)
Figure 5.15 SASCI Utilization and Change in Capital Expenditure in NEH
States (2021-24)
Figure 5.16 Per Capita Expenditures on Health and Education in 2023‑24
Chapter 6: Union Finances During the Award Period: An Assessment
Figure 6.1 Growth Rate of GDP Deflator
Figure 6.2 Annual Growth Rates of Union’s Gross Tax Revenues
Figure 6.3 Trends in Non-tax Revenues of the Union (percentage of GDP)
Figure 6.4 Effective Rate of Interest on Mid-year Liabilities of the Union
Figure 6.5 Composition of Transfers from Union to States and Union
Territories
Figure 6.6 Capital Expenditure of Union (percentage of GDP)
Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Figure 7.1 Trends in the Union Revenue With and Without Devolution and
Grants
Figure 7.2 States’ Own Revenues, Devolution, and Grants (percentage of
GDP)
Figure 7.3 Post-transfer Revenues of the Union and States (percentage of
GDP)
Figure 7.4 Divisible Pool (percentage of GTR)
Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances & Grants-in-Aid
Figure 9.1 Actual and Normatively Assessed Revenue Deficit of Revenue
Deficit States
Figure 9.2 Number of States with Actual and Normatively Assessed
Revenue Deficit
Figure 9.3 Prescribed and Actual Buoyancies during Various FC Periods
Figure 9.4 Comparison between OTR-GSDP Ratio and Efficiency Score of
OTR
Figure 9.5 Average Efficiency Score of OTR
Figure 9.6 Sigma Convergence of Efficiency Score of OTR
Figure 9.7 Relationship between RD/GSDP (percentage) with per capita
Salary and Pension Expenditure for Non‑NEH States (2023-2024)
Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Figure 10.1 Local Body Grants Recommended by Successive Finance
Commissions
Figure 10.2 OSR of RLBs (percentage of Primary Sector GSVA, 2023‑24)
Figure 10.3 OSR of ULBs (percentage of Non-Primary Sector GSVA, 2023-
24)
x(cid:38)ha(cid:83)(cid:87)er 11(cid:29) (cid:41)(cid:76)nanc(cid:76)n(cid:74) of (cid:39)(cid:76)sas(cid:87)er Mana(cid:74)e(cid:80)en(cid:87)(cid:3031)
Figure 11.1 Allocation of Disaster Funds to States by (cid:51)ast FCs (₹ crore)
Figure 11.2 Allocation and Release of Union Share for the State Funds (₹
crore)
Figure 11.3 Releases from NDRF and NDMF (₹ crore)
Figure 11.4 Aggregate Expenditure of States on Relief on Account of Natural
Calamity
Figure 11.5 Disaster-wise Expenditure of States (2019-20 to 2023‑24)
Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
Figure 12.1 Off-budget Borrowings by States (percentage of GDP)
Figure 12.2 Weighted Average Coupon Rate of State Government Securities
vis-à-vis Debt Position of the States
Figure 12.3 Weighted Average Maturity (Years) and Weighted Average Yield
(percentage) of Union and State Government Securities Issued
During the Year
Figure 12.4 Maturity Profile of Outstanding Debt Stock (as on 31 March
2025)
Figure 12.5 Bucket-wise Maturity of State Government Securities (as on 31
March 2025)
Figure 12.6 Redemption Profile of State Borrowings (percentage of GDP)
Figure 12.7 Long-term Debt Trajectory for Union and States Combined
(percentage of GDP) for the Next Two Decades
Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Figure 13.1 State-wise Accumulated DISCOM Losses (percentage of
Aggregate Losses of All State-Owned DISCOMs, 2023‑24)
Figure 13.2 Accumulated losses for States in 2023-24 (percentage of GSDP)
Figure 13.3 State-wise Comparison of Billing and Collection Efficiencies,
and AT&C Losses with All-State Average, 2023‑24
Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Figure 14.1 Subsidies and Transfers for Twenty-one Larger States
(percentage of GSDP)
Figure 14.2 Sectoral Shares of the Subsidies and Transfer Schemes
Figure 14.3 Composition of State Subsidies on the Revenue Account
Figure 14.4 Agricultural Subsidies by Type
Figure 14.5 Sectoral Composition of Unconditional Transfers
Figure 14.6 Number of States with Revenue Deficit Adopting Unconditional
Transfers
Figure 14.7 Subsidies and Transfers (percentage of GSDP)
xiFigure 14.8 Per Capita Subsidy vs Per Capita GSDP (2023-24)
Figure 14.9 Union Subsidies and Transfers
Figure 14.10 Composition of Union Subsidies and Transfers
Figure 14.11 Change in Composition of Subsidies and Transfers between
2018-19 and 2025-26 BE
Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprise Reforms
Figure 15.1 State-wise Number of SPSEs
Figure 15.2 State-wise Number of Active and Inactive SPSEs
Figure 15.3 SPSEs’ Turnover (percentage of GSDP)
Figure 15.4 State-wise Profit and Loss of SPSEs (2022-23)
Figure 15.5 Net Profit / Loss of SPSEs in Power and Non‑power Sectors
Figure 15.6 State-wise Budgetary Outgo to SPSEs
Figure 15.7 Outstanding Guarantees Issued to SPSEs by State Governments
till 2022-23
Figure 15.8 Sectoral Distribution of Net Profits of CPSEs
xiiList of Boxes
Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Box 5.1 GST Compensation
Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Box 10.1 Odisha’s Rural Urban Transition Policy
Box 10.2 Swachha Indore
(cid:38)ha(cid:83)(cid:87)er 11(cid:29) (cid:41)(cid:76)nanc(cid:76)n(cid:74) of (cid:39)(cid:76)sas(cid:87)er Mana(cid:74)e(cid:80)en(cid:87)(cid:3031)
Box 11.1 Methodology of State Level Allocation for SDRF and SDMF
Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Box 14.1 Targeting of Subsidies: Case of Household Power Subsidies
List of Case Studies
Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Case Study 1 Efficient Management of State-owned DISCOMs in Gujarat
Case Study 2 Efficient Management of State-owned DISCOMs in Haryana
xiiiList of Abbreviations
AAI Airport Authority of India
ACS Average Cost of Supply
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADCs Autonomous District Councils
AE Average Expenditure
AG Accountants General
AI Artificial Intelligence
AIDC Agriculture Infrastructure and Development Cess
AMRUT Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation
APDRP Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program
APTEL Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
ARET Additional Retail Excise Tax
ARR Average Revenue Realised
AT&C Aggregate Technical and Commercial
ATRs Action Taken Reports
BE Budget Estimates
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General
CDEMA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CDRI Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CEEW Council on Energy, Environment and Water
CERC Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
CFI Consolidated Fund of India
CoAs Chart of Accounts
CPC Central Pay Commission
CPSEs Central Public Sector Enterprises
CPSUs Central Public Sector Undertakings
CRF Calamity Relief Fund
CRIF Central Road and Infrastructure Fund
CS Central Sector Schemes
CSS Centrally Sponsored Schemes
CWC Central Warehousing Corporation
DBT Direct Benefit Transfers
DDMAs District Disaster Management Authorities
DDMF District-Level Disaster Mitigation Funds
DDRF District-Level Disaster Response Funds
DDUGJY Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana
DISCOMs Distribution Companies
DM Act Disaster Management Act
DPE Department of Public Enterprises
DRI Disaster Risk Index
xivDVC Damodar Valley Corporation
EBRs Extra-Budgetary Resources
ERD Effective Revenue Deficit
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning
FC Finance Commission
FCI Food Corporation of India
FD Fiscal Deficit
FRBM Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
FRP Financial Restructuring Plan
FSBs Fully Serviced Bonds
FSR Forest Survey Report
FY Financial Year
GCOCs Government Controlled Other Companies
GCs Government Companies
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GENCOs Generation Companies
GIA Grants-In-Aid
GPs Gram Panchayats
GRIDCO Grid Corporation of Orissa
GSDP Gross State Domestic Product
G‑Secs Government Securities
GST Goods and Services Tax
GSVA Gross State Value Added
GTR Gross Tax Revenue
IEG Institute of Economic Growth
IFMS Integrated Financial Management Systems
IGST Integrated Goods and Services Tax
IIHS Indian Institute for Human Settlements
IIPA Indian Institute of Public Administration
IMD Indian Meteorological Department
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRMA Institute of Rural Management Anand
IWAI Inland Waterways Authority of India
JAM Jan Dhan bank accounts, Aadhar cards, Mobile phones
JJM Jal Jeevan Mission
KALIA Krushak Assistance for Livelihood and Income Augmentation
kWh Kilowatt‑hour
LB Local Bodies
LFADs Local Fund Audit Departments
LIC Life Insurance Corporation
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas
MAS Model Accounting System
MDF Moderately Dense Forest
xvMGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
MH Major Head
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs
MoHUA Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
MoPR Ministry of Panchayat Raj
MoSPI Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation
MPCs Million-Plus Cities
MTFP Medium-Term Fiscal Policy
NABARD National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NCCD National Calamity and Contingency Duty
NCCF National Calamity Contingency Fund
NCDC National Cooperative Development Corporation
NCRB National Crime Records Bureau
NDCR Non-Debt Capital Receipts
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
NDMF National Disaster Mitigation Fund
NDMIS National Disaster Management Information System
NDRF National Disaster Response Fund
NEC National Executive Committee
NEH North-Eastern and Hilly
NFCR National Fund of Calamity Relief
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NHAI National Highway Authority of India
NHM National Health Mission
NIDM National Institute of Disaster Management
NMAM National Municipal Accounting Manual
NMPCs Non-Million-Plus Cities
NPS National Pension System
NREGA National Rural Employment Guarantee
NSSF National Small Savings Fund
NTR Non-Tax Revenue
O&M Operation and Maintenance
OBB Off-Budget Borrowings
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OF Open Forest
ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
ORE Other Revenue Expenditures
OROP One Rank One Pension
OSL Outstanding Liabilities
OSR Own Sources of Revenue
OTR Own Tax Revenues
PAT Profits after Tax
PCGSDP Per Capita Gross State Domestic Product
xviPCOTR Per Capita Own Tax Revenue
PD Primary Deficit
PES Public Enterprises Survey
PESA Panchayats Extension to Schedule Areas Act
PFMS Public Financial Management System
PLI Production-Linked Incentive
PM KISAN PM Kisan Samman Nidhi Yojna
PM-KUSUM Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha Evam Utthan Mahabhiyan
PMAY Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana
PMGKAY Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana
PPAs Power Purchase Agreements
PRIs Panchayati Raj Institutions
PSE Public Sector Enterprise
R-APDRP Restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RD Revenue Deficit
RDG Revenue Deficit Grant
RDSS Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme
RE Revised Estimates
RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana
RHS Right Hand Side
RLBs Rural Local Bodies
SASCI Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment
SAUBHAGYA Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana
SBI State Bank of India
SBM-G Swachh Bharat Mission-Gramin
SC/ ST Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe
SCs Statutory Corporations
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDMAs State Disaster Management Authorities
SDMFs State Disaster Mitigation Funds
SDRF State Disaster Response Funds
SEB State Electricity Board
SERCs State Electricity Regulatory Commissions
SFC State Finance Commission
SFA Stochastic Frontier Analysis
SFAR State Finance Audit Reports
SGSs State Government Securities
SLBs Service Level Benchmarks
SONTR States’ Own Non-Tax Revenues
SOTR States’ Own Tax Revenues
SPSEs State Public Sector Enterprises
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle
xviiSS Samagra Shiksha
SSPs Social Security Pensions
SSRE Social Sector revenue Expenditure
STP Sewage Treatment Plants
SVAMITVA Survey of Villages Abadi and Mapping with Improvised Technology in
Village Areas
SWM Solid Waste Management
TFR Total Fertility Rate
TGR Trend Growth Rate
ToR Terms of Reference
TRANSCOs Transmission Companies
TRE Total Revenue Expenditure
UDAY Ujjwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana
ULBs Urban Local Bodies
UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UTs Union Territories
VAR Vector Auto-Regressive
VAT Value Added Tax
VDF Very Dense Forest
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB World Bank
xviii1
1.1 The Finance Commission (FC) plays a pivotal role in shaping Centre-State fiscal
relations in India. In discharging its constitutional responsibilities, we at the Sixteenth Finance
Commission (FC-16) undertook a range of institutional, consultative, and analytical exercises
to frame its recommendations. This chapter outlines the constitutional foundation, composition,
and Terms of Reference (ToR) of the FC-16. It also presents the organisational arrangements
and preparatory work undertaken to operationalise the Commission, describes the extensive
consultations with State and Union Governments, explains the methods of data collection and
analysis, and details the broad framework adopted to guide the Commission’s deliberations. The
chapter concludes with an overview and organisation of the report.
Constitution and Composition of the Commission
1.2 In pursuance of clause (1) of Article 280 of the Constitution of India and the provisions
of the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 (Act No. 33 of 1951), the
President of India constituted the FC-16 vide Notification S.O. 5533(E) dated 31 December
2023 (Annexure 1.1). The Commission was mandated to make its recommendations for the
five‑year period commencing on 1 April 2026 and ending on 31 March 2031.
1.3 Dr. Arvind Panagariya, former Vice-Chairman, NITI Aayog and Professor, Columbia
University, was appointed as the Chairman of the FC-16. Shri Ritvik Ranjanam Pandey was
appointed as the Secretary to the Finance Commission (FC).
1.4 Subsequently, vide Notification S.O. 369(E) dated 30 January 2024, the President
appointed the following persons as Members of the Commission (Annexure 1.2):
(i) Shri Ajay Narayan Jha, former Member, Fifteenth Finance Commission and former
Secretary, Department of Expenditure – Full-time Member
1Sixteenth Finance Commission
(ii) Smt. Annie George Mathew, former Special Secretary, Department of Expenditure –
Full-time Member
(iii) Dr. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha, Executive Director, Artha Global – Full-time Member
(iv) Dr. Soumya Kanti Ghosh, Group Chief Economic Advisor, State Bank of India –
Part-time Member
1.5 As Dr. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha did not assume office, the President vide Notification
S.O. 1625(E) dated 5 April 2024 appointed Dr. Manoj Panda, former Director, Institute of
Economic Growth, as a Full-time Member of the Commission (Annexure 1.3).
1.6 Shri Ajay Narayan Jha tendered his resignation from the Commission with effect from
8 April 2025.
1.7 Thereafter, Shri T. Rabi Sankar, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, was
appointed as a part-time Member of the Commission vide Notification S.O. 2506(E) dated 7
June 2025 (Annexure 1.4).
Terms of Reference
1.8 As per the order constituting the FC‑16, its ToR is as follows:
“The Commission shall make recommendations as to the following matters, namely:
i. The distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes
which are to be, or may be, divided between them under Chapter I, Part XII of
the Constitution and the allocation between the States of the respective shares of
such proceeds;
ii. The principles which should govern the grants‑in‑aid of the revenues of the
States out of the Consolidated Fund of India and the sums to be paid to the States
by way of grants‑in‑aid of their revenues under article 275 of the Constitution
for the purposes other than those specified in the provisos to clause (1) of that
article; and
iii. The measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to
supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State on
the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State.
The Commission may review the present arrangements on financing Disaster
Management initiatives, with reference to the funds constituted under the Disaster
Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), and make appropriate recommendations thereon.”
1.9 The Commission was required to submit its report initially by 31 October 2025, covering
the award period from 1 April 2026 to 31 March 2031. The period was later extended vide
2Chapter 1: Introduction
Notification S.O. 4640(E) dated 10 October 2025 (Annexure 1.4A) to submit report by 30
November 2025.
Office Setup and Initial Challenges
1.10 An Advance Cell for the FC‑16 was established within the Ministry of Finance to
oversee preliminary activities in anticipation of the Commission’s formal constitution. Initially
comprising three officers, the Cell undertook critical groundwork necessary for setting up the
Commission’s Secretariat and initiating preparatory processes essential for its effective
functioning.
1.11 Subsequently, the Department of Economic Affairs allocated office space for the
Commission across three floors – seventh, ninth, and nineteenth – of Jawahar Vyapar Bhawan
at 1 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi. While the seventh floor was immediately operational, the ninth
and nineteenth floors were in a state of disrepair and required complete renovation. Considerable
effort went into refurbishing these floors, including the procurement of furniture and installation
of IT infrastructure. These infrastructure and operational arrangements progressed concurrently
with the Commission’s early deliberations and stakeholder outreach.
1.12 Despite a strong commitment from the administrative staff, the process of fully
stabilising operations took nearly four months. The period between January and May 2024 was
marked by significant logistical and financial challenges. The imposition of the Model Code of
Conduct (MCC) in the run up to the General Elections caused delays in financial approvals.
1.13 Infrastructural limitations also posed operational difficulties. The Jawahar Vyapar
Bhawan building, houses multiple government offices, and operates with a limited number of
elevators. Half of the building elevators have been out of order for several years, resulting in
inefficiencies in intra‑office movement and coordination, particularly across the three
non‑contiguous floors occupied by the FC‑16. Often, visiting dignitaries were inconvenienced
by this bottleneck.
1.14 In light of these experiences, we at the FC‑16 are of the view that future Commissions
would benefit from a more integrated and cohesive office set‑up, with floors located in close
proximity and pre‑furnished workspaces prepared in advance of the Commission’s formal
constitution. Provisioning of adequate funds and basic infrastructure at the time of constitution
would further ensure seamless commencement of work and timely onboarding of personnel.
Digital Infrastructure and Public Interface
1.15 To enhance transparency and facilitate wider engagement, the FC‑16 developed and
maintains an official website. This portal serves as a centralised information resource, offering
details on the constitution and composition of the Commission, its official notifications,
recruitment‑related information, and procurement notices. It also hosts key documents,
including background papers and presentations, and provides archival access to reports of
3Sixteenth Finance Commission
previous FCs. Importantly, the website featured a dedicated section for members of the public,
institutions, and organisations to submit suggestions and views on the ToR, thereby supporting
a more inclusive consultative process.
Secretariat Structure and Technical Expertise
1.16 The work of the FC‑16 is supported by a multidisciplinary team of officers and
professionals drawn from various services and backgrounds. Officers on deputation were
inducted from several Central Civil Services, including the Indian Administrative Service,
Indian Revenue Service (Income Tax), Indian Revenue Service (Customs & Indirect Taxes),
Indian Railway Traffic Service, Indian Audit and Accounts Service, Indian Economic Service,
Indian Statistical Service, and the Central Secretariat Service. In addition, officers and
professionals were also deputed or seconded from the Reserve Bank of India, National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi,
and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. These officers contributed their
administrative experience and domain knowledge across fiscal policy, public finance, and
intergovernmental coordination. Annexure 1.5 provides a comprehensive list of all officers
deputed to the FC‑16.
1.17 The process of onboarding officers to the Commission Secretariat involved coordination
with multiple services and departments and was undertaken during a period of overlapping
administrative demands, including the General Elections to the Eighteenth Lok Sabha. These
overlapping demands created procedural bottlenecks in deputation approvals and onboarding.
While some officers were temporarily engaged in election duties and others required procedural
clearances from their parent cadres, the FC worked closely with the concerned authorities to
facilitate timely deputations. Through sustained engagement and inter‑departmental
coordination, most officers were able to join by mid‑2024, allowing the Secretariat to stabilise
its core team and move forward with its analytical and consultative responsibilities.
1.18 In addition to deputed officers, the FC‑16 engaged senior consultants, consultants, and
young professionals with academic and professional training in fields such as economics, public
finance, public policy, statistics, and governance. This blend of expertise enabled the FC‑16 to
maintain a high standard of technical and analytical rigour in its deliberations.
1.19 The FC‑16 also received valuable support from multilateral development institutions.
The World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) deputed public finance
consultants to work directly with the Commission during its tenure. These consultants provided
technical inputs and facilitated access to global best practices in fiscal decentralisation, debt
sustainability, and outcome‑based transfers.
1.20 To harness emerging talent and build capacity in public finance research, the
Commission launched a structured internship programme, offering opportunities to graduate,
4Chapter 1: Introduction
postgraduate, and doctoral‑level students from diverse academic backgrounds. Interns
contributed to ongoing research, data compilation, and preparatory work for State consultations,
thereby enhancing the analytical capacity of the Secretariat.
Engagement with States and Stakeholders
1.21 In furtherance of its Constitutional mandate, the FC‑16 established structured and
multi‑tiered channels of communication with State Governments to ensure a comprehensive
understanding of fiscal realities and development priorities across the country. Recognising that
the quality of its recommendations is contingent on the timeliness and integrity of information
received, the FC‑16 undertook a systematic outreach to key functionaries at various levels
within the States.
1.22 The Chairman of the Commission wrote to the Chief Ministers of all States, outlining
the ToR and inviting their considered views on key issues, including the principles of tax
devolution, grants‑in‑aid, resource augmentation for local bodies, and disaster risk financing.
Complementing this, the Secretary of the FC‑16 addressed the Chief Secretaries of States,
reiterating the data and projection requirements for the award period 2026‑31.
1.23 To facilitate efficient coordination, States were advised to establish a dedicated FC Cell
within their finance departments and designate a senior officer as the nodal officer. A secure,
web‑based portal was developed and hosted on the FC‑16’s official website to facilitate data
and memorandum submissions, with clearly specified deadlines communicated to all States.
1.24 At the operational level, the Joint Secretaries of the FC‑16 engaged with the Accountants
General (Audit) of States, inviting presentations on fiscal trends, compliance with fiscal norms,
and the status of local body finances. Communications were also initiated with the Director
General (Government Accounts) in the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)
of India, seeking detailed finance accounts data for all States. The State verticals of the FC‑16
coordinated directly with designated nodal officers in the State finance departments, providing
access credentials for the dedicated data submission portal and outlining the procedural
framework for interactions.
1.25 States were requested to furnish comprehensive projections for the award period
(2026‑2031), along with the underlying assumptions. They were also asked to share their views
on the key areas covered by the ToR, particularly those relating to the distribution of net tax
proceeds, structure of grants‑in‑aid, fiscal decentralisation, and disaster management financing.
1.26 In addition, the FC‑16 sought granular financial data from 2011‑12 onwards, including
information on receipts and expenditure (both revenue and capital), debt liabilities, salary and
subsidy outflows, deposits, and remittances. Particular emphasis was placed on obtaining
disaggregated ‘service heads’ data and provisional accounts for the latest fiscal year. Until such
detailed data was received, the Commission made interim use of Combined Finance and
Revenue Accounts data to inform its pre‑visit analysis.
1.27 For presentations by the Accountants General (AG) of States, the FC‑16 provided a
5Sixteenth Finance Commission
comprehensive list of focus areas, such as the financial health of the State, performance of
State‑owned enterprises, implementation of past FC recommendations, local body finances, and
power sector reforms. These presentations were integral to the Commission’s preparatory
assessments ahead of State visits.
1.28 In keeping with the principles of transparency and participatory governance, the FC‑16
also invited suggestions and views from the general public, academic institutions, civil society
organisations, and other stakeholders through a public notice (Annexure 1.6). Suggestions were
sought on the ToR and any other issues relevant to the Commission’s mandate. A dedicated
section titled ‘Call for Suggestions’ was hosted on the official website of the Commission to
facilitate structured submissions from interested parties.
1.29 This structured framework of communication enabled productive and continuous
dialogue between the FC‑16 and the States. It also ensured that the consultative process
remained evidence‑based, inclusive, and responsive to the evolving fiscal landscape.
Data Sources and Analytical Methodology
1.30 The recommendations of the FC are grounded in a rigorous analysis of fiscal data
sourced from credible and authoritative institutions. In line with past practice, the FC‑16 placed
significant emphasis on data integrity, transparency, and comparability while assessing the fiscal
positions of the Union and the States, as well as while examining issues relating to local bodies
and disaster management.
1.31 For the assessment of Union finances, the Commission relied on the annual budget
documents presented to Parliament, and publicly available fiscal data. Disaggregated details of
the divisible pool of taxes were obtained from the office of the CAG.
1.32 In respect of the States, the FC‑16 primarily utilised the audited State finance accounts,
compiled by the respective AGs. These were supplemented by fiscal data furnished through the
Commission’s online data portal, where nodal officers designated by each State uploaded
twenty‑nine statements covering receipts, expenditures, power sector finances, subsidies,
centrally sponsored schemes, and other relevant components. Additional sources included the
Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) publications on State finances and the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation, which provided comparable data on gross state domestic product,
gross state value added, consumption, investment, savings, gross capital formation, and so on.
For demographic projections, the FC‑16 referred to data from the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, which provided population estimates up to the year 2036.
1.33 In its deliberations on financing disaster management, the Commission drew on
expenditure data available in State finance accounts, calculating average annual expenditures
on disaster‑related interventions. These were cross‑referenced with data from the National
Disaster Management Information System of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which offered
in‑depth insights into actual disaster‑related expenditures reported by States over recent years.
6Chapter 1: Introduction
1.34 For local bodies, the FC‑16 leveraged multiple data sources to build a comprehensive
picture of fiscal decentralisation. The e‑Gram Swaraj portal of the Ministry of Panchayat Raj,
provided data on the allocation, release, and utilisation of grants to rural local bodies,
disaggregated by tied and untied categories. For urban local bodies, the City Finance portal of
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs offered detailed information on own source
revenues, including property tax, and grants from State and Union Governments. It also
provided performance data on service level benchmarks. Further inputs were collected through
the FC‑16 portal, which enabled consistent reporting by States on financial flows and functional
capacity at the local level.
1.35 Taken together, these data sources enabled the FC‑16 to undertake a nuanced,
evidence‑based analysis across all components of its mandate.
State Consultations and Field Visits
1.36 The months of April, May, and June 2024 coincided with the General Elections to the
Eighteenth Lok Sabha. During this period, the Model Code of Conduct was in force,
constraining direct engagements with State Governments. Accordingly, the FC‑16 decided to
defer State‑level consultations until after the conclusion of the electoral process.
1.37 Following the completion of the electoral process, the Commission commenced its state
visits beginning with Himachal Pradesh in the last week of June 2024. Over the course of the
following twelve months, the Commission undertook consultations with all twenty‑eight States,
culminating with the visit to Uttar Pradesh in the first week of June 2025. Annexure 1.7 provides
the schedule of all State visits undertaken by the Commission during its tenure along with the
list of participants in various consultation held during these visits.
1.38 These visits constituted a central component of the FC‑16’s consultative process, and
provided a unique opportunity to engage directly with the highest levels of leadership in States,
observe implementation realities on the ground, and gather contextual insights into fiscal and
governance challenges.
1.39 The visits were preceded by preparatory presentations by the respective State’s Auditor
Generals, which provided an independent financial perspective and data‑based diagnostics of
the State’s fiscal operations. These insights were instrumental in framing the FC‑16’s
engagements with State officials. Annexure 1.8 lists the presentations made by the AGs for each
state visit.
1.40 Each visit was structured around formal meetings with the Chief Minister, Finance
Minister, Chief Secretary, and senior officials of the State Government. The States presented
detailed memoranda outlining their fiscal position, sectoral priorities, and expectations from the
FC‑16. These were followed by deliberations that allowed the Commission to seek
clarifications, raise analytical queries, and better understand State‑specific concerns relating to
vertical and horizontal devolution, grants‑in‑aid, debt sustainability, and resource needs of local
bodies and for disaster financing.
7Sixteenth Finance Commission
1.41 Following the meeting with State Government representatives, the FC‑16 held structured
interactions with representatives of rural and urban local bodies, including Autonomous District
Councils in exempted areas, trade and industry associations, and political parties. To facilitate
informed and meaningful discussions, an explanatory note outlining the key elements of the
ToR was shared with the State Governments in advance, with the request that it be circulated
among mentioned stakeholder groups. This step was aimed at promoting a common
understanding of the Commission’s mandate and ensuring that the ensuing dialogue was
well‑directed and substantively rich.
1.42 The FC‑16 also held press briefings at the conclusion of its meetings in each State. These
interactions served to inform the media and the broader public about the FC‑16’s mandate, the
progress of its work, and the nature of consultations held with the Chief Minister and senior
State officials. The Commission also shared key suggestions received from States on major
elements of the ToR and responded to questions from the media, thereby promoting
transparency and encouraging wider public engagement with the consultative process.
1.43 In addition to formal deliberations, the FC‑16 also undertook field visits to selected
districts, industrial clusters, municipalities, Gram Panchayats, health and education institutions,
infrastructure projects, and tourism clusters. These site visits allowed members to obtain a
first‑hand understanding of implementation capacity, service delivery bottlenecks and sectoral
innovations.
1.44 Thematic observations emerged from these visits in areas such as urbanisation, where
challenges of financing and service delivery in rapidly growing towns and peri‑urban regions
were evident; tourism and heritage infrastructure, which offered insights into the potential for
State‑led economic development; health and education systems, where differential access and
quality of outcomes were recurring concerns; and disaster risk management, particularly in
ecologically vulnerable regions such as the Himalayan belt and coastal States.
1.45 In several States, the FC‑16 visited sites of national and civilisational significance,
ranging from pilgrimage towns and waste treatment plants to renewable energy installations,
and cooperative farming initiatives. These experiences enriched the Commission’s
understanding of the developmental aspirations and socio‑economic diversity across India.
Consultations with Union Ministries and Institutions
1.46 In the course of its deliberations, the FC‑16 engaged extensively with various Ministries,
line Departments, and autonomous institutions of the Union Government to gain a deeper
understanding of sectoral dynamics, fiscal flows, and institutional priorities. These consultations
were integral to assessing the Union’s fiscal commitments, scheme design challenges, and
intergovernmental financial arrangements across diverse areas.
1.47 The FC‑16 held structured meetings with over twenty‑five Ministries and Departments,
covering key sectors such as disaster management, local governance, social protection, health,
8Chapter 1: Introduction
education, agriculture, infrastructure, environment, and energy. These discussions provided
valuable insights on centrally sponsored schemes, regulatory frameworks, fiscal incentives, and
emerging policy imperatives that have direct implications for Centre‑State fiscal relations.
1.48 Among the prominent institutions with which the Commission held consultations were
the National Disaster Management Authority, the National Institute of Disaster Management,
Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs), CAG of India, and regulatory bodies
such as the Reserve Bank of India and Securities and Exchange Board of India. The FC‑16 also
engaged with line ministries responsible for key development sectors, including the Ministries
of Rural Development, Health & Family Welfare, Housing & Urban Affairs, Power, Education,
and Environment, Forest & Climate Change.
1.49 Particular attention was given to ministries and departments involved in supporting rural
and urban local bodies, implementing/overseeing major subsidy programmes (food, fertilizer,
power), and coordinating region‑specific initiatives such as those in the Northeastern & Hilly
States (NEH). The Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Ministry of Jal Shakti, and Ministry of
Development of North Eastern Region were among the key interlocutors in this regard.
1.50 The insights gathered from these engagements not only informed the FC‑16 sectoral
analysis but also helped contextualise State‑level submissions within the broader framework of
national priorities and constraints.
1.51 A list of all Union Ministries, Departments, and institutions consulted by the FC‑16,
along with dates of interaction, is provided in Annexure 1.9.
Engagements Beyond Government
1.52 In addition to its structured consultations with State Governments and Union Ministries,
the FC‑16 undertook a wide range of interactions with eminent individuals and institutions to
enrich its understanding of intergovernmental fiscal dynamics. The Chairman and Members
held in‑depth discussions with the former Chairpersons of the Twelfth to Fifteenth Finance
Commissions – Dr. C. Rangarajan, Dr. Vijay Kelkar, Dr. Y.V. Reddy, and Shri N.K. Singh –
whose perspectives on evolving fiscal arrangements and institutional design offered valuable
historical and strategic insights. Members of various State Finance Commissions also engaged
with the FC‑16, sharing on‑the‑ground experiences of fiscal decentralisation and local body
financing.
1.53 To ensure its recommendations reflect contemporary academic and policy thought, the
FC‑16 consulted a wide spectrum of economists, public finance scholars, and public policy
professionals. These included former policymakers, think tank leaders, and academics from
Indian and international institutions. Further, deliberations were held with members of civil
society, grassroots governance practitioners, and representatives of sectoral associations. These
wide‑ranging engagements helped the Commission incorporate diverse viewpoints, practical
feedback, and sector‑specific considerations in the formulation of its recommendations.
9Sixteenth Finance Commission
1.54 Annexure 1.10 provides a list of the FC‑16’s consultations with former FC Chairpersons,
members of State Finance Commissions, economists, public finance experts, civil society actors,
and other non‑government stakeholders.
Workshops and Conferences
1.55 In order to deepen its understanding of the fiscal landscape and engage with a broad
spectrum of stakeholders, the FC‑16 organised a series of thematic workshops and conferences
during the course of its deliberations. These platforms served as valuable fora for discussion,
debate, and dissemination of ideas across the domains of fiscal federalism, disaster management,
and the finances of local bodies.
1.56 The FC‑16 convened regional workshops in each of the five zones – Northeast, West,
East, South and North – between May and August 2024. These sessions were hosted in Shillong,
Jaipur, Rajgir, Vishakhapatnam, and New Delhi respectively. These workshops brought
together economists, regional experts, and public finance practitioners to deliberate on issues
central to the FC‑16’s mandate, including vertical and horizontal devolution, disaster
management financing, and local body empowerment.
1.57 A major academic event was organised in collaboration with the National Institute of
Public Finance and Policy, where eminent economists presented papers and policy
recommendations on core issues before the Commission. The event facilitated high‑level
academic engagement on vertical and horizontal devolution, expenditure efficiency, and
intergovernmental fiscal relations.
1.58 The FC‑16 partnered with international institutions such as the Organisation for
Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD), WB, and ADB to organise high‑level
conferences on fiscal equalisation, urban finance, and disaster risk financing. Notable among
these were the OECD ‘Roundtable on Fiscal Relations’, WB ‘Conference on Intergovernmental
Transfers’ and the ‘International Workshop on Financing Disaster Risk Management’, and the
ADB conference on ‘Urban Finances: Issues before the FC‑16’.
1.59 The FC‑16 organised dedicated discussions on local governance such as ‘Finance
Commissions Conclave - Devolution to Development’, jointly with the Ministry of Panchayati
Raj and the National Conference of Mayors and Chairpersons. This discussion was facilitated
by Janaagraha and focused on devolution and accountability mechanisms adopted in urban and
rural governance. The Finance Commissions Conclave gave a unique opportunity to the FC‑16
for having direct interaction with the State Finance Commissions of all States.
1.60 The Commission also engaged with national institutions working on increasing disaster
resilience, particularly in the Himalayan region. A conference on disaster risk reduction was
held in Leh in collaboration with the National Institute of Disaster Management and the
University of Ladakh, to examine region‑specific vulnerabilities and fiscal preparedness.
10Chapter 1: Introduction
1.61 A list of workshops, regional consultations, and conferences organised or attended by
the Commission is provided in Annexure 1.11 along with the list of participants.
Commissioned Thematic and Sectoral Studies
1.62 In keeping with the precedent set by earlier FCs, FC‑16 commissioned a wide range of
studies to supplement its deliberations with empirical evidence and expert analysis. These
included State‑specific evaluations as well as thematic and sectoral studies, designed to inform
key dimensions of the Commission’s ToR and to strengthen the analytical basis of its
recommendations.
1.63 To provide an independent and nuanced assessment of State finances, the Commission
commissioned State‑specific studies for all twenty‑eight States. These were undertaken by
reputed universities and research institutions across the country, and covered the fiscal situation,
debt sustainability, expenditure patterns, and reform priorities of each State.
1.64 Alongside this exercise, the Commission also engaged leading national and international
institutions to undertake thematic and sectoral studies. The National Council of Applied
Economic Research was entrusted with several critical assignments, including an in‑depth
analysis of State‑level growth trajectories and possibilities for convergence, and a
comprehensive assessment of the fiscal situation and debt sustainability of States. The Institute
of Economic Growth undertook a detailed study on the status and impact of FC grants to rural
local bodies, while the Institute of Rural Management, Anand conducted a comprehensive
review of panchayat finances and measures to augment their revenues. To inform the FC‑16’s
work on urban decentralisation, Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy provided two
key studies: one on the principles of devolution to urban local bodies, and another presenting a
municipal reform blueprint tailored to India’s diverse urban ecosystem. The Indian Institute of
Public Administration was engaged to analyse the State Finance Commissions’ reports and
fiscal transfers for local government growth.
1.65 Given the Commission’s mandate to consider disaster risk financing, dedicated studies
were undertaken on financing disaster risk management, drawing on global best practices and
national experience through WB and Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee. On suggesting
improvement in the Disaster Risk Index, the Coalition for Disaster Risk Infrastructure and the
Council on Energy, Environment and Water were actively engaged. The WB provided analytical
inputs on the prevalence and extent of off‑budget financing by States, as well as a technical
study on equalisation through fiscal transfers. A separate macroeconomic modelling exercise
titled ‘Macroeconomic Policy Simulations’ for the FC‑16 period was conducted by Dr. N.R.
Bhanumurthy, employing a structural macro‑econometric model to simulate policy scenarios
over the award period. To analyse the out‑of‑pocket health expenditure and existing financial
gaps across States, the National Health Systems Resource Centre was engaged.
1.66 In addition, targeted studies were commissioned on specific sectors and cross‑cutting
issues, including the power distribution sector, education, health, and subsidies, as well as an
11Sixteenth Finance Commission
in‑house evaluation of Air Quality Improvement grants, and on subsidy. The FC‑16 also
received an independent analysis of the impact of FC recommendations on fiscal consolidation
efforts made by States, prepared by the WB.
1.67 Annexure 1.12 provides a consolidated list of all studies commissioned by FC‑16 –
covering State‑specific evaluations as well as thematic and sectoral analyses – to support its
deliberations and recommendations.
Internal Deliberations and Analytical Support
1.68 The FC‑16 held a series of closed‑door meetings to deliberate on key issues and
formulate its recommendations. In total, 95 internal meetings were convened, involving the
Chairman, Members, and the Member Secretary. These meetings served as the primary forum
for analytical discussions and institutional decision‑making.
1.69 Dedicated verticals within the FC‑16 Secretariat provided comprehensive analytical
support through detailed presentations on Union finances, State finances, grants‑in‑aid, local
bodies, disaster management financing, debt sustainability, subsidies, and fiscal equalisation.
These presentations also incorporated medium‑term fiscal forecasting and scenario analysis to
aid the FC‑16 in assessing sustainability and trade‑offs over the award period. State‑specific
verticals prepared structured in‑house presentations synthesising data received from State
Governments, and the diagnostic assessments of the State AGs.
Advisory Council and Expert Support
1.70 To support its work and deepen its analysis, the FC‑16 constituted an Advisory Council,
comprising experts in public finance and macroeconomics (Annexure 1.13). The members of
the Advisory Council were - Dr. D.K. Srivastava, Mr. Neelkanth Mishra, Dr. Poonam Gupta
(Convenor), Ms. Pranjul Bhandari and Mr. Rahul Bajoria.
1.71 The Advisory Council provided inputs on issues arising from the ToR, reviewed and
monitored commissioned research studies, and brought to the table national and international
best practices. A list of the deliberations of the Advisory Council and analysis conducted by
individual council members in support of the Commission’s work is provided in Annexure 1.14.
Structure of the Report
1.72 The Report of the Sixteenth Finance Commission is organised into sixteen chapters.
Chapters 2‑5, Issues, Approach and Review of Finances, set out the Commission’s overarching
approach and present a review of the finances of the Union and the States, both in aggregate and
individually. Chapter 6, The Award Period: An Assessment of Union Finances, provides an
assessment of the fiscal outlook for the Union during the award period. Chapters 7‑11,
Devolution and Grants, contain the Commission’s recommendations on vertical and horizontal
tax devolution, an assessment of State finances, and grants related to local bodies and disaster
management. Chapters 12‑15 focus on structural reforms critical for India’s long‑term economic
12Chapter 1: Introduction
transformation, including macro‑fiscal stability, electricity distribution, subsidies, and public
sector enterprises. Finally, Chapter 16, Summary of Recommendations, presents a consolidated
overview of the Commission’s recommendations.
Conclusion
1.73 The work of an FC commences well before the formulation of its recommendations. It
begins with the establishment of institutional capacity and credibility, the articulation of
pertinent questions, and a commitment to engage meaningfully with the diverse voices that
constitute India’s federal polity. For the FC‑16, this entailed not only fulfilling its Constitutional
responsibilities but also navigating the inherent complexities and opportunities of Union–State
fiscal relations with deliberative rigour. This chapter has outlined the institutional and
consultative foundation of the Commission’s work. The chapters that follow present the choices
made in pursuit of a carefully calibrated balance; between competing claims, past precedents
and emerging imperatives, and fiscal prudence and developmental ambition.
132
Chapter 2 Issues and Approaches
2.1 Article 280 of the Indian Constitution mandates that the President appoint a Finance
Commission (FC) every five years or sooner to make recommendations on how to divide the
net proceeds of Union taxes, commonly described as the divisible pool, between the Union and
States (vertical devolution), how to apportion the States’ share in this pool among them
(horizontal devolution), what principles should govern the grants‑in‑aid of the revenues of the
States out of the Consolidated Fund of India, and what measures should be taken to augment the
State revenues to supplement the resources of the local bodies constituting the third tier of the
government during a specified period, usually five years. The current Commission is the
sixteenth in the series of FCs appointed under this mandate since 1951, with the financial years
2026‑27 to 2030‑31 as its award period.
2.2 The terms of reference (ToR) of the past FCs have included explicit directions on the
factors they must consider when making their recommendations. For instance, the FC‑2 was
asked to consider the requirements of the Second Five‑Year Plan and the States' efforts to raise
revenues from their own sources when making recommendations on grants‑in‑aid. Subsequent
FCs were given similar, often more elaborate, directions. In contrast to this practice, the terms
of reference of the present Commission adhere strictly to the charge as per the Constitutional
language without any further direction on what factors the Commission should consider in
making its recommendations.
2.3 Thanks to high growth catalysed by the accumulation of economic reforms over time
and rapid physical and digital infrastructure build‑up, India has recently emerged as the world's
fifth‑largest economy. During the years 2026‑27 to 2030‑31, for which the present Commission
is to make recommendations, it is further expected to become the world’s third‑largest economy,
with the United States and China the only two economies larger than it.
15Sixteenth Finance Commission
2.4 The rapid growth has turned out to be pivotal to India’s mission to eradicate poverty. On
one hand, this growth has directly empowered households by placing significantly larger
incomes in their hands. On the other hand, it has provided the Union and State Governments
with a much larger volume of revenue than they had at the beginning of the millennium, enabling
them to undertake critical development and welfare programs. The result has been a near
elimination of extreme poverty from India.
2.5 Estimations from the data pertaining to the Consumption Expenditure Surveys carried
out by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation show that the proportion of the
population living below the conventional Tendulkar poverty line has fallen from 22 per cent in
2011‑12 to less than five per cent in 2023‑24. The sharp decline in poverty has been across all
social groups, including the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This experience
underscores the importance of sustained rapid growth for broad‑based prosperity in the
forthcoming decades.
2.6 Closely following its ToRs, the Commission’s report is principally devoted to answering
the following key questions:
(i) How should the net proceeds of Union taxes (the divisible pool) be shared
between the Union and States from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31 (vertical devolution)?
(ii) How should the States' portion in the divisible pool be allocated among the
twenty‑eight States over the same period (horizontal devolution)?
(iii) What should be the principles governing the grants‑in‑aid of revenue of the
States from the Consolidated Fund of India and what sums should be awarded to
them during the award period?
(iv) What measures are needed to augment the Consolidated Funds of States to
supplement the resources of the third tier of the government during the award
period?
(v) What measures must be taken with respect to the arrangements and financing of
Disaster Management initiatives during the award period?
2.7 The report begins with the Introduction (Chapter 1) describing the ToR of the
Commission and its functioning throughout the term. It is followed by four chapters (Chapter
2‑5), including the present one and three others reviewing the finances of the general
government, the Union, and the States from 2011‑12 to 2025‑26. Chapter 6 assesses the likely
evolution of finances of the Union during the award period. Our recommendations on the above
five questions appear successively in Chapters 7‑11. In Chapters 12‑15, we recommend a set of
reforms for sound management of public finances of the Union and States in four key areas:
prudent fiscal management, addressing the problem of perennial losses of power distribution
companies, streamlining the rapidly expanding subsidies and transfers and minimizing the
losses of public sector enterprises. The last chapter summarizes our recommendations.
16Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
Vertical Sharing of Resources
2.8 There are three main channels through which resources flow from the Union to the
States. First, under Article 270(1) of the Constitution, the Union’s tax revenues, excluding
cesses, surcharges, taxes accruing to the Union Territories (UTs), and the cost of collection, are
shared between the Union and the States based on the recommendations of the FC. Second,
under Article 275(1), the FC recommends specific grants to supplement the Consolidated Funds
of the States. Finally, under Article 282, the Union provides discretionary grants to States,
mainly through the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). Although the FC has no role in
determining either their nature or magnitude, since they add to the overall revenue resources of
the States, it must take them into account when recommending the transfers through the first
two channels.
2.9 Historically, in the early post‑independence decades, the Union’s revenue resources
were limited due to the nation’s low per‑capita GDP. A centralized planned development system
also meant that the Union needed resources for its development schemes. Therefore, the revenue
resources allocated to the States were limited. Over time, as per capita GDP and Union revenue
resources increased, recognizing the large role assigned to the States in areas like education and
health by the Constitution, FCs began transferring progressively larger shares of the Union’s
revenue resources to them. As a result, the average FC transfers increased from 23.1 per cent of
the Union’s gross tax revenue (GTR) during the award periods of the first four FCs (1952‑69)
to 38.5 per cent during the award periods of the last two (until 2023‑24). Figure 2.1 shows the
annual shares of FC devolution and total FC transfers (devolution plus grants) as a per cent of
GTR.
2.10 FC transfers as a proportion of GTR fluctuated considerably without a clear trend during
the award periods of the first three Commissions (1952‑66) but exhibited a rising trend
thereafter. At the beginning of the FC‑7, they witnessed a large discrete jump from 24.6 per cent
of GTR in 1978‑79 to 30.7 per cent of GTR in 1979‑80. They saw a similar jump again at the
beginning of the FC‑14 from 32.2 per cent of GTR in 2014‑15 to 40.6 per cent of GTR in
2015‑16. The States’ share in the divisible pool rose from 29.5 per cent under the FC‑11 to 30.5
per cent under the FC‑12, 32 per cent under the FC‑13, and 42 per cent under the FC‑14. In
2019, before the FC‑15 gave its recommendations, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was
re‑organized into the Union Territories (UTs) of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. Noting that
the share of the UTs would amount to approximately 1 per cent of the divisible pool, the FC‑15
set the share of the remaining twenty‑eight States at 41 per cent. Therefore, it effectively
maintained the status quo on vertical devolution.
2.11 Inclusive of non‑FC transfers, the total transfer of revenue resources to the States is yet
larger. During the award periods of the first four FCs, the latter averaged 33.4 per cent of GTR.
During the award periods of the FC‑14 and FC‑15, the average transfers had reached 55.8 per
cent of GTR.
17Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 2.1 Devolution and Grants (percentage of Gross Tax Revenue)
45%
40.6%
40%
36.9%
35%
30.7% 32.2%
30%
25% 24.6%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Source: Annexure 7.1
2.12 Figure 2.2 shows the division of the revenues of Union and States, inclusive of non‑tax
revenues but excluding capital receipts, between the Union and States from 1970‑71 to 2023‑24.
From 45.7 per cent in 1974‑75 and 1975‑76, the Union’s share in revenues fell to 37.5 per cent
in 1980‑81. It recovered to 40.1 per cent in 1981‑82 and, except for a brief dip during 1992‑93
to 1994‑95, hovered around this percentage till 2007‑08. Since then, the share has seen a clear
downward trend, which became especially sharp during the award periods of FC‑14 and FC‑15.
In the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, the Union’s share in revenues dipped to the all‑time low of
28.0 per cent though it recovered to 33.0 per cent the following year, but only to fall again to
around 32.4 per cent in 2022‑23 and 2023‑24. Post FC and non‑FC transfers, States currently
have a 68‑69 per cent share of the total revenue receipts, excluding capital receipts.
2.13 The Commission has done its assessment of vertical resource imbalance in light of these
shifts in revenue resources. The Union’s revenues and expenditures allow us to calculate the
revenue resources ‘available’ from the Union for devolution to the States. In parallel, the
estimated revenues and expenditures of the States allow us to calculate the additional revenue
resources ‘required’ by the States. Our recommendation on vertical devolution is based on a
comparison of these ‘available’ and ‘required’ revenue resource estimates. To bridge any
positive gap between the ‘required’ and ‘available’ resources, we assessed the room for further
revenue growth through increased tax effort and expenditure savings through greater efficiency
in spending at both levels of government. We then reworked the ‘available’ and ‘required’
revenue resources and repeated the exercise until an acceptable balance was achieved. The
shares in the divisible pool were chosen in line with this balance.
18
07-9691 27-1791 47-3791 67-5791 87-7791 08-9791 28-1891 48-3891 68-5891 88-7891 09-9891 29-1991 49-3991 69-5991 89-7991 00-9991 20-1002 40-3002 60-5002 80-7002 01-9002 21-1102 41-3102 61-5102 81-7102 02-9102 22-1202 42-3202
Devolution/GTR Devolution and FC grants as % GTRChapter 2: Issues and Approaches
Figure 2.2 Post‑transfer Revenue Shares of the Union and States
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Source: RBI’s Database on Indian Economy
Note: The data shows revenue (tax and non‑tax) receipts excluding capital receipts of Union and States from
1970‑71 to 2023‑24.
Horizontal Devolution
2.14 Horizontal devolution entails the allocation of the overall share of the States in the
divisible pool, as determined in the vertical devolution exercise, among different States.
Historically, this allocation has been based on a set of criteria that considers equity and
efficiency. Each criterion is assigned a weight, which determines the percentage of the States’
total share in the divisible pool that will be shared according to that criterion. For example,
assigning a weight of 20 per cent to the population implies that 20 per cent of the divisible pool
is allocated among the States based on their respective shares in the population of all States
combined.
2.15 Until FC‑6, 80 per cent or more of the divisible pool was divided based on population.
This meant equal per capita allocation of 80 per cent or more of the divisible pool. These
Commissions allocated the remainder of the divisible pool based on contribution to tax revenue
or criteria with a stronger bias in favour of equity, such as inverse per capita income, distance
of per capita income from a benchmark per capita income, or some index of development. From
FC‑7 onward, the equity‑oriented criteria acquired greater importance. The FC‑10 introduced
tax effort and area as criteria, the FC‑11 added fiscal discipline, the FC‑14 forest, and the FC‑15
inverse total fertility rate (TFR).
2.16 This Commission has taken the view that, considering India’s growth imperative, there
is a need for at least a small shift in the devolution criteria towards efficiency. Accordingly, we
19
27-1791 47-3791 67-5791 87-7791 08-9791 28-1891 48-3891 68-5891 88-7891 09-9891 29-1991 49-3991 69-5991 89-7991 00-9991 20-1002 40-3002 60-5002 80-7002 01-9002 21-1102 41-3102 61-5102 81-7102 02-9102 22-1202 42-3202
Union's Revenue post transfers States' Revenue post transfersSixteenth Finance Commission
have included the share of a State’s Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in the nation’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) among the devolution criteria. This criterion captures the effect of
various forms of efficiencies, including efficient spending and fiscal rectitude. We have
accommodated this criterion by shifting some of the weight assigned by FC‑15 to per capita
GSDP distance, area, and tax effort.
2.17 In the interest of gradualism, we have retained the remaining criteria deployed by the
FC‑15, although with some tweaks. In the forest criterion, we have included the open forest, and
given different weights to open, moderately dense, and very dense forests. We have also
introduced a small reward for an increase in the weighted forest area over a base period. In
implementing the area criterion, we have reduced the minimum area assigned to every State
from 2 per cent of the total area to 1.5 per cent. Finally, for the demographic performance
variable, we have replaced the inverse TFR with the inverse growth rate of population between
1971 and 2011. Throughout horizontal devolution, we have used the 2011 population. The
rationales for the tweaks to different criteria are explained in greater detail in Chapter 8 on
horizontal devolution.
2.18 We have deployed the inverse population growth as one of the devolution criteria in
continuity with the FC‑15’s use of the inverse TFR to avoid large shifts in the States’ shares. It
is our view, however, that this criterion should be phased out over time. India is currently at risk
of becoming old before it becomes rich, a prospect it must strive to avoid. We have taken a small
step in this direction by lowering the weight assigned to the inverse population growth compared
with that assigned to inverse TFR by the FC‑15.
Grants‑in‑Aid and Assessment of Revenues and Expenditures over
the Award Period
2.19 Article 280(3)(b) calls upon the Commission to recommend “the principles which should
govern the grants‑in‑aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India.”
Under the related Article 275, the President is to provide for “such sums” to be “charged on the
Consolidated Fund of India in each year as grants‑in aid of the revenues of such States” as she
may “determine to be in need of assistance”, after considering the recommendations of the
Finance Commission.
2.20 A critical question we must consider when determining the sums to be provided to States
as grants‑in‑aid is how the “need” specified in Article 275 is to be determined. The First Finance
Commission recognised that the budgetary need is the starting point but laid down certain
cautionary principles for assessing it. It cautioned against laxity in tax effort and lack of
prudence in observing economy when carrying out this exercise. Successive FCs have followed
a ‘gap‑filling’ approach to determining the need for assistance, and recent FCs have used a
‘normative’ approach to assess the revenues and expenditure of States. The philosophy behind
this ‘normative’ approach is that it will enable the FCs to determine how much revenue the
20Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
States are realistically capable of raising and how much expenditure is essential to deliver public
services at a level necessary to maintain the State's development tempo.
2.21 In making their assessment, FCs exercise judgement regarding expenditures that are
‘committed’ in nature and those that should be excluded or normalised. For example, if a State
decides to add a large number of employees to its rolls, expenditures on their salaries become a
part of the committed expenditures. Interest on debt resulting from poor fiscal management is
another example of a discretionary expenditure turning into a ‘committed’ expenditure. Some
States have had to convert the accumulated losses of power distribution companies into debt.
The losses themselves were the result of poor management and would not have cleared the
normative assessment bar. Yet, once such losses are funded by debt, interest on the debt becomes
normatively acceptable. Even in the case of certain expenditures that do not fall into the
conventional committed categories, there could be ambiguity with respect to classification as
normative versus non‑normative. For example, there is no objective criterion for classifying
certain subsidies as normatively acceptable or unacceptable. Conventionally, FCs have excluded
power subsidies from ‘normatively’ permissible expenditures. However, how are subsidies,
such as free water to all, to be distinguished from power subsidies for such classification? There
are no clear answers to these questions.
2.22 Typically, normative assessments expect revenue deficits to decline and drop to zero or
near zero by the last year of the award period. In reality, the actual expenditure and revenue
patterns have not followed the ‘normative’ path charted by FCs, with revenue deficits persisting.
A new FC once again begins with a substantial revenue‑deficit grant, which, as per its own
normative assessment, declines to near zero by the end of its award period. But the realized
outcome remains at variance with the expectation.
2.23 In our assessment of State Finances, we find that the expenditure patterns of States, even
for expenditure ‘committed’ to salaries and pensions, vary significantly. In addition, expenditure
on subsidies and transfers has increased worryingly in recent years. There is also ample scope
to increase tax revenues by improving tax efficiency. We conclude that the reasons for the
persistent revenue deficit of some States lie in these factors. Indeed, revenue deficit grants create
an adverse incentive whereby the expectation of such grants encourages States to be profligate
rather than address the root causes of the revenue shortage.
Local Body Grants
2.24 The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution created the third tier of the
government in an effort to decentralize and devolve administrative and financial powers from
the State to local bodies. The 73rd Amendment gives constitutional status to the Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs) in rural India, and the 74th Amendment does the same to the municipal
institutions in urban India. Recognising the need for augmenting the financial resources of the
21Sixteenth Finance Commission
local bodies (LBs), the amendments mandate the FC to recommend the ‘measures needed to
augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources’ of the local bodies.
2.25 Successive FCs, appointed after these amendments, have adopted a dual interpretation
of the phrase ‘measures needed to augment’. On the one hand, they have recommended
grants‑in‑aid from the Consolidated Fund of India to LBs, and on the other, they have suggested
measures to increase their own revenues. They have recognised, just as we have, that the primary
responsibility for the funds and functionaries necessary to perform the functions devolved to
LBs rests with the State Governments. The grants‑in‑aid recommended by the FC are to play
only a supplementary role in helping the local bodies meet their financial needs.
2.26 Following the established practice, we held extensive consultations with various
stakeholders on the expenditure needs of and fiscal resources likely to be available to the LBs
during the award period of this Commission. The memoranda submitted by the States and the
Union provide their views on the subject. We also interacted with the representatives of select
LBs during our visits to the States. Further, we visited several Gram Panchayats and
municipalities in different States. We witnessed a transformative change underway in the
delivery of basic civic services, such as drinking water, sanitation, streets, streetlights, and even
public libraries, by the Panchayats. Urban municipalities have begun to pay significantly greater
attention to the collection and treatment of solid waste and sewerage management. The
representatives of the LBs uniformly emphasized the need for the transfer of a larger volume of
grants from the Union and a reduction in the extent of tied grants, enabling them to address their
specific needs.
2.27 We commissioned studies and organised conferences to understand various dimensions
of local body finances. Experts have emphasized the importance of the timely constitution of
State Finance Commissions (SFCs), adequate resources for them, and prompt action on their
reports. The Constitution also directs the FC to make its recommendations ‘on the basis of the
recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State.’ Accordingly, SFCs have a
crucial role in the devolution of resources to the rural and urban local bodies. However, we have
found that many States fail to appoint them in a timely fashion. Moreover, the available SFC
reports are heterogeneous in their approach, methodology, and coverage of issues. As a result,
we have not found them useful for framing our recommendations for the transfer of funds, which
must follow a common set of criteria.
2.28 Some have argued that the FC‑recommended transfers should play a gap‑filling role,
based on the normative assessment by the SFC of expenditure needs of and resources to be
transferred by the State to the local bodies. However, recognizing that this may give rise to
perverse incentives on the part of the States and LBs, we have not followed this approach.
Instead, we have tried to strike a balance between the availability of resources and the needs of
the local bodies, suggesting certain focus areas for increasing the own sources of revenue (OSR)
of the local bodies. Currently, OSR mobilisation remains weak: total OSR of local bodies
22Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
contributes just 0.4 per cent of GDP in India. In the absence of comparable reports of SFCs, we
also agree with past Commissions’ view that population should be the main criterion for inter
se sharing of grants to the LBs, with area serving as a secondary criterion for Panchayats and
generation of OSR for the municipalities. One of the key areas of our focus is accelerating
urbanisation. Urbanisation, by its inherent nature, acts as a catalyst for economic development.
Cities concentrate physical and human resources, infrastructure, economic activities, and
employment opportunities. They help production units to exploit economies of scale and
improve their competitiveness. Keeping this in view, we have focused on two important areas
aimed at aiding urban growth.
2.29 First, there is an urgent need for the revamp of the drainage system in Indian cities. While
the large metros are in a position to raise their own fiscal resources for this purpose, the same is
not true of the smaller cities. Therefore, taking into account the availability of limited resources,
we have recommended the provision of some fiscal resources for revamping the drainage system
in the middle‑level municipalities on a cost‑sharing basis.
2.30 Second, we have observed that there are unusually long delays in conferring a statutory
urban status on areas that come to exhibit all urban characteristics. India’s urbanisation process
remains constrained by the slow and ad‑hoc conversion of census towns into statutory towns
and the hesitant merger of peri‑urban areas into nearby urban local bodies. Such areas continue
to be governed by rural local bodies (RLBs), which are ill‑equipped to manage the burgeoning
demands of an urbanising population. As a result, unplanned growth, deficient infrastructure,
and weak service delivery persist in peri‑urban areas. Hence, we have given particular attention
in our recommendations to speeding up the conversion of RLBs that have already acquired
substantial urban features into urban local bodies (ULBs). In pursuing this objective, we have
focused on the incorporation of peri‑urban areas into adjacent municipal bodies.
2.31 Finally, in designing a part of our grants to RLBs and ULBs, we have incorporated
incentives for these bodies to improve upon the generation of their own source of revenues, as
well as for the States to undertake at least a small matching of the grants by the FC. The former
is in keeping with the principle that as LBs become more capable, they must also achieve a
certain degree of financial self‑sufficiency. There is greater pressure from local residents for the
delivery of high‑quality services when they have themselves contributed to the revenues of the
LB. The latter is in keeping with the Constitutional spirit that local bodies are primarily the
responsibility of the State Governments. Fiscal transfers from the Consolidated Fund of India
to LBs are meant to be only supplementary in nature.
Disaster Relief Grants
2.32 The ToR of the Commission specifically mandate ‘a review of the present arrangements
on financing disaster management initiatives, with reference to the funds constituted under the
Disaster Management Act, 2005 and to make appropriate recommendations thereon’.
23Sixteenth Finance Commission
Accordingly, in this report, we have provided a review of the progress in disaster management
in recent years as well as recommendations for further progress and grants to be provided to
meet the challenges arising during our award period.
2.33 Except for the district level response and mitigation fund, all the funds mandated by the
Disaster Management Act, 2005 have been constituted by all the States as well as by the Union.
Recommendations on Calamity Relief have been a part of the FC’s recommendations since the
FC‑2. FCs have been instrumental in transforming India’s disaster management framework by
institutionalizing dedicated funds such as the Calamity Relief Fund and National Calamity
Contingency Fund, fostering a collaborative fiscal partnership between the Union and States
through shared allocation mechanisms, recommending dynamic expansions to the list of
recognized disasters in line with evolving risks and assessing States’ needs based on disaster
risk. We acknowledge the role of the past Commissions in both creating and transforming the
disaster management architecture in India. Our approach with respect to financing and
management of disasters reflects a commitment to that legacy of institutional strengthening,
collaborative governance and responding to evolving challenges.
2.34 We have held extensive consultations with the States and the relevant ministries of the
Union Government and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). We have also
consulted various expert institutions to deepen our understanding of the impact of the past
recommendations and to identify areas where a course correction is needed. The expertise of
institutions like the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and the Council on Energy,
Environment and Water has informed our understanding of disaster risk assessment. Their
inputs have been integral to our deliberative process.
2.35 In our recommendations, we have acknowledged the institutionalization of mitigation
funds along with those meant for relief and response. Our analysis reveals that progress in the
utilization of mitigation funds has been slow. As a result, an assessment of the likely impact of
these funds is not possible as yet. Nevertheless, we have decided to continue with the current
arrangements for disaster financing, as provided under law. Although the issuance of the
guidelines for mitigation funds was delayed, projects taken under these funds should be
continued and brought to fruition, with greater flexibility in both selection and execution at the
Union and State levels.
2.36 We have deliberated extensively on improving the Disaster Risk Index (DRI)
methodology, in which scores are assigned based on the probability of hazards striking a State,
the State's exposure to hazards, and the extent of its vulnerability. Based on the internationally
accepted definitions of disaster risk, we recognize that the DRI is a multiplicative function of
the variables hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, and the risk only exists when these variables
intersect. We have vastly expanded the hazard variable to include more disasters,
accommodating the key demand from almost all the States. We have also acquired credible and
more recent datasets on hazards from expert agencies and have ensured that our methodology
24Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
remains objective and scientific. While we acknowledge the role of risk assessment in the
allocation of grants, we also appreciate the importance of past expenditure on disaster
management as an indicator of the immediate future needs of the States. Past expenditure on
disaster management is a valuable empirical signal of the frequency, intensity, and fiscal impact
of disasters experienced by States over time and we continue to assign it an important role in
designing future allocations.
2.37 Responding to the requests from various stakeholders and based on sound evidence, we
have also made important recommendations with respect to expanding the list of nationally
notified disasters. In our recommendations, we have paid adequate attention to capacity building
and systems improvement. Based on our interactions with the States and expert agencies, we
concluded that due to varying institutional capacities, wide variations exist among States in
terms of utilization of the funds. We have recommended that capacity building be taken up using
funds meant for mitigation, with the NDMA tasked with undertaking a comprehensive study of
institutional capacity gaps at all levels and proposing targeted measures.
2.38 Recognizing the role of technology as a critical enabler in effective disaster
management, we have recommended that the NDMA synergize the efforts of all concerned
agencies to make technological interventions at all stages of the disaster management cycle. We
recognize that data‑driven decision making is vital for accurately determining the hazard profile
of each State and for guiding the equitable allocation of inter se disaster management grants.
Hence, we have deliberated extensively on all the available data sources on disaster expenditure
heads, disaster wise expenditures, items on which most of the expenditure is incurred and the
States’ approaches in booking the expenditure in finance accounts. This analysis has informed
our recommendations on how National Disaster Management Information System can be made
the repository of all disaster‑related data.
Reforms for Sound Public Finances
2.39 In last four chapters of the report, we focus on a set of reforms necessary to place the
Union and State finances on a sound footing. Four specific areas covered are: prudent fiscal
management, power distribution companies, subsidies and transfers and public sector
enterprises.
Prudent Fiscal Management
2.40 A key driver of sustained growth is the robust fiscal health of both the Union and the
States. Translated, this means that the Government should be able to mobilise adequate
resources to fund its economic and social development expenditures. It also means a fiscal
design that ensures inter‑generational equity, that is, the distribution of the burden of resource
mobilization between current and future generations. A balance must be maintained between
taxes and debt as the means of resource mobilization. In its growth journey, India will have to
25Sixteenth Finance Commission
ensure that the debt incurred by both the Union and States is sustainable and does not unduly
transfer the burden of current expenditures to future generations.
2.41 Since the reforms of the 1990s, the Union Government's debt profile has evolved into a
portfolio that is both stable and safe. Its debt‑to‑GDP ratio has successfully achieved a secular
decline. Notwithstanding the reversal of this trend due to the COVID‑19 pandemic, the debt as
a proportion of GDP is back on its path of secular decline. The Union Government is on course
to reduce debt to below 50 per cent of GDP by 2030‑31. The structure of Indian’s sovereign
debt is among the safest globally, thanks to its low rollover risk, even compared to many
advanced economies. Currency risk is also minimal due to the small share of external debt in
total debt and to generally prudent exchange‑rate management. This fiscal stance must be
maintained in the forthcoming decades.
2.42 At the State level, many large States have maintained sound finances, with fiscal deficits
below 3 per cent of their GSDPs. However, certain States have had a history of repetitive
breaches and a high debt‑to‑GSDP ratio. While fiscal imbalance in a handful of States is unlikely
to threaten the country’s overall fiscal stability, it does carry the risk of undermining their growth
prospects. In addition to reducing high debt levels, States must adopt best debt management
practices to economize on the cost of servicing it.
Electricity Distribution Companies
2.43 The electricity sector has made considerable progress in recent years, with all willing
households in rural and urban areas now electrified. However, one important area with
implications for State finances, financial health of power distribution companies (DISCOMs),
has remained a weak link in this sector. Despite efforts by the Union and State Governments to
improve operational and economic efficiency, DISCOMs in many States have been unable to
achieve sustained profitability. They have remained subject to persistent losses and debt. In
collaboration with State Governments, the Union Government has given bailouts on three
different occasions over a period of two decades, which led to weakening the State finances of
the affected States each time. Yet, DISCOMs remain subject to the largest ever debt today.
2.44 Our diagnosis of the problem suggests that the explanation for the repeated cycles of
losses, debt accumulation, and bailouts of DISCOMs lies in the current governance structure.
As public entities, DISCOMs lack the necessary incentive to achieve a high degree of efficiency
in plugging leakages through technical losses, theft, under‑billing, and under‑collection. At the
same time, the State Electricity Regulatory Commissions have not always fixed the tariff at
cost‑recovery levels. The lower tariffs suit the State authorities as well since they translate into
a lower subsidy bill for the exchequer. The first‑best solution to the problem is the privatization
of DISCOMs. Short of this step, States must undertake serious governance reforms. To help
States in this direction, we provide the case studies of governance structures of DISCOMs in
Gujarat and Haryana, which have delivered healthy outcomes on a sustained basis in this area.
26Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
Subsidies
2.45 Subsidies and transfers form another area of reform with serious budgetary implications.
While these instruments have a legitimate role in a welfare society, the imperative of fiscal
prudence should not be ignored. Once introduced, subsidies and transfers are rarely phased out.
Due to their electoral appeal and ease of disbursement through a well‑developed digital
payments system, large‑group cash transfer schemes have proliferated. As more wealth is
created over time and the revenue base expands, political pressures are likely to push further in
this direction. These pressures need to be resisted, lest they undermine the future financial
stability of States and the Union.
2.46 The primary role of subsidies and transfers should be to assist the poor. Any other
subsidies must be predicated on compelling evidence of externalities. Both the Union and States
must review the current schemes to assess whether they meet these criteria. Those that do not
should be phased out. It is also important to review the beneficiary base of the schemes that are
retained, to ensure that the schemes cater to only those targeted by the scheme. Finally, the
schemes must have exit clauses to remove those who become ineligible over time from the list
of beneficiaries.
Central and State Public Sector Enterprises
2.47 Public sector enterprises (PSEs) constitute the final subject we consider in this part of
the report. Our detailed review of both Central and State PSEs reveals considerable scope for
reforming PSEs to enhance their contribution to economic growth. Without such reforms, their
losses will remain a burden on the State exchequer, and their assets, mainly land, would go
unused. According to the Public Enterprise Survey 2023‑24 (Appendix VIII, pp. 271‑2), there
are seventeen central PSEs (CPSEs) under liquidation, twenty‑four CPSEs approved for closure
by the Government, and thirty‑one CPSEs that are non‑operational as on 31 March 2024.
Altogether, assets of a massive seventy‑two CPSEs have been rendered unproductive. To
minimize further draining of public resources by these enterprises, they must be swiftly
evaluated for closing down. A similar problem also exists in the States. As many as 308 out of
a total of 1,635 State PSEs (SPSEs) have ceased to carry out their operations.
2.48 There also exist a large number of loss‑making CPSEs and SPSEs. Almost one‑third of
CAG‑audited CPSEs incurred losses in each of the latest four years for which we have CAG
data. The annual losses of the loss‑making CPSEs varied from ₹36,213 crore to ₹51,419 crore
over the same period. In the States, 489 SPSEs out of 1,055 SPSEs for which data on profit &
loss are available incurred losses. (cid:55)he losses amounted to ₹1.14 lakh crore in 2022‑23. One rule
of thumb worth considering is for the concerned department to mandatorily take to the Cabinet
any enterprise incurring losses in three out of four consecutive years for consideration for
closure, privatization or continuation.
27Sixteenth Finance Commission
2.49 In States, the problem of SPSE accounts in arrears is endemic. As of 31 March 2023,
1,237 SPSEs had 7,162 accounts in arrears. As many as 441 SPSEs had their accounts in arrears
for more than three years. Each State must ensure that all accounts in arrears are settled and
finalized, and the SPSEs are brought within the ambit of the CAG audit.
2.50 The Union Government had taken the bold step of adopting the New Public Sector
Enterprise Policy in February 2021. It commits the government to closing or privatizing CPSEs
in non‑strategic sectors. While the closure of loss‑making enterprises has gathered speed
recently, action on privatization has not. Based on the experience of CPSEs privatized during
1999 to 2004, significant efficiency gains can be reaped through the privatization of CPSEs and
SPSEs in the non‑strategic sectors.
Concluding Remarks
2.51 With the threat of COVID‑19 behind us and India well on its way to becoming the
third‑largest economy during the award period of the present Commission, this Commission has
sought to lay a sound fiscal foundation for sustained growth in the forthcoming decades. On the
one hand, we have adhered to the tradition of gradual change followed by a vast majority of the
past Commissions, while on the other, we have sought to make a directional change. Our
recommendation on vertical devolution reflects continuity, whereas that on horizontal
devolution rewards States for their contribution to growth for the first time.
2.52 Departing from the practice followed by all the preceding FCs, we find that the revenue
deficit grants have not led to adoption of policies towards reduction of revenue deficit. Instead,
it has created adverse incentives and endless cycles of persistent revenue deficits and revenue
deficit grants for almost the same set of States.
2.53 In the area of local body grants, our directional change has been in the incentivization of
speedier urbanization, which acts as a catalyst for faster growth. Our ULB grants open two
avenues to speedier and orderly urbanization – incorporating peri‑urban areas that have already
acquired nearly all characteristics of an urban settlement into the adjacent municipal body and
revamping the drainage infrastructure of cities with populations between 10 lakh and 40 lakhs.
2.54 In the disaster management area, we have carried forward the work of recent
Commissions, most notably the FC‑15. Two features of our recommendation in this are
noteworthy. First, in an innovative step, the FC‑15 partially based its grant allocations to the
States on a Disaster Risk Index. In making our recommendations, we have aligned this approach
fully to the international practice, defining it as a product of hazard, exposure and vulnerability.
Our hazard variable is based on a significantly larger number of disasters, accommodating a key
demand of nearly all States. Second, although we found that progress in utilizing mitigation
funds during the FC‑15 award period has been slow, which has undermined our ability to assess
the outcome of these funds, we have recommended continuing with the current arrangements to
allow the efforts in this area more time. Finally, in response to requests from various
28Chapter 2: Issues and Approaches
stakeholders and recognizing the existence of sound evidence, we have recommended the
inclusion of heatwaves and lightning among the national disasters.
2.55 Our final set of recommendations focuses on sound public finances of the Union and
States. We identify four focus areas: improving overall fiscal management, ensuring the
long‑term stability of power distribution companies, rationalizing and restraining the expansion
of subsidies, and making the public‑sector enterprises efficient and competitive. As discussed
in last four chapters of the report, through further reforms, both the Union and the States can
contribute and collaborate in each of these areas.
293
3. CHAPTER 3: FIANCES OF THE UNION AND STATES
3.1 In a modern democratic society, the government discharges numerous functions. It
provides public goods, such as external defence, internal security, public welfare, infrastructure,
public parks, and so on, which the market fails to provide. It redistributes income and wealth in
ways that are seen as socially desirable. It provides a legal and institutional framework,
including laws, regulations, and judicial infrastructure, within which private parties may transact
with minimal friction. It corrects market failures arising from externalities such as air and water
pollution, monopoly, and other forms of imperfect competition, as well as asymmetric
information.
3.2 In a large democratic country such as India, the Union Government alone cannot perform
these functions efficiently. The Indian Constitution recognizes this fact and, in the Seventh
Schedule, delineates areas that are solely the responsibility of the Union Government (List I or
the Union List), those that are solely the responsibility of the State Governments (List II or the
State List), and those that are shared between the Union and State Governments (List III or the
Concurrent List). The Union List includes subjects such as defence, foreign affairs, banking,
and currency; the State List covers areas such as public order, police, public health and
sanitation, agriculture, and land; and the Concurrent List has items such as education, labour,
forests, and economic and social planning.
3.3 Based on the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, passed in 1992, India gave
constitutional status to the third tier of government in the form of local bodies represented by
panchayats in rural areas and municipal bodies in urban areas. Under these amendments, some
of the functions discharged by the State Governments have been gradually delegated to the rural
and urban local bodies. This process of devolution is still ongoing, and the status of the functions
performed by these local bodies varies considerably across States, depending on the willingness
of the State Governments to share effective power with them.
31Sixteenth Finance Commission
3.4 Each tier of the government requires fiscal resources to discharge its assigned functions.
For example, the Union Government acquires these resources through (i) taxes, such as income
and corporation taxes, customs duties, the goods and services tax (GST) and excise duties,
(ii) non‑tax revenues, such as royalties on minerals and user charges on goods and services it
provides to households and firms, and (iii) future liabilities consisting of borrowings from the
market and non‑market sources. Once acquired, the government must allocate these fiscal
resources across different expenditure items to efficiently discharge various functions. This
chapter explores how the Union and State Governments, taken together, acquired their fiscal
resources in recent years, how they allocated them across different expenditure items, and
whether the future liabilities have been incurred sustainably. In the following two chapters, we
turn to Union and State finances individually.
Review Period and the Two Disruptions
3.5 Our analysis of Union and State finances in this report spans 2011‑12 to 2025‑26. The
choice of the initial year is dictated by the fact that 2011‑12 is the year when the last base year
of the GDP series was revised. The terminal year is the latest year for which data were available
at the time of writing the report. We have the definite (actual) figures until 2023‑24, while we
rely on Revised Estimates (RE) and provisional accounts for 2024‑25 and Budget Estimates
(BE) for 2025‑26. In this chapter, the review is confined to years 2011‑12 to 2023‑24. By way
of background, it is useful to note at the outset that two major disruptions, with implications for
the government finances, characterized this period.
3.6 First, there was a decline in growth rate during 2019‑20, primarily driven by problems
in the financial sector, impacting banking as well as non‑banking finance companies, mutual
funds and other financial institutions, and adversely impacting the credit growth. The
government had to take several corrective steps, including increased infusion of equity, to
improve the balance sheets of banks.
3.7 Second, the outbreak of COVID‑19 in the last quarter of 2019‑20 caused significant
disruptions to the economy and finances in India and globally. This was an unprecedented shock
requiring out‑of‑the‑box responses. India took necessary steps to safeguard the lives and
livelihoods of the needy through a large expansion of programs such as the public distribution
system and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
programme.
3.8 Despite loud calls from nearly all quarters at home and abroad, the Union Government
chose not to follow the rest of the world in stimulating demand through massive cash transfers.
It foresaw that any attempts to address the demand deficiency through a large demand stimulus,
with COVID‑19 still disrupting supply chains, would only translate into inflation. As a result,
whereas most countries worldwide were confronted with double‑digit inflation as COVID‑19
and its aftermath unfolded, India escaped that fate. Moreover, after a large negative growth (-5.8
per cent) in real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020‑21, India’s economy rapidly recovered,
registering growth rates of 9.7 per cent, 7.6 per cent, 9.2 per cent, and 6.5 per cent during the
four years beginning with 2021‑22 and ending in 2024‑25.
32Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
3.9 This robust recovery notwithstanding, India’s public finances did take a hit due to the
COVID‑19 crisis. While the government had to expand public expenditures to minimize the
effect of the shock, especially on the poor and vulnerable, revenue collection saw a slowdown
in the immediate post‑COVID years. The resultant expansion of borrowing, accompanied by a
downward shift in the GDP trajectory, led to a major spike in the debt‑to‑GDP ratio. In turn, the
post‑COVID‑19 trends in the country’s public finance were quite different from those during
the pre‑COVID‑19 years. The following discussion brings out this contrast.
Government Finances: An Overview
3.10 Table 3.1 shows the total receipts and expenditure, including on revenue and capital
account, of the general government1 in absolute values as well as percentage of GDP. To
eliminate double‑counting, inter‑government transactions like grants and loans by the Union to
the States or interest payments by the States to the Union and vice versa, have been netted out.
This chapter reviews in detail, trends and major components of receipts and expenditure. Unless
specified otherwise, all GDP figures in this Report are presented at nominal values.
Table 3.1 Receipts, Expenditure and Deficit of Union and States Combined
Fiscal Fiscal
GDP Receipts Expenditure Receipts Expenditure
Year Deficit Deficit
(Figures in (cid:2534) lakh crore) (Figures as percentage of GDP)
2011‑12 87.36 17.17 24.14 6.97 19.7 27.6 8.0
2012‑13 99.44 19.94 26.88 6.94 20.0 27.0 7.0
2013‑14 112.33 22.33 29.97 7.64 19.9 26.7 6.8
2014‑15 124.68 24.40 32.77 8.37 19.6 26.3 6.7
2015‑16 137.72 27.86 37.52 9.66 20.2 27.2 7.0
2016‑17 153.92 31.59 42.94 11.35 20.5 27.9 7.4
2017‑18 170.90 34.80 45.17 10.37 20.4 26.4 6.1
2018‑19 189.00 38.57 50.38 11.81 20.4 26.7 6.2
2019‑20 201.04 39.17 53.98 14.81 19.5 26.8 7.4
2020‑21 198.54 36.37 63.18 26.81 18.3 31.8 13.5
2021‑22 235.97 48.27 70.46 22.19 20.5 29.9 9.4
2022‑23 268.90 54.30 78.20 23.89 20.2 29.1 8.9
2023‑24 301.23 61.84 85.28 23.44 20.5 28.3 7.8
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Union Budgets, States and Union
Territories (UTs) Finance Accounts
1 The General Government here consists of the Union, State governments and Union Territories with legislatures. Transfers
from the Union and States to local bodies are captured under the general government expenditures but exclude the own revenue
resources of local governments and expenditures met out of them. Own revenue resources of local bodies taken together amount
to approximately 0.4 per cent of GDP.
33Sixteenth Finance Commission
Revenues
3.11 Revenue receipts of the general government, comprising tax revenue and non‑tax
revenue, have mostly remained between 19 per cent and 20 per cent of GDP since 2011‑12. It
dipped below this range in 2020‑21 due to COVID‑19. Encouragingly, recent trends indicate an
uptick, with revenue receipts in 2023‑24 reaching above 20 per cent of GDP. Review of a longer
period shows that the revenue receipts had been increasing and had touched a high of 22 per
cent just before the global financial crisis as shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Revenue Receipts of General Government (percentage of GDP)
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
Tax Revenue
3.12 Tax revenue continues to be the mainstay of government financing, accounting for
around 87 per cent of the revenue receipts during the review period. As per the division of tax
administration in the Constitution, the Union collects taxes on corporate and personal income,
customs duties and excise duties on petroleum products, while States collect value added tax
(VAT) on petroleum products and alcoholic liquor, excise duties on alcoholic liquor, stamp duty
and registration fees, and motor vehicle taxes. With the introduction of GST, revenues from
GST are shared between the Union and the States.
3.13 As shown in Table 3.2, tax revenue of the Union and State Governments has steadily
increased from below 17 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12. While there is a dip in 2019‑20 due to
corporate tax reduction and early impact of COVID‑19, and in 2020‑21 due to COVID‑19, the
tax revenues have climbed up to 18 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24.
34
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Revenue Receipts Tax Non-TaxChapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
Table 3.2 General Government Taxes and FC Devolution (percentage of GDP)
General
Tax Devolution Own Tax
Net Tax Receipts Government
Year (States’ Share in Receipts of
of Union Total Tax
Union Taxes) States/UTs
Revenue
2011‑12 7.3 2.9 6.6 16.8
2012‑13 7.5 2.9 6.8 17.3
2013‑14 7.3 2.8 6.6 16.7
2014‑15 7.3 2.7 6.5 16.5
2015‑16 6.9 3.7 6.4 17.0
2016‑17 7.2 4.0 6.1 17.3
2017‑18 7.3 3.9 6.2 17.4
2018‑19 7.0 4.0 6.4 17.4
2019‑20 6.8 3.2 6.1 16.1
2020‑21 7.2 3.0 5.9 16.1
2021‑22 7.7 3.8 6.2 17.7
2022‑23 7.8 3.5 6.6 17.9
2023‑24 7.8 3.7 6.5 18.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
3.14 Long‑term trends show that, since 1991, tax revenues have maintained a steady growth
rate of 13.6 per cent, with the highest surge observed between 2004 and 2008. In the
post‑pandemic period, tax revenues have demonstrated resilience, growing at 13.8 per cent, a
pace that surpasses the average growth rate recorded in the decade preceding COVID‑19.
General government tax collections have increased from around 15.2 per cent of GDP in
1990‑91 to 18.0 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24.
3.15 The contribution of Union taxes in general government tax receipts has historically been
higher than that of States/UTs. Union taxes contributed around two‑thirds of general
government tax collections, averaging approximately 63‑64 per cent over the period 1990‑91 to
2023‑24. In contrast, the States' own‑tax revenue share has hovered around 36‑37 per cent. In
1990‑91, Union taxes accounted for 10.0 per cent of GDP, while State taxes contributed 5.3 per
cent. This composition has largely persisted - Union taxes rose to 11.5 per cent of GDP and
States/UTs taxes to 6.5 per cent in 2023‑24.
3.16 However, this composition shifts substantially after accounting for tax devolution as
recommended by Finance Commissions. For example, in 2023‑24, the transfers (tax devolution)
from the Union to States stood at around 21 per cent of the general government tax receipts.
Post devolution, the Union Government is left with 43 per cent of taxes, while the States have
access to a higher share of 57 per cent. Tax devolution has seen a level jump in 2015‑16 due to
a sharp increase in vertical devolution recommended by the Fourteenth Finance Commission
(Figure 3.2). This is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 8 on vertical devolution.
35Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 3.2 Union and State Taxes (percentage of Total Tax Receipts)
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
Figure 3.3 Composition of Tax Revenues of General Government (2021‑2024)
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
36
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Union - GTR States/UTs - Own Tax FC Devolution
Union - post dev States/UTs - post dev
Stamps and Other, 4.0%
Registration fees, 4.2%
Customs, 4.5%
Taxes on Sales,
GST, 32.4%
Trade, etc., 8.1%
Excise Duties, 12.1%
Corporation Tax, Taxes on Income,
17.0% 17.7%Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
3.17 During the period 2011‑12 to 2023‑24, Union tax revenues grew at 11.2 per cent per
annum with a buoyancy of 1.1, partly due to buoyant direct taxes. In contrast, States’ own‑tax
revenues grew at a relatively slower pace of 9.7 per cent per annum, with a buoyancy of 0.95.
Moreover, significant variations persist in tax collections across States, as we explain later in
the chapter. Relatively lower buoyancy of State taxes has led to increased dependence of States,
on average, on the share in Union taxes and other central transfers.
3.18 As shown in Figure 3.3, more than 32 per cent of the total tax revenue comes from GST,
and about 35 per cent comes from direct taxes, almost equally contributed by the corporation
taxes and the taxes on income other than corporation tax. With the introduction of GST, excise
duties and sales tax/VAT are limited to five petroleum products and alcoholic liquor for human
consumption, and they account for about 20 per cent of the total taxes. Customs duties levied
by the Union contribute 4.5 per cent to the kitty, and stamps and registration fees levied by the
States contribute 4 per cent. Other small taxes such as electricity duties and land revenue account
for another 4 per cent.
Non‑tax Revenues
3.19 Non‑tax revenues comprise dividends from public sector enterprises and banks, the
surplus from Reserve Bank of India (RBI), profit and royalty from natural resources and
telecommunication spectrum, and user charges such as fees and tolls. In order to derive the
non‑tax revenue of the general government, the inter‑governmental transactions such as interest
paid by States/ UTs to the Union on central loans and vice versa interest received by States from
the Union on cash balance investment account (Treasury bills) have been netted out. Otherwise,
these form part of the non‑tax revenues of individual governments.
3.20 In recent years, non‑tax revenues have been around 12‑13 per cent of total revenue
receipts. As shown in Figure 3.4, they have hovered around 2.5 per cent of GDP over the review
period, with most of the variation being contributed by non‑tax revenues of the Union. The main
contributor to this variation has been fluctuations in the transfer of surplus by the RBI to the
Union Government as dividends and proceeds of spectrum auctions. While the non‑tax revenues
of States have remained flat at 1 per cent of GDP in recent years, they have been in a steady
decline over a longer period – States’ non‑tax receipts stood at 1.4 per cent of GDP during the
period 2000‑01 to 2010‑11.
3.21 Non‑tax revenues have displayed some episodes of sharp spikes, often reflecting one‑off
policy measures. For example, they rose to nearly 4 per cent of GDP in 2010‑11, driven
primarily by proceeds from telecom spectrum auctions. Unlike tax revenues, which tend to grow
with economic activity and can be reformed to expand the base or rates, non‑tax receipts do not
enjoy the same benefit. They are significantly impacted due to rigidity in pricing of
administrative services and natural resources and sub‑optimal performance of public sector
undertakings, with which we deal in detail in Chapter 15.
37Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 3.4 Non‑tax Revenues (percentage of GDP)
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
Note: Non‑Tax Receipts of Union adjusted for Interest earned on loans to the States and vice versa.
Non‑Debt Capital Receipts
3.22 Non‑Debt Capital Receipts (NDCR) constitute only a small fraction of the total receipts
of the general government. These receipts primarily encompass miscellaneous capital inflows,
with the major sources being disinvestment proceeds and the recovery of loans and advances.
The NDCR for the general government is calculated after netting out recoveries of
intergovernmental loans and advances. Historically, it has been around 0.5 per cent of GDP,
barring a few years where it has crossed 1 per cent. In recent years, it has come down to 0.2 per
cent of GDP.
Expenditure
3.23 As shown in Figure 3.5, the total expenditure of the general government, encompassing
both revenue and capital expenditure, has historically ranged between 24 per cent and 30 per
cent of GDP. However, total expenditure saw a sharp increase during the pandemic, soaring to
31.8 per cent of GDP (Table 3.3). While expenditure as a share of GDP has gradually declined
post‑pandemic, it is yet to return to pre‑COVID levels. A key factor contributing to this
sustained momentum is the heightened focus on capital expenditure in recent years. Increased
investment in infrastructure and development projects has kept public expenditure levels
38
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Union after adjustments States/UTs after adjustment General GovernmentChapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
elevated. Over a long period, since 1990‑91, the total expenditure of the general government
has grown at an annual rate of 13.2 per cent.
Table 3.3 Composition of General Government Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Year Revenue Expenditure Capital Expenditure Total Expenditure
2011‑12 23.4 4.2 27.6
2012‑13 23.2 3.9 27.0
2013‑14 22.8 3.8 26.7
2014‑15 22.3 4.0 26.3
2015‑16 22.4 4.9 27.2
2016‑17 22.8 5.1 27.9
2017‑18 22.4 4.0 26.4
2018‑19 22.5 4.2 26.7
2019‑20 22.9 3.9 26.8
2020‑21 27.5 4.3 31.8
2021‑22 25.0 4.9 29.9
2022‑23 24.2 4.9 29.1
2023‑24 22.9 5.4 28.3
Annual Growth Rate 10.9% 12.3% 11.1%
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
Figure 3.5 General Government Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
39
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Total Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Capital ExpenditureSixteenth Finance Commission
Revenue Expenditure
3.24 Revenue expenditure, which comprises the current expenditure of the government,
including expenditure on interest payments, salaries and pensions of civil and defence
workforce, subsidies, maintenance of assets, grants and assistance, continues to constitute more
than 80 per cent of the total expenditure.
3.25 The revenue expenditure of the general government was arrived at after netting out the
intergovernmental transfers, such as grants by the Union to the States and UTs and the interest
payments on the inter‑governmental loans. It has hovered around 23 per cent of GDP since
2011‑12, reducing from 23.4 per cent in 2011‑12 to 22.5 per cent just before the pandemic. It
peaked at 27.5 per cent in 2020‑21 due to the pandemic and has dropped back to 22.9 per cent
in 2023‑24, but is still above the pre‑pandemic levels, mainly due to increased interest payments
on account of high deficits incurred during COVID‑19.
Table 3.4 Composition of General Government Revenue Expenditure
(percentage of GDP)
Transfers to
General Social Economic Revenue
Year Local
Services Services Services Expenditure
Bodies#
2011‑12 10.0 6.2 6.8 0.4 23.4
2012‑13 9.9 6.1 6.7 0.4 23.2
2013‑14 10.0 6.2 6.2 0.5 22.8
2014‑15 10.0 5.6 6.2 0.5 22.3
2015‑16 9.9 6.0 6.0 0.5 22.4
2016‑17 10.1 6.1 6.1 0.5 22.8
2017‑18 10.3 5.9 5.7 0.5 22.4
2018‑19 10.4 6.0 5.6 0.5 22.5
2019‑20 10.5 6.2 5.8 0.5 22.9
2020‑21 11.4 6.7 8.9 0.5 27.5
2021‑22 11.0 6.7 6.8 0.5 25.0
2022‑23 10.8 6.3 6.7 0.5 24.2
2023‑24 10.6 6.0 5.8 0.5 22.9
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
#Transfers to Local Bodies are made under General, Social and Economic Services heads also.
3.26 Functionally, revenue expenditure is classified into general, social, and economic
services as shown in Table 3.4. General Services, which include administration, police, and
interest payments, have seen a gradual increase in share, from about 43 per cent in 2011‑12 to
just over 46 per cent in 2023‑24. Social services, such as education, health, and social welfare,
accounted for around 26 per cent of total revenue expenditure in 2023‑24, a share that has
remained largely stable. Economic Services, which support agriculture, rural development, and
40Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
industry, fluctuated between 25‑29 per cent of revenue expenditure, except for 32 per cent in
the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21.
3.27 During the review period, revenue expenditure has shown an annual trend growth rate
of approximately 10.9 per cent as shown in Table 3.3. As depicted in Table 3.5, the structure of
revenue expenditure has remained relatively rigid on account of high interest payments, salaries,
and pensions. These committed expenditures limit the fiscal space available for discretionary or
developmental spending. The total committed expenditure hovered around half of the revenue
expenditure during the review period, at 12.8 per cent in 2011‑12 to 13.0 per cent of GDP in
2023‑24.
Table 3.5 Composition of General Government Committed Expenditure
(percentage of GDP)
Year Interest Payments Pension Salaries
2011‑12 4.6 2.2 6.0
2012‑13 4.5 2.2 5.9
2013‑14 4.7 2.1 5.8
2014‑15 4.7 2.2 5.9
2015‑16 4.7 2.2 5.8
2016‑17 4.7 2.3 5.8
2017‑18 4.7 2.5 5.8
2018‑19 4.7 2.5 5.7
2019‑20 4.7 2.6 5.8
2020‑21 5.3 2.9 6.0
2021‑22 5.2 2.6 5.7
2022‑23 5.1 2.6 5.4
2023‑24 5.2 2.5 5.3
Annual Growth Rate 11.5% 12.6% 9.5%
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
3.28 The reduction in salaries (0.7 per cent of GDP) was largely offset by the increases in the
interest payments (0.6 per cent of GDP). Interest payments have consistently been one of the
largest components of revenue expenditure, constituting more than 20 per cent of the revenue
expenditure (Figure 3.6). Pre‑pandemic, the interest payments were 4.7 per cent of GDP but
have risen to 5.2 per cent of GDP due to a higher deficit during the pandemic. Over the long
run, interest payments had been coming down since the early 2000s till the onset of the
pandemic. Salaries and pensions total around 8 per cent of GDP and have shown marginal
decline during the review period. While pensions have seen a level jump after the
implementation of the Seventh Pay Commission, salaries as a proportion of GDP have declined.
41Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 3.6 Trends of Interest Payments by General Government
40.0 7.0
35.0
6.0
30.0
5.0
25.0
4.0
20.0
3.0
15.0
2.0
10.0
1.0
5.0
0.0 0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
3.29 Over a longer period from 1990‑91 to 2023‑24, revenue expenditure has generally
ranged between 20 to 25 per cent of GDP (Figure 3.5). It has seen three phases of increased
revenue expenditure followed by a reduction, first in the late 1990s, mainly due to the
implementation of the award of the Fifth Pay Commission, second, during the global financial
crisis, and the last during the pandemic.
Capital Expenditure
3.30 Capital expenditure, crucial for asset creation and medium‑term growth acceleration, has
remained between 4‑5 per cent of GDP during the review period. However, post‑pandemic, due
to a specific push by the Union Government, the capital expenditure has increased to 5.4 per
cent of GDP in 2023‑24. An important institutional development during this period has been the
introduction of the Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (initially
rolled out in 2020‑21), which provided interest‑free loans to States for priority capital projects.
(cid:55)his scheme has expanded significantly, with annual allocations rising from ₹12,000 crore in
2020‑21 to ₹1.1 lakh crore in 2023‑24, thereby incentivising States to augment their capital
spending.
3.31 At the disaggregated level, the bulk of general government capital outlay is directed
towards economic services – particularly transport, rural development, and energy
infrastructure. Capital expenditure on the social sector, including allocations to health and
education infrastructure, has also risen in recent years but remains modest.
42
erutidnepxE/stpieceR
euneveR
foegantecreP
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
PDG
fo
egantecreP
Interest/Revenue Receipts Interest/Revenue Expenditure Interest/GDP (--RHS)Chapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
Deficits
3.32 A key element in sound macroeconomic management is ensuring that the government
does not rely excessively on borrowing on the fiscal resources side of the equation. Such reliance
is measured by the fiscal deficit, defined as the gap between total expenditures and non‑debt
revenues. Large fiscal deficits have several detrimental effects on the economy. They add to the
public debt and create future interest liabilities. As the debt grows, the threat of inflation looms.
Moreover, a large debt leads lenders to demand high interest rates. Given the fixed volume of
savings in the economy in any given year, a larger fiscal deficit leaves fewer investible resources
for private investors to borrow. This crowding out of private investors hurts future growth. For
these reasons, prudent macroeconomic management entails keeping the fiscal deficit within a
reasonable limit.
3.33 To the extent that the government uses borrowings to finance revenue rather than capital
expenditures, private savings that could have financed private investments end up financing
current government expenditures. For this reason, the revenue deficit, equalling the gap between
the expenditures and revenues on the revenue account, is viewed unfavourably. It effectively
lowers the total investment in the economy, thereby undermining future growth. Symmetrically,
a revenue surplus enhances the investment in roads, railways, ports, and airports and boosts
growth. For this reason, attention must also be paid to the revenue deficit.
3.34 The primary deficit is a final indicator commonly monitored as part of prudent
macroeconomic management. It equals the fiscal deficit minus interest payments on the existing
debt. It measures borrowings beyond what is necessary to service the existing debt. The larger
the primary deficit, the larger the addition to debt attributable to current year fiscal policy.
Table 3.6 Deficits of General Government (percentage of GDP)
Revenue Deficit
Year Fiscal Deficit Revenue Deficit Primary Deficit (percentage of
Fiscal Deficit)
2011‑12 8.0 4.3 3.4 53.8
2012‑13 7.0 3.5 2.5 50.4
2013‑14 6.8 3.3 2.1 48.7
2014‑15 6.7 3.3 2.1 48.4
2015‑16 7.0 2.6 2.3 36.7
2016‑17 7.4 2.7 2.7 37.0
2017‑18 6.1 2.9 1.4 47.1
2018‑19 6.2 2.8 1.6 45.4
2019‑20 7.4 4.0 2.7 54.0
2020‑21 13.5 9.5 8.2 70.2
2021‑22 9.4 4.7 4.2 50.4
2022‑23 8.9 4.2 3.8 47.5
2023‑24 7.8 2.5 2.6 32.8
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
43Sixteenth Finance Commission
3.35 Table 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show the trends in the three deficits of general government.
The deficits witnessed a decline during the initial years but saw a reversal of that trend during
2019‑20 due to the twin effect of economic slowdown and the corporate tax cut and then due to
COVID‑19. Fiscal Deficit came down from 8 per cent in 2011‑12 to almost 6 per cent in
2018‑19. It deteriorated in 2019‑20 and climbed up to 13.5 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21 due to
the impact of COVID‑19. The deficit has come down since then to levels below what it was
during 2011‑12, but the reduction has tapered due to the government’s continued effort to keep
the capital expenditure high. Revenue Deficit has followed a similar path, but the reduction
post‑pandemic has been steeper, as is evident from the improving ratio of revenue to fiscal
deficit, since the focus is mainly on capital expenditure.
3.36 A longer period view shows that the deficits deteriorated during the late 1990s and the
early 2000s, followed by steep consolidation, primarily driven by improvement in tax revenues,
until the global financial crisis in 2008‑09. The increase in deficit during the financial crisis was
again followed by a period of consolidation, which has been disrupted by the pandemic, as
explained above.
3.37 While the revenue receipts had been rising since the late 1990s, the fiscal deficit
increased due to an even steeper rise in revenue expenditure (Figure 3.8). Due to this fiscal
pressure, capital expenditure saw marginal compression. These developments led to the
adoption of the fiscal consolidation roadmaps by governments and the enactment of the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Act (2003). With revenue receipts still rising and
revenue expenditure first plateauing and then reducing as a proportion of GDP, the fiscal stress
started easing, creating more space for capital expenditure expansion as well as a reduction in
Figure 3.7 Trends of Deficits in General Government (percentage of GDP)
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
-2.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
44
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Fiscal Deficit Revenue Deficit Primary DeficitChapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
fiscal deficit. This effort met a setback due to the global financial crisis, but the consolidation
effort resumed after the crisis. Post‑financial crisis, the consolidation effort has been led less by
the expansion of revenue and more by the contraction of revenue expenditure and, to some
extent, capital expenditure.
3.38 The pandemic in 2020‑21 disrupted efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit, causing a
temporary setback. However, the situation improved quickly, with a sharp recovery that brought
the deficit down to levels even lower than those seen in 2011‑12. This turnaround was mainly
due to revenue receipts and revenue expenditure returning to pre‑pandemic levels.
Encouragingly, capital expenditure has been rising steadily in recent years, driven by increased
investment from the Union Government in key infrastructure areas like railways, roads and
bridges.
Figure 3.8 Components of General Government Fiscal Deficit (percentage of GDP)
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Source: Union Budgets, States and UTs Finance Accounts
Debt and Other Liabilities
3.39 Government liabilities are divided into two broad components: public debt and other
liabilities. Total liabilities, expressed as a proportion of GDP are called debt‑to‑GDP ratio. As
general government debt represents the liability of the overall government sector as a whole, the
following inter‑governmental transactions are netted out to correct for double‑counting.
i. Union’s loans to States and UTs
ii. Securities issued by States to National Small Savings Fund
iii. Investment in T‑Bills by States/UTs with legislature which represents lending by
States/UTs to the Union.
45
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Revenue Receipts Revenue Expenditure
Capital Expenditure Fiscal DeficitSixteenth Finance Commission
Table 3.7 General Government Debt (percentage of GDP)
Union States and Intergovernmental General
Year
Government UTs Lending Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (2) + (3) - (4)
2011‑12 53.5 23.0 8.9 67.5
2012‑13 52.5 22.3 8.2 66.7
2013‑14 52.2 21.9 7.1 66.9
2014‑15 51.4 22.2 6.6 67.0
2015‑16 51.5 23.4 6.4 68.5
2016‑17 49.5 24.6 5.8 68.3
2017‑18 49.3 24.7 5.2 68.9
2018‑19 49.1 24.8 4.4 69.5
2019‑20 51.9 26.0 4.0 73.9
2020‑21 61.9 30.0 4.4 87.5
2021‑22 58.3 27.6 3.9 82.0
2022‑23 57.6 26.7 3.5 80.8
2023‑24 57.1 26.9 3.6 80.5
Source: Status Paper on Debt, Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance), States and UTs
Finance Accounts
Figure 3.9 Trend of General Government Debt (percentage of GDP)
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Source: Status Paper on Debt, Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance), States and UT
Finance Accounts
46
19-0991 29-1991 39-2991 49-3991 59-4991 69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
Union Government States and UTs General GovernmentChapter 3: Finances of the Union and States
3.40 As shown in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.9, the outstanding government liabilities were at 67
per cent of GDP till 2014‑15, which saw a small increase of 2 percentage points due to States
taking over debt of their power sector companies during 2015‑16 and 2016‑17 (for details, see
Chapters 5 and 13). However, higher deficits had to be incurred due to the crisis of 2019‑20 and,
especially the pandemic, which led to a step jump in the debt‑to‑GDP ratio.
3.41 While recent years have attracted attention due to the pandemic‑induced debt surge, the
high level of debt is not a new phenomenon. Following the trend of fiscal deficit, early 2000s
were marked by increasing debt, reaching almost 84 per cent of GDP, which came down below
70 per cent due to the fiscal consolidation efforts as explained before. Period pertaining to global
financial crisis saw an increase in debt levels which started coming down soon after, but only to
be reversed when the pandemic hit.
Concluding Remarks
3.42 Prior to the outbreak of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the general government collected
revenue of 19‑20 per cent of GDP, while the expenditures ranged between 26 and 28 per cent
of GDP. The excess of expenditure over revenue reflected itself in fiscal deficit of 6‑8 per cent
of GDP.
3.43 The government had to adopt extraordinary measures during the COVID‑19 year
2020‑21 and expenditure rose sharply to 31.8 per cent and fiscal deficit climbing up to 13.5 per
cent of GDP. Post‑COVID, the quick and strong recovery of the economy helped the finances
of the general government to move on a consolidated path with declining expenditure and rising
revenue, though deficits still remained high at 7.8 per cent in 2023‑24.
3.44 As per the constitutional division of revenue power, the Union collects 63‑64 per cent
of the total revenue of the general government, and the States together collect 36‑37 per cent.
The States, on the other hand, have been assigned responsibilities requiring larger expenditure.
This asymmetry gets corrected by devolution of about a third of the Union’s revenue.
Post‑devolution, the share of the Union in total general government revenue gets reduced to
about 43 per cent, and that of the States rises to 57 per cent. These issues are discussed in detail
for the Union in the next Chapter and for the States in Chapter 5.
47REVIEW OF THE
4
UNION FINANCES
CHAPTER 4 REVIEW OF THE UNION FINANCES
4.1 The Indian economy has shown sustained and resilient growth in the past decade, despite
the challenges posed by the COVID‑19 pandemic. During the period of review, the
macroeconomic situation was largely positive despite hinderances posed by subdued credit
take‑off and the pandemic. The fiscal policy landscape was transformed with the introduction
of Goods and Services Tax (GST) and a targeted push towards digitization.
4.2 The Union Government was on a path of fiscal consolidation in the first half of the
review period. Though this trajectory was upset by the challenges mentioned in the previous
chapter, there is a renewed focus on getting back on the path, which is reflected in the finances
of the Union post‑pandemic, with a reduction in expenditure and deficit figures. As one of the
fastest‑growing economies, home to the largest population in the world, India needs to strike an
appropriate balance between its developmental aspirations and macroeconomic stability.
Union Finances: An Overview
4.3 We begin with a high‑level overview of the Union finances, focusing on the total
revenue, total expenditure, and fiscal deficit in absolute terms and relative to gross domestic
product (GDP). Table 4.1 reports GDP, total revenues, total expenditures, and fiscal deficit in
rupees, with the corresponding figures as a percentage of GDP shown in parenthesis.
4.4 Nominal GD(cid:51) grew from ₹87.4 lakh crore in 2011‑12 to ₹301.2 lakh crore in 2023‑24.
As seen in Table 4.2, the average annual (nominal) GDP growth rate during these years was 11
per cent. Revenues grew slightly faster at the annual average rate of 11.4 per cent. The average
annual expenditure growth was 10.9 per cent. With GDP growth considerably slower in 2019‑20
than in earlier years, revenue growth also slowed down that year. Likewise, a negative revenue
growth accompanied negative GDP growth in 2020‑21.
49Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 4.1 GDP, Revenue, Expenditure and Fiscal Deficit
(₹ (cid:47)a(cid:78)h (cid:38)rore) ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51) (cid:76)n (cid:83)aren(cid:87)heses)
Year
GDP Revenues Expenditure Fiscal Deficit
2011‑12 87.36 7.88 (9.0) 13.04 (14.9) 5.16 (5.9)
2012‑13 99.44 9.20 (9.3) 14.10 (14.2) 4.90 (4.9)
2013‑14 112.34 10.57 (9.4) 15.59 (13.9) 5.03 (4.5)
2014‑15 124.68 11.53 (9.2) 16.64 (13.3) 5.11 (4.1)
2015‑16 137.72 12.58 (9.1) 17.91 (13.0) 5.33 (3.9)
2016‑17 153.92 14.40 (9.4) 19.75 (12.8) 5.36 (3.5)
2017‑18 170.90 15.51 (9.1) 21.42 (12.5) 5.91 (3.5)
2018‑19 189.00 16.66 (8.8) 23.15 (12.2) 6.49 (3.4)
2019‑20 201.04 17.53 (8.7) 26.86 (13.4) 9.34 (4.6)
2020‑21 198.54 16.92 (8.5) 35.10 (17.7) 18.18 (9.2)
2021‑22 235.97 22.09 (9.4) 37.94 (16.1) 15.85 (6.7)
2022‑23 268.90 24.55 (9.1) 41.93 (15.6) 17.38 (6.5)
2023‑24 301.23 27.89 (9.3) 44.43 (14.8) 16.55 (5.5)
2024‑25 P 330.68 30.78 (9.3) 46.56 (14.1) 15.77 (4.8)
2025‑26 BE 356.98 34.96 (9.8) 50.65 (14.2) 15.69 (4.4)
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) for GDP and Union Budgets for
Revenue and Expenditure
Note: For 2024‑25, provisional figures (P) are provided instead of revised estimates (RE), wherever
available. BE = Budget Estimates.
Table 4.2 (cid:42)ro(cid:90)(cid:87)h (cid:53)a(cid:87)es of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51), (cid:53)e(cid:89)en(cid:88)e and E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e)
Year GDP Revenues Expenditure
2012‑13 13.8 16.7 8.1
2013‑14 13.0 14.8 10.6
2014‑15 11.0 9.1 6.7
2015‑16 10.5 9.1 7.6
2016‑17 11.8 14.4 10.3
2017‑18 11.0 7.7 8.4
2018‑19 10.6 7.4 8.1
2019‑20 6.4 5.2 16.0
2020‑21 -1.2 -3.5 30.7
2021‑22 18.9 30.6 8.1
2022‑23 14.0 11.1 10.5
2023‑24 12.0 13.6 6.0
2012‑(cid:21)(cid:23) ((cid:36)(cid:89)era(cid:74)e) 11.0 11.4 10.9
Source: MoSPI for GDP and Union Budgets for Revenue and Expenditure
50Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
4.5 Union revenues have hovered around 9 per cent of GDP, with no discernible trend. They
fell below the 9 per cent mark during the growth slowdown years of 2018‑21 but rose again to
9.3 per cent in 2023‑24. Expenditures as a proportion of GDP exhibited a mild downward trend
until 2018‑19, falling from the peak of 14.9 per cent in 2011‑12 to 12.2 per cent in 2018‑19.
This was a period of fiscal consolidation, with the fiscal deficit declining every single year as a
percentage of GDP (even in 2017‑18, it fell from 3.48 per cent to 3.46 per cent). The sharp
decline in GDP growth in 2019‑20 and the negative growth in 2020‑21 ended that process. The
fiscal deficit peaked at 9.2 per cent in the latter year. It was brought down to 6.7 per cent of
GDP the following year, with the decline continuing at a more gradual pace in subsequent years.
At 4.8 per cent in 2024‑25 (P), it remained elevated and only marginally below that in 2012‑13.
Union Revenues
4.6 From the high‑level overview in the previous section, we now proceed to unpack the
major components of revenues and expenditures, focusing on the former in this section. Unlike
many Western economies, India distinguishes between current (more commonly called the
revenue account) and capital accounts in the government budget. The distinction is not
watertight, with some capital expenditures appearing in the revenue account. For example,
revenue expenditure of the Union includes transfers to States for the implementation of centrally
sponsored schemes. The outcomes of many of these schemes primarily take the form of durable
assets such as schools, hospitals and houses for individuals. As the Union does not own these
assets, they are not technically classified as capital expenditure. Nevertheless, the distinction is
useful since the vast majority of infrastructure expenditure, an important indicator of the quality
of government expenditure, forms the bulk of the capital account expenditure.
Trends in Revenue and Capital Receipts
4.7 The Union Government’s total receipts comprise net tax revenue, non‑tax revenue, and
non‑debt capital receipts. Net tax revenue and non‑tax receipts together form receipts on the
revenue account. Net tax revenue constitutes the predominant component of total receipts, with
non‑tax revenues and capital receipts making only a modest contribution. Net tax revenue equals
the gross tax revenue (GTR) net of the share of States in Union taxes1 and national calamity and
contingency duty (NCCD). As a proportion of GDP, net tax revenue has seen only a modest
uptick during the period under review, rising from 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 7.7 per
cent in 2023‑24. Non‑tax revenues and non‑debt capital as proportions of GDP have similarly
moved in the narrow ranges of 1.0 - 1.8 per cent and 0.1 - 0.7 per cent respectively.
4.8 Net tax revenue receipts as a percentage of GDP have remained above 7 per cent except
for two years. The fall to 6.7 per cent during 2019‑20 was likely due to the transition effect of
replacing myriad Union and State indirect taxes with a single nationwide GST in July 2017 and
the economic slowdown during 2019‑20. The COVID‑19 shock, the impact of which had set in
during the last quarter of 2019‑20, was also a factor.
1 This definition of net tax revenue is based on the way the Union Budget is presented annually, wherein these two items are
subtracted from GTR to arrive at ‘tax revenue’ figures of the Union.
51Sixteenth Finance Commission
4.9 In the financial year 2020‑21 which saw the pandemic unfold, net tax revenue as a
proportion of GDP rose modestly to 7.2 per cent, but much of the rise was due to a fall in GDP.
The same year, at 1.0 per cent of GDP, non‑tax revenue dipped to its lowest level for any year
during the period under review. However, there was a gradual pick‑up in tax and non‑tax
revenues in the following years, reaching 7.7 per cent and 1.3 per cent of GDP, respectively, in
2023‑24. Total (tax plus non‑tax) revenue receipts reached 9.0 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24 and
are at 9.2 per cent in 2024‑25 (P) as shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 (cid:53)ece(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:87)s of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Non‑debt Total
Gross Tax States' Net Tax Non‑tax
Year Capital Receipts of
Revenue (cid:54)hare Revenue Revenue
Receipts (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on
(4) (cid:32) ((cid:21)) – (7) (cid:32) ((cid:23)) (cid:14)
(1) ((cid:21)) (3) ((cid:24)) ((cid:25))
(3) ((cid:24)) (cid:14) ((cid:25))
2011‑12 10.2 2.9 7.2 1.4 0.4 9.0
2012‑13 10.4 2.9 7.5 1.4 0.4 9.3
2013‑14 10.1 2.8 7.3 1.8 0.4 9.4
2014‑15 10.0 2.7 7.2 1.6 0.4 9.2
2015‑16 10.6 3.7 6.9 1.8 0.5 9.1
2016‑17 11.1 4.0 7.2 1.8 0.4 9.4
2017‑18 11.2 3.9 7.3 1.1 0.7 9.1
2018‑19 11.0 4.0 7.0 1.2 0.6 8.8
2019‑20 10.0 3.2 6.7 1.6 0.3 8.7
2020‑21 10.2 3.0 7.2 1.0 0.3 8.5
2021‑22 11.5 3.8 7.6 1.5 0.2 9.4
2022‑23 11.4 3.5 7.8 1.1 0.3 9.1
2023‑24 11.5 3.7 7.7 1.3 0.2 9.3
2024‑25 P 11.5 3.9 7.6 1.6 0.1 9.3
2025‑26 BE 12.0 4.0 7.9 1.6 0.2 9.8
Source: Union Budgets
Note: The difference between GTR and States’ share does not exactly add up to Net tax revenue due to netting
out of NCCD.
4.10 Not all tax revenues collected by the Union Government remain with it. The GTR net of
cess, surcharges, and tax revenues accruing to Union Territories (UTs) minus the cost of
collection constitutes the divisible pool, which is shared between the Union and State
Governments as per the recommendations by FCs. For example, the Fifteenth Finance
Commission (FC‑15) had recommended that 41 per cent of the divisible pool be awarded to the
52Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
States and the remainder to the Union. Table 4.3 shows the GTR, net tax revenue, and States’
share as percentage of GDP, as recommended by the FCs from 2011‑12 to 2025‑26 BE. It is the
net tax revenue, not gross tax revenue, that constitutes the tax revenue of the Union Government.
4.11 The States’ share in GTR was 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12, leaving the Union
Government with net tax revenue of 7.2 per cent only. Till 2014‑15, net tax revenue remained
at or above 7.2 per cent. However, the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FC‑14) (2015‑20)
recommended increasing the share of States in the divisible pool from 32 per cent to 42 per cent.
This recommendation led to an increase in the States’ share in the divisible pool from 2.7 per
cent of GDP in 2014‑15 to 3.7 per cent in 2015‑16. The corresponding reduction in the Union
Government’s share was partially offset by a rise in GTR to 10.6 per cent in 2015‑16, with the
net tax revenue declining only modestly from 7.2 per cent in 2014‑15 to 6.9 per cent in 2015‑16.
The remaining gap in the Union Government’s share recovered the following year due to a
further increase in GTR to 11.1 per cent of GDP. FC‑15 continued the vertical devolution
percentage of the FC‑14 with a one percentage point downward adjustment in the States’ share
in recognition of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh being designated as Union Territories. As a
result, on average, tax devolution to States has remained approximately 1.0 per cent of GDP
above the pre‑FC‑14 levels. In parallel, though GTR as a proportion of GDP in 2023‑24 was 1.5
percentage points above its level in 2014‑15, net tax revenue as a proportion of GDP was only
0.5 percentage points above its level in 2014‑15.
Major Union Tax Heads and Their Contribution to Revenues
4.12 In Table 4.4, we decompose GTR into its main components. Direct taxes have generally
accounted for more than half of GTR. Within direct taxes, corporate taxes have contributed
more than half of the revenues until 2019‑20. In 2019‑20, the government significantly reduced
the corporate tax rate to align it with the international level. As a result, revenues from this
source as a proportion of GDP fell initially from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2018‑19 to 2.8 per cent
in 2019‑20 and 2.3 per cent in 2020‑21. However, they partially recovered in the following
years, reaching 3.0 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24. Income tax contributed only 2.0 per cent to 2.1
per cent of GDP from 2011‑12 to 2015‑16 but saw a rise thereafter, reaching 2.5 per cent in
2017‑18, 3.0 per cent in 2021‑22, and 3.5 per cent in 2023‑24.
4.13 Indirect taxes have ranged from 4.4 per cent to 5.6 per cent of GDP, but without a
discernible trend. From 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12, they rose to 5.6 per cent in 2016‑17,
fell to 4.7 per cent in 2019‑20, rose again to 5.5 per cent in 2021‑22, only to drop back to 5.0
per cent in 2023‑24.
4.14 Indirect taxes have four major components: customs duty, Union excise duties, service
tax, and GST. Here, GST includes the central goods and services tax (CGST), integrated goods
and services tax (IGST) and GST compensation cess. Introduced in July 2017, GST subsumed
the service tax. As a result, GST was nil until 2016‑17, and the service tax became nil 2018‑19
onwards.
53Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 4.4 (cid:54)hares of Ma(cid:77)or (cid:56)n(cid:76)on (cid:55)a(cid:91)es ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Direct Tax Indirect Tax
GST
Union ((cid:38)(cid:42)(cid:54)(cid:55)(cid:14)
Year Corporation Income Service GTR
Customs Excise (cid:44)(cid:42)(cid:54)(cid:55)(cid:14)
Tax Tax Tax
Duties Comp
(cid:38)ess)
2011‑12 3.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.0 10.2
2012‑13 3.6 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.3 0.0 10.4
2013‑14 3.5 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.0 10.1
2014‑15 3.4 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.0 10.0
2015‑16 3.3 2.1 1.5 2.1 1.5 0.0 10.6
2016‑17 3.2 2.3 1.5 2.5 1.7 0.0 11.1
2017‑18 3.3 2.5 0.8 1.5 0.5 2.6 11.2
2018‑19 3.5 2.5 0.6 1.2 0.0 3.1 11.0
2019‑20 2.8 2.5 0.5 1.2 0.0 3.0 10.0
2020‑21 2.3 2.5 0.7 2.0 0.0 2.8 10.2
2021‑22 3.0 3.0 0.8 1.7 0.0 3.0 11.5
2022‑23 3.1 3.1 0.8 1.2 0.0 3.2 11.4
2023‑24 3.0 3.5 0.8 1.0 0.0 3.2 11.5
2024‑25 P 3.0 3.7 0.7 0.9 0.0 3.1 11.5
2025‑26 BE 3.0 4.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 3.3 12.0
Source: Union Budgets
Note: Gross Tax Revenue also includes taxes of Union Territories, which amount to less than 0.1 per cent of
GDP
4.15 Among indirect taxes, customs and union excise duties have declined as a proportion of
GDP, because they have been partially subsumed into GST. For the same reason, the service tax
contribution now stands near nil. Initially, GST had teething pains, with CGST failing to
compensate for the losses of other indirect tax revenues. However, its performance improved in
later years, helping indirect taxes partially recover. CGST as a proportion of GDP rose from 2.4
per cent in 2018‑19, the first full year of its implementation, to 2.7 per cent in 2023‑24.
4.16 The government has been implementing tax reforms that are aimed at simplification,
increasing ease of voluntary compliance and certainty to the taxpayer. Apart from the structural
changes introduced in direct and indirect taxation discussed above, such as the introduction of
GST, other measures have been taken in the past ten years in pursuit of these goals. These
include phasing out of exemptions and deductions and nudging the taxpayer towards a
54Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
simplified new tax regime, leveraging the permanent account number as a unified identification
and use of Aadhaar for GST registration. Reforms have also been introduced to reduce litigation
and promote voluntary compliance through provisions for updated returns and the reduction of
rates and duties. These efforts are bearing fruit, as evidenced by the rise in tax revenues.
Cesses and Surcharges
4.17 Article 246 (246A for GST matters) empowers the Union to legislate on all matters
relating to subjects in the Union and Concurrent Lists of the Seventh Schedule. These powers
include the power to tax, including cesses. Additionally, Article 271 gives the Union the power
to impose surcharges on certain duties and taxes. As noted earlier, the cesses and surcharges,
along with taxes accruing to UTs do not form a part of the divisible pool. In 2011‑12, this
non‑shareable portion of revenues was 1.1 per cent of GDP, and the divisible pool was 9.1 per
cent. By 2023‑24, the non‑shareable portion had expanded to 2.2 per cent of GDP while the
divisible pool as a proportion of GDP stood at 9.4 per cent. GST compensation cess was levied
to compensate the States for a period of five years for the expected revenue loss while
transitioning from multiple indirect taxes to GST. This cess was transferred in its entirety to the
States. We shall discuss cesses and surcharges in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Non‑tax Revenues
4.18 Non‑tax revenues comprise interest receipts from loans advanced in the past to States
and central public sector enterprises (CPSEs), surplus from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI),
profits and dividends from public sector commercial banks and CPSEs, and user charges such
as fees and tolls. Table 4.5 reports the contributions of these items to Union revenues from
2011‑12 to 2025‑26 BE.
4.19 Union Government received significant non‑tax revenues under economic services
owing to profits from public sector petroleum companies, royalties from offshore oil fields,
revenue from the sale of telecom spectrum, and toll collections from roads and bridges as shown
in Table 4.5. In absolute terms, revenue from these sources rose from ₹38,(cid:26)08 crore in 2011‑12
to ₹1,51,699 crore in 2023‑24. Surplus from the RBI and dividends from public sector financial
institutions constitute another significant contributor to the Union's non‑tax revenues. They
increased from ₹50,608 crore in 2011‑12 to ₹1,(cid:26)0,8(cid:26)(cid:26) crore in 2023‑24. It is difficult to discern
a clear trend in non‑tax revenues owing to either their periodic nature, as in the case of
royalties/auction fees, or large fluctuations, as in the case of dividends. Nevertheless, in
aggregate, the total contribution of non‑tax revenues to revenue receipt of the Union is
significant and ranged between 12.0 per cent in 2022‑23 and 21.0 per cent in 2015‑16 as
illustrated in Table 4.5. Larger non‑tax revenue as a source of revenue receipts has emerged as
an important source of fiscal buffer for the Union Government in recent years.
55Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 4.5 Ma(cid:77)or (cid:38)o(cid:80)(cid:83)onen(cid:87)s of (cid:49)on‑tax Revenue
Non‑tax
Revenue Non‑tax Interest Dividend Economic
Year (% of Revenue Receipts and Profits Services
Revenue ((cid:8) of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51)) ((cid:8) of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51)) ((cid:8) of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51)) ((cid:8) of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Rece(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:87)s)
2011‑12 16.2 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.4
2012‑13 15.6 1.4 0.2 0.5 0.4
2013‑14 19.6 1.8 0.2 0.8 0.6
2014‑15 18.0 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.5
2015‑16 21.0 1.8 0.2 0.8 0.7
2016‑17 19.9 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.7
2017‑18 13.4 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.4
2018‑19 15.2 1.2 0.1 0.6 0.4
2019‑20 19.4 1.6 0.1 0.9 0.5
2020‑21 12.7 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.4
2021‑22 16.8 1.5 0.1 0.7 0.6
2022‑23 12.0 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.5
2023‑24 14.7 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.5
2024‑25 RE 17.7 1.6 0.1 0.9 0.4
2025‑26 BE 17.0 1.6 0.1 0.9 0.4
Source: Union Budgets
Non‑debt Capital Receipts
4.20 Non‑debt capital receipts form a small portion of the Union’s revenues. As a percentage
of GDP, they were 0.4 per cent in 2011‑12, rose to 0.7 per cent in 2017‑18, but fell to 0.3 per
cent and 0.2 per cent during the COVID‑19 years of 2020‑21 and 2021‑22 as shown in Table
4.6. Subsequently, the contribution rose modestly to 0.3 per cent in 2022‑23 but fell again to 0.2
per cent in 2023‑24.
4.21 One component of non‑debt capital receipts, the recovery of loans and advances item,
has remained constant at 0.1 per cent of GDP since 2013‑14. The second component,
miscellaneous receipts, which predominantly comprises receipts from disinvestment of the
government’s equity holdings and proceeds from the monetization of assets item, rose from 0.21
per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to the peak of 0.59 per cent in 2017‑18. It has steadily declined
since then. In 2016, the Union Government approved a new policy of disinvestment and strategic
sale to leverage the assets of CPSEs for resource generation. This step, inter alia, increased
capital receipts from disinvestment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Rural
Electrification Corporation Limited in 2017‑18 and 2018‑19. However, despite some highly
visible privatization efforts such as Air India and Neelachal Ispat Nigam Limited, the ambitious
targets for disinvestment set after 2019‑20 have not been realized, as can be seen from the
56Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
difference in BE and actual receipts in Table 4.7. Beginning in 2024‑25, the Union Government
has discontinued setting disinvestment targets in the Union Budget.
Table 4.6 Trends in Non‑debt (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a(cid:79) (cid:53)ece(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:87)s ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Non‑debt Capital (cid:53)eco(cid:89)er(cid:76)es of (cid:47)oans
Year M(cid:76)sce(cid:79)(cid:79)aneo(cid:88)s (cid:53)ece(cid:76)(cid:83)(cid:87)s
Receipts and Advances
2011‑12 0.42 0.22 0.21
2012‑13 0.41 0.15 0.26
2013‑14 0.37 0.11 0.26
2014‑15 0.41 0.11 0.30
2015‑16 0.46 0.15 0.31
2016‑17 0.42 0.11 0.31
2017‑18 0.68 0.09 0.59
2018‑19 0.60 0.10 0.50
2019‑20 0.34 0.09 0.25
2020‑21 0.29 0.10 0.19
2021‑22 0.17 0.10 0.06
2022‑23 0.27 0.10 0.17
2023‑24 0.20 0.09 0.11
2024‑25 P 0.13 0.07 0.05
2025‑26 BE 0.21 0.08 0.13
Source: Union Budgets and Finance Accounts of the Union Government
Table 4.7 Comparison of Actual and Estimated Proceeds from Disinvestment
BE RE Actuals
Year Actuals/BE Actuals/RE
(₹ crore) (₹ crore) (₹ crore)
(1) ((cid:21)) (3) ((cid:23)) (5) (cid:32) ((cid:23)) (cid:18) ((cid:21)) (6) (cid:32) ((cid:23)) (cid:18) (3)
2018‑19 80,000 80,000 94,727 118% 118%
2019‑20 1,05,000 65,000 50,304 48% 77%
2020‑21 2,10,000 32,000 37,897 18% 118%
2021‑22 1,75,000 78,000 13,627 8% 17%
2022‑23 65,000 50,000 NA NA NA
2023‑24 51,000 NA NA NA NA
Source: Union Budgets
Union Expenditures
4.22 As a part of its effort to bring the fiscal deficit down to 3 per cent of GDP by 2020‑21,
as stipulated in the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM), the Union
57Sixteenth Finance Commission
Government steadily compressed revenue expenditure, bringing it down from 13.1 per cent of
GDP in 2011‑12 to 10.6 per cent in 2018‑19 as illustrated in Table 4.8. However, this effort had
a setback in 2019‑20, principally due to a decline in the nominal GDP growth rate. This setback
was followed by the onset of COVID‑19, which led to a decline in even nominal GDP on the
one hand and necessitated the expansion of welfare programs such as the public distribution
system and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (MGNREGA)
on the other. The result was an increase in revenue expenditure as a proportion of GDP from
11.7 per cent in 2019‑20 to 15.5 per cent in 2020‑21.
4.23 The total expenditure mirrored the trend in revenue expenditure. As a proportion of
GDP, it declined gradually from 14.9 per cent in 2011‑12 to 12.2 per cent in 2018‑19. This trend
reversed in 2019‑20, with expenditure reaching a high of 17.7 per cent in 2020‑21 due to
increased welfare spending in the wake of the pandemic. Since then, the expenditure has steadily
declined, reaching 14.8 per cent in 2023‑24 and is estimated to decline further to 14.1 per cent
as per 2024‑25 (P) and 14.2 per cent in 2025‑26 BE. Reduction in revenue expenditure as a
proportion of GDP have been the principal lever to reduce the total expenditure.
Table 4.8 (cid:55)ren(cid:71)s (cid:76)n E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Revenue Capital Total Expenditure
Year
Expenditure Expenditure ((cid:53)e(cid:89)en(cid:88)e (cid:14) (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a(cid:79))
2011‑12 13.1 1.8 14.9
2012‑13 12.5 1.7 14.2
2013‑14 12.2 1.7 13.9
2014‑15 11.8 1.6 13.3
2015‑16 11.2 1.8 13.0
2016‑17 11.0 1.8 12.8
2017‑18 11.0 1.5 12.5
2018‑19 10.6 1.6 12.2
2019‑20 11.7 1.7 13.4
2020‑21 15.5 2.1 17.7
2021‑22 13.6 2.5 16.1
2022‑23 12.8 2.8 15.6
2023‑24 11.6 3.2 14.8
2024‑25 (P) 10.9 3.2 14.1
2025‑26 BE 11.0 3.1 14.2
Source: Union Budgets
4.24 With an expanding public sector as a stated objective of economic policy before the
launch of economic reforms, the government played a dominant role in driving capital
expenditures. For example, in the early 1980s, the public sector accounted for 24 of the 30
58Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
largest firms by capital employed, and three‑fourths of paid‑up share capital2. However, in
recent years, the government has broadly moved away from this policy and has increasingly
focused on investment in infrastructure. Union Government’s budgetary capital expenditure
remained below 2.0 per cent of GDP, hovering around 1.7 per cent on an average from 2011‑12
to 2019‑20. However, it steadily increased thereafter, rising to 2.5 per cent in 2021‑22 and
3.2 per cent in 2023‑24. It stands at 3.2 per cent in 2024‑25 (P) and 3.1 per cent as per 2025‑26
BE. In the Union Budget 2025‑26, Government has allocated ₹1.5 lakh crore for 50‑year interest
free loans to States for capital expenditure. This turnaround in capital expenditures in the wake
of the COVID‑19 crisis has been an important achievement of the government. There has been
a visible change for the better in the country’s road, railway, and civil aviation network.
Revenue Expenditure: Broad Composition
4.25 The Union Government devotes a large proportion of its revenue expenditure to general
services, followed by economic and social services as shown in Table 4.9. Interest payments,
pensions, defence, and police account for approximately 95 per cent of the total expenditures on
general services. Repayment of outstanding loans to the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF),
implementation of the One Rank One Pension (OROP) in the defence forces, and salary
increases of the government employees as per the recommendations of the Seventh Central Pay
Commission (CPC) have contributed to increased revenue expenditure in recent years.
4.26 Economic services witnessed the second‑highest spending during the period, though its
overall percentage declined from 4.2 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 2.7 per cent in 2023‑24.
Subsidies and welfare schemes such as those mandated by MGNREGA and the National Food
Security Act were the main drivers of this component of revenue expenditure.
4.27 Under the Indian Constitution, social services are primarily the responsibility of the State
Governments, with the Union Government complementing their efforts by undertaking schemes
to fill the gaps left by them. Spending on education, health, and drinking water & sanitation are
the major contributors to social services. Expenditure on social services by the Union
Government declined from 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 0.8 per cent in 2023‑24. While
the health expenditure peaked at 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2021‑22 due to COVID‑19, it has since
come down to 0.1 per cent in 2023‑24. The same year, education expenditure stood at 0.3 per
cent of GDP.
Some Major Items of Expenditure
4.28 Besides the broad revenue expenditure categories shown in Table 4.9, it is useful to
consider the major expenditure heads. Table 4.10 shows three major expenditure heads within
general services: interest payments, pensions, and defence. Interest payments constitute a large
part of revenue expenditures under general services. From 2014‑15 to 2019‑20, they had shown
2 Frankel, Francine, 2005. India’s Political Economy 1947-2004: The Gradual Revolution, New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
p. 580.
59Sixteenth Finance Commission
a downward trend, declining from 3.2 per cent of GDP to 3.0 per cent. However, the large
additional debt incurred due to COVID‑19 reversed that trend, with interest payments rising to
3.4 per cent in 2020‑21 and 3.5 per cent in 2023‑24. Defence and pensions have contributed
approximately another 2 per cent of GDP to revenue expenditures under the general services
category. This sum has been relatively stable during the period under review.
Table 4.9 (cid:51)rof(cid:76)(cid:79)e of (cid:53)e(cid:89)en(cid:88)e E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Grants,
General Social Economic Contributions Revenue
Year
Services Services Services and Expenditure Expenditure
of UTs
2011‑12 5.6 1.2 4.2 2.1 13.1
2012‑13 5.6 1.1 3.9 1.9 12.5
2013‑14 5.7 1.1 3.5 1.8 12.2
2014‑15 5.7 0.4 2.9 2.8 11.8
2015‑16 5.6 0.5 2.7 2.4 11.2
2016‑17 5.7 0.6 2.8 2.0 11.0
2017‑18 5.7 0.6 2.5 2.3 11.0
2018‑19 5.6 0.5 2.4 2.1 10.6
2019‑20 5.7 0.6 2.7 2.7 11.7
2020‑21 6.2 0.8 5.5 3.0 15.5
2021‑22 6.1 1.1 3.7 2.7 13.6
2022‑23 6.0 0.7 3.6 2.5 12.8
2023‑24 6.0 0.8 2.7 2.1 11.6
2024‑25 RE 5.9 0.5 2.8 1.9 10.9
2025‑26 BE 5.9 0.5 2.5 2.1 11.0
Source: Union Budgets
4.29 Pay and allowances of civilian employees (excluding defence personnel) of the Union
Government (not shown in Table 4.10), which cut across general services and economic and
social services categories, declined slightly from 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 1.0 per cent
in 2023‑24. Like defence and pension, this item has remained stable. Implementing the
recommendations of the Seventh CPC had led to a slight rise in this expenditure category to 1.2
per cent in 2016‑17, but the figure returned to 1.1 per cent and fell to 1.0 per cent in 2023‑24.
Salary and allowances of defence forces also declined from 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to
0.5 per cent in 2023‑24. However, pension payments increased from 0.7 per cent to 0.8 per cent
during this period, partly due to implementation of OROP. Parenthetically, it may be noted that
in August 2024, the Government of India announced the implementation of the Unified Pension
Scheme (UPS), a hybrid defined‑contribution and defined‑benefit model for employees as an
60Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
option under the National Pension System (NPS). This scheme will impact future expenditures
of the Union Government, though not during the award period of the present FC.
Table 4.10 Ma(cid:77)or (cid:44)(cid:87)e(cid:80)s of (cid:53)e(cid:89)en(cid:88)e E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Interest Revenue
Year Defence Pension Subsidies
Payments Expenditure
2011‑12 3.1 1.2 0.7 2.5 13.1
2012‑13 3.1 1.1 0.7 2.6 12.5
2013‑14 3.3 1.1 0.7 2.3 12.2
2014‑15 3.2 1.1 0.8 2.1 11.8
2015‑16 3.2 1.1 0.7 1.9 11.2
2016‑17 3.1 1.1 0.9 1.5 11.0
2017‑18 3.1 1.1 0.9 1.3 11.0
2018‑19 3.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 10.6
2019‑20 3.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 11.7
2020‑21 3.4 1.0 1.1 3.8 15.5
2021‑22 3.4 1.0 0.8 2.1 13.6
2022‑23 3.5 1.0 0.9 2.1 12.8
2023‑24 3.5 1.0 0.8 1.4 11.6
2024‑25 RE/P 3.4 0.9 0.8 1.3 10.9
2025‑26 BE 3.6 0.9 0.8 1.2 11.0
Source: Union Budgets
4.30 Like pay and allowances, subsidies cut across the broad expenditure categories as shown
in Table 4.10. Major subsidy items of the Union Government include food, fertilizer, petroleum,
and interest subventions. In Table 4.11, we provide their component‑wise evolution. The
proportion of petroleum subsidy experienced a sharp decline due to a decline in the Liquid
Petroleum Gas (LPG) subsidy. While food subsidy increased gradually due to the
implementation of the National Food Security Act enacted in 2013, the corresponding
expenditure remained on the books of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) till 2016‑17 and was
financed by off‑budget borrowing. FCI raised loans from NSSF, backed by a guarantee from
the Government of India.
4.31 In 2020‑21, Union Government decided to take the entire liability on the budget. This
repayment led the food subsidy to increase from 4.6 per cent of revenue expenditure in 2019‑20
to a staggering 17.6 per cent in 2020‑21. The ripple effect of this one‑time repayment was felt
on deficit figures. In recent years, the expenditure on food subsidies has grown further due to
special welfare measures taken during the pandemic. For example, in the wake of the COVID‑19
61Sixteenth Finance Commission
outbreak, the government introduced Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana. Under this
scheme, additional free‑of‑cost foodgrains at the scale of 5 kg per person per month were
distributed to NFSA beneficiaries, over and above their regular monthly entitlements of 5 kg of
grains at subsidised rates. The Union Government announced continuation of the scheme for
the next 5 years with effect from 01 January 2024 for the NFSA beneficiaries, with the
modification that each beneficiary now receives only the regular entitlement of 5 kg of
foodgrains per month free of cost. This means that the current level of food subsidy outgo will
continue at least until 2029‑30.
Table 4.11 (cid:38)o(cid:80)(cid:83)onen(cid:87)s of (cid:54)(cid:88)(cid:69)s(cid:76)(cid:71)(cid:76)es on (cid:87)he (cid:53)e(cid:89)en(cid:88)e (cid:36)cco(cid:88)n(cid:87) ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Year Food Fertilizer Petroleum Interest (cid:50)(cid:87)hers Total
2011‑12 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.0 2.5
2012‑13 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.0 2.6
2013‑14 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 2.3
2014‑15 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.1
2015‑16 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.9
2016‑17 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.5
2017‑18 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3
2018‑19 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.2
2019‑20 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.3
2020‑21 2.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 3.8
2021‑22 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.1
2022‑23 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.1
2023‑24 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.4
2024‑25 RE 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3
2025‑26 BE 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2
Source: Union Budgets
4.32 Fertilizer subsidies steadily declined till 2019‑20 after which they rose in 2020‑21 due
to one‑time repayment of dues. Since these subsidies are import‑dependent, their expenditures
are sensitive to world market conditions. Geopolitical tensions during the last three years have
led to serious disruptions of international supply chains in fertilizer, thereby leading to a sharp
rise in the subsidy bill on this account.
4.33 The government’s policy towards phasing out petroleum subsidies has been successful,
with a steady decline from 1.0 per cent in 2012‑13 to a negligible level in 2023‑24. Though the
trends show that overall expenditure on subsidies decreased gradually from 2015‑16 to 2019‑20,
it was principally due to its financing through off‑budget borrowing. In the years following the
62Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
one‑time settlement of dues, the expenditure on subsidies remained at 2.1 per cent of GDP till
2022‑23. However, the government successfully cut all major subsidies and brought the
expenditure on them down to 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24. The subsidy bill is expected to
decline to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2024‑25 RE and 1.2 per cent in 2025‑26 BE.
Capital Expenditure
4.34 Capital expenditure by the Union declined from 1.8 per cent of GDP in 2016‑17 to 1.5
per cent in 2017‑18 but recovered thereafter as shown in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.1. From
2020‑21, capital expenditures on economic services saw a major acceleration, with the result
that the total capital expenditures of the Union reached 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24.
Railways, roads, civil aviation, and telecom have been the focus areas of capital spending in
recent years. Expenditure in these items has increased from 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2014‑15 to
1.9 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24.
Table 4.12 Ma(cid:77)or (cid:38)o(cid:80)(cid:83)onen(cid:87)s of (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a(cid:79) E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re of (cid:87)he
Union ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
(cid:50)(cid:87)her
Roads and Capital
Year Defence Railways Comm.
(cid:37)r(cid:76)(cid:71)(cid:74)es Expenditure
Services
2011‑12 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.8
2012‑13 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.7
2013‑14 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.7
2014‑15 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.6
2015‑16 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.8
2016‑17 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.8
2017‑18 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.5
2018‑19 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.6
2019‑20 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.7
2020‑21 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.0 2.1
2021‑22 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0 2.5
2022‑23 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.2 2.8
2023‑24 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.2 3.2
2024‑25 RE 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.2 3.2
2025‑26 BE 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.1 3.1
Source: Union Budgets
63Sixteenth Finance Commission
(cid:41)(cid:76)(cid:74)(cid:88)re 4.1 (cid:55)ren(cid:71)s (cid:76)n (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a(cid:79) E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
Source: Union Budgets
4.35 As discussed in the introduction earlier, some expenditure of the Union which is
technically classified as revenue expenditure is provided as grants to States under various
schemes. These grants are utilized in the creation of assets such as houses under Pradhan Mantri
Awas Yojana, schools under Samagra Shiksha and piped water infrastructure under Jal Jeevan
Mission. This expenditure, though classified as revenue in the Union Budget, actually
contributes to investment and the growth of the economy. Accordingly, these grants are shown
separately in the Union Budget annually as Grants‑in‑Aid (GIA) for the creation of capital
assets.
4.36 Alongside capital expenditure, it is useful to look at the trends in this component as its
ultimate outcome is asset creation. Table 4.13 shows that GIA for creation of capital assets has
consistently maintained a significant role, forming around 1.0 per cent of GDP on an average
between 2011‑12 and 2023‑24. The gradual reduction from 2011‑12 to 2019‑20 reflects the
efforts made by the Union in reducing its revenue expenditure. Barring the anomaly of the
pandemic year, this expenditure is maintained at 1.0 per cent of GDP. This sustained GIA
commitment, alongside rising direct spending, reflects a balanced approach to infrastructure
development. While capital expenditure has increasingly targeted key sectors such as railways,
roads, civil aviation, telecom, and defence with notable shifts in spending priorities, the steady
GIA share underscores the government’s strategic use of transfers to States and other entities to
support capital asset creation.
64
21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 )ER(
52-4202
)EB(
62-5202
Defence(cid:3033) Railways(cid:3033) Roads and Bridges
(cid:50)ther Communication Services(cid:3033)(cid:3033) Capital ExpenditureChapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
Table 4.13 (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a(cid:79) E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on an(cid:71) (cid:42)(cid:44)(cid:36) for Creation of Capital Assets
((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Capital Expenditure GIA for Creation of (cid:38)a(cid:83)e(cid:91) (cid:14) (cid:42)(cid:44)(cid:36)
Year
((cid:38)a(cid:83)e(cid:91)) Capital Assets
(1) ((cid:21)) (3) (4) (cid:32) ((cid:21)) (cid:14) (3)
2011‑12 1.8 1.5 3.3
2012‑13 1.7 1.2 2.8
2013‑14 1.7 1.2 2.8
2014‑15 1.6 1.0 2.6
2015‑16 1.8 1.0 2.8
2016‑17 1.8 1.1 2.9
2017‑18 1.5 1.1 2.7
2018‑19 1.6 1.0 2.6
2019‑20 1.7 0.9 2.6
2020‑21 2.1 1.2 3.3
2021‑22 2.5 1.0 3.5
2022‑23 2.8 1.1 3.9
2023‑24 3.2 1.0 4.2
2024‑25 RE 3.2 0.9 4.1
2025‑26 BE 3.1 1.2 4.3
Source: Union Budgets
Fiscal, Revenue and Primary Deficits
4.37 Table 4.14 reports the three indicators of deficits from 2011‑12 to 2025‑26 BE. The
movements in the indicators differ markedly before and after the pandemic. Before COVID‑19,
all three indicators registered downward trends. Between 2011‑12 and 2018‑19, the fiscal deficit
fell from 5.9 per cent of GDP to 3.4 per cent, the revenue deficit fell from 4.5 per cent to 2.4 per
cent, and the primary deficit fell from 2.8 per cent to 0.4 per cent. These years represented a
period of effective fiscal consolidation and improved quality of expenditure, with the latter
represented by a reduction in borrowing to finance revenue expenditures.
4.38 With the onset of the pandemic in the last quarter of 2019‑20, all three deficit indicators
saw a reversal in trend that year. The fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP rose by 1.2 percentage
points, revenue deficit by 0.9 percentage points, and primary deficit by 1.2 percentage points.
A sharp decline in the growth rate of the economy during this year was accompanied by a
slowdown in the growth in revenues, without a commensurate reduction in the revenue
expenditures, explaining the reversal of trends3.
3 Nominal GDP growth fell by four percentage points from 10.6 per cent in 2018-19 to 6.4 per cent in 2019-20
65Sixteenth Finance Commission
4.39 The outbreak of the COVID‑19 pandemic in the last quarter of 2019‑20 led to the
lockdown of almost all activities, except agriculture and essential services, for varying periods
in 2020‑21. The Union Government undertook a large targeted fiscal expansion to boost welfare
measures. As a result, the Union Government’s deficits came under severe stress. Its fiscal
deficit nearly doubled to 9.2 per cent of GDP, revenue deficit rose to 7.3 per cent from 3.3 per
cent in the previous year, and primary deficit rose by a similar magnitude.
Table 4.14 (cid:39)ef(cid:76)c(cid:76)(cid:87) (cid:44)n(cid:71)(cid:76)ca(cid:87)ors of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Fiscal Deficit Revenue Deficit Primary Deficit (cid:53)(cid:39)(cid:18)(cid:41)(cid:39) ((cid:8))
Year
((cid:41)(cid:39)) ((cid:53)(cid:39)) ((cid:51)(cid:39))
(1) ((cid:21)) (3) ((cid:23)) (5) (cid:32) (3) (cid:18) ((cid:21))
2011‑12 5.9 4.5 2.8 76.4
2012‑13 4.9 3.7 1.8 74.3
2013‑14 4.5 3.2 1.1 71.0
2014‑15 4.1 2.9 0.9 71.6
2015‑16 3.9 2.5 0.7 64.3
2016‑17 3.5 2.1 0.4 59.1
2017‑18 3.5 2.6 0.4 75.1
2018‑19 3.4 2.4 0.4 70.0
2019‑20 4.6 3.3 1.6 71.4
2020‑21 9.2 7.3 5.7 79.7
2021‑22 6.7 4.4 3.3 65.1
2022‑23 6.5 4.0 3.0 61.6
2023‑24 5.5 2.5 2.0 46.2
2024‑25 P 4.8 1.7 1.4 36.0
2025‑26 BE 4.4 1.5 0.8 33.4
Source: Union Budgets
4.40 The fiscal performance of the Union Government improved from 2021‑22 to 2024‑25
(P), from very high deficits. Therefore, there remains considerable scope for further fiscal
consolidation. We will return to this subject in Chapter 6. However, presently, we note that on
the margin, all three indicators of fiscal balance have shown improvement beginning in 2021‑22,
even though the pandemic had not receded by then. By 2024‑25 (P), the fiscal deficit had fallen
to 4.8 per cent of GDP, revenue deficit to 1.7 per cent, and primary deficit to 1.4 per cent.
4.41 To round off the discussion of deficit indicators, we present the revenue deficit as a
percentage of the fiscal deficit in the last column of Table 4.14. This indicator steadily improved
in the first few years, with its value declining from 76.4 per cent in 2011‑12 to 59.1 per cent in
2016‑17. It rose sharply to 75.1 per cent in 2017‑18 and remained above 70.0 per cent till
2019‑20. With the pandemic's severe blow to the economy, the ratio spiked to 79.7 per cent in
66Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
2020‑21. It has seen a steady and speedy downward journey in the subsequent years, falling to
36.0 per cent in 2024‑25 (P).
(cid:50)(cid:88)(cid:87)s(cid:87)an(cid:71)(cid:76)n(cid:74) (cid:47)(cid:76)a(cid:69)(cid:76)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:76)es
4.42 Table 4.15 shows the Union Government's liabilities against the Consolidated Fund of
India (Public debt) and other liabilities (Public account) as proportions of GDP. The table
divides public debt into liabilities incurred from residents (internal debt) and those incurred from
non‑residents (external debt). Public account liabilities are, by definition, internal.
Table 4.15 (cid:51)rof(cid:76)(cid:79)e of (cid:39)e(cid:69)(cid:87) an(cid:71) (cid:47)(cid:76)a(cid:69)(cid:76)(cid:79)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:76)es of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
Internal External Public (cid:50)(cid:87)her Total
Year
Debt Debt Debt (cid:47)iabilities (cid:47)iabilities
(1) ((cid:21)) (3) ((cid:23))(cid:32)((cid:21))(cid:14)(3) ((cid:24)) ((cid:26))(cid:32)((cid:23))(cid:14)((cid:24))
2011‑12 37.0 1.9 38.9 12.8 51.7
2012‑13 37.9 1.8 39.6 11.4 51.0
2013‑14 37.8 1.6 39.4 11.1 50.5
2014‑15 38.0 1.6 39.6 10.5 50.1
2015‑16 38.5 1.5 40.0 10.1 50.1
2016‑17 37.3 1.5 38.8 9.5 48.3
2017‑18 37.5 1.5 38.9 9.3 48.2
2018‑19 37.4 1.4 38.9 9.2 48.1
2019‑20 39.9 1.5 41.4 9.3 50.7
2020‑21 49.9 2.0 51.9 8.9 60.7
2021‑22 48.6 1.9 50.4 7.0 57.4
2022‑23 48.6 1.8 50.5 6.2 56.6
2023‑24 48.8 1.9 50.7 5.7 56.4
2024‑25 RE 49.2 1.9 51.1 5.0 56.1
2025‑26 BE 48.8 1.9 50.6 4.5 55.1
Source: Union Budgets
Note: The outstanding stock of external liabilities is reckoned at historical rates of exchange on which the
liability was initially accounted for in the books of accounts after netting the repayments made at current
exchange rates.
4.43 Internal debt has remained the dominant component, rising steadily from 37.0 per cent
of GDP in 2011‑12 to 48.8 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24. The major components of internal debt
are market loans, treasury bills (T‑bills), and securities against small savings. Market loans
represent the largest portion of internal debt, growing from 28.8 per cent of GDP to 34.0 per
cent of GDP during the period 2011‑12 to 2023‑24. T‑bills, while a smaller segment, have shown
67Sixteenth Finance Commission
consistent growth in absolute terms, reflecting increased cash management needs. The securities
against small savings have expanded significantly, from 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 9.1
per cent of GDP in 2023‑24, as States have moved away from this source.
4.44 External debt has increased moderately from ₹1.(cid:26) lakh crore in 2011‑12 to ₹5.(cid:26) lakh
crore in 2023‑24 but has remained stable as a percentage of GDP at around 1.9 per cent,
indicating the government’s continued preference for domestic borrowing. Overall, public debt
grew from ₹34 lakh crore in 2011‑12 to ₹152.6 lakh crore in 2023‑24, with its share of GDP
peaking at 51.9 per cent during the pandemic year and stabilizing thereafter to around 50 per
cent, reflecting the fiscal consolidation efforts taken by the Union.
(cid:41)(cid:76)(cid:74)(cid:88)re 4.2 (cid:55)ren(cid:71)s (cid:76)n (cid:39)e(cid:69)(cid:87) of (cid:87)he (cid:56)n(cid:76)on an(cid:71) Ma(cid:77)or (cid:54)o(cid:88)rces of (cid:41)(cid:76)nanc(cid:76)n(cid:74) ((cid:83)ercen(cid:87)a(cid:74)e of (cid:42)(cid:39)(cid:51))
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Market Loans Securities against small savings
Other Internal Debt Public Debt
Other Liabilities
Source: Union Budgets
Note: Other Internal Debt includes T‑bills, cash management bills, sovereign gold bonds etc ; Other
Liabilities includes NSSF, SPFs, Other Accounts, Reserve Funds and Deposits
4.45 The second component of total liabilities is classified as other liabilities in the Union
Budget. This category consists of NSSF4, State provident funds (SPF), other accounts, and
reserve funds and deposits which can be interest bearing or otherwise. Although the absolute
amount of these liabilities has increased from ₹11.2 lakh crore in 2011‑12 to ₹1(cid:26).1 lakh crore
in 2023‑24, their share as percentage of GDP has declined sharply, from 12.8 per cent in 2011‑12
4 The liabilities under “NSSF” under Other Liabilities is total outstanding collections minus investments in the form of special
securities issued to GoI.
68Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
to 5.7 per cent in 2023‑24, reflecting a strategic move away from these sources in government
finance. Notably, liabilities under the NSSF have shrunk from 6.7 per cent to 1.4 per cent of
GDP during this period, while reserve funds and deposits have become slightly more significant,
rising from 1.5 per cent to 2.1 per cent of GDP. These trends together highlight a clear evolution
in the Union Government’s liability profile towards greater reliance on market‑based financing
and a reduced dependence on traditional sources like small savings and provident funds. The
trends in public debt and other liabilities along with major sources of financing, are presented
in Figure 4.2.
4.46 FRBM Act, 2003 as amended in 2018 set debt‑to‑GDP targets of 60.0 per cent for the
general government, 40.0 per cent for the Union Government, and 20.0 per cent for the State
Governments combined, by the end of 2024‑25. Between 2011‑12 and 2018‑19, the Union
Government had achieved a modest reduction in the debt‑to‑GDP ratio from 51.7 per cent to
48.1 per cent. However, the growth slowdown in 2019‑20 reversed this trend, raising the ratio
to 50.7 per cent. Then, in 2020‑21, the expansionary fiscal response to the COVID‑19 crisis
resulted in a major spike, with the ratio jumping to 60.7 per cent. This spike placed the target of
reducing the debt‑to‑GDP ratio to 40.0 per cent by the end of 2024‑25 out of reach.
4.47 In the meantime, the FC‑15 laid out an indicative debt and deficit path for the Union
Government. According to this path, the total outstanding liabilities of the Union were assessed
to decrease from 62.9 per cent of GDP at the end of 2020‑21 to 56.6 per cent at the end of
2025‑26. The total outstanding liabilities of the Union in 2020‑21 stood at 60.7 per cent of GDP,
which decreased to 56.4 per cent in 2023‑24. Assuming the absence of any major
macro‑economic shock, the Union Government has committed to a glide path of fiscal
consolidation, which will bring down its total liabilities to 55.1 per cent at the end of 2025‑26,
and attain a debt‑to‑GDP level of about 50±1 per cent by the end of 2030‑31, the last year of
this FC’s award period.
4.48 The share of external debt in the government's total liabilities is small relative to its level
during the 1980s. The country also holds a sizeable foreign exchange reserve and has a deep
foreign exchange market. These facts significantly contain the risk of a balance‑of‑payments
crisis like the one experienced in 1991.
Extra‑B(cid:88)(cid:71)(cid:74)e(cid:87)ar(cid:92) (cid:53)eso(cid:88)rces
4.49 For completeness, we draw attention to the fact that the outstanding liabilities, as
reported in Table 4.15, do not include the extra‑budgetary resources (EBRs). EBRs are raised
by various entities, through bonds sold in the market and loans taken from the NSSF and fully
serviced by the Government of India through budgetary allocations. However, the government
has started reporting these liabilities in the Union Budget since 2016‑17 to maintain
transparency. As per the statement on EBRs in the Union Budget 2025‑26, the total liabilities
incurred through these instruments during 2016‑17 to 2022‑23 were ₹1.38 lakh crore, and NIL
in 2023‑24.
69Sixteenth Finance Commission
4.50 Apart from the EBRs mobilized through the issue of bonds fully serviced by the
government, financial support to certain expenditures was extended through loans from NSSF
to entities such as the FCI and the Building Materials & Technology Promotion Council. The
(cid:84)uantum of these E(cid:37)Rs was the highest at ₹1.26 lakh crore in 2019‑20 and ₹94,636 crore in
2020‑21. As per the disclosure in the Union Budget 2024‑25, the government has repaid these
loans.
(cid:38)onc(cid:79)(cid:88)(cid:71)(cid:76)n(cid:74) (cid:53)e(cid:80)ar(cid:78)s
4.51 After a relatively successful handling of the health emergency related to COVID‑19 in
2020‑21, the Indian economy has reverted to its normal growth path. The Union Government
took several welfare‑oriented measures to protect the vulnerable, which cost 4.6 per cent of
GDP, and doubled the fiscal deficit to 9.2 per cent in 2020‑21. Subsequently and gradually, the
finances of the Union Government have returned to the pre‑COVID level. Revenue receipts of
the Union in 2023‑24 increased by 0.9 per cent of GDP over the pre‑COVID year of 2018‑19,
while revenue expenditure fell by 1.0 per cent of GDP over the same period. Among the most
positive developments post‑COVID is a major acceleration in capital expenditures. It doubled
to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24 from 1.6 per cent in 2018‑19. Though the fiscal deficit remains
elevated relative to pre‑COVID years, the trend is downward.
4.52 The welfare spending undertaken in 2020‑21 had a trifold impact. It protected the
vulnerable during COVID‑19, softened the immediate blow to GDP growth, and contributed to
the subsequent speedy and decisive recovery of the economy. More importantly, the government
successfully escaped the double‑digit inflation that plagued much of the world in the aftermath
of COVID‑19. This was done by rejecting the calls from nearly all quarters for a much larger
package to stimulate the economy, as nearly all other countries had done.
4.53 The political economy influences the level and composition of public expenditure in a
democracy. Over the decades, India has witnessed an increase in public expenditure as a
proportion of its GDP. However, one healthy development has been that while the Indian state
directly entered the manufacturing activity on a massive scale during several post‑independence
decades, it has largely vacated this space since the launch of the economic reforms in 1991.
Moreover, continuation of some subsidies notwithstanding, the government has come to focus
more centrally on providing public goods such as infrastructure, defence, public health,
sanitation, and piped water. Recently, it has also undertaken road, bridge, tunnel, and building
construction projects on scale and focussed on timely completion. The quality of the Union
Government’s expenditures has seen a distinct improvement.
4.54 The government has also introduced new tax reforms to increase revenue and improve
efficiency. The adoption of the GST on 01 July 2017 has been a major step in this direction.
This has greatly improved the conventional economic efficiency by replacing many
distortionary Union and State indirect taxes with a single tax nationwide on each product. It also
ended the cascading of taxes and has eliminated the need for border check posts to monitor
70Chapter 4: Review of the Union Finances
inter‑state trade. The digitization of the tax administration holds great promise for minimizing
tax avoidance. The new simplified direct tax code substantially eliminates the system of
exemptions and promises to reduce tax avoidance in the long run. The government has also
lowered the corporation tax sufficiently to align it with international standards, while doing
away with numerous exemptions. This being said, there remains scope for increasing tax
collection through tax policy and tax administration reforms, given India’s level of
development.
4.55 On the expenditure side, the shift to the Direct Benefit Transfer system for most
programs involving cash or in‑kind transfers has greatly improved efficiency. Duplicate claims
and claims for non‑existent beneficiaries have been substantially eliminated, and the targeted
beneficiaries have received their full entitlement. The Union Government has successfully
replaced conventional carbon‑heavy fuels with a cleaner source in nearly all poor rural
households by channelling the urban LPG subsidy to the latter. It has also been highly effective
in expanding toilets in rural households and ending open defecation. Its scheme to bring tap
water to rural households has also seen rapid progress. These schemes have made a major
difference for the better in the lives of rural women now joining the labour force in progressively
larger numbers.
71REVIEW OF
5
STATE FINANCES
5. CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF STATE FINANCES
5.1 Within its federal structure, the Constitution empowers States to legislate on numerous
subjects covered by the State List (List II) and the Concurrent List (List III). The subjects on
these lists include law and order, public health, agriculture, education, labour, land, forestry, and
internal trade. The legislative power naturally comes with the responsibility of delivering public
services in these areas. In turn, the efficient delivery of services requires prudent financial
management. This is the context of the present chapter.
5.2 Several key developments have impacted the finances of States in recent years. The jump
in devolution to States from 32 per cent to 42 per cent of the divisible pool beginning in 2015‑16
led to a significant increase in their total revenues and expenditures. The introduction of the
Goods and Services Tax (GST) in July 2017 fundamentally restructured their indirect tax
systems. The Ujjwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY) impacted the debt profiles of many
States in a major way. The economic slowdown in 2019‑20 presented significant fiscal
challenges. Finally, as with the Union Government, State Governments faced the pressure for
increased expenditure on the one hand and a revenue squeeze on the other during the COVID‑19
pandemic, resulting in a jump in the fiscal deficit and debt. In the following, we provide an
overview of the revenues, expenditures, fiscal deficits, and debt of all 28 States of India
combined from 2012 to 2024. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of individual
States.
State Finances: An Overview
5.3 Table 5.1 presents gross domestic product (GDP), total receipts, total expenditures, and
fiscal deficit (FD) of all States combined in rupees and also as a percentage of GDP from
2011‑12 to 2023‑24. Total receipts include receipts on both revenue (current) and capital
accounts. Likewise, total expenditures include expenditures on the revenue and capital accounts.
73Sixteenth Finance Commission
Accordingly, the difference between the total expenditures and total receipts represents the fiscal
deficit.
Table 5.1 GDP, States’ Combined Expenditure, Revenue and Fiscal Deficit
Total
Total
Receipts
Expenditure Fiscal Total Total Fiscal
GDP (Revenue
Year (Revenue plus Deficit Receipts Expenditure Deficit
plus
Capital)
Capital)
(figures in (cid:2534) lakh crore) (figures as percentage of GDP)
2011‑12 87.36 10.90 12.55 1.65 12.5 14.4 1.9
2012‑13 99.44 12.33 14.24 1.91 12.4 14.3 1.9
2013‑14 112.33 13.49 15.92 2.43 12.0 14.2 2.2
2014‑15 124.68 15.82 19.04 3.21 12.7 15.3 2.6
2015‑16 137.72 18.05 22.19 4.13 13.1 16.1 3.0
2016‑17 153.92 20.20 25.49 5.28 13.1 16.6 3.4
2017‑18 170.90 22.67 26.75 4.08 13.3 15.7 2.4
2018‑19 189.00 25.58 30.12 4.54 13.5 15.9 2.4
2019‑20 201.04 26.20 31.36 5.16 13.0 15.6 2.6
2020‑21 198.54 26.08 32.95 6.87 13.1 16.6 3.5
2021‑22 235.97 32.75 37.66 4.90 13.9 16.0 2.1
2022‑23 268.90 35.22 42.44 7.22 13.1 15.8 2.7
2023‑24 301.23 38.16 46.81 8.64 12.7 15.5 2.9
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), States’ Finance Accounts
5.4 Between 2011‑12 and 2023‑24, India’s nominal GDP multiplied 3.4‑fold from ₹8(cid:26).4
lakh crore to ₹301.2 lakh crore. (cid:55)he States(cid:182) total revenues and expenditures multiplied by 3.5
and 3.7, respectively, over the same period. Therefore, revenues and expenditures as a
proportion of GDP saw a slight increase.
5.5 This overview of 2011‑2024 needs to be unpacked in light of important changes that
occurred over the review period. In 2014‑15, both total revenues and expenditures as a
proportion of GDP rose significantly. This rise was primarily due to a change in accounting
practice, whereby the Union, which had previously transferred its allocations to certain centrally
sponsored schemes (CSS) directly to the implementing agencies, began channelling them
through the consolidated funds of the States. As a result, both total revenues and expenditures
recorded on the States’ budgets saw an upward movement. A more substantive upward shift in
the total revenues and expenditures occurred in 2015‑16 when the share of the States in the
divisible pool rose from 32 per cent to 42 per cent.
5.6 Under GST, States replaced several of their taxes with the State GST (SGST) to be
collected on goods and services consumed within the State. As part of the agreement reached
between the Union and State Governments under GST, the former had promised to compensate
74Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
the latter through a grant for the gap between a projected 14 per cent annual growth in revenues
from the taxes replaced by SGST over their 2015‑16 base and the revenue collected through
SGST for a period of five years. Therefore, although GST suffered from teething pains during
its early years of implementation, the Union compensated the States as explained above. This
compensation provided a significant boost to the States’ total revenues in the years 2017‑18 and
2018‑19. However, the economic slowdown and the onset of COVID‑19 led to a decline in the
revenue as a proportion of GDP in 2019‑20 and 2020‑21 relative to 2018‑19. The expenditure
as a proportion of GDP fell in 2019‑20, but lesser than revenue, and rose in 2020‑21, leading to
larger fiscal deficits during these years. The Union Government relaxed the States’ borrowing
limit to up to 5 per cent of GSDP to accommodate the large expenditure expansion in 2020‑21.
With the economy regaining some of its normalcy in 2021‑22, the total revenue as a proportion
of GDP returned to its higher level, but with the fiscal deficit also brought down sharply,
expenditures as a proportion of GDP fell.
5.7 The five‑year period over which the Union Government had promised to provide GST
compensation ended on 30 June 2022. The resulting discontinuation of the GST compensation
grant led to a decline in the States’ revenues as a proportion of GDP in 2022‑23 and 2023‑24
relative to their pre‑COVID but post‑GST level. The States resorted to higher fiscal deficits
during these years to sustain expenditure as a proportion of GDP at approximately the same
level as in 2021‑22.
5.8 The States’ combined fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP has remained within the 3
per cent borrowing limit set by the Union Government in all but two years. In 2016‑17, the
deficit exceeded the 3 per cent mark due to the implementation of the UDAY scheme in
2015‑16, which led to a sudden increase in debt and, consequently, higher interest payments. In
2020‑21, the source of the higher deficit was the COVID‑19‑induced shortfall in revenues and
expansion of expenditure. We next disaggregate the sources of revenue and objects of
expenditure in succession.
Trends in Receipts
5.9 At the broadest level, the States’ total receipts may be divided into revenue and capital
receipts. As shown in Table 5.2, the latter form only a small part of the States’ receipts. Most of
the States’ capital receipts come from debt‑creating instruments and are not included in Table
5.2. Like the Union Government, the States borrow principally from the market, though they
also draw from public accounts maintained for specific purposes.
5.10 Except in 2013‑14, the States’ revenue receipts exceeded 12 per cent of GDP during all
years under review. With non‑debt capital receipts playing a minuscule role, movements in these
receipts have driven the total receipts discussed in the previous section. The tax revenues of the
States have thus been adversely impacted by the introduction of GST in July 2017, the sharp
decline in the growth rate in 2019‑20, and the COVID‑19 crisis in 2020‑21.
75Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 5.2 Revenue and Capital Receipts of the States (percentage of GDP)
Total Revenue
Non‑debt Capital
Year (Current) Account Total Receipts
Receipts
Receipts
2011‑12 12.3 0.2 12.5
2012‑13 12.3 0.1 12.4
2013‑14 11.9 0.1 12.0
2014‑15 12.5 0.2 12.7
2015‑16 13.0 0.1 13.1
2016‑17 13.0 0.1 13.1
2017‑18 13.0 0.2 13.3
2018‑19 13.3 0.2 13.5
2019‑20 12.8 0.3 13.0
2020‑21 13.0 0.1 13.1
2021‑22 13.8 0.1 13.9
2022‑23 13.1 0.0 13.1
2023‑24 12.6 0.1 12.7
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
Components of Revenue Receipts
5.11 Revenue receipts of the States can be divided into four major components: own tax
revenues, own non‑tax revenues, share in the divisible pool, and grants from the Union
Government. The States’ own tax revenue sources include the SGST, excise tax, sales tax,
vehicle tax, stamp duties, and land revenue. Their non‑tax revenue sources include charges for
services, fines and penalties, royalties on minerals, dividends from State public‑sector
undertakings and interest on loans. These revenue sources are complemented by grants‑in‑aid
from the Consolidated Fund of India and the States’ share in the divisible pool, as recommended
by the Finance Commission (FC). Grants‑in‑aid include FC‑recommended grants (deficit grants,
local body grants, disaster relief grants, and sector- and State‑specific grants), the Union’s
contribution to CSS, and GST compensation. The divisible pool consists of Union taxes, other
than taxes belonging to the Union Territories, cesses, and surcharges, minus the cost of
collection. Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC‑13) awarded States 32 per cent of the divisible
pool, which was subsequently enhanced to 42 per cent by the Fourteenth Finance Commission
(FC‑14). The Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC‑15) recommended a marginally reduced share
of 41 per cent, primarily to accommodate the exclusion of Jammu and Kashmir following its
reorganization.
5.12 Table 5.3 provides the contributions of various sources of the States’ revenues as a
proportion of GDP from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24. Except for the first five years of GST
implementation (2017‑18 to 2021‑22), during which the Union Government provided a GST
compensation grant shown under the grants‑in‑aid column in the table, the States’ own tax
revenue as a proportion of GDP has been remarkably stable. It accounted for approximately half
76Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
of the States’ total receipts throughout the period. The States’ own non‑tax revenue as a
proportion of GDP has also remained stable at a little above 1 per cent. Some revenue increase
came from a jump in the States’ share of the divisible pool (shown in Tax Devolution column)
beginning in 2015‑16. The increase amounted to approximately 1 per cent of GDP. The
contribution of FC‑recommended tax devolution to the States’ revenues has ranged from 2.7 per
cent of GDP in 2014‑15 to 4.0 per cent in 2018‑19 during the period under review. The grants
show a jump beginning in 2014‑15, but this is due to the accounting change whereby the Union
Government began channelling its contribution to the CSS through the States’ budgets instead
of transferring it directly to the implementing agencies.
Table 5.3 Components of Revenue Receipts of the States (percentage of GDP)
Total Total Revenue
Own
Own Tax Tax Grants‑in‑Aid (Current)
Year Non‑Tax
Revenue Devolution (Including GST Account
Revenue
Compensation) Receipts
2011‑12 6.3 1.1 2.9 2.0 12.3
2012‑13 6.5 1.2 2.9 1.8 12.3
2013‑14 6.3 1.2 2.8 1.7 11.9
2014‑15 6.2 1.1 2.7 2.5 12.5
2015‑16 6.1 1.1 3.6 2.2 13.0
2016‑17 5.9 1.1 3.9 2.2 13.0
2017‑18 5.9 1.0 3.9 2.2 13.0
2018‑19 6.1 1.1 4.0 2.2 13.3
2019‑20 5.8 1.3 3.2 2.4 12.8
2020‑21 5.7 0.9 3.0 3.5 13.0
2021‑22 6.0 1.0 3.7 3.0 13.8
2022‑23 6.3 1.0 3.5 2.2 13.1
2023‑24 6.2 1.0 3.7 1.6 12.6
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
5.13 Some shifts among the components of grants‑in‑aid are worth noting here. FC grant data
show spikes in 2019‑20 and 2020‑21. The former resulted from the release of pending FC‑14
grants for Rural and Urban Local Bodies, and the latter from enhanced allocations for revenue
deficit (RD) and disaster management grants under FC‑15. Transfers under CSS peaked during
2020‑21 as part of the Union Government’s pandemic response. The CSS‑related transfers by
the Union result in the expansion of both revenues and expenditures of the States.
5.14 Before the introduction of GST, States relied heavily on taxes such as sales
tax/value‑added tax (VAT), excise duties, stamp and registration duties, and entertainment tax
for their own tax revenue. GST has now subsumed many of these taxes, with SGST becoming
a key component of the States' tax revenue. As a consequence, the States' own tax revenues are
now more closely tied to the performance of GST. Its contribution to State revenues has grown
77Sixteenth Finance Commission
from 2.5 per cent of GDP in its first complete year of implementation in 2018‑19 to
approximately 2.7 per cent by 2023‑24. Among the other taxes, sales tax on petroleum and
liquor and excise duty on liquor have consistently contributed around 1.4 per cent and 0.8 per
cent of GDP, respectively, post‑GST. The stamps and registration fees contributed
approximately 0.7 per cent to 0.8 per cent of GDP.
Components of Own Tax Revenue
5.15 Figure 5.1 shows the average shares of the major tax heads in the States’ own tax
revenue from 2018‑19 to 2023‑24, excluding the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21. SGST is levied
and collected by a State on intrastate sales of a good or service, with the sale and consumption
of the good or service occurring in the same State. However, in the State accounts, SGST also
includes the part of the Integrated GST (IGST) accruing to the State on inter‑state transactions
and imports when the final consumption of the good or service occurs in that State.
Figure 5.1 Shares of Major Tax Items in States’ Own Tax Revenue: 2018‑19 to 2023‑24,
excluding 2020‑21
1.1%
4.4%
5.5%
State Goods and Service Tax
11.4% Taxes on Sales, Trade, etc.
41.2% State Excise
Stamps and Registration fees
13.2% Taxes on Vehicles
Other Taxes
Land Revenue
23.2%
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
5.16 At 41.2 per cent, SGST was the largest contributor to the States’ own tax revenues during
2018‑19 to 2023‑24 (with 2020‑21 excluded). The sales tax, collected principally on petroleum,
petroleum products, and alcoholic beverages, was a distant second with a 23.2 per cent share.
Excise duty, collected on alcoholic products at the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail stages,
contributed 13.2 per cent. Other items were stamp and registration fees (11.4 per cent), vehicle
tax (5.5 per cent), and land revenue (1.1 per cent).
78Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Tax and Non‑tax Revenue Buoyancy
5.17 During the period from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 (excluding 2020‑21), the combined tax
revenue of all States exhibited a buoyancy of 0.96 with respect to GDP, indicating that tax
revenue grew at a slightly lower rate than GDP. Non‑tax revenue, on the other hand, showed a
buoyancy of 0.91, reflecting an even slower growth relative to GDP. Consequently, the total
own revenue receipts of the States demonstrated a buoyancy of 0.96. In contrast, Union transfers
grew at a rate substantially exceeding the growth of GDP during this period. This fact
underscores the growing reliance of States on Union transfers to meet their revenue needs.
Trends in Expenditure
5.18 Over the past decade, the expenditure of States as a percentage of GDP has witnessed a
significant increase. As shown in Table 5.4, it rose from 14.2 per cent in 2013‑14 to a peak of
16.6 per cent in 2016‑17 and again in 2020‑21. A consistent feature of the spending pattern has
been the dominance of revenue over capital expenditure. Only twice during the period under
review, in 2015‑16 and 2016‑17, did capital expenditure touch or exceed 3 per cent of GDP.
The reason for this uptick is discussed in Paragraph 5.26. Revenue expenditure has remained
persistently high, hovering around or exceeding the 13 per cent mark since 2015‑16 and reaching
14.4 per cent in the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21. Larger FC devolutions under the FC‑14 and
FC‑15 have not translated into larger capital expenditures except in 2015‑16 and 2016‑17.
Table 5.4 An Overview of the States’ Expenditures (percentage of GDP)
Revenue Capital Total
Year
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
2011‑12 12.0 2.3 14.4
2012‑13 12.1 2.2 14.3
2013‑14 12.0 2.1 14.2
2014‑15 12.9 2.4 15.3
2015‑16 13.1 3.0 16.1
2016‑17 13.3 3.3 16.6
2017‑18 13.2 2.4 15.7
2018‑19 13.4 2.5 15.9
2019‑20 13.4 2.2 15.6
2020‑21 14.4 2.2 16.6
2021‑22 13.6 2.3 16.0
2022‑23 13.4 2.4 15.8
2023‑24 12.9 2.6 15.5
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
79Sixteenth Finance Commission
5.19 In 2020‑21, the Union Government introduced a scheme - ‘Special Assistance to States
for Capital Investment (SASCI)’ offering 50‑year interest‑free capital expenditure loans to
States to boost their capital expenditures. The details of loans under SASCI are given in
Table 5.5 and Annexure 5.4. While a large number of States have taken advantage of this loan
facility, it may be hypothesized that in some cases, States substituted capital expenditure
projects they would have undertaken with other sources of revenue for those undertaken using
SASCI. We return to this issue in our inter‑state analysis later in this chapter.
Table 5.5 Interest‑free Loans from the Union Government for
Capital Expenditure
Amount
Year Percentage of GDP
(₹ lakh crore)
2020‑21 0.12 0.06
2021‑22 0.14 0.06
2022‑23 0.81 0.30
2023‑24 1.10 0.36
2024‑25 1.50 0.45
Source: Data provided by Dept. of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance)
5.20 Committed expenditures, such as salaries, pensions, and interest payments, can
substantially explain the stickiness of revenue expenditures. However, it bears noting that at
least some of these expenditures result from the choices made by the States. Over time, the
committed expenditures have absorbed an increasing share of the States’ revenue expenditures
and undermined their fiscal flexibility. The problem becomes particularly serious when
unexpected expenditure needs arise.
Components of Revenue Expenditures
5.21 Table 5.6 shows the major components of the States’ revenue expenditures. They include
general services, social services, economic services, and transfers to local bodies. General
services are subdivided into three subcategories: interest, pension, and ‘others’. The combined
expenditure on interest payments and pension has risen from 2.9 per cent of GDP during the
first four years to 3.2 per cent of GDP during the last year. Besides, as a percentage of revenue
receipts, States’ interest payments increased from 11.7 per cent in 2015‑16 to 14.6 per cent in
2020‑21, before falling to 13.0 per cent in 2023‑24. Similarly, pension expenditure as a
percentage of revenue receipts grew from 11.1 per cent in 2015‑16 to 13.9 per cent in 2020‑21
and stood at 13.0 per cent in 2023‑24.
80Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Table 5.6 Components of Revenue Expenditure of States (percentage of GDP)
General Services Transfers
Social Economic
Year Interest to Local
Pension Others Total Services Services
Payments Bodies#
2011‑12 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.4 4.8 2.5 0.3
2012‑13 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.3 4.8 2.7 0.3
2013‑14 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.3 4.8 2.6 0.4
2014‑15 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.3 5.0 3.2 0.4
2015‑16 1.5 1.5 1.3 4.3 5.3 3.1 0.4
2016‑17 1.6 1.4 1.3 4.4 5.4 3.2 0.4
2017‑18 1.7 1.6 1.3 4.6 5.1 3.1 0.4
2018‑19 1.6 1.6 1.4 4.7 5.2 3.1 0.4
2019‑20 1.7 1.7 1.3 4.7 5.3 3.0 0.4
2020‑21 1.9 1.8 1.3 5.1 5.7 3.3 0.4
2021‑22 1.8 1.7 1.3 4.8 5.4 3.0 0.4
2022‑23 1.7 1.7 1.3 4.7 5.3 3.0 0.4
2023‑24 1.6 1.6 1.2 4.5 5.1 3.0 0.4
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
# Transfers to Local bodies are made under General, Social and Economic Services heads also.
5.22 Salary expenditure, which is spread across general, social, and economic expenditures,
is the largest component of the States' committed expenditures. However, it has shown a
downward trend in recent years. Consolidated salary expenditure for all States has increased
nearly three times in absolute terms; however, as a percentage of GDP, it has declined from
4.2 per cent to 3.6 per cent during the period under review. Figure 5.2 depicts the States’
combined committed expenditure as a proportion of GDP. It shows that with the fall in the salary
component approximately offsetting the increase in pensions and interest payments, total
committed expenditures, which had risen from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 to 7.8 per cent
in the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, returned to 6.9 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.23 Expenditure on social services as a proportion of GDP has shown a rising trend
throughout the period under review, increasing from 4.8 per cent in the first three years to a
range of 5.1‑5.4 per cent in the last three. Social services include education, health, and welfare
programs. Figure 5.3 depicts the evolution of expenditures on social services as a proportion of
the States’ total revenue expenditures and GDP. The increase in the share can be attributed
mainly to increased spending on health. The expenditure on economic services increased from
2.5 per cent in 2011‑12 to the peak of 3.3 per cent in 2020‑21 and then fell to 3.0 per cent during
2023‑24. Burgeoning power subsidies to DISCOMs have been the primary driver of this
increase. This report provides a deeper analysis of the power sector in Chapter 13.
81Sixteenth Finance Commission
45.0 5.8
40.0 5.6
35.0
5.4
30.0
5.2
25.0
5.0
20.0
4.8
15.0
4.6
10.0
5.0 4.4
0.0 4.2
82
ERT
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egatnecreP
PDG
fo
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Figure 5.2 Components of Committed Expenditure of States
(percentage of GDP)
Interest Payments Salaries Pension
2023-24 1.6 3.6 1.6
2022-23 1.7 3.8 1.7
2021-22 1.8 4.0 1.7
2020-21 1.9 4.1 1.8
2019-20 1.7 4.0 1.7
2018-19 1.6 3.8 1.6
2017-18 1.7 3.9 1.6
2016-17 1.6 3.9 1.4
2015-16 1.5 4.0 1.5
2014-15 1.5 4.1 1.4
2013-14 1.5 4.0 1.4
2012-13 1.5 4.1 1.4
2011-12 1.5 4.2 1.4
- 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Source: States’ Finance Accounts, States’ Budgets, CAG Audit Reports on State Finances
Figure 5.3 Social Sector Revenue Expenditure (percentage of GDP and
Total Revenue Expenditure)
SSRE/TRE SSRE/GDP (RHS)
Source: States’ Finance AccountsChapter 5: Review of State Finances
Expenditure on Health and Education
5.24 Given the importance of education and health, it is worthwhile considering the
expenditure on both separately. Table 5.7 shows that the States' health expenditure as a
proportion of GDP was barely 0.6 per cent in 2011‑12. This proportion increased over the years,
reaching 1.0 per cent in 2020‑21 and 2021‑22 but fell marginally to 0.9 per cent in 2022‑23. The
allocation of public expenditures to health has historically been low in India, with citizens
incurring significantly larger expenditures out of their pockets. The onset of COVID‑19
highlighted the fragility of existing health infrastructure, necessitating a quick expansion of
health expenditure to 1.0 per cent of GDP from 0.8 per cent. The elevated level was sustained
in 2021‑22, though it fell to 0.9 per cent in 2023‑24. The States’ education expenditure as a
percentage of GDP has exhibited a relatively stable trajectory, ranging from 2.2 to 2.5 per cent
of GDP throughout the period under review.
Table 5.7 Expenditures on Health and Education (percentage of GDP)
Year Health Education
2011‑12 0.6 2.4
2012‑13 0.7 2.5
2013‑14 0.6 2.4
2014‑15 0.8 2.5
2015‑16 0.8 2.5
2016‑17 0.8 2.5
2017‑18 0.8 2.4
2018‑19 0.8 2.4
2019‑20 0.8 2.5
2020‑21 1.0 2.5
2021‑22 1.0 2.4
2022‑23 0.9 2.3
2023‑24 0.9 2.2
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
Note: The expenditure figures for health and education include both revenue and capital expenditure.
Subsidies
5.25 Subsidies, which are spread across different expenditure categories in Table 5.6,
constitute another major expenditure item. They have seen a sharp rise in recent years. An
analysis of budgets and finance accounts of twenty‑one large States reveals that total
expenditure by States on subsidies and beneficiary‑oriented schemes has risen consistently from
2.2 per cent of their GSDP in 2018‑19 to 2.7 per cent in 2023‑24. Of the total of approximately
₹(cid:26).6 lakh crore spent in 2023‑24 on subsidies and benefits, nearly half was allocated to the
power sector (34.2 per cent) and social security pensions (15.5 per cent) together. Chapter 14 of
this report provides a detailed analysis of subsidies.
83Sixteenth Finance Commission
Capital Expenditure
5.26 During the period, capital expenditure fluctuated between 2.1 per cent and 3.3 per cent
of GDP (Figure 5.4). The uptick during 2015‑16 and 2016‑17 was mainly due to States taking
over the debt of DISCOMs under the UDAY scheme. The recent increase is due to Union
assistance to States in the form of an interest‑free 50‑year loan for capital expenditure.
Overlaying the trend in capital expenditure with the trends in receipts shows that States tend to
compress capital expenditure during the years in which they face resource constraints.
Figure 5.4 Capital Expenditure by States (percentage of GDP)
General Sector Social Sector Economic Sector Disbursement of Loans and Advances
3.5 3.3
3.0
3.0
2.6
2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
5.27 Under UDAY, States assumed the liabilities of their DISCOMs, resulting in a temporary
increase in borrowing from banks and other financial institutions, including LIC, NABARD,
NCDC, and SBI. This borrowing, although classified as capital expenditure, was primarily
directed towards providing financial support for State Public Sector Enterprises and DISCOMs,
rather than creating productive capital assets. Consequently, the capital expenditure in 2016‑17,
which peaked at 3.3 per cent of GDP, does not fully represent investments in infrastructure that
would enhance long‑term economic capacity.
5.28 In addition to loans taken over by States under UDAY, States’ capital expenditures also
include loans and advances extended to public sector entities, along with actual capital
expenditures on the creation of physical assets. As depicted in Table 5.8, the capital outlay of
States has varied between 1.9 per cent and 2.5 per cent of GDP, while loans, advances, and
investments have varied between 0.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent of GDP.
84Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Table 5.8 Components of Capital Expenditures (percentage of GDP)
Disbursement of Total Capital
Year Capital Outlays
Loans and Advances Expenditure
2011‑12 1.9 0.4 2.3
2012‑13 1.9 0.3 2.2
2013‑14 1.9 0.2 2.1
2014‑15 2.1 0.2 2.4
2015‑16 2.4 0.7 3.0
2016‑17 2.5 0.8 3.3
2017‑18 2.2 0.2 2.4
2018‑19 2.3 0.2 2.5
2019‑20 2.0 0.2 2.2
2020‑21 2.0 0.2 2.2
2021‑22 2.2 0.2 2.3
2022‑23 2.1 0.3 2.4
2023‑24 2.4 0.2 2.6
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
Deficit and Debt
5.29 Table 5.9 presents the main conventional measures of deficits as proportions of GDP,
including fiscal, revenue, and primary deficits. The last column also reports the outstanding
liabilities as a proportion of GDP. The fiscal deficit for all States has shown a notable increase
since the 2011‑12 fiscal year. It stood at 1.9 per cent of GDP in 2011‑12 but steadily climbed,
peaking at 3.5 per cent in 2020‑21. In between, it witnessed a jump from 2014‑15 to 2016‑17,
with a rise in the last two years resulting principally from the absorption of DISCOM debt under
the UDAY scheme. Like the Union, States have also reversed this trend post‑pandemic, cutting
fiscal deficit to 2.1 per cent of GDP in 2021‑22. However, it rebounded in the following two
years, reaching 2.7 per cent in 2022‑23 and 2.9 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.30 Out of the 13 years under review, the States have incurred a positive revenue deficit
(RD) in 10 years. Because market borrowings invariably finance it, the revenue deficit crowds
out either public or private capital expenditure. It fluctuated between -0.2 per cent and 1.4 per
cent of GDP during the 13 years. The revenue deficit to fiscal deficit (RD/FD) ratio is sometimes
seen as an indicator of the crowding out of capital expenditure by revenue expenditure. In the
early years of the decade, States maintained a tight grip on their revenue deficits, directing a
significant portion of borrowing towards capital expenditures. However, by 2019‑20, the
RD/FD ratio had deteriorated to 25.0 per cent, peaking at 40.2 per cent during the pandemic
year of 2020‑21. The ratio improved in the following two years, at 11.4 per cent in 2022‑23 and
12.0 per cent in 2023‑24. As a group, the States have scored reasonable success in restoring
fiscal stability post‑pandemic.
85Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 5.9 Trends in Aggregate Fiscal Indicators of States (percentage of GDP)
Fiscal Deficit Revenue Primary RD/FD (in Outstanding
Year
(FD) Deficit# (RD) Deficit (PD) per cent) Debt#
2011‑12 1.9 -0.2 0.3 -- 22.1
2012‑13 1.9 -0.2 0.4 -- 21.6
2013‑14 2.2 0.1 0.7 4.4 21.2
2014‑15 2.6 0.4 1.1 14.0 21.5
2015‑16 3.0 0.0 1.5 1.2 22.7
2016‑17 3.4 0.3 1.8 8.1 24.0
2017‑18 2.4 0.2 0.7 7.7 24.1
2018‑19 2.4 0.1 0.8 4.7 24.1
2019‑20 2.6 0.7 0.9 25.0 25.4
2020‑21 3.5 1.4 1.6 40.2 29.3
2021‑22 2.1 -0.2 0.3 -- 26.9
2022‑23 2.7 0.3 1.0 11.4 26.1
2023‑24 2.9 0.3 1.2 12.0 26.4
Source: MoSPI Comparable Estimates for GDP (2011‑12 series), States’ Finance Accounts
# Revenue Deficit and Outstanding Liabilities figures have been adjusted for loans for GST compensation
5.31 Primary deficit, which represents liabilities incurred in excess of interest payments on
outstanding liabilities as a percentage of GDP, represents another measure of fiscal discipline
that has been positive throughout the period. It ranged from 0.3 to 1.8 per cent of GDP.
Interestingly, it peaked, not during the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21 but in 2016‑17. Though this
measure fell to 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2021‑22, it rose back to 1.0 per cent in 2022‑23 and 1.2
per cent in 2023‑24.
5.32 As a consequence of the increase in fiscal deficit, the debt‑to‑GDP ratio has shown a
steady upward trend over the past decade. The ratio increased gradually from 22.1 per cent in
2011‑12 to 24.1 per cent by 2017‑18. The implementation of UDAY and the onset of the
COVID‑19 pandemic led to a sharp increase in the States’ debt, pushing the debt‑to‑GDP ratio
to a peak of 29.3 per cent in 2020‑21. In the post‑pandemic period, the debt ratio has begun to
stabilize, dropping slightly to 26.4 per cent in 2023‑24, reflecting efforts by States to consolidate
their finances and reduce their borrowings.
5.33 The sustained high fiscal deficits and the consequent debt accumulation have resulted in
a significant portion of revenue receipts being allocated to debt servicing. From 12.5 per cent of
revenue receipts in 2011‑12, interest payments on debt steadily rose to 14.6 per cent in the
COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21 (Figure 5.5). Though the ratio declined subsequently, it has
remained elevated at 13.0 per cent of revenue receipts in 2023‑24. Calculated as a percentage
of their own tax and non‑tax revenues, the burden of interest payments has been significantly
higher: 20.7 per cent in 2011‑12 and 22.6 per cent in 2023‑24. The high debt service burden
reduces the fiscal space for expenditures on critical items, such as health, education, and
infrastructure.
86Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Figure 5.5 High and Rising Cost of Debt Service
15.0 35.0
14.5
30.0
14.0
13.5 25.0
13.0
20.0
12.5
15.0 12.0
11.5 10.0
11.0
5.0
10.5
10.0 0.0
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
Composition of Debt
5.34 The composition of State debt has undergone significant evolution over the past decade.
Market borrowings have become increasingly dominant, rising from 39.6 per cent of total
87
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PDG
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Box 5.1 GST Compensation
The GST compensation mechanism was intended to insulate States from revenue losses arising
from the new tax regime, which worked smoothly till 2019-20. However, the onset of the COVID-
19 pandemic adversely impacted GST collections, leading to a larger need for fiscal resources for
GST compensation than the cess could generate, especially in the face of the economic slowdown.
At the same time, States needed fiscal resources to relieve the suffering arising from the pandemic.
In response, the Union Government introduced a special borrowing window under which the extra
debt created by the compensation cess shortfall would be repaid from future compensation cess
collections. Thus, the collection of GST cess was extended beyond June 30, 2022, until the
additional debt was repaid. Under the scheme, a cumulative amount of approximately ₹2.50 lakh
crore was disbursed to the States in 2021-22 and 2022-23, accounting for around 0.5 per cent of
GDP each year. Given that these loans are serviced directly by the Union Government from the
cess proceeds and do not create a repayment liability for the States, we have treated them as part
of the GST compensation rather than States’ debt. Consequently, these borrowings have been
excluded from the States' debt and other liabilities.
Debt to GDP (--RHS) Int Payment to Revenue ReceiptsSixteenth Finance Commission
liabilities in 2012‑13 to 63.7 per cent in 2022‑23. In contrast, reliance on the National Small
Savings Fund (NSSF) has diminished from 22.0 per cent in 2012‑13 to a mere 3.6 per cent in
2022‑23. This shift reflects the growing preference for market‑based financing, driven by the
availability of more competitive options relative to traditional sources.
5.35 The share of loans from the Union Government has declined steadily, from 7.4 per cent
in 2011‑12 to 3.4 per cent in 2019‑20 (Figure 5.6). The trend towards declining dependence on
Union Government loans can be traced back to the FC‑12 recommendations and the enactment
of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, which together catalysed a
shift away from Union on‑lending to States. The debt swap scheme of the early 2000s also
contributed to the States switching to market borrowings. The Union Government’s scheme,
SASCI, as mentioned earlier, has recently partially reversed this trend. The scheme aims to
stimulate capital expenditure by providing the States with 50‑year interest‑free loans. The Union
loans stood at 5.4 per cent of the outstanding liabilities at the end of 2023‑24.
5.36 The States’ sources of fiscal deficit financing reflect these shifts in the composition of
debt in a more magnified form. The share of market borrowings in the fiscal deficit financing
has increased from 80.4 per cent of the fiscal deficit in 2011‑12 to 94.8 per cent by 2019‑20.
However, the SASCI loans of the Union Government has led to this share tapering down to 75.5
per cent in 2023‑24, with the share of loans from the Union Government in financing States’
fiscal deficits increasing from 2.1 per cent in 2019‑20 to 16.9 per cent in 2020‑21 and 27.2 per
cent in 2021‑22, before moderating to 11.3 per cent by 2023‑24.
Figure 5.6 Composition of Outstanding Liabilities of the States
80.0 100.0
90.0
70.0
80.0
60.0
70.0
50.0
60.0
40.0 50.0
40.0
30.0
30.0
20.0
20.0
10.0
10.0
0.0 -
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
88
₹
erorc
hkal
ni
tnuomA
LSO
fo
egatnecreP
Public Account Liabilities Loans from GoI
Internal Debt Internal Debt (as % of OSL) (--RHS)
Loans from GoI (as % of OSL) (--RHS) Public Account Liabilities (as % of OSL) (--RHS)Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
14.0 5.0
12.0
4.0
10.0
3.0
8.0
6.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
2.0
0.0 -
89
₹
erorc
hkal
ni
tnuomA
PDG
fo
egatnecreP
Guarantees issued by the States
5.37 The States’ guarantees, which represent contingent liabilities for the States, have seen
fluctuation over the decade. In the early part of the decade, from 2011‑12 to 2014‑15, States’
guarantees increased steadily, rising from 2.6 per cent to a peak of 3.4 per cent of GDP. The
growth in guarantees during these years indicates a period of increased borrowing by
State‑linked entities, necessitating State backing to secure favourable financing terms. However,
following this peak, there was a notable decline in State guarantees as a share of GDP, dropping
to 2.6 per cent in 2015‑16 and further to 2.0 per cent in 2016‑17. This reduction coincides with
the introduction of the UDAY scheme, under which the States took over the loans to the
DISCOMs on their books, thereby reducing the amount of outstanding guaranteed loans.
5.38 From 2017‑18 onward, there was a resurgence in State guarantees, with a steady increase
from 2.0 per cent of GDP to 3.1 per cent in 2019‑20 (Figure 5.7). The sharp rise of guarantees
to 3.8 per cent of GDP in the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21 and its continuance at that level
underscores the heightened fiscal risks that States assumed. While these guarantees do not
immediately impact State debt levels, they represent potential future obligations that could
materialize if the entities involved are unable to meet their financial commitments. In such cases,
States would be required to honour these guarantees, potentially leading to a sudden increase in
public debt and straining fiscal resources. By 2023‑24, the guarantees extended by States
reached a new high of ₹11.48 lakh crores, i.e., 3.8 per cent of the GD(cid:51). About half of these
guarantees pertained to power sector companies.
Figure 5.7 Off‑budget Guarantees by the States
Total Guarantees Guarantees/GDP (--RHS)
Source: States’ Finance AccountsSixteenth Finance Commission
Off‑Budget Borrowings
5.39 Several States have accumulated significant off‑budget borrowings (OBB), which are
often not disclosed under the respective State FRBM Acts. Moreover, many of the entities
responsible for OBBs lack independent revenue streams and are primarily involved in
implementing government subsidy schemes. By their very nature, off‑budget borrowings are
difficult to track and measure. The instruments used vary across States, lack standard
definitions, and are neither centrally compiled nor consistently reported, making it challenging
to assess the true fiscal position of States. The burden of servicing the debt of these State entities
eventually falls on the State budgets. The issue of OBB and the current framework of their
reporting is discussed in Chapter 12.
Inter‑State Comparison
5.40 The aggregate analysis of the 28 States helps assess the implications of State‑level fiscal
actions for the overall macroeconomic stability. However, this aggregate picture obscures
important changes that occurred at the level of individual States over the period under study.
For example, large fiscal deficits in some States may be offset by low or negative fiscal deficits
in others. Likewise, high debt levels in some States may be offset by low debt levels in others.
Even when the overall picture may appear stable, corrective action may be warranted at the
individual State level to improve the efficiency of expenditures. Improvements in State‑level
outcomes inevitably require policy action at the State level. With this in view, we next consider
the State‑level revenues, expenditures, fiscal deficits, and debt.
Revenue Receipts
5.41 The comparative analysis of States’ revenue profiles reveals significant variations in
fiscal capacity, driven by differences in economic structure, governance efficiency, and reliance
on Union transfers. As shown in Figure 5.8, States such as Odisha, Goa and Chhattisgarh exhibit
higher own revenue to GSDP ratios, with Odisha leading at 13.8 per cent in 2023‑24, followed
by Goa (13.2 per cent) and Chhattisgarh (10.6 per cent), partially supported by mining, which
brings them handsome royalties. Conversely, States like Manipur (3.3 per cent), Tripura (4.7
per cent), Nagaland (5.5 per cent), West Bengal (5.6 per cent), and Sikkim (5.7 per cent) register
lower ratios, reflecting a limited capacity to generate revenue internally and a consequent higher
dependence on Union transfers.
5.42 The own revenue receipts of the States are primarily driven by their tax revenues.
Non‑tax revenues are significant contributors only for select States with access to mineral
royalties, such as Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand. The own‑tax‑to‑GSDP ratios vary
significantly across States even seven years after the implementation of GST. Among larger
States, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh exhibit high tax‑GSDP ratios of 7.6‑7.7 per
cent in 2023‑24, while Bihar and West Bengal lag behind at 5.6 per cent and 5.4 per cent of
GSDP, respectively. Therefore, while there is a slight upward trend in the own tax‑GSDP ratio
for all States combined, there are significant differences among States. If the States at the lower
90Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
end of the scale push their tax‑GSDP ratio even to the average level, it will lead to a higher
aggregate own‑tax‑to‑GSDP ratio for all States.
5.43 Examples in the previous paragraph suggest that the own‑tax‑to‑GSDP ratio does not
depend in any systematic manner on per capita income. The per capita income of Bihar is
significantly lower than that of Uttar Pradesh, while that of Uttar Pradesh is significantly lower
than that of West Bengal. Yet, both Bihar and West Bengal have had consistently lower own
tax‑GSDP ratio than Uttar Pradesh. Even Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, which rank among the
States with the highest per capita incomes, achieve a significantly lower own‑tax‑to‑GSDP ratio
than Uttar Pradesh. This is the reason successive FCs have identified the States’ own tax‑to-
GSDP ratio, which represents tax revenue raised per rupee of GSDP, as a measure of their tax
effort.
Figure 5.8 Components of States’ Own Revenue in 2023‑24 (percentage of GSDP)
7.0 6.8
8.9 4.3
7.6 3.0
7.7 1.6
6.0 2.9
7.0 1.5
7.6 0.6
7.4 0.5
6.5 1.4
6.8 1.1
6.7 1.2
6.4 1.3
6.6 1.0
6.8 0.8
6.2 1.0
6.3 0.5
6.1 0.5
5.6 0.6
5.4 0.2
7.3 2.3
6.1 1.4
6.1 1.0
5.6 1.4
3.7 3.3
5.6 1.2
5.4 1.3
3.8 1.9
3.9 1.6
4.2 0.5
2.8 0.5
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
91
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.41
Tax Non Tax
Odisha
Goa
Chhattisgarh
Telangana
Jharkhand
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Maharashtra
Kerala
Non-NEH States
Gujarat
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Haryana
Punjab
Karnataka
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
West Bengal
Arunachal Pradesh
Uttarakhand
Meghalaya
Himachal Pradesh
Mizoram
Assam
NEH States
Sikkim
Nagaland
Tripura
ManipurSixteenth Finance Commission
5.44 In contrast, the State’s own tax revenue per capita does depend systematically on per
capita income. Between two States with the same population, the one with a higher per capita
income has a higher GSDP. Therefore, with the same tax effort, it can generate a larger volume
of tax revenue, translating into higher tax revenue per capita. Differences in the tax effort may
weaken this relationship, but since it exhibits no systematic relationship with per capita income,
in reality, we do not observe such a reversal in the data. Figure 5.9, which plots per capita own
tax revenue against per capita income for the 28 States in 2023‑24, illustrates this point. This
relationship suggests that rapid economic growth, resulting in increased tax revenue per capita,
facilitates the provision of public services at higher levels.
Figure 5.9 The Positive Relationship between Per Capita GSDP and
Per Capita Own Tax Revenue of the States, 2023‑24
64,000
GA
MH
32,000
AP GJ TG
AR SK
KA
HR
16,000 CG TN
KL
MP HP
RJ PB
ML UK OD MZ
8,000 UP TR
JH NL
AS WB
4,000
BR MN
2,000
45,000 90,000 1,80,000 3,60,000 7,20,000
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
States’ Reliance on Union Transfers
5.45 At 80 per cent in 2023‑24, Telangana and Haryana report the highest proportions of own
revenues in total receipts and exhibit the lowest reliance on devolution and grants (including the
Union’s contribution to the CSS). Karnataka (75.7 per cent) and Maharashtra (75.1 per cent)
also exhibit strong fiscal autonomy, rooted in diversified economic bases with industry and
services making substantial contributions to their GSDPs. In contrast, with limited economic
bases, Manipur (9.7 per cent) and Arunachal Pradesh (13.5 per cent) are heavily reliant on
devolution and grants. Details of States’ own tax revenue and total revenue receipts are given
in Annexures 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.
92
)elacs
gol(
RTO
cp
pc GSDP (log scale)Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Figure 5.10 Reliance on Devolution and Grants for Revenues in 2023‑24
Own Revenue Central Transfers
Manipur
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Tripura
Mizoram
Meghalaya
NEH States
Sikkim
Assam
Himachal Pradesh
Uttarakhand
Bihar
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Madhya Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Andhra Pradesh
Rajasthan
Odisha
Non-NEH States
Punjab
Goa
Gujarat
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Maharashtra
Karnataka
Haryana
Telangana
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
5.46 The average reliance on devolution and grants, as percentage of revenue receipts, across
all States was 42.2 per cent in 2023‑24. The reliance is significantly higher for Northeastern and
Hilly (NEH) States (69.0 per cent) than for non‑NEH States (39.9 per cent). Uttarakhand’s
reliance on devolution and grants is 53.2 per cent, the lowest among the NEH States and lower
than some non‑NEH States. In the case of Sikkim, an NEH State that, nevertheless, enjoys the
highest per capita GSDP in the country, devolution and grants account for 68.6 per cent of its
total revenues. Among non‑NEH States, Bihar (72.3 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (55.5 per cent),
and West Bengal (53.5 per cent) exhibit the highest reliance on devolution and grants as sources
93Sixteenth Finance Commission
of revenue. Figure 5.10 provides the full comparative picture of the States’ reliance on
devolution and grants for revenues in 2023‑24.
Expenditure
5.47 Like receipts, expenditure levels and quality vary significantly across States. Total
expenditures as a proportion of GSDP in poorer States, such as Bihar and Chhattisgarh, exceed
Table 5.10 Revenue and Capital Expenditure in 2023‑24 (percentage of GSDP)
Revenue Capital Total
States
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Bihar 21.9 4.4 26.3
Chhattisgarh 22.5 3.1 25.6
Odisha 19.0 5.9 24.9
Uttar Pradesh 16.9 4.7 21.6
Jharkhand 16.5 5.3 21.8
Madhya Pradesh 17.1 4.5 21.6
Goa 17.2 3.6 20.8
Rajasthan 16.4 1.8 18.2
Andhra Pradesh 15.2 1.8 17.0
Non‑NEH States 13.5 2.7 16.2
Punjab 15.5 0.6 16.1
West Bengal 13.6 1.7 15.3
Telangana 11.5 3.5 15.0
Kerala 12.6 1.5 14.1
Tamil Nadu 12.2 1.9 14.1
Maharashtra 10.9 1.9 12.8
Haryana 10.6 1.9 12.5
Gujarat 9.4 2.9 12.3
Karnataka 9.3 2.2 11.5
Arunachal Pradesh 53.4 22.0 75.4
Nagaland 36.0 7.6 43.6
Meghalaya 31.3 8.6 39.9
Manipur 31.8 6.3 38.1
Mizoram 33.2 3.9 37.1
Tripura 23.4 3.6 27.0
NEH States 21.2 4.7 25.9
Himachal Pradesh 21.0 2.7 23.7
Sikkim 17.7 5.7 23.4
Assam 18.6 4.2 22.8
Uttarakhand 15.0 3.5 18.5
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
94Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
25 per cent of GSDP, while falling short of 13 per cent in richer States like Maharashtra,
Haryana, Gujarat and Karnataka. This difference signifies a proportionately lower public
spending in richer, as opposed to poorer States on average. Table 5.10 details revenue and capital
expenditures as proportions of GSDP in the 28 States for the 2023‑24 fiscal year.
Figure 5.11 (cid:51)er (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re on (cid:51)ens(cid:76)on ((cid:76)n ₹)
20,000
16,000
12,000
8,000
4,000
-
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
Figure 5.12 (cid:51)er (cid:38)a(cid:83)(cid:76)(cid:87)a E(cid:91)(cid:83)en(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:88)re on (cid:54)a(cid:79)ar(cid:76)es ((cid:76)n ₹)
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
95
rahiB dnahkrahJ lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
ayhdaM
hsedarP
rattU
hragsittahhC nahtsajaR tarajuG setatS
HEN-noN
setatS
llA
akatanraK ahsidO anagnaleT anayraH arthsarahaM hsedarP
arhdnA
udaN
limaT
massA ayalahgeM dnahkarattU bajnuP setatS
HEN
alareK arupirT rupinaM hsedarP
lahcanurA
hsedarP
lahcamiH
dnalagaN aoG maroziM mikkiS
2018-19 2023-24
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
-
rahiB dnahkrahJ hsedarP
rattU
ahsidO tarajuG hsedarP
ayhdaM
lagneB
tseW
setatS
HEN-noN
setatS
llA
akatanraK anagnaleT anayraH hragsittahhC nahtsajaR massA hsedarP
arhdnA
arthsarahaM alareK udaN
limaT
bajnuP dnahkarattU setatS
HEN
ayalahgeM arupirT hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM maroziM dnalagaN aoG mikkiS hsedarP
lahcanurA
2018-19 2023-24Sixteenth Finance Commission
5.48 Salaries and pensions, as components of government revenue expenditure, exhibit
considerable inter‑state variation in both scale and composition. The per capita variation reflects
differences in State government workforce size and pay commission implementation timelines.
Since pension expenditure reflects the legacy obligations of the government to its employees, it
tends to be more inflexible in nature. Any structural changes in the salaries, such as those
resulting from pay commission recommendations, are also reflected in the pension outgo. The
per capita expenditures on pension and salaries are shown in Figures 5.11 and 5.12 respectively.
Hilly States and smaller population States often show higher per capita expenditure on these
heads due to scale effects, whereas fiscally constrained low‑income States typically devote a
smaller share, as developmental spending competes for the tight fiscal resources. The state‑wise
details of revenue expenditure are given in Annexure 5.7.
Figure 5.13 Capital Expenditure (percentage of Total Expenditure) in 2023‑24
Jharkhand
Odisha
Gujarat
Telangana
Uttar Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Karnataka
Goa
Bihar
Non-NEH States
Haryana
Maharashtra
Tamil Nadu
Chhattisgarh
West Bengal
Kerala
Andhra Pradesh
Rajasthan
Punjab
Arunachal Pradesh
Sikkim
Meghalaya
Uttarakhand
Assam
NEH States
Nagaland
Manipur
Tripura
Himachal Pradesh
Mizoram
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0%
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
96Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
5.49 A key indicator of expenditure quality is capital expenditure. States show significant
differences on this score as well. Figure 5.13 shows capital expenditure as a proportion of the
total expenditure in the non‑NEH and NEH States in 2023‑24. In 2023‑24, Arunachal Pradesh
stands out with 29.2 per cent of its total expenditure allocated to capital projects. Each of Odisha,
Gujarat, Jharkhand, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh allocated more than 20 per
cent of their expenditures to capital items. At the other extreme, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and
Rajasthan devoted no more than 10 per cent of the expenditure to capital items. A similar
variation can be found among NEH States, with Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Meghalaya
leading and Mizoram, Himachal Pradesh and Tripura allocate significantly smaller portions of
their budgets to capital expenditure, indicating a higher priority for recurrent expenditures, such
as salaries, subsidies, and interest payments.
5.50 The push from the Union Government for capital expenditure in States through the
SASCI program has had a positive effect on capital expenditures, but not to the full extent of
the transfers under the program. A large allocation of these loans has happened between 2021‑22
and 2023‑24. The average SASCI loans granted to all States was 0.24 per cent of the States’
GSDP. However, the magnitude of offtake varied across States according to the historical levels
of capital‑account expenditure.
Figure 5.14 SASCI Utilization and Change in Capital Expenditure in
Non‑NEH States (2021‑2024)
44,000
UP
39,000
34,000
MH
29,000
24,000
KA
MP
19,000 GJ
BR
OD
TN
14,000
TG
9,000
JH
KL WB RJ
4,000 CG
GA
-1,000 HR AP
- 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000
PB
-6,000
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
97
)erorc
₹(
erutidnepxE
latipaC
ni
egnahC
Special Assistance to States for Capital (cid:44)nvestment (₹ crore)Sixteenth Finance Commission
5.51 The positive correlation between SASCI and the change in capital expenditure by a State
provides suggestive empirical evidence that SASCI has contributed to increased capital
expenditure. Figures 5.14 and 5.15 plot this relationship for the non‑NEH and NEH States,
respectively. We plot the SASCI utilized by the State during 2022‑24 on the horizontal axis and
the increase in its average annual capital expenditure during 2022‑24 compared to that in
2018‑20 on the vertical axis. While the average relationship exhibits the correct direction,
responses differ considerably across States. For similar levels of SASCI utilization, the increases
in capital expenditures of West Bengal and Tamil Nadu are quite different. In Punjab, the
average capital expenditure fell despite positive utilization of SASCI.
Figure 5.15 SASCI Utilization and Change in Capital Expenditure in NEH States (2021‑2024)
8,000
7,000
AS
6,000
5,000
4,000
UK
AR
3,000
ML
MN
2,000
NL
1,000 SK HP
TR
-
- 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
MZ
-1,000
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
5.52 From an immediate social welfare viewpoint, it is useful to compare per capita health
and education expenditures across States. This expenditure depends not only on how the State
prioritizes education and health, but also, importantly, on the fiscal capacity of the State. On
average, States with low per capita income tend to have low per capita revenue and expenditure,
despite decades of efforts by successive FCs to reduce this disparity through the assignment of
a large weight to the income‑distance criterion in the devolution formula.
5.53 Figure 5.16 shows the differences in per capita health and education expenditures across
States. Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Goa, in that order, spend the most on health and
education on a per capita basis. All three of them receive significantly larger per capita amounts
from FC devolution than the overall per capita devolution. Goa and Sikkim are also States with
98
)erorc
₹(
erutidnepxE
latipaC
ni
egnahC
Special Assistance to States for Capital (cid:44)nvestment (₹ crore)Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
the highest per capita incomes. On average, except Tripura and Assam, the NEH States spend
uniformly more than non‑NEH States on account of their larger per capita expenditures in
general. Even excluding Goa, variation among non‑NEH States is higher than among the NEH
States. For example, leaving aside the exceptional cases of Sikkim, Goa, and Arunachal Pradesh,
the ratio of the highest to lowest per capita spending is 2.2 in the non‑NEH group of States and
1.8 in the NEH group.
Figure 5.16 Per Capita Expenditures on Health and Education in 2023‑24
Education Health
Goa
Chhattisgarh
Odisha
Maharashtra
Rajasthan
Kerala
Andhra Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Haryana
Telangana
Gujarat
Karnataka
Non-NEH States
Punjab
Madhya Pradesh
West Bengal
Jharkhand
Bihar
Uttar Pradesh
All States
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Nagaland
Mizoram
Himachal Pradesh
Meghalaya
Uttarakhand
NEH States
Manipur
Tripura
Assam
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
Source: States’ Finance Accounts
99Sixteenth Finance Commission
Deficit and Debt
5.54 In our aggregate analysis, we found that once we take into account the impacts of UDAY
and COVID‑19, State finances do not raise serious concerns. While it is desirable to increase
capital expenditure and steadily reduce the debt‑to‑GDP ratio, these are attainable goals.
However, once we disaggregate the States, a more nuanced picture emerges. Table 5.11 presents
the fiscal and revenue deficits and debt as proportions of GSDP for the non‑NEH and NEH
States successively. Each group of such States is arranged in descending order of the
debt‑to‑GSDP ratio. A quick glance at the Table reveals the significant variations across States,
particularly regarding the debt‑to‑GSDP ratio. It ranges from 15.7 per cent in Odisha to 42.9 per
cent in Punjab within the non‑NEH group and from 25.5 per cent in Uttarakhand to 50.9 per
cent in Arunachal Pradesh within the NEH group. Below, we briefly consider the evolution of
debt and fiscal and revenue deficits, first in non‑NEH States and then in NEH States, with
detailed data relegated to Annexures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
5.55 As illustrated in the figures for 2023‑24, Punjab, West Bengal, Bihar, Rajasthan, Kerala,
and Andhra Pradesh, in that order, represent the six non‑NEH States with the highest
debt‑to‑GSDP ratios. Among them, Punjab stands out for its chronic fiscal imbalances. At 31.5
per cent, its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio was already high in 2011‑12. In 2016‑17, it jumped to 43.2 per
cent due to the implementation of the UDAY scheme and has not recovered since then. After
peaking at 46.4 per cent in 2020‑21, the ratio declined slightly but remained high at 42.9 per
cent in 2023‑24. Both the revenue and fiscal deficits have been large throughout, the former
often exceeding 2 per cent of GSDP and the latter breaching the 3 per cent mark. In 2023‑24,
the State’s revenue and fiscal deficits stood at 3.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent, respectively. Driven
by high debt servicing costs and substantial subsidies, the revenue‑deficit‑to‑fiscal‑deficit ratio
has frequently exceeded 70 per cent. A significant portion of the State’s borrowing has been
used to address revenue shortfalls rather than for capital investment, underscoring structural
fiscal weaknesses.
5.56 West Bengal began the period under review with a high debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of 40.1 per
cent in 2011‑12. While it has managed to prevent a further increase in this ratio in the following
years, except the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, it has not been successful in achieving a
meaningful fiscal consolidation. Throughout the period under review, it incurred substantial
revenue and fiscal deficits, with borrowings being substantially used to finance the former.
Consequently, the State’s capital expenditure has been low.
5.57 Bihar has the lowest per capita income in India. Its high debt‑to‑GSDP ratio can be
partially viewed as an artefact of its low GSDP. Yet, insofar as the same low per capita GSDP
determines the State’s capacity to raise its own tax revenues, and it depends heavily on FC
devolution and Union grants for additional revenues, the high debt‑GSDP ratio is of concern. In
2011‑12, the ratio was 28.3 per cent but has crept up over the following dozen years. The ratio
peaked during the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21 at 40.6 per cent and remained high at 37.0 per
cent in 2023‑24. Until 2018‑19, Bihar exhibited substantial revenue surpluses, allowing it to
undertake substantial capital expenditures. However, the situation has deteriorated since the
100Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
post‑COVID years, with revenue balance turning negative and fiscal deficit spiking. The latter
stood at 5.9 per cent in 2022‑23 and 4.1 per cent in 2023‑24.
Table 5.11 Composition of Debt and Fiscal Deficit (percentage of GSDP) in 2023‑24
Outstanding Liabilities
Fiscal Revenue Loans
States Internal Public Total
Deficit Deficit# from
Debt Account Liabilities#
Union
Punjab 4.4 3.7 37.0 0.6 5.3 42.9
West Bengal 3.3 1.6 31.6 1.6 5.1 38.3
Bihar 4.1 -0.3 27.2 3.8 6.1 37.0
Rajasthan 4.4 2.6 27.1 2.4 8.5 37.9
Kerala 3.0 1.6 22.6 1.0 11.7 35.3
Andhra Pradesh 4.5 2.8 28.1 1.6 4.9 34.6
Goa 2.2 -1.5 23.8 2.4 5.6 31.9
Madhya Pradesh 3.4 -1.0 21.8 3.9 5.0 30.7
Haryana 2.9 1.1 26.2 0.4 3.9 30.5
Tamil Nadu 3.6 1.8 25.3 1.9 2.7 29.9
Uttar Pradesh 3.2 -1.4 24.2 1.5 4.0 29.7
Non‑NEH States 3.0 0.4 21.7 1.5 4.9 28.0
Telangana 3.4 -0.1 22.8 0.8 3.8 27.3
Jharkhand 1.4 -2.4 15.2 2.6 8.8 26.5
Chhattisgarh 5.3 2.2 18.6 2.1 4.0 24.7
Karnataka 2.5 0.4 16.0 0.9 5.7 22.6
Gujarat 1.2 -1.7 16.7 0.9 3.1 20.6
Maharashtra 2.2 0.3 13.8 0.7 3.4 18.0
Odisha 1.9 -3.9 6.5 1.5 7.7 15.7
Arunachal Pradesh 4.1 -17.9 24.4 11.9 14.6 50.9
Nagaland 4.3 -3.2 33.7 5.1 5.5 44.2
Manipur 4.3 -2.0 28.0 4.3 11.2 43.5
Himachal Pradesh 5.3 2.6 28.9 2.1 11.9 42.8
Meghalaya 6.0 -2.6 26.4 5.8 8.4 40.6
Mizoram 2.1 -1.8 21.2 5.4 10.4 37.0
Sikkim 5.4 -0.3 23.9 4.1 4.6 32.7
NEH States 3.8 -0.6 22.7 2.8 6.9 32.5
Assam 4.1 0.5 22.2 2.5 4.0 28.7
Tripura 0.8 -2.8 15.2 2.0 10.7 27.9
Uttarakhand 2.5 -1.1 18.2 1.6 5.7 25.5
Source: MoSPI Comparable Estimates for GDP (2011‑12 series), States’ Finance Accounts
# Revenue Deficit and Outstanding Liabilities figures have been adjusted for loans for GST compensation.
101Sixteenth Finance Commission
5.58 Rajasthan saw its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio rise steadily from the modest 24.6 per cent in
2011‑12 to a peak of 40.2 per cent in 2020‑21, and then down to 37.9 per cent in 2023‑24. The
State has incurred large revenue and fiscal deficits throughout the period under review. Its fiscal
deficit reached 9.3 per cent of GSDP in 2015‑16 and 6.2 per cent in 2016‑17, primarily due to
the implementation of the UDAY scheme. This, in turn, caused the debt‑to‑GSDP ratio to rise
to 30.8 per cent in 2015‑16 and 34.0 per cent in 2016‑17 from 24.0 per cent in 2014‑15.
5.59 Kerala is a high‑income non‑NEH State that had a manageable debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of
25.5 per cent in 2011‑12. However, it has run high fiscal deficits throughout the period under
review, which have added approximately 10 percentage points to its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio. The
latter peaked at 39.2 per cent in 2020‑21 before declining to 35.3 per cent in 2023‑24.
Throughout the period under review, Kerala also incurred significant revenue deficits, which
undermined capital expenditures.
5.60 The fiscal trajectory of the newly formed State of Andhra Pradesh has been marked by
significant volatility. At 26.1 per cent at inception in 2014‑15, the State had a higher
debt‑to‑GSDP ratio than Telangana – the other State carved out of the original Andhra Pradesh
on June 2, 2014. The debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of Telangana in 2014‑15 was 18.7 per cent, and that
of pre‑bifurcation Andhra Pradesh in 2013‑14 was 20.7 per cent. The newly formed Andhra
Pradesh struggled to control its revenue and fiscal deficits from the outset. Throughout the
post‑bifurcation period, its revenue balance has been negative, and, except for the 2021‑22 fiscal
year, the fiscal deficit has consistently exceeded 3 per cent. Consequently, the State’s
debt‑to‑GSDP ratio peaked at 36.0 per cent in 2020‑21 and remained high at 34.6 per cent in
2023‑24.
5.61 At the other end of the spectrum, we have four States – Odisha, Maharashtra, Gujarat,
and Karnataka in that order – with the lowest debt‑to‑GSDP ratios throughout the period under
review. The debt‑to‑GSDP ratio in Odisha remained between 15.3 and 22.1 per cent until
2018‑19. Due to economic slowdown, the ratio increased to 24.0 per cent in 2019‑20, but it
declined rapidly thereafter, reaching 14.5 per cent in 2022‑23 and 15.7 per cent in 2023‑24.
Throughout this period, Odisha has consistently maintained a surplus in its revenue account,
often exceeding 2.5 per cent and reaching a high of 7.2 per cent in 2021‑22. Even in the
COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, its revenue surplus stood at 2.4 per cent. With just two exceptions,
Odisha has maintained a fiscal deficit below 2.5 per cent from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24.
5.62 Maharashtra also has had a remarkably low and stable debt‑to‑GSDP ratio throughout
the period under review. In 2011‑12, this ratio was 19.1 per cent, and it remained below this
level until the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, when it inched up to 20.7 per cent. However, it fell
below the 2011‑12 level once again the following year and stood at 18.0 per cent in 2023‑24.
This remarkable performance resulted from a fiscal deficit that exceeded 2 per cent during only
two years: 2.4 per cent in 2019‑20 and 2.2 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.63 Gujarat’s debt‑to‑GSDP ratio has remained between 22 per cent and 26 per cent during
the thirteen years under review. The ratio was 24.5 per cent at the beginning of the period under
review and 20.6 per cent at its end. Except for the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, its revenue
account has been consistently in surplus. The State has also maintained low fiscal deficits
throughout, not exceeding 2.5 per cent of GSDP even during the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21.
102Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
Recently, the deficit as a proportion of GSDP was 0.6 per cent in 2021‑22, 0.9 per cent in
2022‑23, and 1.2 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.64 Karnataka has the second‑highest per capita income among the large States in India.
Although its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio was slightly higher than that of Gujarat in 2023‑24, its overall
trajectory during the period under review was slightly below that of the latter. Until the 2019‑20
fiscal year, its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio remained below 20 per cent. The ratio peaked at 23.5 per cent
in 2020‑21 and stood at 22.6 per cent in 2023‑24. With only two exceptions, the State’s revenue
balance has been in surplus, while, except for the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, the fiscal deficit
has remained well below 3 per cent.
5.65 The remaining eight non‑NEH States lie between these two extremes, presenting a more
mixed record, but without raising concerns for fiscal stability. In order of rising debt‑to‑GSDP
ratio in 2023‑24, they are – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Goa. At 11.5 per cent, Chhattisgarh had the distinction of having
the lowest debt‑to‑GSDP ratio in 2011‑12. However, it steadily increased in subsequent years,
reaching the peak level of 26.0 per cent in 2020‑21. The State maintained a healthy revenue
surplus in most years until the 2018‑19 fiscal year. However, it ended up with a revenue deficit
of 2.8 per cent in 2019‑20 and 1.1 per cent in 2020‑21. During the past three years, the State has
had a revenue surplus in two years and a revenue deficit in one. The State’s record on fiscal
deficit has been mixed, with a range of 0.5 to 5.3 per cent of GSDP. The deficit has been
especially high in three of the last five years: 5.2 per cent in 2019‑20, 3.7 per cent in 2020‑21,
and 5.3 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.66 Jharkhand has the third lowest per capita income among the 28 States in the country.
The period began under review with a debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of 20.4 per cent in 2011‑12, but saw
it rise sharply to 27.4 per cent in 2015‑16 due to the implementation of the UDAY scheme. The
ratio spiked to 36.2 per cent in 2020‑21 but has since declined, reaching 26.5 per cent in
2023‑24. Compared with other low per capita income States such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh,
Jharkhand has the advantage of mineral revenues, which, along with handsome FC devolution
and Union grants, have provided it with sufficient revenue resources to maintain a revenue
surplus in most years, occasionally in the range of 2 to 3 per cent of GSDP. The fiscal deficit in
Jharkhand has been subject to greater volatility than in most other States, ranging from no deficit
in 2021‑22 to 5.6 per cent in 2015‑16.
5.67 Telangana has the highest per capita income among the large States of India. It inherited
a low debt‑GSDP ratio of 18.7 per cent at inception in 2014‑15. However, the ratio climbed
steadily, reaching 25.0 per cent in 2019‑20 and then jumped to 29.9 per cent in 2020‑21. As in
other States, the COVID‑19‑induced peak saw a decline in the following years; however, the
ratio remained nearly eight percentage points above the 2011‑12 at 27.3 per cent in 2023‑24.
With only three exceptions, the account of Telangana has been in surplus during the period
under review. However, except once, its fiscal account has exhibited deficits exceeding 3 per
cent from 2015‑16 onwards.
5.68 Uttar Pradesh has consistently been among the top two large States in terms of its own
tax revenue as a proportion of GSDP. In addition, being the State with the second lowest per
103Sixteenth Finance Commission
capita GDP and the highest population, it receives the largest share of FC devolutions by a
significant margin. These two factors give the State an edge in terms of revenues. Against this
background, the State’s debt‑to‑GSDP ratio may be characterized as being on the high side.
During the period under review, it fell below the 30 per cent mark only thrice, to 29.6 per cent
in 2019‑20 and 29.5 per cent in 2022‑23. During the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21, it rose to 34.0
per cent but fell back to 29.7 per cent by 2023‑24. Given its comfortable revenue situation, the
State has consistently exhibited a revenue surplus. At peak, it stood at 4.0 per cent of GSDP in
2019‑20. The fiscal deficit spiked to 5.1 per cent in 2015‑16 and 4.3 per cent in 2016‑17 due to
the implementation of the UDAY scheme. Setting aside these years, the fiscal deficit exceeded
the 3 per cent mark only twice, to 3.2 per cent in 2014‑15 and 2023‑24.
5.69 Tamil Nadu had the second‑lowest debt‑to‑GSDP ratio in 2011‑12 among the non‑NEH
States. However, as in the case of Chhattisgarh, the ratio increased steadily in the following
years, reaching 24.7 per cent in 2019‑20 and then spiking to 31.0 per cent in 2020‑21. The ratio
has remained high since then, standing at 29.9 per cent in 2023‑24. The State has consistently
experienced a revenue deficit since the 2013‑14 fiscal year. Barring 2016‑17, its fiscal deficit
was below 3 per cent until 2018‑19 but crossed this threshold every single year since then.
5.70 Until recently, Haryana had the highest per capita income among the large States.
Currently, it ranks third. Like Tamil Nadu, it had a low debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of 18.8 per cent in
2011‑12, which steadily increased in the subsequent years, reaching 29.7 per cent in 2019‑20,
spiking to 33.5 per cent in 2020‑21, and then declining to 30.5 per cent by 2023‑24. The State
ran revenue deficits throughout the period under review, which exceeded 2.3 per cent in four
out of the thirteen years. It also incurred a fiscal deficit of 3 per cent or more during eight out of
the thirteen years.
5.71 In terms of its fiscal situation, Madhya Pradesh is comparable to Uttar Pradesh except
that its own tax revenue as a proportion of GSDP has seen a steady decline from 8.8 per cent in
2011‑12 to 7.0 per cent in 2023‑24. Its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio fell from 26.4 per cent in 2011‑12 to
22.8 per cent in 2013‑14, but rose thereafter, reaching a peak of 32.6 per cent in 2020‑21. The
ratio declined to the 30 per cent range in each of the following three years and stood at 30.7 per
cent in the 2023‑24 fiscal year. With its robust revenue situation, the State has maintained a
revenue surplus during all but two (2019‑20 and 2020‑21) out of the thirteen years under review.
On fiscal deficit, the record has been more mixed: in six out of the thirteen years, it has been 3.3
per cent of GSDP or more.
5.72 In terms of population, Goa is by far the smallest non‑NEH State, and in terms of per
capita income, it is by far the richest. The State’s own tax revenue as a proportion of GSDP is
the highest and, on a per capita basis, it receives by far the most in FC devolution among
non‑NEH States. Except for 2011‑12, its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio has fluctuated between 26.1 and
36.3 per cent. It stood at 31.9 per cent in the 2023‑24 fiscal year. Out of the thirteen years under
review, the State has had a revenue surplus in nine and a fiscal deficit of less than 3 per cent in
ten years.
5.73 Turning to the NEH States, consider first Sikkim, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh,
three relatively richer States by per capita income, with greater proximity to the larger Indian
104Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
market and the benefit of substantial Union Government tax concessions to industrial units
located within them. These States have witnessed high growth and enjoyed relatively high per
capita incomes over the recent decades. Sikkim has the highest per capita income in the country.
It is also the recipient of substantial FC devolution on a per capita basis. Until 2019‑20, its
debt‑to‑GSDP ratio hovered within the narrow range of 20.8 per cent to 23.7 per cent. It
increased to 27.5 per cent in 2020‑21 and continued to rise steadily, reaching 32.7 per cent by
2023‑24. Except for 2019‑20 and 2020‑21, Sikkim’s revenue balance has been positive
throughout the period under consideration. The State’s fiscal deficit remained below 3 per cent
until 2018‑19. However, it has been very high in the subsequent years, reaching 6.7 per cent in
2019‑20, 6.9 per cent in 2020‑21, and 5.4 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.74 Outside of the years 2018‑19 to 2021‑22, Uttarakhand has maintained a debt‑to‑GSDP
ratio below 25 per cent. After peaking at 31.8 per cent in 2020‑21, the ratio slid down to 25.5
per cent in 2023‑24. The State has also experienced healthy revenue surpluses over the last four
of the thirteen‑year period, ranging from 1.1 per cent of GSDP in 2023‑24 to 2.9 per cent in
2021‑22. Its fiscal deficit exceeded 3 per cent of GSDP during five of the six years from 2014‑15
to 2019‑20. However, during the past four years, it has remained at or below 2.5 per cent of
GSDP.
5.75 In contrast, Himachal Pradesh has had a debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of over 32 per cent
throughout the period under review. In 2020‑21, the COVID‑19 year, this ratio rose sharply to
45 per cent, and although it fell to 40.8 per cent in 2021‑22, it rebounded to 42.7 per cent in
2022‑23 and 42.8 per cent in 2023‑24. For several years, ending in 2021‑22, the State had
maintained a revenue surplus; however, it incurred large revenue deficits in the last two of the
thirteen‑year period: 3.3 per cent in 2022‑23 and 2.6 per cent in 2023‑24. The State has also
seen its fiscal deficit rise sharply over the last two years, reaching 6.4 per cent in 2022‑23 and
5.3 per cent in 2023‑24.
5.76 Among the northeastern States, Assam is by far the largest in both population and GSDP.
Proportionately, it also has the maximum amount of plain area amongst all NEH States. It was
able to keep its debt‑to‑GSDP ratio at 20 per cent or less during most years till 2019‑20, but saw
it rise to the 25‑26 per cent range from 2020‑21 onwards. During these latter years, it has also
seen fiscal deficits rise to 3.4 per cent of GSDP or higher levels.
5.77 The remaining six northeastern States – Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur,
Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura – are small in terms of population and GSDP. They are also
heavily dependent on FC devolutions and Union transfers. As we saw earlier in Figure 5.10 that
79 per cent or more of these States’ revenue receipts in 2023‑24 came from devolution and
Union transfers. This dependence was as high as 87 per cent in the case of Arunachal Pradesh
and 90 per cent in that of Manipur. As shown in Table 5.11, except for Mizoram and Tripura,
the remaining four States also had a debt‑to‑GSDP ratio over 40 per cent in 2023‑24. In 2011‑12,
Mizoram had a debt‑to‑GSDP ratio of 61.9 per cent, but the State steadily brought it down to
36.2 per cent by 2019‑20. In 2020‑21, the ratio rose back to 41.8 per cent, but the State
subsequently brought it down. It stood at 37.0 per cent in 2023‑24.
105Sixteenth Finance Commission
5.78 (cid:50)ther than the C(cid:50)(cid:57)(cid:44)D‑19 pandemic, another event that significantly affected the States(cid:182)
debt position was the takeover of DISCOMs’ debt under UDAY during 2015‑16 and 2016‑17.
States which opted for UDAY - Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana and Uttar Pradesh – exhibited an impact of more
than 0.5 per cent of GSDP on their respective debt positions, in either or both years. Punjab’s
disbursement of loans jumped to 1.5 per cent of GSDP in 2015‑16 and 9.8 per cent in 2016‑17,
with its debt to GSDP ratio rising from 31.7 per cent in 2014‑15 to 33.1 per cent in 2015‑16 and
further to 43.2 per cent in 2016‑17. Similarly, in the case of Rajasthan, the issuance of UDAY
bonds resulted in an increase in loan disbursements from 0.1 per cent of GSDP in 2014‑15 to
5.4 per cent in 2015‑16 and 1.7 per cent in 2016‑17. Consequently, the debt to GSDP ratio
increased from 24.0 per cent in 2014‑15 to 30.8 per cent in 2015‑16 and further to 34.0 per cent
in 2016‑17. The accumulation of huge debts by the power sector companies in these States,
which constitute off‑budget liabilities, poses a challenge to the fiscal sustainability of these
States.
Concluding Remarks: The Big Picture
5.79 The analysis in this chapter shows that at the beginning of the review period, States had
lower levels of debt and deficit than they do today. With the implementation of UDAY and the
onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the finances of the States deteriorated. Of course, the
restructuring under UDAY only made explicit a problem that had been brewing beneath the
surface for some years. The COVID‑19 pandemic was an unexpected and unavoidable shock.
Although the Union Government bore the brunt of this shock, States could scarcely escape its
detrimental effects on fiscal deficits and debt. As a whole, there has been a concerted effort by
States to contain deficits and debt in the aftermath of the pandemic. The combined debt of States
declined from 29.3 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21 to 26.4 per cent in 2023‑24. Further optimism
stems from the GST having overcome its initial teething pains and showing the promise of rising
revenues as a proportion of GDP in the coming years. States can accelerate these gains by
enhancing SGST collection through the use of AI and other tools. They may also contribute to
further fiscal consolidation through reform of their tax system at both the policy and
administrative levels.
5.80 States with excessively high levels of committed expenditure must pay particular
attention to containing their future expansion, such that expenditure growth rates are well below
the growth in their nominal GSDP. This entails exercising caution in further personnel
expansion, including teachers and administrative staff. States suffering from high commercial
losses in the power sector must give serious consideration to reforms aimed at containing them.
The reforms may include the privatization of DISCOMs, strengthening State Electricity
Regulatory Commissions, and implementing the best practices followed by States with a history
of profitable DISCOMs. An effort also needs to be made to contain the expansion of subsidies
and transfers, especially those creating permanent expenditure liabilities. No matter how
attractive a benefits scheme appears, it has a fiscal cost. It is prudence in these dimensions that
will unlock resources for growth and development while ensuring fiscal stability.
106Chapter 5: Review of State Finances
5.81 The aggregate financial picture of the States raises some concerns but is not alarming.
More serious weaknesses are revealed when we look at individual States. High debt‑to‑GSDP
ratios in some States limit the availability of fiscal resources for building infrastructure and other
developmental expenditures. That, in turn, undermines growth and revenue generation. This
‘high debt‑low growth‑low revenue‑high debt’ vicious cycle can only be broken through greater
tax revenue effort and better expenditure discipline. Devolution and FC grants and Union
transfers can only go so far in alleviating the problem, as they have the obvious limitation that
the provision of larger financial resources to one State must translate into smaller provisions for
another or the Union Government.
107UNION FINANCES
6
DURING THE
AWARD PERIOD:
Chapter 6
AN ASSESSMENT
6.1 After reviewing the fiscal trends in the past, we now turn to an assessment of the Union
finances during the award period spanning 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. We assess the expenditure needs
and revenue prospects of the Union in this Chapter and those of States in Chapter 9. Together,
they form the basis of the shares of the Union and States in the divisible pool in the vertical
devolution, the shares of each of the twenty‑eight States in the horizontal devolution and grants
to be disbursed from the Union to the States.
6.2 The terms of reference (ToR) of the Seventh to Fifteenth Finance Commissions (FCs),
except the FC‑9, specifically required them to take into account the needs and resources of the
Union Government when making their recommendations. While the present Commission’s ToR
does not give this directive, it is only logical for it to ground its recommendations in such an
assessment.
Views of the Union Government
6.3 The Union Government made four preliminary submissions to us from October 2024 to
May 2025 covering different aspects of the ToR. This was followed by the submission of a
consolidated memorandum in July 2025 after holding consultations with Union ministries. The
memorandum provided the views of the Union Government on the state of the economy and
called for a reset of the country’s public finances to achieve its ambition to become a developed
economy by 2047.
6.4 In its submission, the Union has emphasized its commitment to fiscal consolidation
through improved quality of expenditure while remaining committed to sustained rapid growth.
Among the priorities, it highlights the provision of necessary fiscal stimulus, predominantly
through capital spending, optimal allocation of resources to promote national development
priorities, and strengthening the social safety nets. These goals are to be achieved through
109Sixteenth Finance Commission
leveraging technology, partnering with States, and implementing fiscal measures aimed at
greater economic resilience. The memorandum notes that inadequate net revenue receipts
currently constrain the Union’s efforts at fiscal consolidation. The net revenues are being unduly
eroded by devolution and grants recommended by the FCs, especially since the large increase
in the devolution to States by FC‑14.
6.5 The Union Government has urged this Commission to incorporate in its assessment the
Union Government’s obligatory expenditures, such as interest payments, expenditures on
national defence and security, and provision of basic amenities to all the citizens of the country.
The memorandum further states that the assessment should provide for an adequate volume of
financial resources for the Union to help correct the imbalance that currently exists. It
specifically emphasizes that this Commission’s forecasts must take into account the Union’s
increased need for defence expenditures.
6.6 The projections of Union finances submitted in the memorandum adhere to the fiscal
consolidation path that the Union has adopted in its Medium‑Term Fiscal Policy (MTFP) and
Strategy Statement of the Union Budget, 2025‑26. While it does not provide specific projections
for the revenue and fiscal deficits, the memorandum provides the end target for the outstanding
liabilities of the Union at 49.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the final year of the
award period, 2030‑31. The Union Government has assumed around 11 per cent annual growth
of nominal GDP for the award period. Buoyancy for gross tax revenue for the period is estimated
at 1.1 with an annual growth rate of 12.1 per cent. Non‑tax revenue has been estimated at 1.2
per cent of GDP, with no growth envisaged in the non‑debt capital receipts.
6.7 On the expenditure side, the submission focuses on defence as the highest priority,
especially in view of the critical junction at which India stands. Accordingly, the combined
revenue and capital expenditures on defence, border guard and internal security are projected to
reach 2.2 per cent of GDP in the final year of the award period. The overall capital expenditure
(inclusive of defence) is projected to be 3.3 per cent of GDP in 2030‑31, with a focus on
investment in infrastructure, as compared to 3.2 per cent in 2023‑24. Revenue expenditure is
projected to grow at a rate of approximately 10 per cent throughout the award period. This is
largely owing to committed expenditures and focus on developmental priorities through
centrally sponsored and central sector schemes. With these projections, the outstanding debt to
GDP ratio of the Union is projected to decline from 55.1 per cent in 2025‑26 to 49.5 per cent in
2030‑31.
Economic Outlook
6.8 In the years following the COVID‑19 pandemic, the economy has returned to robust
growth, with real GDP rising from a negative growth of -5.8 per cent in 2020‑21 to an average
of 8.2 per cent in the following four years. Nominal GDP declined by -1.2 per cent in 2020‑21
and recorded an annual average of 13.7 per cent during 2021‑22 to 2024‑25 (Provisional).
110Chapter 6: Union Finances during the Award Period: An Assessment
6.9 We need projections of nominal GDP for our base year 2025‑26 and the award period
2026‑27 to 2031‑32. The projection exercise for 2025‑26 utilizes a dynamic factor model that
incorporates long‑term indicators from 2005‑06 to 2024‑25. We then estimate GDP for the
period from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31 by deploying a vector auto‑regressive (VAR) model using
annualised key structural macroeconomic variables. Model selection is based on stability tests,
serial correlation diagnostics, and optimal lag criteria in addition to economic theory. The
nominal GDP growth rate projected by the model equals 11.4 per cent for 2025‑26 and ranges
from 11.7 to 11.9 per cent for the years 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. These results are partly influenced
by the high growth in GDP deflator during 2010‑14 (Figure 6.1).
6.10 We noted that the Ministry of Finance, in its budget for the fiscal year 2025‑26, estimated
a nominal GDP growth rate of 10.1 per cent. Given that our model predictions were on the high
side due to the high growth in the GDP deflator during 2010‑14, after due deliberations, we
adopted the Ministry’s nominal GDP growth rate for our base year, 2025‑26. Moreover, an
average annual growth rate in nominal GDP of 11 per cent has been recorded during the period
2012‑13 to 2023‑24, which is also the growth rate adopted by the Ministry in its projections for
the years 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. Considering these facts, we have settled on an 11 per cent nominal
GDP growth rate for the award period as well.
Figure 6.1 Growth Rate of GDP Deflator
14%
12%
10.5%
10%
8.7%
8.4%
7.9%
8%
6.2%
6%
4.8% 5.9%
4.0% 3.9%
4% 3.3%
2.3%
3.2% 2.4% 3.1%
2%
2.6%
0%
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI)’s published data of nominal and real
GDP
111
)%
ni(
rotalfeD
PDG
11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 52-4202Sixteenth Finance Commission
Base Year Estimates and Norms for Assessment
6.11 In the Union Budget 2025‑26, the Union Government has reiterated its commitment to
fiscal consolidation through a balance between developmental priorities and imperatives of
fiscal prudence. It presented a glide path for fiscal consolidation for this Commission’s award
period as part of this approach. Our review of the finances of the Union and States has informed
our assessment, which also strives to create this balance by laying down a guiding path that
restores fiscal balance without undermining these developmental priorities. Simultaneously, we
have adopted a conservative approach while projecting expenditure at both tiers of the
government to underline the importance of fiscal discipline in spending choices, staying clear
of the tide of populist measures.
6.12 We have chosen 2025‑26 to be the base year for making our projections for the award
period. The budget estimates (BE) for this year, as presented in the Union Budget 2025‑26, are
taken as the starting point for this exercise. Adjustments, as deemed necessary, are made to these
estimates on the revenue side, as explained in detail in the following paragraphs. The reference
period for growth and buoyancy in the assessment of Union finances is 2011‑12 to 2024‑25. As
already mentioned, the nominal GDP is assumed to grow at 11.0 per cent each year for the five
years. Interest payments are calculated by applying the effective rate of interest on the assessed
outstanding liabilities for the period 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. The revenue deficit path has been
projected based on the assessment of revenue and expenditure. As restoring balance in the
finances of the Union in a manner that is realistic and achievable is one of our primary
objectives, we have laid down a path of fiscal deficit that reduces it to 3.5 per cent of GDP in
the final year of our award period, 2030‑31.
Assessment of Revenues
6.13 As explained in Chapter 4, the revenue of the Union consists of tax and non‑tax receipts
on the revenue account and the non‑debt capital receipts on the capital account. Tax revenues
account for the bulk of the Union’s total revenues and are important even for the assessment of
State finances, as States’ share in net proceeds of Union taxes form a significant portion of
States’ revenues.
Tax Revenues
6.14 For the period 2011‑12 to 2024‑25, gross tax revenue of the Union grew at an average
rate of 12.1 per cent annually, as seen in Figure 6.2, with an implied buoyancy of 0.87. When
we discount the years of impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, considering its extreme and
singular nature, the average annual growth rate of gross tax revenues is 11.3 per cent, and the
buoyancy is 0.93. It is worth noting that the tax revenues went through significant upheaval due
to unprecedented changes in the tax system during this period, such as the introduction of the
Goods and Services Tax (GST), corporate tax rationalization, and also the economic slowdown
of 2019‑20. In light of these facts, the growth and buoyancy of taxes have been rather robust.
We assume that these changes have stabilized now and the Union tax revenues will be more
buoyant during the award period.
112Chapter 6: Union Finances during the Award Period: An Assessment
Figure 6.2 Annual Growth Rates of Union’s Gross Tax Revenues
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
Source: Union Budgets
6.15 Considering the stabilization and recovery of corporate tax revenues after the rate change
and the pandemic, revenue from this source is assumed to grow with a buoyancy of 1.1. In the
Union Budget 2025‑26, certain measures to give relief to personal income‑tax payers were
announced. These decisions are likely to cause a decline in collections. Accordingly, we have
made a one‑time downward revision in the base year revenues from direct taxes, over and above
what is already provided in the budget estimates. On this adjusted estimate, a buoyancy of 1.1
is assumed for the growth in revenues from personal income tax and other direct taxes.
6.16 In indirect taxes, one major policy change anticipated during the award period is the end
of GST compensation cess in 2025‑26. For the award period, it is assumed that the GST
compensation cess will be merged with the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) and the
State Goods and Services Tax (SGST) in equal halves. Accordingly, revenue from CGST is
recalculated for the first year and projected to grow at around 12 per cent rate for the remaining
award period, consistent with the buoyancy of 1.1. The remaining indirect taxes have been
projected to grow at marginally lower rates, given the current trends.
6.17 With this assessment, the gross tax revenues of the Union are expected to go up from
11.5 per cent of GDP in 2024‑25, as per the provisional accounts, to 12 per cent in the terminal
year of the award period. This would bring the tax‑to‑GDP ratio close to the highest level ever
achieved in the past, which was in 2007‑08.
6.18 To estimate the net tax revenue of the Union, we have assumed the same mix of divisible
and non‑divisible portions of the gross tax revenue in the budget estimates, with adjustment for
the merger of GST compensation cess in CGST and SGST in equal proportions.
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Non‑tax Revenues
6.19 The annual average realisation from non‑tax revenues of the Union from 2011‑12 to
2024‑25 has been 1.5 per cent of GDP, as seen in Figure 6.3. The largest contributor to this
category has been the transfer of surplus from the RBI to the Union Government. It has shown
substantial variations during the review period, ranging from 0.1 per cent of GDP (in 2022‑23)
to 0.7 per cent of GDP (in 2019‑20). Considering the large fluctuations in this source of revenue
in the past and its preponderance in non‑tax revenues, suitable adjustments are made in the base
year while assessing the dividend from the RBI. This will absorb risks from a sudden fall in this
revenue, if any, during the award period, and help shield non‑tax revenue collections from
resultant shocks.
6.20 As discussed in Chapter 4, the other major contributor to non‑tax revenues of the Union
is receipts from economic services, which flow from sectors such as telecommunications,
power, roads, and highways. During our consultations with the Union ministries, the
Department of Telecommunications briefed us on the policy changes introduced recently, with
implications for gross revenue. These changes promise to stabilize revenues starting 2025‑26
and ensure that there are no sudden spikes or falls in the non‑tax revenue of the Union. We have
considered this factor while assessing revenues from this sector.
6.21 For all other items of non‑tax revenue, growth is projected based on recent trends. Since
the infrastructure sector primarily drives the revenues from non‑tax sources, we have ensured
that our assessment of them is consistent with the growth trajectory assumed for the economy.
Based on these projections, the overall non‑tax revenue of the Union is assumed to grow at the
same rate as GDP, and its proportion to GDP remains almost constant at 1.2 per cent, during the
award period.
Figure 6.3 Trends in Non‑tax Revenues of the Union (percentage of GDP)
2.0%
1.8%
1.6%
1.4%
1.2%
1.0%
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
Source: Union Budgets
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6.22 The projections made for the tax and non‑tax revenues of the Union are on the
conservative side and in line with the submissions made by the Union. This cautious approach
helps us in chalking out a realistic fiscal consolidation roadmap. At the same time, it helps our
assessment of State finances to be conservative. It also leaves room for stabilization of tax
reforms and rationalisation of tax structures due to be undertaken in the years to come. This
being said, there is scope for upward movement in the actual revenue collections, as we have
noted in our concluding remarks in Chapter 4. With the impetus offered by changes in direct tax
policies, along with the thrust on digitization leading to a rise in voluntary compliance, and the
high buoyancy of GST collections witnessed since its stabilization, this expectation for a rise in
tax revenues is reasonable. On the non‑tax revenue side, too, there is scope for additional
revenue collection, especially with the investments in infrastructure made in the recent past
bearing fruit.
Non‑debt Capital Receipts
6.23 The two sources of non‑debt capital receipts for the Union are recoveries of loans and
advances (mostly from the State Governments), and miscellaneous capital receipts (which
include receipts from disinvestment). The receipts from recoveries of loans and advances have
formed a very small component ever since lending by the Union has been limited to loans passed
on to States on account of external assistance. In 2020‑21, the Union Government started the
special incentive scheme for capital investment (SASCI), wherein interest‑free loans are being
extended to States, which are to be repaid after fifty years. The recovery of these loans falls
beyond our award period.
6.24 Receipts from disinvestment do not show any discernible trend in the past, as these
receipts are intermittent due to the nature of transactions. Although the Union Government has
steadfastly pursued the disinvestment roadmap to achieve better efficiency, the disinvestment
proceeds in the past few years have tapered. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Union Government
has also done away with setting disinvestment targets in the Union Budget. The Union
Government stated in its memorandum that disinvestment receipts cannot be expected to exhibit
sustained annual growth, given the finite pool of public sector equity available for
disinvestment. In Chapter 15, we have analysed the issue related to public sector enterprises in
greater detail and recommend that the disinvestment policy should be actively pursued.
Accordingly, we have assumed an overall growth of 11 per cent for non‑debt capital receipts for
the award period, given the greater need for revenue mobilization from this source.
Assessment of Expenditure
6.25 Our approach towards projections of expenditure is two‑pronged. On the one hand, we
have taken a conservative approach to a large part of the revenue expenditures. On the other, we
have left sufficient space for increased capital expenditure within the overall objective of fiscal
consolidation and for expenditures for the Union Government to meet its Constitutional
functions and discharging its developmental obligations. Therefore, the assessment ensures
115Sixteenth Finance Commission
improved quality of expenditure, while recognizing the committed liabilities of the Union, its
responsibilities as listed in the Seventh Schedule, and also its role in furthering national interests
through grants and transfers to States and Union Territories (UTs) under various schemes.
The Revenue Expenditure
6.26 Post pandemic, the revenue expenditure of the Union has declined from 15.5 per cent of
GDP in 2020‑21 to 10.9 per cent in 2024‑25 as per the provisional accounts, which is an
encouraging trend. This has led to a reduction of revenue deficit from 7.3 per cent of GDP in
2020‑21 to 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2024‑25. Interest payments, defence, pensions, police,
subsidies and grants to States account for 85 per cent of the Union’s revenue expenditure. We
have projected these separately and the remainder as a lump sum.
Interest payments
6.27 Interest payments are one of the major items of revenue expenditure for the Union, with
its share in total ranging from 22‑30 per cent in the last few years. Interest payments jumped
from 3.0 per cent of GDP in 2019‑20 to 3.5 per cent in 2023‑24 due to the higher deficit incurred
during the pandemic. The Union Government has projected interest payments at 3.5 per cent of
GDP for the base year. As per our assessment, the reduction in fiscal deficit and, therefore,
outstanding debt, should result in reduced expenditure on interest payments
6.28 As a first step in assessing interest payment expenditure, we calculated the outstanding
liabilities for each year of the award period by adding the projected fiscal deficit of that year to
the previous year’s outstanding liabilities. Average liability of each year is calculated as a simple
average of the opening and closing balances of outstanding liabilities. The average annual
effective interest rate was estimated at 6.5 per cent based on past data, as seen in Figure 6.4. As
a next step, this effective interest rate is applied to the average liabilities of each year of the
award period to arrive at the expenditure on interest payments. As per our projections, interest
payments are scheduled to drop back to 3 per cent of GDP by the end of the award period.
Figure 6.4 Effective Rate of Interest on Mid‑year Liabilities of the Union
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
Source: Union Budgets
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Pensions
6.29 Pension is one of the fastest‑growing items of revenue expenditure. Pension payments
of the Union Government have been volatile during our review period due to significant changes
like the implementation of the Seventh Central Pay Commission (CPC) award and one‑rank
one‑pension for the defence forces. While the Union Government has announced the
constitution of the eighth CPC, it would be premature to account for any possible increase in
pension outgo without actual inputs based on the CPC’s recommendations. Therefore, pension
expenditure is assumed to grow at rates based on past trends, excluding the years of sudden
jump due to the aforementioned changes, which were one‑time events.
Defence and Internal Security
6.30 The Union Government, in its submission, has highlighted the need to increase spending
in the defence sector, considering the recent geopolitical changes and hostility at our borders.
Defence is one of the primary responsibilities of the Union and is the first item in the Union List
of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution. We recognise the need for growth in defence
spending but believe that this expenditure should be aimed at capacity building and
modernization on the capital side, rather than on the revenue side. On the revenue side, we have
split the defence expenditure into salary and non‑salary components. The salary component, that
is, pay and allowances, is projected to grow at 6 per cent per annum, which is marginally higher
than the growth rate in the past. The non‑salary component has been projected to grow at a
considerably higher level of 15 per cent per annum to accommodate the growing defence needs.
Expenditure on police, primarily central police forces, is projected to grow at the past trend.
Subsidies
6.31 Almost all the preceding FCs have commented on the need to rationalize subsidies at
both the Union and State levels. We have carried out a detailed analysis of the subsidies and
transfers in Chapter 14 of this report. Our projections for the award period for subsidies are
guided by this analysis.
6.32 The past trends in food subsidy are not fully reflected in the statement for subsidies
presented in the Union Budget due to the extra budgetary resources (EBRs) used to finance this
expenditure in the past. This issue has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. To analyse past
trends in the true sense, we have adjusted the food subsidy shown in the budget by adding the
amount financed through EBRs in those years to arrive at the actual year‑wise expenditure on
this item. As per the recalculated amount, expenditure on food subsidy constituted around 1.0
per cent of GDP during the majority of the review period, peaking at 1.4 per cent of GDP in
2020‑21. Starting from 2023‑24, there has been a decline in this expenditure, and it is estimated
to be at 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2025‑26 as per budget estimates. The Union Government’s
decision to extend the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) till 01 January
2029 implies a fixed outgo under food subsidy at least for the first three years of our award
period.
117Sixteenth Finance Commission
6.33 While keeping in mind the need to ensure food security of the most vulnerable sections
in the country, it is also necessary to rationalize this expenditure through better targeting.
Accordingly, we have projected that food subsidies will increase marginally every year in
absolute terms, instead of adopting a common growth rate. The increase in spending due to
inflationary pressures should be offset by better targeting and a revision of the database of
eligible beneficiaries in a continuous manner.
6.34 Fertilizer subsidy is the second largest subsidy in terms of expenditure. During our
consultation with the Department of Fertilizers, issues such as unrestricted access to fertilizer
use and the need for better coordination in the sector were presented to us, along with the
schemes launched recently to incentivize reduced chemical fertilizer usage and production of
indigenous variants. The Union Government, in its memorandum, stated that the import and
production costs of materials are expected to reduce during our award period. Further, measures
like the direct benefit transfer system for subsidy delivery are expected to improve tracking of
sales and movement, thus bringing down the subsidy bill.
6.35 Accordingly, for projecting expenditure on fertiliser subsidy, we have followed an
approach similar to that of food subsidy projections. There is a need to rationalize fertilizer
subsidy through better targeting. At the same time, we acknowledge that the way forward needs
to be carefully coordinated. Therefore, we have projected a very moderate increase in this item
of expenditure in absolute terms.
6.36 Since petroleum and other subsidies have been rationalized and constitute a minor
portion of the total subsidy provided by the Union, their projections from the base year are done
based on recent past trends. Based on these considerations, the expenditure on subsidies of the
Union comes down from 1.2 per cent of GDP in the base year to 0.9 per cent of GDP in the final
year of the award period.
6.37 The growth of subsidies in various forms and their impact on the overall fiscal balance
of the Union and States has been a major point of concern for this Commission. We have tried
to treat the subsidy expenditure of the Union and States in a similar manner and set a course for
the rationalization of this ever‑growing item of expenditure. A reduction in subsidies is a
necessary prerequisite to achieve fiscal consolidation. While there is scope for greater
rationalization of this item, the projected path of reduction is highly feasible. The restraint shown
by the Union Government in reducing its subsidy expenditure in the recent past makes us
optimistic of continued reduction in this expenditure.
Grants‑in‑Aid and Transfers to States and Union Territories
6.38 In the current scheme of revenue transfers from the Union to States and UTs,
grants‑in‑aid (GIA) and transfers include grants as recommended by the finance commission
and other grants and transfers. The latter are predominantly under centrally sponsored schemes
(CSS), a small portion under central sector schemes (CS) and remaining are miscellaneous items
such as transfers from National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF). A snapshot of the composition
of these transfers is presented in Figure 6.5.
118Chapter 6: Union Finances during the Award Period: An Assessment
Figure 6.5 Composition of Transfers from Union to States and Union Territories
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Source: Union Budgets
Note: Figures are percentages of each component among total grants‑in‑aid and transfers from Union to States
6.39 The projected expenditures on grants based on our recommendations are discussed in
detail in Chapters 9, 10 and 11.
6.40 The CSS account for more than 50 per cent of total transfers from the Union to the States.
In its memorandum, the Union Government placed great emphasis on expenditure under CSS
as the channel to achieve national development priorities. It has also provided details of reforms
undertaken to enhance the quality of public spending under these schemes. Though the CSS
were restructured and rationalized in 2015‑16, over the past decade, there has been an increase
in their number, with more than 80 schemes currently in operation. Run by more than 20
departments/ministries of the Union, the spending on CSS amounts to approximately 1.5 per
cent of GDP every year. While there is a mechanism to review the efficacy and efficiency of
these schemes once every five years, this has not resulted in the closure of any scheme, either
due to the attainment of its stated objectives or otherwise. Often, the goalpost is shifted when
the initial end period is reached or the objectives have been achieved, and the scheme is renewed.
6.41 In light of these observations, there is an urgent need to rationalize the existing structure
of CSS by linking the implementation with measurable, real‑time output indicators that would
allow for a more efficient use of resources while delivering the desired results. The Commission
recommends that the Union Government appoint a high‑powered committee that does a fresh
assessment of the schemes and recommends closure of the schemes that are not spending
resources productively. Continuing schemes with low or negative social returns has the effect
of crowding out higher return schemes that could replace them.
6.42 The top five CSS, based on their budget outlay, contribute to more than half of the CSS
spending. These schemes are the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA) Program,
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY, urban & rural), Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM), Samagra
Shiksha (SS), and National Health Mission (NHM, urban & rural). Considering their
preponderance, the expenditure on these individual schemes was analysed and projected based
on past trends as the first step. While doing this, we also considered aspects such as the lifetime
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of the scheme since its inception, levels of saturation already achieved in the outcomes, and
scope for prolonged continuity. The remaining CSS whose individual outlay was less than 8 per
cent of total CSS outlay were projected together, and a similar methodology was followed for
the remaining transfers in the next step.
6.43 Since the GST compensation regime is anticipated to come to an end, this transfer item
is not projected. With this assessment, the expenditure on transfers and grants‑in‑aid under the
Union’s welfare schemes is projected to decline from 1.4 per cent of GDP in the base year to
1.1 per cent in the final year of the award period.
6.44 The residual revenue expenditure of the Union Government, comprising various line
items across all ministries of the government, constitutes less than 15 per cent of the total
revenue expenditure of the Union. It has been projected to grow a little above the past trend, at
8 per cent per annum.
Capital Expenditure
6.45 Capital expenditure witnessed a step jump during the pandemic, and the increase has
been sustained post‑pandemic, reaching 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2024‑25 as compared to 1.6 per
cent in 2018‑19, as can be seen from Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6 Capital Expenditure of Union (percentage of GDP)
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
Source: Union Budgets
6.46 Expenditure on defence, railways, roads and loans to States are some of the major items
under capital expenditure of the Union. In its memorandum, the Union highlighted the need for
an increase in defence expenditure to achieve multi‑domain operational capabilities in the
context of national security. We agree with this view and see the need for increased spending
on defence on the capital account. Accordingly, we have projected defence capital expenditure
to grow at a rate of 30 per cent annually. With this level of increase in defence capital
expenditure, the total defence expenditure will reach 1.9 per cent of GDP in the final year of the
award period, as compared to the current level of 1.4 per cent in the base year. However, the
Commission is of the view that such increases will require continued serious structural reforms
in long‑term planning and procurement.
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6.47 Since 2020‑21, the Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) has
become an important instrument for boosting the States’ capital expenditures. Under this
scheme, 50‑year interest‑free loans are provided to States to undertake projects with heavy
capital expenditures. During our consultations with the State Governments, most of them
acknowledged the positive role of this scheme in boosting capital investments and suggested its
extension. These loans are projected to increase at a rate of 15 per cent annually to reach 0.5 per
cent of GDP by the end of the award period.
6.48 The remaining element of the capital expenditure, including spending on infrastructure,
is projected to grow at the rate of 11 per cent in line with the growth of GDP. Based on these
projections, the total capital expenditure of the Union Government is projected to reach 3.8 per
cent of GDP in 2030‑31 as compared to 3.1 per cent in the base year. The results of this
assessment are presented at Annexure 6.1 and Annexure 6.2.
Deficits and Debt
6.49 The above projections are in line with the current efforts of the Union Government
towards fiscal consolidation, with a path set for increased capital expenditure. Based on these
projections, the fiscal deficit of the Union would decrease from the budgeted level of 4.4 per
cent of GDP in 2025‑26 to 3.5 per cent by the terminal year of the award period. Out of the
fiscal deficit of 3.5 per cent of GDP in the final year, 0.5 per cent of GDP would be going to
States as a 50‑year interest‑free loan purely for capital expenditure.
6.50 The fiscal consolidation path is coupled with improving the quality of the fiscal deficit
and the revenue deficit. The revenue deficit is projected to decrease from the budgeted level of
1.5 per cent of GDP in 2025‑26 to a surplus of 0.1 per cent of GDP by the end of the award
period. This would bring back the fiscal balance on the revenue account, with a significant
improvement in the quality of expenditures of the Union.
6.51 As discussed in Chapter 4, a proportion of the Union’s revenue expenditure is transferred
to States as GIA for capital creation. The concept of effective revenue deficit (ERD) as a fiscal
parameter was introduced in Union Budget 2011‑12 and is calculated as the difference between
revenue deficit and grants‑in‑aid (GIA) for creation of capital assets.
6.52 For our assessment, we observed the trends in GIA for creation of capital assets and
projected this expenditure item to grow in consonance with the welfare schemes of the Union
Government. With this assessment, the ERD is projected to decrease from 0.3 per cent of GDP
in the base year to a surplus of 1.1 per cent of GDP in the final year of award period. Since the
introduction of this fiscal indicator, the Union Government is poised to achieve its target of
eliminating ERD through this path.
6.53 With the above consolidation roadmap for the Union, the debt to GDP ratio is projected
to fall from the current budgeted level of 55.1 per cent of GDP in the base year to 47.6 per cent
of GDP at the end of the award period. It bears reiterating that these paths of deficits and debt
have been arrived at based on conservative estimates of revenue and expenditure. This fact
makes the roadmap amply feasible and achievable.
6.54 Next, we turn to the vertical and horizontal devolution, followed by the assessment of
State finances along with our discussion on grants‑in‑aid.
121SHARING OF
7
TAX REVENUES:
VERTICAL
CHAPTER 7
DEVOLUTION
7.1 Today, fiscal federalism is a central feature of India’s fiscal architecture. However, this
was not always the case. In the early days of British rule, India's finances were centralized to
such an extent that the country could be considered unitary in fiscal matters. In fact, this is
exactly how the Expert Committee on the Financial Provisions of the Union Constitution,
appointed by the Constituent Assembly President Dr. Rajendra Prasad and chaired by Nalini
Ranjan Sarkar, described it in its 1948 report. The report stated, “The process of financial
development in this country has been one of evolution from a unitary to a quasi‑federal type.
The Government of India started as a completely unitary government, in full control of the
country's revenues, with the provincial governments depending on the central government for
all their needs.”
Genesis of Fiscal Federalism in Pre‑Independence India
7.2 After taking charge of the reins of the government from the East India Company, the
Crown fully controlled provincial revenues and expenditures for several decades. It expanded
the financial authority of provinces only gradually, first through grants for the provision of
specific services and then a partial or complete transfer of some of the revenue heads to them.
In the early decades, it allowed provinces to keep only a fraction of the revenue they raised,
including from income tax. In effect, the devolution at the time was from the provinces to the
Centre.
7.3 The first step towards a complete separation of revenue heads between the Centre and
provinces was taken under the Government of India Act of 1919, a good six decades after the
Crown replaced the East India Company. The fiscal arrangements under this Act came into force
on 01 April 1921. Under these arrangements, excise, judicial stamps, land revenue, and
irrigation receipts were assigned to provinces and income tax, customs, salt and opium to the
Centre. Until 1926‑27, provinces continued to be required to contribute to the Centre’s revenues.
123Sixteenth Finance Commission
7.4 Several committees looked into different aspects of taxation during the second half of
the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. However, no significant change in Centre‑State fiscal
relations occurred until the Government of India Act, 1935. This act spelled out the allocation
of different taxes between the Centre and provinces and provided the legal framework for the
division of the proceeds of income tax between them. In 1936, the government appointed Sir
Otto Niemeyer to recommend how income tax proceeds should be divided between the Centre
and provinces (vertical devolution) and among provinces (horizontal devolution). Niemeyer
recommended a 50:50 division between the Centre and provinces, with the provinces’ share
divided among them according to population and residence of the taxpayer. He also
recommended fixed‑amount annual grants‑in‑aid to five provinces to fill the gaps between their
expenditures and revenues. The government accepted these recommendations. This was the
genuine beginning of fiscal federalism in India. With minor adjustments, the arrangements as
recommended by Niemeyer remained in force till the Indian Constitution came into force and
the recommendations of the First Finance Commission were implemented, beginning in 1952.1
The Constitutional Provisions
7.5 There are three major provisions of revenue resource sharing between the Union and
States in the Indian Constitution: sharing of Union tax revenues under Articles 270 (and Article
272 until 80th Constitutional Amendment), grants from the Union Budget under Article 275(1)
and under Article 282. Below, we spell out the critical details of each of these items.
Sharing of the Union Tax Revenues under Articles 270 and 272
7.6 In its original form, the Constitution required the Centre to share with States the net
proceeds of income tax mandatorily (Article 270) and those of central excise tax optionally if
the Parliament so decided (Article 272). These and other provisions in Part XII of the
Constitution served as the legal framework within which the first ten FCs made their
recommendations.
7.7 Based on the Alternative Scheme of Devolution, recommended by the FC‑10, the
Government of India enacted the Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act in June 2000.
Through this Act, the Parliament amended Article 270 to make net proceeds of all taxes in the
Union list, except those levied under Articles 268 and 269, surcharges on taxes mentioned in
Article 271, and any cesses levied for specific purposes, shareable with States. Article 268 refers
to certain taxes levied by the Union but collected and appropriated by the States, such as certain
stamp duties and excise duties on medicinal & toilet preparations. Article 269 provides for
certain taxes levied and collected by the Union but assigned to the States, such as taxes on the
sale, purchase, or consignment of goods in the course of interstate commerce. Since the
Eightieth Amendment rendered Article 272, providing for the option of sharing the proceeds of
the central excise tax between the Union and the States, redundant, it was omitted from the
1 For a more detailed account of the evolution of fiscal federalism under the British, see the Report of the First Finance
Commission, Ch 2.
124Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Constitution. The FC‑11 to FC‑14 (2000‑01 to 2014‑15) made their recommendations under
these modified provisions.
7.8 The 101st Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in September 2016, introduced a
major reform replacing a host of indirect taxes levied by States and the Union with a single
nationwide Goods and Services Tax (GST). As a part of this reform, the Integrated Goods and
Services Tax (IGST) component of the GST replaced the erstwhile tax on the purchase, sale,
and consignment of goods in the course of interstate commerce and the countervailing duty on
imports. To incorporate this change into the design of Union‑State sharing of tax revenues, the
101st Amendment added Article 269A, relating to IGST, alongside Articles 268 and 269, cesses
and surcharges, to the list of exceptions to shareable tax revenues in Article 270. Because the
GST came into force on 01 July 2017, the FC‑15 made its recommendations on vertical
devolution under these provisions.
Grants by the Union under Article 275(1)
7.9 In addition to the devolution of tax revenues under Article 270, fiscal resources from the
Union to the States flow under Article 275(1) of the Constitution on the recommendation of the
FC. As a result, these grants [other than those given under proviso to Article 275(1)] are
commonly referred to as “FC grants”. The grants under Article 275(1) have been given most
prominently and frequently to bridge the gap between the States’ revenues and expenditures on
the revenue (current) account, but also for specific sectors or to specific States for specific
projects. The disaster relief and local body grants to the States, recommended by FCs, are also
given under Article 275(1). We discuss these grants in greater detail in upcoming chapters.
Grants by the Union under Article 282
7.10 Under Article 282 of the Constitution, “The Union or a State may make any grants for
any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament
or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may make laws.” In terms of the purposes of
the grants, this is a very open‑ended provision, allowing both the Union and States to make
grants even in areas in which they lack the power to legislate. The Union Government currently
provides substantial grants to States through its centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) under this
provision. In the past, Plan grants were also provided under it. All grants by the Union
Government to State Governments other than FC grants are sometimes referred to as “non‑FC”
grants. Beyond recording the magnitudes of the grants to States under Article 282 in the present
chapter, we do not discuss them in this report.
7.11 Both FC and non‑FC grants come from the Consolidated Fund of India and are in
addition to the States’ share of the shareable tax revenue resources, also referred to as the
divisible pool. A key difference is that grants under Article 275(1) are charged upon the
Consolidated Fund of India while those under Article 282 are voted. The grants under Article
282 give the Union Government a high degree of flexibility in that it can award them for any
125Sixteenth Finance Commission
public purpose to any implementing agencies, including non‑governmental organizations
(NGOs), educational institutions, and hospitals. They can be provided for drought or earthquake
relief in addition to the grants recommended by the FC. During the COVID‑19 crisis, the grants
for vaccination infrastructure and migrant support could be quickly mobilized under Article 282.
Vertical Devolutions by Successive Finance Commissions
7.12 In this section, we summarize the recommendations of the past fifteen FCs on the
division of tax revenues between the Union and State Governments. The first ten FCs made their
recommendations under the original Article 270 and Article 272, with the former providing for
the sharing of income tax revenue and the latter for Union excise duties. The following five FCs
made their recommendations under Article 270 as amended by the Constitution (80th)
Amendment Act, 2000, and the Constitution (101st) Amendment Act, 2016.
The First Ten Finance Commissions: 1952 to 2000
7.13 Table 7.1 summarizes the shares of States in the income tax and excise duties, as
recommended by the first ten FCs. The FC‑1 recommended raising the then prevailing 50 per
cent share of the States in the income tax to 55 per cent. Subsequent Commissions steadily raised
it, with the FC‑3 and FC‑4 arguing that the increase in the States’ share to 66.67 per cent and 75
per cent, respectively, by them was justified because a classification change in the Income Tax
Act in 1959 had led to the exclusion of corporate profit tax from the divisible pool. By the FC‑7,
the States’ share in income tax had reached 85 per cent. The FC‑8 and FC‑9 left this share
unchanged, while the FC‑10 lowered it to 77.5 per cent. The latter argued that the 85 per cent
rate had left the Union Government no incentive to increase the revenue from this source. To
compensate for the reduction, however, it simultaneously recommended an increase in the
States’ share of Union excise duties.
7.14 Turning to the Union excise duties, the FC‑1 made a modest beginning by awarding a
40 per cent share in the proceeds from three commodities – tobacco, matches, and vegetable
products – to the States. The FC‑2 expanded the scope to eight commodities but cut the States’
share in the proceeds to 25 per cent. The FC‑3 expanded the scope to all commodities that
yielded ₹50 lakh or more in revenues while cutting the States’ share further to 20 per cent. The
FC‑4 expanded the scope to all commodities and held the States’ share unchanged at 20 per
cent. The FC‑5 and FC‑6 also held the States’ share unchanged. The FC‑7 broke away from the
practice of a gradual shift in the States’ share, doubling it from 20 per cent to 40 per cent.
Because the Union excise duties accounted for a large proportion of the shareable tax revenues,
this change led to a large increase in the fiscal resources devolved to the States. The FC‑8 raised
the States’ share in excise duties further to 45 per cent, with the extra 5 per cent reserved
exclusively for disbursement to revenue‑deficit States. The FC‑9 maintained the status quo for
1989‑90 while increasing the amount reserved for revenue‑deficit States to 7.425 per cent for
the remaining five years i.e., 1990‑95. Finally, the FC‑10 raised the States’ share in excise duty
to 47.5 per cent, reserving 7.5 per cent for revenue‑deficit States.
126Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Table 7.1 Shares of States in the Proceeds from Income Tax and
Union Excise Duties (1952‑2000)
Share in Income Tax Share in Union Excise Duties
FC
(percentage) (percentage)
FC‑1 (1952‑57) 55 40*
FC‑2 (1957‑62) 60 25**
FC‑3 (1962‑66) 66.67 20#
FC‑4 (1966‑69) 75 20^
FC‑5 (1969‑74) 75 20
FC‑6 (1974‑79) 80 20
FC‑7 (1979‑84) 85 40
FC‑8 (1984‑89) 85 45
FC‑9 (1989‑95) 85 45
FC‑10 (1995‑2000) 77.5 47.5
* Applied to only three commodities: tobacco, matches, and vegetable products.
** Applied to eight commodities.
# Applied to all commodities yielding (cid:2534)50 lakh or more in excise tax revenue.
^ All commodities included from here onwards.
Source: Reports of FC‑1 to FC‑10
The Last Five Finance Commissions: 2000‑2026
7.15 With the 80th Constitutional Amendment having come into force in 2000, the divisible
pool for the last five FCs has included all Union tax revenues except cesses, surcharges, tax
revenues accruing to the Union Territories (UTs) minus the cost of tax collection. Observing
that the average share of the States in the divisible pool from 1980‑81 to 1999‑2000 had been
28.3 per cent and, with three minor exceptions, the share had remained consistently in the 26‑29
per cent range, the FC‑11 recommended a 29.5 per cent share in the divisible pool for the States.
The FC‑12 and FC‑13 raised the share to 30.5 per cent and 32 per cent respectively. The FC‑14
broke away from this gradual approach and hiked the States’ share to 42 per cent.
7.16 In 2019, when the work of the FC‑15 was still in progress, the Union Government
reorganized the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir into the union territories (UTs) of Jammu
& Kashmir and Ladakh. Estimating that the tax share of the erstwhile State would have been
approximately 1 per cent of the divisible pool, the FC‑15 fixed the share of the remaining
twenty‑eight States at 41 per cent. Therefore, currently, the tax revenues in the divisible pool
are shared in a 41:59 ratio between the States and the Union.
127Sixteenth Finance Commission
Long‑Term Trends in Vertical Sharing of Fiscal Resources
7.17 In this section, we first consider the long‑term trend in the sharing of revenue resources
between the Union and State Governments. We then analyse the implications of this sharing of
revenue resources for the revenues of each tier of the government and the distribution of the
total revenue of Union and States between them. We include in our discussion of the shared
resources the shareable tax revenues (divisible pool) under Article 270, FC grants under Article
275(1), and non‑FC grants by the Union government under Article 282. As we will see, two
features of the long‑term trend in the transfer of fiscal resources to the States stand out. First,
States have seen a steady rise in their share of the divisible pool and the overall fiscal resources.
Second, with two exceptions, the increase in the States’ share of the divisible pool recommended
by FCs has been gradual. The exceptions are the FC‑7 and FC‑14.
The Sharing of Tax Revenue Resources
7.18 Table 7.2 shows the evolution of the States’ share in the divisible pool, FC grants, and
non‑FC grants as a percentage of the gross tax revenue (GTR) of the Union under all fifteen
FCs. In Table 7.3, we report the same variables, but as a percentage of GDP. The figures in the
tables are averages over the years within the award period of each FC. In the case of the FC‑15,
our data includes actual financials for the years 2020‑21 to 2023‑24, provisional accounts/
revised estimates for 2024‑25 and budget estimates for 2025‑26. The award periods of the FC‑3,
FC‑4, FC‑9 and FC‑15 spanned four, three, six, and six years respectively. Award periods of the
remaining eleven FCs spanned the usual five years.
7.19 As can be seen from Table 7.2, the total transfers to States more than doubled from 25.1
per cent of GTR during the award period of FC‑1 to 56.4 per cent during the award period of
the FC‑14. Until the award period of the FC‑6, the transfers fluctuated considerably. For
example, they rose to 40.8 per cent under the FC‑2, fell to 31 per cent under FC‑3, and rose
again to 36.3 per cent under the FC‑4. The fluctuations continued during the succeeding two
FCs, but once the FC‑7 pushed up the transfers to 45.6 per cent of GTR, they exhibited a
gradually rising trend. The only big jump after that came under the FC‑14 to 56.4 per cent from
48.8 per cent under the FC‑13.
7.20 Approximately half or more of the transfers to the States have come from tax devolution
throughout the period. Devolution more than doubled from 16.0 per cent of GTR during the
FC‑1 award period to 34.0 per cent during the FC‑14 award period. The first large shift in this
share came under the FC‑7 when it rose to 26.9 per cent of GTR from 19.9 per cent under the
FC‑6. This large increase was the result of the doubling of the States’ share in the Union excise
duty by the FC‑7 to 40 per cent from 20 per cent under the FC‑6. From FC‑7 to FC‑12, the share
stagnated and rose only marginally to 27.9 per cent in FC‑13. However, under the FC‑14, the
share saw a step jump to 34.0 per cent.
128Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Table 7.2 Tax Devolution and Grants (percentage of GTR)
FC Devolution FC Grants FC Transfers Non‑FC Grants Total Transfers
FC‑1 16.0 4.5 20.5 4.8 25.4
FC‑2 19.8 7.0 26.8 14.0 40.8
FC‑3 15.2 5.1 20.3 10.9 31.2
FC‑4 17.6 7.0 24.5 11.7 36.3
FC‑5 23.3 4.6 27.9 14.9 42.8
FC‑6 19.9 6.8 26.7 12.2 38.9
FC‑7 26.9 2.3 29.1 16.4 45.6
FC‑8 25.1 3.1 28.2 18.4 46.6
FC‑9 26.5 4.4 30.9 18.0 48.9
FC‑10 27.0 3.1 30.2 14.4 44.5
FC‑11 26.6 5.3 31.9 15.1 47.0
FC‑12 25.9 5.3 31.2 15.7 46.9
FC‑13 27.9 4.6 32.5 16.3 48.8
FC‑14 34.0 5.4 39.4 17.0 56.4
FC‑15 32.1 5.5 37.7 17.6 55.3
Source: See Annexure 7.1
Table 7.3 Devolution and Grants (percentage of GDP)
FC Devolution FC Grants FC Transfers Non‑FC Grants Total Transfers
FC‑1 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.2 1.0
FC‑2 1.0 0.4 1.3 0.7 2.1
FC‑3 1.0 0.3 1.4 0.8 2.1
FC‑4 1.2 0.5 1.6 0.8 2.4
FC‑5 1.7 0.3 2.0 1.1 3.2
FC‑6 1.7 0.6 2.3 1.1 3.4
FC‑7 2.5 0.2 2.7 1.5 4.2
FC‑8 2.5 0.3 2.8 1.9 4.7
FC‑9 2.6 0.4 3.0 1.7 4.7
FC‑10 2.4 0.3 2.7 1.3 3.9
FC‑11 2.4 0.5 2.8 1.3 4.1
FC‑12 2.8 0.6 3.4 1.7 5.1
FC‑13 2.9 0.5 3.3 1.7 5.0
FC‑14 3.7 0.6 4.2 1.8 6.1
FC‑15 3.6 0.6 4.3 2.0 6.2
Source: See Annexure 7.1
129Sixteenth Finance Commission
7.21 The transfers saw a sharper rise as a proportion of GDP than GTR. This is because the
GTR itself has seen an increase as a proportion of GDP over time. From 1.0 per cent of GDP
during the award period of the FC‑1, total transfers to States have risen six‑fold to 6.1 per cent
and 6.2 per cent during the award periods of the FC‑14 and FC‑15. Tax devolution has risen
five‑fold from 0.7 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP between the FC‑1 and FC‑15. Non‑FC
grants have seen the sharpest rise from 0.2 per cent of GDP to 2.0 per cent of GDP during this
period.
Implications for the Union and State Revenues
7.22 It is instructive to analyse the trends in the Union and State revenues in relation to
devolution and grants. Figure 7.1 shows how the Union revenue as a percentage of total general
government (Union plus States) revenue has evolved with devolution and grants from the FC‑5
to FC‑15. For each FC, the first bar shows the Union revenues pre‑devolution and pre‑transfers
(FC and non‑FC grants) as a per cent of the general government revenue. The second bar shows
the Union revenue as a per cent of the general government revenue after subtracting out
devolution, and the third bar shows the Union revenue as a percentage of general government
revenue after subtracting out both devolution and transfers.
Figure 7.1 Trends in the Union Revenue With and Without Devolution and Grants
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FC-5 FC-6 FC-7 FC-8 FC-9 FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
Union's Revenue pre devolution Union's Revenue post devolution
Union's Revenue post transfers
Source: RBI’s Database on Indian Economy (DBIE); Union Budget
Note: FC‑5 covers period from 1970‑71 to 1973‑74; FC‑15 covers period from 2020‑21 to 2025‑26 BE.
130Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
7.23 Between FC‑5 and FC‑12, the Union revenue net of devolution and transfers fluctuated
between 38.4 per cent (FC‑12) and 44.2 per cent (FC‑6) of the general government revenue. It
then dropped to 36.0 per cent during the FC‑13, 31.8 per cent during the FC‑14, and 32.9 per
cent during the FC‑15. Net of devolution alone, the share of the Union Government in general
government revenue has fallen from a peak of 54.0 per cent during the FC‑6 to 43.6 per cent
during the FC‑14. Revenue resources have thus seen a clear movement away from the Union to
the States.
7.24 Figure 7.2 considers the States’ own tax revenues (SOTR) plus non‑tax revenues
(SONTR) alongside devolution and grants as proportions of GDP. Between the FC‑5 and FC‑15,
States’ own revenues as well as transfers through devolution and grants, as proportions of GDP,
have seen significant increases. The result has been an increase in total revenues of the States
from 8.1 per cent of GDP during the FC‑5 to 13.3 per cent during the FC‑14 and 13.4 per cent
during FC‑15.
Figure 7.2 States’ Own Revenues, Devolution and Grants (percentage of GDP)
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
FC-5 FC-6 FC-7 FC-8 FC-9 FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
SOTR/GDP SONTR/GDP Devolution/GDP FC grants/GDP Non-FC grants/GDP
Source: RBI DBIE
FC‑5 covers period from 1970‑71 to 1973‑74; FC‑15 covers period from 2020‑21 to 2023‑24
Trends in Post‑Transfer Revenues of the Union and States
7.25 In Figure 7.3, we present the Union’s and States’ post‑transfer revenues as proportions
of GDP from the FC‑5 to FC‑15. We can glean three points from it. First, the Union’s
post‑transfer revenue was 6.1 per cent of GDP during the FC‑5, rose to the peak of 7.8 per cent
during the FC‑8, and then fell back to 6.2 per cent during the FC‑15. Second, the States have
unmistakably gained in total revenues over the five and a half decades covered by Figure 7.3.
131Sixteenth Finance Commission
Their transfer‑inclusive revenues steadily rose from 8.1 per cent of GDP during the FC‑5 to 11.8
per cent during the FC‑9, fell to 10.5 per cent during the FC‑10, and steadily rose again to the
peak of 13.4 per cent during the FC‑15. Finally, relative shares of the Union and States in the
post‑transfer revenues changed from 43:57 during the FC‑5 to 33:67 during FC‑15. Recall that
the 1948 report of the Expert Committee on the Financial Provisions of the Union Constitution
had described the Centre‑State financial relations at the time as “quasi‑federal.” This is no longer
the case. At least going by the FC recommended resource transfers to States and the allocation
of revenues between the two levels, India has evolved as a full‑fledged federation.
Figure 7.3 Post‑transfer Revenues of the Union and States (percentage of GDP)
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
FC-5 FC-6 FC-7 FC-8 FC-9 FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
Union's Revenue post transfers/GDP State's Revenue post transfers/GDP
Source: RBI DBIE; Union Budget
FC-5 covers period from 1970-71 to 1973-74; FC-15 covers period from 2020-21 to 2023-24
Two Issues
7.26 During its consultation with various stakeholders, this Commission came across two
issues that it considers worthy of careful attention. First, it has been contended that the States
have not been receiving their full share of the divisible pool recommended by FCs. For instance,
tax revenues devolved during the FC‑15 award period fall short of 41 per cent of the divisible
pool which was recommended by the FC‑15 and accepted by the Union Government. Second,
while successive FCs have recommended increasing the share of the States in the divisible pool,
this has not led to an increase in the overall resources of the States due to offsetting actions by
the Union Government consisting of increased cesses and surcharges and reduced grants and
transfers. Because the devolution, as recommended by FCs and accepted by the Union
Government has a Constitutional status, this Commission was concerned about the suggested
discrepancy between the recommended and actual amounts and looked into the matter in detail.
132Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Devolution: Recommended versus Actual
7.27 Because the Union Government must make the initial transfer of the States’ share in the
divisible pool based on the estimated size of the divisible pool, once the actual size of the
divisible pool becomes known, a positive or negative discrepancy between the recommended
and actual devolution may appear. However, our review of the prevailing practice and available
data shows that adjustments to each year’s devolution are made twice to ensure that no
discrepancies remain. The Union Government makes the first adjustment once the actual figures
on all taxes, the divisible pool, and devolution become available to it. And the second adjustment
is made when the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) certifies the amount of divisible
pool.
7.28 Table 7.4 presents the full process of adjustments for fiscal years 2018‑19 to 2022‑23,
the last year for which complete data are available. The first row in the table provides the
devolution for a given fiscal year, say FY T, based on RE for tax revenue as reported in the FY
T+1 budget. The second row reports the devolution due in FY T based on actual tax revenue as
reported in the FY T+2 budget. The third row calculates the additional devolution due to States
for FY T by subtracting the amount devolved based on RE tax revenue (Row 1) from the amount
due based on actual tax revenue (Row 2). This adjustment gets made in FY T+2. The fourth row
reports an additional, second adjustment made based on CAG certified data. This exercise takes
place during FY T+3. The fifth row reports the divisible pool as certified by CAG. True
devolution due to States, shown in the sixth row, is 0.42 times the divisible pool in the fifth row
for years 2018‑19 and 2019‑20, as per the FC‑14 recommendation, and 0.41 times the divisible
pool for the remaining years as per the FC‑15 recommendation. The last row reports the final
devolution to the States, which exactly matches the devolution due in the sixth row.
7.29 For completeness, we note that before 2018‑19, whereas the first adjustment used to take
place as described above, the second, CAG adjustment took place only once in ten years. Our
calculations for years 2010‑11 to 2017‑18, not reported here, show that on a net basis, after the
first adjustment, the Union Government paid the State Governments ₹15,756 crores more than
what was due based on the CAG‑certified divisible pools and the corresponding
FC‑recommended shares of States for these years. According to the Ministry of Finance, this
gap has been settled by recording the excess amount as payment due on certain services that the
Union Government had received from the States during these years.
7.30 The responsibility of ascertaining and certifying net proceeds which are to be shared
between the Union and States is entrusted to the CAG by the Constitution. In the spirit of
transparency and to put the concerns of States to rest, we recommend that, every year, the Union
Government disclose the data pertaining to net proceeds as certified by CAG.
133Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 7.4 Devolution to States: Due and Actual (₹ crore)
S.
Item Source 2018‑19 2019‑20 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23
No.
1. States' share of Annex 4B/10B of 7,36,880 7,14,889 5,94,988 8,19,637 9,48,406
FY T devolved Receipt budget
based on RE tax (FY T+1)
revenue for FY T
2. States' share of Annex 4B/10B of 6,78,036 6,83,353 6,15,841 8,53,107 9,72,204
FY T due based on Receipt budget
actual FY T tax (FY T+2)
revenue
3. First adjustment: Annex 4B/10B of -58,843 -31,537 20,852 33,470 23,799
Additional Receipt budget
devolution due (FY T+2)
(Row 2 - Row 1)
4. Second Adjustment Annex 4A/10A 31,508 -677 -863 -16,647 -1,199
of FY T based on of Receipt budget
CAG Certified
(FY T+2)
numbers: Additional
devolution due
5. Net proceeds CAG certificate 16,89,390 16,25,418 14,99,946 20,40,146 23,68,305
(divisible pool) of
FY T as certified by
CAG
6. Devolution as per FC calculation 7,09,544 6,82,675 6,14,978 8,36,460 9,71,005
FC based on FC
recommendations recommended
share of States 42
or 41 per cent of
(5)
7. Final devolution FC calculation 7,09,544 6,82,675 6,14,978 8,36,460 9,71,005
amount of FY T
(2) + (4)
after all adjustments
Source: As shown in the second column of the table
134Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
FC Transfers to States Relative to the Gross Tax Revenue
7.31 During our visits, a large majority of the States made the point that the rising cesses and
surcharges and, therefore, the shrinking divisible pool as a proportion of GTR have substantially
wiped out the large increase in FC devolution to States recommended by the FC‑14. It may be
recalled that the FC‑14 had recommended increasing the share of the States in the divisible pool
from 32 per cent to 42 per cent. This issue is of critical importance, requiring a detailed
examination.
7.32 Table 7.5 presents the States’ shares in the divisible pool, FC grants, and total FC
transfers as percentages of GTR from 2010‑11 to 2023‑24. These years covers the award periods
of the FC‑13, FC‑14 and FC‑15. GTR represents the sum of all Union tax revenues including
cesses and surcharges. Therefore, the percentages in Table 7.5 show the States’ shares in the
Union tax revenues inclusive of cesses and surcharges.
Table 7.5 Devolution and FC Grants (percentage of GTR)
Year Devolution to States FC Grants to States Total FC Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) + (3)
2010‑11 27.7 4.0 31.7
2011‑12 28.8 4.9 33.7
2012‑13 28.1 4.4 32.5
2013‑14 27.9 4.7 32.6
2014‑15 27.1 5.1 32.2
Average (FC‑13) 27.9 4.6 32.5
2015‑16 34.8 5.8 40.6
2016‑17 35.4 5.6 41.0
2017‑18 31.5 4.8 36.3
2018‑19 35.9 4.5 40.4
2019‑20 32.4 6.2 38.6
Average (FC‑14) 34.0 5.4 39.4
2020‑21 29.4 9.1 38.5
2021‑22 32.6 7.7 40.3
2022‑23 31.1 5.7 36.8
2023‑24 32.6 4.3 36.9
2024‑25RE 33.9 3.4 37.3
2025‑26BE 33.3 3.1 36.4
Average (FC‑15) 32.1 5.5 37.6
Source: Annexure 7.1
135Sixteenth Finance Commission
7.33 Consider first the evolution of the devolution to States as a percentage of GTR. From a
27.1‑28.8 per cent range during the FC‑13 award period (2010‑11 to 2014‑15), this share jumped
to a 31.5‑35.9 per cent range during 2015‑16 to 2019‑20 (FC‑14 period). During the subsequent
years (FC‑15 period), it slid down to the 29.4‑33.9 per cent range. In terms of the average over
the life of each commission, devolution experienced an upward jump by 6.1 per cent of GTR
during the FC‑15 award period over that under the award period of the predecessor Commission.
Then, during the FC‑15 award period, devolution fell by 1.9 per cent of GTR. Therefore, there
has been a partial dilution of devolution to States during the FC‑15 award period over the FC‑14,
though its average level remains above the FC‑13 award period by 4.2 per cent of GTR.
7.34 FC grants during the FC‑15 increased by 0.1 per cent of GTR over the FC‑14 award
period. This led to a narrowing of the shortfall in the total FC transfers between the last two FCs
to 1.7 per cent of GTR. In summary, FC devolution plus grants averaged 32.5 per cent of GTR
during the award period of the FC‑13, 39.4 per cent during the FC‑14, and 37.7 per cent of GTR
during the FC‑15. Therefore, as far as FC transfers are concerned, the boost to them by the
FC‑14 has been substantially, even if not fully, preserved over the last ten years.
7.35 Before concluding this section, we note that while the claim that increased cesses and
surcharges have almost wiped out the increase in the devolution recommended by the FC‑14 is
unsupported by data, it is true that the devolution as a percent of GTR during the award period
of even the FC‑14 did not rise as much as it would have had cesses and surcharges not risen as
a proportion of GTR. But since cesses and surcharges as a proportion of GTR did rise, the
divisible pool as a proportion of GTR ended up shrinking from 89.2 per cent of GTR during the
award period of the FC‑13 to 82.1 per cent during the award period of the FC‑14. This trend of
shrinking share of the divisible pool in GTR continued during the FC‑15, with the share
averaging 78.3 per cent during its award period. The decline resulted in a further fall in the
devolution as a percent of GTR though it remained well above its level during the award period
of the FC‑13.
Views of the State Governments
7.36 States have overwhelmingly pitched for an increase in the States’ share in the divisible
pool from 41 per cent to 50 per cent. As many as eighteen out of the twenty‑eight States have
made this recommendation. Exceptions include Sikkim [40 per cent with the divisible pool
expanded to the Union’s Gross Revenue Receipts (GRR) or 50 per cent with the divisible pool
including cesses, surcharges and cost of collection beyond 20 per cent of GTR], Madhya Pradesh
(48 per cent if the divisible pool includes the entire GTR and 40.7 per cent if it includes the
entire GRR), Nagaland (48 per cent), Assam (45 per cent), and Himachal Pradesh (41 per cent).
States argue that the Constitution has assigned a proportionately larger expenditure
responsibility to States, particularly in sectors such as health, education, agriculture, drinking
water, sanitation, welfare, and law and order. To discharge these responsibilities, they need more
resources.
136Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
7.37 A majority of States have also raised concerns regarding the increasing share of cesses
and surcharges in GTR, as they are not a part of the divisible pool. Many submissions –
including those from Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Uttar
Pradesh – highlighted the declining share of the divisible pool in the gross tax revenues of the
Union and proposed measures to counter this trend. The measures included: (i) inclusion of
cesses and surcharges in the divisible pool; (ii) capping their share as a percentage of gross tax
revenue and transferring any amount above that cap to the divisible pool; and (iii) compensatory
enhancement of States' share in the divisible pool if these levies remain excluded.
7.38 Among other suggestions on cesses and surcharges, Telangana has recommended
transferring them to a non‑lapsable “Infrastructure Development Fund for Backward States,”
while Madhya Pradesh has advocated a Constitutional Amendment requiring the Union
Government to obtain ratification by at least 50 per cent of States to introduce any new cess or
surcharge, as well as maintain the existing ones. Uttar Pradesh has proposed that cesses and
surcharges be subject to a review, once the objective of the levy has been served.
7.39 In addition to tax revenues, several States, including Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat,
Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Kerala, Tripura, and Madhya Pradesh, have proposed the inclusion
of certain non‑tax revenues of the Union Government in the divisible pool. These include
revenues from the sale of natural resources such as spectrum and offshore oil, dividends from
public sector undertakings, and proceeds from the monetisation of public assets. The argument
made is that some of these resources originate from States or were deployed on State lands.
7.40 Some States, such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and West Bengal, highlighted the need for
greater fiscal flexibility in Union‑to‑State transfers. Recommendations include rationalisation
or consolidation of CSS, increased Union contribution in CSS, and the substitution of
specific‑purpose schemes with untied grants. These suggestions were often linked to concerns
about conditionalities and implementation flexibility in areas falling under the State List.
7.41 A final set of concerns by the States relates to the GST. Three such concerns are
noteworthy. First, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and West Bengal have
complained of a loss of fiscal autonomy. They argue that pre‑GST, they could adjust the sales
tax or VAT rates. However, under GST, they have lost this flexibility since any changes to the
rates require GST Council approval. Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh, and Haryana contend that under
GST, they have lost control over a large part of their tax base. Second, Tamil Nadu has
complained about the lack of buoyancy of SGST, while Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Haryana, Uttarakhand, and Punjab have argued that GST’s destination‑based nature
shifted revenue to consuming States, resulting in a permanent loss of revenues. Finally, many
States have noted that the cessation of transfers to States from GST compensation cess on 30
June 2022, has led to a sudden fiscal imbalance in their budgets, with Tamil Nadu reporting an
estimated shortfall of nearly ₹20,000 crore in 2024‑25. Several States, including Punjab and
Uttarakhand, have noted that the guaranteed 14 per cent annual growth during the transition was
unrealistic, with actual buoyancy of GST falling well short of it.
137Sixteenth Finance Commission
Views of the Union Government
7.42 In its memorandum, the Union Government expresses concern about the persistent fiscal
imbalance in its budget and the tight fiscal space facing it. It notes that significant increases in
vertical devolution recommended by the FC‑7 and FC‑14 were premised on providing States
with more untied resources. However, these increases have had a lasting impact on the Union's
fiscal space, leading to persistent revenue deficits. The Union argues that increased untied
transfers aim to strengthen the fiscal autonomy of the States, but this has not always translated
into sustained fiscal prudence on their part. At the same time, the Union has experienced a
decline in its non‑debt revenue resources. The Union's diminished fiscal space adversely impacts
its ability to achieve national development goals. The Union calls for moderation in tax
devolution (without suggesting a specific division) because it requires additional resources for
defence modernization and prudent macroeconomic management. It argues that the current level
of vertical devolution, where more than 49 per cent of the Gross Revenue Receipts (GRR) are
estimated to be transferred to States, is not fiscally sustainable. It further states that a moderated
vertical devolution would be adequate for fiscally prudent States to meet their development
requirements.
7.43 As regards cesses and surcharges, the Union states that their exclusion from the divisible
pool is by Constitutional design and has been upheld by successive FCs. Yet, States continue to
argue for their inclusion, which is contrary to the Constitution. The Union views this as a settled
issue and seeks an end to the debate on it.
7.44 The Union further argues that though not shareable, cesses often fund welfare and
infrastructure schemes that benefit States. For instance, the Health and Education cess supports
programmes like Samagra Shiksha and the PM POSHAN Scheme, while the Road and
Infrastructure cess funds the Central Road and Infrastructure Fund (CRIF), part of which is
allocated to States for development and maintenance of State Roads, among other things. The
Agriculture Infrastructure and Development Cess (AIDC) supports agriculture‑related schemes.
In this way, cesses are often routed back to States via CSS and other schemes.
7.45 The Union contends that the concern that these levies shrink the divisible pool is
frequently raised, but data suggests otherwise. Excluding GST compensation cess, cesses
comprised 6.7 per cent of gross revenue during the FC‑15 period - less than the FC‑13’s 7.0 per
cent. Surcharges, too, though rising on income and corporate tax, remain within historical
bounds. From the Union’s perspective, says the memorandum, retaining cesses and surcharges
allows quick, targeted fiscal responses, as seen during the COVID‑19 crisis.
The Commission’s Analysis
7.46 Both the States and the Union have made strong cases for their respective positions. The
arguments offered by them require careful analysis.
138Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
Constitutional Considerations Regarding Non‑Tax Revenues, and Cesses and
Surcharges
7.47 Many of the recommendations by the States are not in accordance with the Constitutional
provisions. The Constitution does not permit the sharing of non‑tax revenues of the Union. Nor
does it allow a cap on cesses and surcharges or their inclusion in the divisible pool. Regarding
the CSS, there is certainly room for improvement in their design and implementation, but under
Article 282 of the Constitution, any changes to them are the prerogative of the Union
Government.
7.48 Is there a need to amend the Constitution, as would be required to implement these
suggestions? This Commission’s considered opinion is that the founding fathers had good
reasons to include these provisions, and they have withstood the test of time. Following the
design of the Government of India Act, 1935, which set the template for Union‑State fiscal
relations, the Constitution, in its original form, chose to limit mandatory devolution to income
tax, while giving the Parliament the option to devolve a part of the excise duties. Later, when
expanding the scope of devolution to all taxes with some exceptions, the 80th Constitutional
Amendment once again did not consider bringing non‑tax revenues into the divisible pool. One
rationale for this exclusion is that the non‑tax revenues come from Union‑exclusive activities,
such as defence production, telecom services, and central public sector enterprises (CPSEs).
7.49 As regards cesses and surcharges, the Constitution provides for them in recognition of
the fact that the Union may be faced with emergencies such as war, famine, and pandemic. In
such situations, it needs to raise revenue without being constrained in any way. Because the
requisite amount of such revenue depends on the nature of the emergency and cannot be
anticipated in advance, it would be imprudent to impose a cap on it.
7.50 An inclusion of cesses partially or wholly into the divisible pool will also conflict with
the purpose of the cess itself. Cesses are earmarked for expenditures on specific heads.
Therefore, their design effectively rules out the inclusion in the divisible pool unless it is levied
for that purpose. However, in that case, cess can be replaced by a regular tax.
Higher Devolution to Counter Cesses and Surcharges?
7.51 This brings us to the States’ suggestion on countering the increase in cesses and
surcharges by a compensatory increase in the States’ share in the divisible pool. The question
this suggestion raises is whether a further shift in tax revenues in favour of the States is
warranted. In this regard, the Commission is of the view that the current division of tax revenues,
complemented by the FC and non‑FC grants, gives the States sufficient resources to discharge
their Constitutional responsibilities. The proliferation of transfers and subsidies by the States to
various groups and for various causes in recent years suggests the existence of sufficient funds
for developmental activities in their budgets.
139Sixteenth Finance Commission
7.52 From 2015‑16 to 2023‑24, the percentage share of the States in the total tax revenues
has averaged 57.5 per cent (Chapter 3, Figure 3.2). In 2023‑24, the latest year for which we
have data, this share stood at 57 per cent. Resources at the States’ disposal are significantly
larger after we take into account FC and non‑FC transfers to them. After all transfers to States
are netted out, the Union Government’s share in the nation’s non‑debt revenue resources during
the FC‑15 award period averaged 32.9 per cent (Figure 7.1 in this chapter). This means that the
States currently spend more than two‑thirds of the nation’s total non‑debt revenues. Their share
of 41 per cent in the divisible pool thus understates their overall access to non‑debt revenue
resources.
Lessons of Two Historical Episodes
7.53 When considering countering cesses and surcharges by an increase in the share of the
States in the divisible pool, it is of critical importance to take into account the stress that this
increase would generate on the Union finances, the shift in the Union’s incentive to rely on the
conventional tax instruments it would cause, and the response it would engender from the Union
to shore up its fiscal space. Two historical episodes offer sobering lessons in this regard.
7.54 The FC‑7 (1979‑80 to 1983‑84) recommended increasing the States’ share in income tax
from 80 per cent to 85 per cent and in the Union excise duties from 20 per cent to 40 per cent.
As the excise duties constituted a large component of the Union revenues at the time, the jump
in the States’ share of them led to considerable stress on the Union’s finances. Its share in the
combined tax revenues of the Union and States went down from 55.3 per cent in 1978‑79 to
48.6 per cent in 1979‑80. This sharp decline led the Union Government to begin shifting its
reliance from income tax and excise duties to customs duties and corporation tax, which did not
form a part of the divisible pool. As a result, the combined share of income tax and excise tax
in GTR fell from 43.7 per cent in 1978‑79 to just 27.9 per cent in 1988‑89. In the meantime, as
a response to the declining share of the divisible pool in GTR, the FC‑8 (1984‑85 to 1988‑89)
raised the States’ share in excise duties to 45 per cent.
7.55 It was this shrinking of the divisible pool as a percent of GTR that eventually led the
FC‑10 to recommend the 80th Amendment to the Constitution. In its report, the Commission
argued that the significantly reduced shares had resulted in a loss of interest on the part of the
Union Government in raising revenue from income tax and excise duties. To support this
argument, it invoked the Ministry of Finance, which had argued, “If the Central Government
wishes to raise ₹100 crores for itself through Union excise duties, it would have to raise around
₹182 crores. To get the same ₹100 crores through a personal tax yield, the Central Government
would have to raise ₹667 crores.” 2
7.56 The FC‑10 further cited the Chelliah Committee on Tax Reform to strengthen the case
for the amendment. It noted that in its 1991 report, the latter had recommended fixing the share
of States in aggregate central tax revenues at 25 per cent via a Constitutional Amendment.
According to the Commission, the committee had argued, “There would be certainty then for
the States and the Union regarding what revenues would accrue to their respective budgets and
2 Report of the Tenth Finance Commission, chapter 13, paragraph 13.4, p. 59.
140Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
the Centre would not have to distort the pattern of taxation by being virtually compelled to raise
non‑shareable taxes.”3
7.57 The second episode relates to the FC‑14. Like the FC‑7, it recommended a large increase
in the share of the States in the divisible pool from 32 per cent to 42 per cent. This generated
stress on the Union’s finances, in response to which it’s share in majority of CSS to non‑NEH
States was brought down to 60 per cent immediately and the share of cesses and surcharges
increased over time to meet development spending of the Union Government. Non‑FC transfers
to States, mainly through the CSS, fell from 22.4 per cent in 2014‑15 to 16.4 per cent in 2015‑16
and remained below that level for the remaining four years of the award period of the FC‑14.
Over time, cesses and surcharges expanded, with a corresponding shrinking share of the
divisible pool in GTR, as shown in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4 Divisible Pool (percentage of GTR)
100.0
89.0 88.9 89.7 89.3 89.1 86.9 86.2
90.0 81.2 80.9 79.9 81.9 81.3
80.0 75.6 74.0 75.3 77.5
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Source: CAG certificates from 2010‑11 to 2023‑24, Union Budgets for remaining years.
7.58 Economic efficiency argument dictates that reliance on cesses and surcharges as the
sources of revenue except for short‑term specific needs is undesirable. This is because efficiency
is best served by broad‑based taxation while cesses and surcharges are often applied to a narrow
base: a specific commodity or a specific group of taxpayers. Reliance on cesses and surcharges
for revenues in the long run also impedes tax reform. If the Union Government is raising a large
part of its revenue from cesses and surcharges, it is likely to lose interest in the standard
instruments of taxation, as noted by the FC‑10 in the context of its recommendation for the 80th
Amendment. The resulting neglect may adversely impact the efforts to raise revenue buoyancy
of those instruments to the detriment of the States’ interests.
3 Report of the Tenth Finance Commission, Chapter 13, paragraph 13.10, p. 60.
141
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Higher Devolution in Place of the CSS Transfers?
7.59 An argument is sometimes made that the Union’s share in the CSS be passed on directly
to the States in untied form through a higher devolution with the role of the CSS substantially
reduced or even eliminated. The argument made in favour of this change is that the States are
closer to the people and are in a better position to determine the needs of their people. The
diversity of India and the different levels of development imply that the needs of different States
are different. Therefore, the “one size fits all” CSSs do not make optimal use of the nation’s
development resources. The FC‑14 had cited this among the motivations for recommending
raising the States’ share in the divisible pool from 32 per cent to 42 per cent. While none of the
States has made this argument to the present Commission, given its salience among scholars
and commentators, it is incumbent upon the Commission to address it.
7.60 The CSS have played a crucial role in the nation’s development. While the dominant
role of the States in development is fully recognized in the Constitution as well as by successive
FCs, with fiscal resources progressively shifted towards them, in some critical development
areas, the Union has led the way. Therefore, we are persuaded to maintain the status quo insofar
as the issue of replacing the CSS transfers with increased devolution is concerned.
7.61 A different issue related to the CSS, raised by some States, concerns their rationalisation
and consolidation, and greater flexibility for the States in implementing them. While the
Commission has no direct role in the design and implementation of the CSS, it appreciates the
value of regular evaluation and rationalization to pave the way for the discontinuation of
schemes that are not performing as expected. It is also sympathetic to giving the States greater
flexibility in choosing among different CSS since their needs differ considerably due to the
differences in their levels of development and diversity in other dimensions. In Chapter 6, we
recommend a High‑Powered Committee to be appointed by the Union Government to carry out
a fresh assessment of the schemes and recommend closure of the schemes that are not spending
resources productively.
Higher Devolution to Counter the Adverse Effect of GST on the States’ Revenues?
7.62 The case for increased devolution to States due to a reduction in their revenues or loss
of fiscal autonomy following the adoption of GST raises two issues. First, if the adoption of
GST did lead to a reduction in the States’ revenues or autonomy, in all likelihood, it also led to
a reduction in the Union’s revenues or autonomy. The right solution to the problem is for the
States and the Union to work jointly within the GST Council to reform the GST such that the
revenue loss to both entities is reversed.
7.63 The second issue concerns the factual basis of the decline in the States’ revenues
following the adoption of GST. The GST was introduced on 01 July 2017. At the time, it was
anticipated that there would be a period of adjustment to the new regime during which the States’
revenues may decline. Therefore, under the GST compact, the States were guaranteed a 14 per
cent growth in SGST revenues over the base year revenues yielded by the taxes that the GST
came to replace for five years. This five‑year period ended on 30 June 2022. In the meantime,
the GST has achieved considerable stability and begun to generate significantly higher levels of
142Chapter 7: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
revenues. This full restoration of revenues is also reflected in the States’ revenues. The rates of
six‑year and three‑year averages of own tax revenue of States to GDP ratios ending in 2016‑17
were 6.2 per cent and 6.1 per cent, respectively. In comparison, the same ratio has been 6.3 per
cent in 2022‑23 and 6.4 per cent in 2023‑24. Therefore, the combined own‑tax‑revenue‑to‑GDP
ratio of the States, which must be the basis of any shift in devolution shares, has not fallen
following the adoption of the GST.
7.64 A decline in the ratio of own tax revenue to GSDP of an individual State following the
adoption of GST is consistent with a lack of decline in the corresponding aggregate ratio. But
such a decline cannot form the basis of an increase in the aggregate share of the States in the
divisible pool. For the individual States, shortfalls in revenues are dealt with as a part of the
State‑level evaluation of revenues and expenditures by the Commission during its award period.
7.65 Finally, the issue of the loss of flexibility due to the GST decision being taken jointly by
the Union and States in the GST Council is beyond the remit of the FC. However, we note that
within its federal structure, the Indian Constitution provides for many such compromises in the
larger national interest. The existence of the FC itself is an example of such a compromise. In
the opinion of this Commission, GST too will emerge as a similarly outstanding example.
The Union’s Case
7.66 Though the Union has made no explicit submission regarding a shift in the share of the
divisible pool in its favour, it has emphasized the need for a larger share of the nation’s revenues.
There is no doubt that the recent shifts in the external security and defence environment call for
increased capital expenditures on defence. The Union has also shown a high degree of
effectiveness in building the nation’s infrastructure, an effort that must be supported with more
financial resources.
7.67 The only instrument available to the Commission to assist the finances of the Union is
the share in the divisible pool. With cesses and surcharges having cut the size of the divisible
pool from 89.1 per cent of GTR in 2014‑15 to a 74‑80 per cent range during the first four years
of the FC‑15 award period for which actuals are available, there is no room for cutting the States’
share in it. The Commission is of the view that if an efficient and broad‑based system of taxation
is to be put in place, a grand bargain would have to be struck between the Union and States in
which the Union would agree to fold a large part of the revenue from cesses and surcharges into
regular taxes and States would agree to a smaller share in the resulting larger divisible pool,
with no loss of revenues to either side.
Recommendation
7.68 Presently, for its award period, the Commission recommends retaining the States’ share
in the divisible pool at its current level of 41 per cent.
143SHARING OF TAX
8
REVENUES:
HORIZONTAL
CHAPTER 8 .
DEVOLUTION
8.1 Horizontal devolution refers to allocating the portion of divisible pool assigned to States
among individual States. Like any exercise involving the distribution of a fixed pie among
numerous claimants, this is a challenging task for Finance Commissions (FCs). Any increase in
the share of one State over what the previous FC awarded implies a reduction in the share of
one or more of the other States. Each State also has a perception of its fair share in the pie, based
on its own unique circumstances, and views the award of a smaller share as unfair. However,
the sum of these perceived shares across all States exceeds one. Recognizing these challenges,
FCs have generally based their recommendations on a set of transparent criteria originating in
equity and efficiency, though not to every State’s full satisfaction.
Equity and Efficiency as Guides to Horizontal Devolution
8.2 The equity objective seeks to equalize the availability of public services across States.
Two key factors leading to inter‑State inequities in the provision of public services are
differences in: i) available revenue resources, and ii) production costs of those services.
Equity‑based devolution criteria aim to compensate for both sources of differences. Devolutions
based on per capita income distance address the differences in revenue resources. Area‑based
allocation is an example of devolution based on cost differences.
8.3 The efficiency‑based criteria seek to encourage healthy revenue growth and fiscal
stability. To the extent that revenue growth depends on Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP)
growth, these criteria may also include incentives for growth. Rewarding efficiency is important
since purely equity‑based devolution undermines incentives for States to raise their own
revenues or spend the available revenues prudently. For example, if a State is convinced that
grants by the Union will cover any gaps between its expenditures and revenues, it is likely to
slack off in raising its own revenues and may also turn profligate in its expenditures.
145Sixteenth Finance Commission
8.4 Equity and efficiency need not conflict, but they may. For an example of harmony
between the two objectives, consider the case of a public service, such as health, provided by
the State Government. Other things being the same, the lower per capita income States are able
to raise less revenue of their own on a per capita basis than higher per capita income States.
Therefore, with equal per capita devolution out of the States’ share in the divisible pool, the
lower per capita income States are able to provide health services at a lower level than the higher
per capita income States. This difference implies that the marginal benefit of health expenditures
in lower per capita income States exceeds that in higher per capita income States. It follows that
a shift in revenue from high per capita income States to low per capita income States on the
margin would yield a higher overall benefit from health services.
8.5 Another channel through which equalizing revenue devolution can contribute to
efficiency is disincentivizing costly inter‑state migration. In the absence of such devolution,
higher per capita income States would provide public services such as health and education at a
higher level than lower per capita income States. This difference would encourage migration
from the latter to the former States. By eliminating the difference, equalising transfers would
eliminate the incentive for such migration.
8.6 However, pursuing equity in devolution may also undermine the allocative efficiency of
revenue resources. If the expectation that revenue transfers from Union taxes would compensate
for all revenue deficiency leads the lower per capita income States to slack off on their revenue
efforts, then the net effect of equity‑driven devolution on the provision of public services will
turn negative. This consideration has led FCs to generally include some efficiency‑driven
criteria in their devolution formulae.
8.7 An alternative classification of horizontal devolution criteria divides them into
need‑based, cost‑disability‑based, and efficiency or performance‑based categories. This scheme
includes population under need‑based criteria; area and infrastructure distance under
cost‑disability criteria; and tax effort and fiscal stability under efficiency‑based criteria. This
classification can be subsumed under the one based on equity and efficiency, since need‑based
and cost‑disability‑based criteria can be included under equity.
Limits to Achieving Equity
8.8 At the outset, it is important to appreciate that multiple factors limit the ability of tax
devolution to achieve full equity in the provision of public services across States. First, in
addition to current expenditures, the ability to provide public services also depends on past
investments in public assets such as schools, colleges, hospitals, roads, and human capital. With
the limited fiscal resources available for devolution and grants during its award period, the FC
must take the differences in these investments as given, and it cannot neutralize inequities
resulting from them except marginally.
8.9 Second, to the extent that own‑tax and non‑tax revenues of States are large relative to
the States' share in the divisible pool and feasible grants out of the Consolidated Fund of India,
146Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
FC is limited in its ability to bring about full equity into the States' capacity to provide public
services. In effect, the differences arising from the States' own revenue resources may be too
large for FC transfers to eliminate them through devolution and grants.
8.10 Third, even if the previous two factors are absent, and FC has sufficient financial
resources to devolve, it is limited in its ability to fully equalize the capacity to provide public
services due to a lack of data to meaningfully measure the differences in the costs of their
provision across States. The costs of providing public services vary across States due to
numerous geographical, environmental, social, and cultural factors. Per capita costs of providing
public services in hilly States are significantly higher on average than those in the plains, and
even within these groups, these costs differ significantly. Credible data is unavailable to measure
these differences in the costs of providing public goods.
8.11 Fourth, economic and political economy constraints limit the extent to which FCs can
allocate revenues and grants unevenly across States to equalize their capacities to provide public
services. Economic constraints result from the possible adverse effects of the uneven
distribution of the divisible pool and grants on efficiency, growth, and future revenue
generation. Political economy considerations may arise from a sense on the part of some States
that they have been denied their ‘fair’ share of tax revenues. These considerations partially
explain why past FCs have avoided devolving tax revenues or awarding grants purely on equity
grounds and have given some consideration to efficiency‑based criteria such as tax effort and
fiscal discipline. Indeed, recognising that equal per capita allocations are often viewed as ‘fair’,
the earlier FCs had relied on population as the principal devolution criterion. The political
economy constraint additionally sheds light on why the successive FCs have generally been
careful not to alter the allocations made by their immediate predecessor FCs by wide margins.
8.12 Finally, even if no constraint on the FC's ability to allocate tax revenues and grants
existed, it could only equalize the States' capacity to provide public services across States.
Ultimately, the political leadership decides how the State's fiscal resources are allocated to
different expenditure heads. These decisions can result in differences in the availability of public
services, even when no differences exist in the capacities of States to provide them. In the same
vein, differences across States may also arise due to differences in the governance efficiency in
translating expenditures into outcomes.
8.13 Continuing differences in the provision of public services across States highlight the
importance of these factors. While FC allocations of tax revenues have helped arrest the
inequalities in revenue expenditures across States over the past several decades, eliminating
those inequalities remains a distant goal. Nevertheless, even if substantial inequities in the
States' capacities to provide public services remain, after growth accelerated and began
delivering significantly larger volumes of total revenues, States have been able to raise their
capacities to provide public services to higher levels and at a faster pace.
8.14 Therefore, even though horizontal devolution's power emanates from the high priority it
assigns to equalization, insofar as this power depends on the magnitude of revenue resources
147Sixteenth Finance Commission
available for devolution, efficiency of taxation and expenditure can hardly be ignored. Indeed,
the efficiency assumes even greater importance since it is at the heart of growth acceleration.
Rapid improvements in infrastructure, education, health and skills are just as important as their
balanced development across States.
8.15 We next provide an evaluation of the criteria the past FCs have deployed to allocate the
States’ share in the divisible pool among the States.
Equity‑Based Criteria of Horizontal Devolution
8.16 We divide the discussion of devolution criteria applied by past FCs into those primarily
aimed at achieving equity, and those that target efficiency. In principle, almost all criteria impact
both equity and efficiency. As such, the classification is only suggestive and not watertight.
Population
8.17 This criterion divides a portion of the States’ share of the divisible pool in proportion to
each State's share in the total population of all States. For example, if 20 per cent of the States’
share in the divisible pool is devolved based on population, a State having 5 per cent of all
States’ population receives 5 per cent of 20 per cent of the States’ share in the divisible pool.
This calculation translates into the State receiving 1 per cent of States’ share in the divisible
pool.
8.18 If the per capita costs of public services were constant regardless of scale and were
identical across States, devolving 100 per cent of the States’ share in the divisible pool, based
on population shares, would equalize the per capita capacity to provide public services across
States. But neither of these assumptions is valid. Other things being the same, the larger the
population, the lower the per capita cost of public service provision. Likewise, the cost of
provision of public services for a given size of population varies across States according to area
(cost is higher in the State with larger area), terrain (cost is higher in hilly regions), past
investments in infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and human capital, and other similar factors.
8.19 If the more populous States have lower per capita incomes (or a higher incidence of
poverty), even an equal per capita tax revenue allocation can lend the distribution of tax revenue
some progressivity. This is because of the economies of scale in the provision of public services.
Other things being the same, a more populous State can provide a given level of public service
at a lower cost. Alternatively, a State with larger population can provide the public service at a
higher level with the same per capita tax revenue.
Area
8.20 The area gives rise to differences in the costs of providing public services between
States. Ceteris paribus, the per‑person cost of public service in a State with twice the area, but
the same population as another State, is higher. To compensate for this cost disability, beginning
148Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
with the Tenth Finance Commission (FC‑10), FCs have devolved a part of the States’ share in
the divisible pool according to the States’ respective shares in the total area across all States.
8.21 As conventionally applied, the criterion allocates the devolved funds in direct proportion
to each State’s share in the total geographical area of all States. A State twice as large in area as
another State receives twice as much as the latter, and a State thrice as large receives thrice as
much. Empirically, the per capita cost of the provision of public services may vary, not linearly
as assumed by this allocation rule, but at a diminishing or an increasing rate. However, FCs have
not investigated this relationship and adopted the practical assumption of linearity in the
implementation of the criterion.
8.22 It has not been generally recognized that, in terms of per capita allocation, this criterion
is equivalent to an inverse‑population‑density criterion. Area divided by population is the
inverse of the population density. The higher the population density of a State, the lower its
allocation per capita according to this criterion. This interpretation makes it further transparent
that the criterion is designed to correct for the cost disability from the higher per capita cost of
provision of public services due to a greater dispersion of population.
8.23 According to the Census 2011, the population density in India varied from 16.5 persons
per square kilometre to 1105.5 persons per square kilometre. The ratio of these two population
densities is 67. Therefore, per capita devolution according to this criterion to the State with the
lowest population density is 67 times that of the State with the highest population density.
8.24 This interpretation also throws new light on the implications of the assignment of a
minimum of 2 per cent share under area criterion to each State by recent FCs for equity. To
explain, consider two States with identical population densities, but one having a 2.1 per cent
share in the total area and the other having a 0.2 per cent share. Applied without modification
of area, the criterion would award each State equal per capita allocation. However, replacing the
smaller State’s share by 2 per cent would mean cutting its population density to one‑tenth of its
original level, and result in an allocation ten times that of the larger State in per capita terms.
8.25 There is another side effect of the assignment of a minimum 2 per cent share to each
State. As many as twelve States in India, jointly accounting for 11.3 per cent of the total area of
the twenty‑eight States, have less than a 2 per cent share each in the total area. While the
modification has the intended effect of benefiting the smaller States, it also has the unintended
consequence of taking away 12.7 per cent (i.e. 24 per cent minus 11.3 per cent) of the total area
from the remaining sixteen States. Such a large loss of area undermines the objective of
compensation for the cost disadvantage associated with a large area that the criterion is designed
to promote.
Inverse Per Capita Income Criterion
8.26 Over the years, FCs have devolved a part of the States’ share in the divisible pool based
on per capita income in two forms: inverse per capita income and the distance of per capita
149Sixteenth Finance Commission
income from a benchmark level of per capita income. In the latter case, benchmark level of per
capita income is generally represented by the per capita income of the highest per capita income
State among the large States. In each case, the objective is to allocate a larger revenue per capita,
the lower the State’s per capita income. However, the two criteria generally lead to different
allocations to the States.
8.27 The idea is based on the hypothesis that States can raise equal revenue per rupee of
income with equal tax effort. This implies that despite equal tax effort, States with lower per
capita income have a lower capacity to raise revenue per capita than States with higher per capita
income. Therefore, if fiscal capacity equalization is the goal, States with lower per capita income
must receive more revenue per capita through devolution than those with higher per capita
income.
8.28 One approach to achieving this objective is to make the per capita allocation to a State
proportionate to the inverse of its per capita income. Under this approach, the State’s share in
the total transfer of tax revenue equals the inverse per capita income weighted population,
divided by the sum of the inverse per capita income weighted population across all States.
Per Capita Income Distance Criterion
8.29 An alternative approach to making devolutions progressive, relative to the population
criterion, is to base a State’s per capita allocation on the distance between a fixed benchmark
per capita income and that State’s per capita income. Conventionally, FCs have proxied the
benchmark per capita income to that of the highest per capita income State among large States,
mostly Punjab until 2001‑02 and Haryana thereafter. Under the criterion, the lower a State’s per
capita income, the greater the distance between the benchmark per capita income and its own,
and the greater is the per capita allocation of revenues to it. Stated precisely, this criterion sets
the share of a State in the tax revenue devolved equal to the ratio of its
per‑capita‑income‑distance‑weighted population to the sum of the per-capita
income‑distance‑weighted population of each State.
8.30 The progressivity of allocations under the per‑capita‑income‑distance criterion can be
enhanced by excluding the States that lie nearest to the top of the per capita income distribution.
For example, we may exclude the States with per capita income in the eightieth or higher
percentile. The Fifth Finance Commission (FC‑5), which first introduced the
per‑capita‑income‑distance criterion, deployed a version of this formulation. It excluded States
with per capita incomes exceeding the average per capita income across all States and allocated
per capita revenue in proportion to the shortfall of the State’s per capita income from the average
per capita income across all States.
8.31 The Seventh Finance Commission (FC‑7) introduced the inverse per capita income
criterion. However, the FC‑10 chose to drop it in favour of the per‑capita‑income‑distance
criterion. It reasoned that, whereas the distance from the benchmark per capita income is linear
in per capita income, inverse per capita income is convex over the positive range. It went on to
150Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
note that, “… Compared to the distance formula, in the inverse income formula, owing to the
implicit convexity in it, the middle‑income States have to bear a relatively higher burden of this
adjustment”1.
Poverty
8.32 FC‑7 and the first report of the Ninth Finance Commission (FC‑9) used poverty as a
criterion of horizontal devolution. States with a higher incidence of poverty were awarded a
larger revenue per capita. However, this criterion proved controversial due to a mismatch
between available poverty estimates and States’ own perceptions of poverty faced by them
relative to other States. As a result, even the FC‑9 dropped this criterion in its second and final
report, noting, “…Several States did not approve of the introduction of the index of population
below the poverty line in the devolution formula. They felt that State‑wise data on the number
of poor people below the poverty line were not statistically reliable. … Since even the backward
States such as Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (UP) did not favour the
use of the criterion of people below the poverty line in the devolution formula, we have decided
to drop it”2. Subsequent FCs have not revived the deployment of this criterion. Interestingly,
however, some States have recommended to the present Commission to consider basing a part
of its devolution on NITI Aayog’s Multi‑dimensional Poverty estimates.
Indices of the Level of Development
8.33 In the early decades, some FCs used different indicators of the level of economic
development (or ‘backwardness’, a commonly used term at the time), including infrastructure
index. Once again, the objective was to allocate more revenue resources, in per capita terms, to
the less developed (more backward) States. In most cases, FCs did not specify how they
quantified the development features they noted in the texts of their reports, though in some cases,
they did. For example, the FC‑9 evolved an index of backwardness comprising “… A
combination of two indices, namely, population of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes
(ST) and the number of agricultural labourers in different States, as revealed in the Census for
1981”3. The FC‑10 used an index of infrastructure reflecting “… the relative achievement of a
State in providing an economic and social infrastructure to its citizens.”4 and specified the index
so constructed along‑with the methodology used to derive it. The Eleventh Finance Commission
(FC‑11) was the last to use an indicator in this category, an infrastructure index, which it did
quantify.
Efficiency‑Based Criteria of Horizontal Devolution
8.34 Some consideration to efficiency has been given, beginning as far back as the First
Finance Commission (FC‑1). The FC‑1 devolved 20 per cent of the States’ share in income tax
1 Report of the FC-10, paragraph 5.39, p. 23 and Appendix 4, pp. 171-75.
2 Report of FC-9, paragraph 5.10, p. 19.
3 Report of FC-9, paragraph 5.10, p. 19.
4 Report of FC-10, paragraph 5.44, p. 24.
151Sixteenth Finance Commission
revenues based on the State’s contribution to those revenues. Indirectly, the extent of the
contribution depended on the State's income generation capacity, which in turn depended on the
efficiency of resource use. Other efficiency criteria, such as forest cover, total fertility rate
(TFR), tax effort, and fiscal discipline, have been added by more recent FCs. In our discussions
with the States, the contribution to national gross domestic product (GDP) has also figured
prominently. We briefly discuss these criteria in this section.
Forest Cover and Ecology
8.35 In recognition of growing concern for climate change, and the national importance of
forests and ecology, the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FC‑14) introduced the State’s share
in the total dense forest cover of all States as a criterion for devolution of a part of the States’
share in the divisible pool. The principal argument for including this criterion is based on
economic efficiency. Forests generate wider ecological benefits for the country, while imposing
a net cost on the host State by depriving it of alternative uses of the forest land. Forest‑area‑based
devolution thus provides the necessary incentive for conserving and expanding forests.
8.36 In India’s special circumstances, the forest‑area criterion also serves as a partial proxy
for cost disability characterizing the northeastern and hilly (NEH) States. The hilly terrains lead
to significantly higher costs of transporting goods and people, and of building physical
infrastructure than in the plains. The NEH States also suffer from relatively poor connectivity
to the rest of the country. Because the ten NEH States account for 33.4 per cent of India’s dense
forest area in 2021 but only 5.3 per cent of the population, on a per capita basis, the forest‑area
criterion awards them a significantly larger revenue than other States.
Total Fertility Rate
8.37 Introduced by the Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC‑15), the TFR is the newest
criterion deployed to allocate a part of the States’ share in the divisible pool. The criterion
rewards States for their efforts to bring down population growth. Because higher the TFR, the
higher the population growth, States with high TFR receive low allocations and vice versa. More
precisely, the share of a State in the total resources devolved, based on this criterion, equals that
State’s population weighted by inverse of TFR, divided by the sum of population weighted by
inverse of TFR of each State.
8.38 In introducing TFR as a criterion for horizontal devolution, the FC‑15 sought to partially
offset the disadvantage that the shift to the 2011 Census from the 1971 Census in implementing
the population criterion had brought to the States that had successfully arrested the growth rates
of their populations. In the words of the Commission, “…After almost four decades, this
Commission has been mandated to use the population data of the most recent Census. As
mentioned earlier, some States had raised serious concerns regarding this. We feel that the use
of the latest Census data, and sudden change of underlying data, should not unfairly put some
152Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
States which have performed well on the national objective of demographic management at a
disadvantage”5.
8.39 The FC‑15 classifies this criterion explicitly under ‘Performance‑based Criteria’. As
such, within the equity‑efficiency framework, this criterion belongs under efficiency. However,
consistent with the international discourse on the subject, the view that excessively low TFR,
which is bound to lead to population aging, is to be resisted rather than encouraged has gained
ground recently. There is now a growing concern about the country growing old before
becoming rich.
Tax Effort and Tax Contribution
8.40 FC‑10 was the first to use tax effort as a criterion for devolution, which was subsequently
used by FC‑11, FC‑12 and FC‑15. The rationale for including tax effort among devolution
criteria is two‑fold. First, if FCs establish a tradition of basing a part of the devolution on the
tax effort, States would be incentivized to make a greater effort to raise their own revenue.
Second, the criterion would reward States that have made a stronger effort at tax collection.
8.41 Tax effort is measured by the own tax revenue (OTR)‑to‑GSDP ratio, that is, tax revenue
raised per rupee of GSDP. The more tax per rupee of GSDP a State collects, the greater is its
measured tax effort. Under this criterion, per capita devolution is proportional to this measure
of tax effort. A State’s share in the revenue devolved is equated to its population weighted by
tax‑to‑GSDP ratio divided by the sum of each State’s population weighted by tax‑to‑GSDP
ratio.
8.42 An alternative to this approach is to allocate revenue to each State in proportion to its
share of the total OTR across all States. This approach is equivalent to allocating per capita
revenue based on per capita tax revenue raised by the State. The State's share in the devolved
revenue, under this criterion, equals its population weighted by per capita tax revenue, divided
by the sum of population weighted by per capita tax revenue of each State. In this form, the
criterion may be more appropriately described as a tax contribution (rather than tax effort)
criterion.
Fiscal Discipline
8.43 The FC‑11 first introduced fiscal discipline as a criterion for devolution to reward States
for such discipline and incentivize them to improve upon it. It measured fiscal discipline by the
extent of improvement a State made in the ratio of its own revenue receipts to its total revenue
expenditure, relative to the improvement in a similar ratio for all States. The improvement was
computed for a reference period over a base period. An improvement could result from a higher
volume of own revenue, a lower revenue expenditure, or a combination thereof.
5 Report of the FC-15, paragraph 6.53, p. 162.
153Sixteenth Finance Commission
Horizontal Devolution by Successive Finance Commissions
8.44 We now review the history of horizontal devolution by successive FCs. For ease of
exposition, we divide the discussion into three sections: the First to Seventh FC, the Eighth to
Tenth FC, and the Eleventh to Fifteenth FC.
First to Seventh Finance Commissions: 1952‑53 to 1983‑84
8.45 The first seven FCs relied on only two criteria for horizontal devolution of the States’
share in the Union income tax: i) population and ii) contribution to tax revenues. FC‑1, FC‑3
and FC‑4 assigned 80 per cent weight to population, and FC‑2, FC‑5, FC‑6 and FC‑7 assigned
90 per cent. Tax contribution got the remainder of the weight in each case. In this scheme, the
population served the cause of equity, while the tax revenue rewarded efficiency. Table 8.1
summarizes the criteria applied by these FCs.
8.46 Regarding Union excise duties, the first FC relied exclusively on population shares as
the criterion for horizontal devolution as seen in Table 8.1. FC‑2 devolved 90 per cent of States’
share in excise duties based on population and 10 per cent based on other adjustments. FC‑3
also continued to base the devolution of these duties predominantly on population, but also
considered, “… the relative financial weakness of the States, the disparity in the levels of
development reached, the percentage of scheduled castes and tribes and backward classes in
their population, etc.”6. However, it did not explicitly spell out the relative weights of population
and other criteria, nor did it explain how it measured them, providing only the final percentage
shares of the States in the revenues devolved.
Table 8.1 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: First to Seventh FCs
Income Tax Excise Duty
Population Tax Contribution Population Other
FC‑1 80 20 100 0
FC‑2 90 10 90 10
FC‑3 80 20 Not specified Not specified
FC‑4 80 20 80 20
FC‑5 90 10 80 20
FC‑6 90 10 75 25
FC‑7 90 10 25 75
Source: First to Seventh FC Reports
8.47 FC‑4 was more explicit in assigning the weights to population and level of development.
It devolved 80 per cent of the States’ share in excise duties based on population, and 20 per cent
based on the social and economic backwardness of the States as measured by variables such as
per capita value added in agriculture and manufacturing, labour participation rates, the share of
the rural population in total population, gross enrolment ratios in grades I to V, population per
hospital bed, and the shares of SCs and STs in the total population. However, once again, FC‑4
6 Report of FC-3, Chapter 4, paragraph 47, p. 22.
154Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
did not indicate how it quantified the indicators of development it had identified, reporting only
the final allocations to different States out of the total share of the States in the Union excise
duties.
8.48 The FC‑5 also devolved 80 per cent of the States’ share in Union excise revenues based
on population. However, for the remaining 20 per cent, it argued, “…the States having less per
capita incomes have lower potential for raising resources and are therefore placed at a
disadvantage as compared to the States with higher per capita income”7. It concluded that it was
reasonable that, “…some portion of the States’ share should be distributed to States with per
capita income less than the average of all States”8. The capacity to raise revenue is an equity
consideration while contribution to tax revenue is an efficiency consideration. The FC‑5, thus,
introduced the State’s revenue‑raising capacity as a criterion for horizontal devolution for the
first time. It also connected the revenue‑raising capacity of the State to its per capita income.
Every subsequent FC adopted these two innovations in one form or another.
8.49 The FC‑5 devolved one‑third of remaining 20 per cent of the States’ share in Union
excise duties based on an integrated index of backwardness among all States, and two‑thirds
according to a per‑capita‑income‑distance formula. It restricted this latter allocation exclusively
to States with below‑average per capita income. It stipulated that this part of the States’ share in
Union excise duties “…should be distributed among States whose per capita income is below
the average per capita income of all States in proportion to the shortfall of the State’s per capita
income from all States’ average, multiplied by the population of the State”9. The phrase in italics
represented yet another innovation by FC‑5. It came to be known as the ‘income‑distance’
criterion, with the vast majority of subsequent FCs adopting it in some modified form.
8.50 The Sixth Finance Commission (FC‑6) set aside 75 per cent of the States’ share in the
Union excise duties for devolution based on population shares, and the remaining 25 per cent
on “…the distance of a State’s per capita income from that of the State with the highest per
capita income multiplied by population of the State concerned according to 1971 census”10. This
criterion was an extension of the income‑distance criterion deployed by the FC‑5 to include all
States as beneficiaries. Rather than restricting the devolution to States with below‑average per
capita income, it included all States as beneficiaries. Only Punjab, the State with the highest per
capita income, received zero allocation because its income distance from itself was nil.
8.51 Beginning with the FC‑7, the weight assigned to population directly in horizontal
devolution of States’ share of Union excise revenues declined significantly, with equalizing
criteria receiving larger weights. The FC‑7 assigned a weight of 25 per cent to population. Of
the remainder, it devolved 25 per cent based on population weighted by inverse per capita
income, 25 per cent on the State’s share in the total number of poor nationwide, and 25 per cent
7 Report of the FC-5, paragraph 4.12, p. 36.
8 Report of the FC-5, paragraph 4.12, p. 36.
9 Report of the FC-5, paragraph 4.12, p. 36.
10 Report of the FC-6, Ch IV, paragraph 16, p. 17.
155Sixteenth Finance Commission
on the revenue equalization principle. The first of these three criteria represented a variation on
the income distance formula, allocating a larger revenue per capita to a State, the lower its per
capita income.
8.52 In implementing its third criterion, the FC‑7 first estimated each State’s potential per
capita revenue based on per capita GSDP and a common average level of tax effort. It then
allocated 25 per cent of the States’ share in Union excise duties in proportion to the population
weighted by the distance between the highest estimated per capita revenue and the State’s
estimated per capita revenue. As the Eighth Finance Commission (FC‑8) pointed out in its
report, this criterion was equivalent to the income distance criterion11.
Eighth to Tenth Finance Commissions: 1984‑85 to 1999‑2000
8.53 The Sixth and Seventh FCs had interpreted per capita income as an indicator of the level
of development. However, like FC‑5, the FC‑8 returned to interpreting it as an indicator of
revenue‑raising capacity. To quote FC‑8, “We are of the view that the distance of per capita
income of States from the highest per capita income of any State, which is a well‑accepted
indicator of the relative backwardness of States, would also be a good indicator of the capacity
of States to raise resources”12. Given that the goal of progressive tax revenue allocations is to
equalize the ability of States to provide public services rather than equalizing per capita incomes
or the level of development across States, the interpretation of income distance as an indicator
of the gap in revenue‑raising capacity in the context of horizontal devolution is more
appropriate. Unsurprisingly, this interpretation became conventional wisdom post FC‑8.
8.54 The FC‑8 unified the horizontal devolution criteria across income tax and Union excise
duties. After setting aside 10 per cent of the States’ share in income tax revenue for devolution
based on contribution and 11.1 per cent of their share in Union excise duties for allocation
exclusively to revenue‑deficit States, it applied a common set of criteria to devolve the
remaining share of States in income tax revenues plus the Union excise duties. It allocated 25
per cent of this revenue based on population shares, 25 per cent based on the inverse per capita
income criterion, and 50 per cent according to the income‑distance formula. To avoid allocating
nil revenue to the State with the highest per capita income (Punjab) under the income‑distance
criterion, the FC‑8 notionally assigned it the same distance as calculated for the State with the
second‑highest per capita income (Haryana). Notably, taking cognisance of several limitations
of poverty estimates, FC‑8 dropped it as a devolution criterion.
8.55 The FC‑9, in its first report (applicable during 1989‑90), allocated 25 per cent of the
States’ share in revenues from income tax and Union excise duties based on population share,
12.5 per cent based on inverse per capita income, 50 per cent based on per capita income distance
and 12.5 per cent based on the proportion of poor population in the State. It devolved the States’
share in revenues from income tax and Union excise duties differently in its second report
11 Report of the FC-8, paragraph 6.35, p. 51.
12 Report of the FC-8, paragraph 6.36, p. 52
156Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
(applicable to 1990‑91 to 1994‑95). It allocated 10 per cent of the income tax revenue based on
contribution, 45 per cent based on income distance, 22.5 per cent on the population as per the
1971 Census, 11.25 per cent on a composite index of backwardness, and 11.25 per cent on the
population‑weighted inverse per capita income. Regarding Union excise duties, the FC‑9
allocated 25 per cent based on population, 12.5 per cent on the inverse per capita income
criterion, 12.5 per cent on an index of backwardness, 33.5 per cent on the income‑distance
formula, and 16.5 per cent on revenue deficit.
8.56 The FC‑10 was the last Commission before the 80th Constitutional Amendment came
into force, which brought all taxes into a single divisible pool. Because FC‑10 had recommended
what later became the 80th Constitutional Amendment, it is unsurprising that it returned to
applying a common set of criteria to the devolving income tax and Union excise duties. Having
set aside 15.8 per cent of the States’ share in Union excise revenues for devolving to
revenue‑deficit States, it recommended allocating the remainder of the share in excise duties
and the States’ share in income tax revenue according to a common set of criteria. It assigned a
20 per cent weight to population, 60 per cent to population weighted by per capita income
distance, 5 per cent to area, 5 per cent to an infrastructure index, and 10 per cent to tax effort.
The FC‑10, thus, introduced area as a criterion for the first time. Table 8.2 summarises the
allocation criteria and weights employed by the FC‑8 to FC‑10.
Table 8.2 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: Eighth to Tenth FCs
FC‑9
FC‑9*
Criterion FC‑8* (Second Report) FC‑10**
(First R eport)
Income Tax Excise Duty
Population Share 25 25 22.5 25 20
Inverse Per Capita Income 25 12.5 11.25 12.5
Per Capita Income Distance 50 50 45 33.5 60
Proportion of Poor Population 12.5
Tax Contribution 10
Index of Backwardness 11.25 12.5
Revenue Deficit 16.5
Area 5
Infrastructure Index 5
Tax Effort 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Eighth to Tenth FC Reports
Notes: *The weights in this column were applied to the States' share in income tax plus excise tax after taking
out 10 per cent from the States’ share in income tax for allocation according to tax contribution and 11.1 per
cent out of the States’ share in excise tax for devolution to revenue‑deficit States.
**The weights in this column were applied to the States’ share in the income tax plus excise tax after taking
out 15.8 per cent from the States' share in excise revenues for devolution to revenue‑deficit States.
157Sixteenth Finance Commission
8.57 We may summarise some highlights of the allocation criteria deployed by the first ten
FCs (1952‑2000). First, during the early decades, the FCs relied heavily on population as the
basis for horizontal devolution. The first six FCs allocated 80 per cent or more of the States’
share in income tax, and 75 per cent or more of their share in Union excise tax based entirely on
population. During this phase, per capita devolutions were approximately equal across States,
with only a small degree of progressivity based on the differences in the levels of development
or per capita income.
8.58 Second, devolution became more progressive under the FC‑7. With the States' share in
Union excise revenues doubling from 20 per cent to 40 per cent under this FC, this source
became a large proportion of the States’ share in the divisible pool. Moreover, the FC‑7 allocated
75 per cent of the States’ share in Union excise revenues based on criteria that lent progressivity
to the allocations.
8.59 Third, this shift was sustained and accelerated under the Eighth to Tenth FCs, with the
devolution criteria across revenues from income tax and Union excise tax substantially unified,
and the direct weight assigned to population falling to or below 25 per cent. Finally, by the
FC‑10, the income‑distance criterion had emerged as the major source of progressivity in
horizontal devolution.
Eleventh to Fifteenth Finance Commissions: 2000‑01 to 2025‑26
8.60 The 80th Amendment Act, 2000, was notified on 09 June 2000, and came into force
retrospectively from 01 April 1996. Under it, all Union taxes and duties (except cess, surcharges,
tax revenues belonging to the Union Territories) minus the cost of tax collection, became a part
of the divisible pool. Therefore, beginning with the FC‑11, a single set of devolution criteria
disbursed the entire States’ share of the divisible pool to the States. Table 8.3 provides a
summary of the criteria deployed by these five FCs.
Table 8.3 Weights (percentage) of Different Criteria: Eleventh to Fifteenth FCs
Criterion FC‑11 FC‑12 FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
Population (1971) 10 25 25 17.5
Population (2011) 10 15
Area 7.5 10 10 15 15
Income Distance/Fiscal Capacity 62.5 50 47.5 50 45
Index of Infrastructure 7.5
Forest 7.5 10
Total Fertility Rate 12.5
Tax/Fiscal Effort 5 7.5 2.5
Fiscal Discipline 7.5 7.5 17.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Eleventh to Fifteenth FC Reports
158Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
8.61 Under the last five FCs, the income‑distance criterion, with its progressive tilt, has been
the basis of horizontal devolution of 45 per cent or more of the divisible pool. In addition,
population, area, and infrastructure index also lean towards equity in varying degrees.
Therefore, each of these five FCs has disbursed 75 per cent or more of the divisible pool based
on equity. Forest cover is an efficiency‑based criterion, but it also carries an element of equity
ex‑post since the seven northeastern States accounted for 25.4 per cent of India’s dense forest
area in 2021, but only 3.8 per cent of the population as per the 2011 Census. Madhya Pradesh
and Chhattisgarh together accounted for another 20.7 per cent of the forest area and 8.3 per cent
of the population. The remaining three criteria - total fertility rate, tax effort, and fiscal discipline
- are efficiency‑based but have accounted for the devolution of a relatively small proportion of
the divisible pool.
State‑wise Shares: Eleventh to Fifteenth Finance Commissions
8.62 Next, we consider the shares of different States in the total share of all States in the
divisible pool under the Eleventh to Fifteenth FCs. As a preliminary point, it is important to note
that the States’ shares are impacted not only due to shifts in the devolution criteria applied, but
also because of the changes in the values of underlying parameters. For instance, the per capita
income distance of a State under the FC‑15 was not the same as under the FC‑14 because the
per capita incomes of the States in the base years relevant to the former were different than those
for the latter. In fact, analysis done by this Commission shows that, even if we were to retain
the exact same criteria and associated weights as the FC‑15, the States’ shares shift significantly
due to the updation of underlying data.
Non‑Northeastern and Hilly States
8.63 Table 8.4 shows the shares of non‑NEH States, classifying them into high, middle, and
low per capita GSDP States, and listing them in order of declining per capita GSDP in current
rupee terms in 2023‑24. We also include the population shares across all States (inclusive of
Jammu & Kashmir) as per the 2001 and 2011 Censuses, the former for comparison with
devolutions by FC‑11 and Twelfth Finance Commission (FC‑12), and the latter for comparison
with devolutions by Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC‑13) to FC‑15. For FC‑15, precision
requires recalculating the 2011 census share by excluding Jammu & Kashmir, but we eschew it
to avoid making the data unwieldy. Until the end of FC‑13, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana
formed a single State. Therefore, the 2011 population share of the undivided Andhra Pradesh
should be obtained by adding the shares of the component States shown in the Table 8.4. Finally,
the ideal comparison would be with the population shares during the award period, but given
their wider acceptance, we opt for Census figures.
8.64 Devolution based solely on population would award each State a share equal to its share
of the population. Under this scheme, each State would receive the same amount per capita.
Therefore, comparing the devolution share of a State shown in Table 8.4 for a given State with
159Sixteenth Finance Commission
its population share allows us to assess whether it got more than, equal to, or less than the per
capita amount devolved nationally. Such a comparison in the light of the information on per
capita GSDP levels also allows us to gain insight into the degree of progressivity of the
devolutions relative to equal per capita revenue allocation.
8.65 Table 8.4 lists eight States under the high per capita GSDP category, seven under the
middle per capita GSDP category, and three under the low per capita GSDP category. Each State
in the first category had a per capita GSDP of 70 per cent of GSDP per capita of Telangana or
higher, the highest per capita GSDP State among the large non‑NEH States in 2023‑24. Taken
together, these eight States accounted for 33.7 per cent of the population in 2011 but had shares
in the 21.2 to 23.7 per cent range in the devolution under the five FCs (FC‑11 to FC‑15). The
three States in the third category had per capita GSDP of less than one‑third of Telangana in
2023‑24. Together, they accounted for 28.3 per cent of the population in 2011 and had a share
in the 30.8 to 34.4 per cent range in the devolution under the five FCs. Therefore, the devolutions
have had a progressive tilt under all five FCs relative to equal per capita shares.
8.66 Table 8.5 makes the comparison of devolution share with its population share explicit
by reporting the ratio of the former to the latter. For the devolution shares under the FC‑11 and
FC‑12, we use the population shares from Census 2001, and for those under the FC‑13, FC‑14,
and FC‑15, we use the population shares from Census 2011. For the FC‑15, the shares in Table
8.5 are calculated after recalculating the 2011 population shares, with Jammu & Kashmir
excluded.
8.67 If a State’s share in devolution happens to coincide with its share in population, the ratio
shown in Table 8.5 would be exactly one. In this case, the State receives a per capita devolution
equal to the per capita amount devolved in aggregate. If the ratio is less than one, the State
receives a smaller amount per capita than the per capita amount devolved in aggregate. If the
ratio is more than one, the State receives a larger amount per capita than the amount devolved
in aggregate. An allocation pattern would be considered progressive relative to equal per capita
amounts devolved across all States if the ratio is less than one at the top end of income
distribution and if it rises as we move to poorer States.
8.68 Among the eight high per capita‑GSDP non‑NEH States, Goa was the only one to
receive a larger share in devolution than its share in population under all five FCs. It received
more than three times the overall devolution in per capita terms under the FC‑14 and FC‑15.
Haryana, which has served as the benchmark State for the calculation of the income‑distance
beginning with the FC‑11, stands out for its consistently low per capita devolutions relative to
the overall devolution per capita. On the other hand, Telangana, Karnataka and Kerala saw a
sharp decline in their relative per capita devolutions under the FC‑15 over that under the FC‑14.
Relative per capita shares of Haryana and Tamil Nadu remained virtually unchanged, while
those of Gujarat and Maharashtra saw a modest rise.
160Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
Table 8.4 Population and Devolution Shares under the Eleventh to Fifteenth FCs: Non‑NEH
States
Population Population
States Share FC‑11 FC‑12 Share FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
(2001) (2011)
High per capita GSDP
Goa 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.38 0.39
Telangana - - - 2.94 - 2.44 2.10
Karnataka 5.22 4.93 4.46 5.13 4.33 4.71 3.65
Haryana 2.09 0.94 1.08 2.13 1.05 1.08 1.09
Tamil Nadu 6.17 5.39 5.31 6.06 4.97 4.02 4.08
Gujarat 5.01 2.82 3.57 5.08 3.04 3.08 3.48
Maharashtra 9.57 4.63 5.00 9.44 5.20 5.52 6.32
Kerala 3.15 3.06 2.67 2.81 2.34 2.50 1.93
Total (High per capita
31.34 21.98 22.35 33.71 21.20 23.73 23.04
GSDP)
Middle per capita GSDP
Andhra Pradesh* 7.53 7.70 7.36 4.16 6.94 4.31 4.05
Punjab 2.41 1.15 1.30 2.33 1.39 1.58 1.81
Rajasthan 5.58 5.47 5.61 5.76 5.85 5.50 6.03
Odisha 3.64 5.06 5.16 3.53 4.78 4.64 4.53
West Bengal 7.92 8.12 7.06 7.67 7.26 7.32 7.52
Chhattisgarh 2.06 - 2.65 2.15 2.47 3.08 3.41
Madhya Pradesh 5.96 8.84 6.71 6.10 7.12 7.55 7.85
Total (Middle per capita
35.10 36.34 35.85 31.70 35.81 33.98 35.20
GSDP)
Low per capita GSDP
Jharkhand 2.66 - 3.36 2.77 2.80 3.14 3.31
Uttar Pradesh 16.42 19.80 19.26 16.78 19.68 17.96 17.94
Bihar 8.20 14.60 11.03 8.74 10.92 9.67 10.06
Total (Low per capita GSDP) 27.28 34.40 33.65 28.29 33.40 30.77 31.31
Memo
Jammu & Kashmir 1.00 1.29 1.30 1.05 1.55 1.85 0.00
All Non‑NEH States 94.72 94.01 93.15 94.75 91.96 90.33 89.55
Source: Reports of FC‑11 to FC‑15; Census of India 2001 and 2011.
Notes: *For comparing the devolution share of undivided Andhra Pradesh under the FC‑13 to its 2011
population share, the shares of bifurcated Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, shown in Table 8.4 should be
summed. For the FC‑14, the population and devolution shares for Andhra Pradesh are as shown. For the
FC‑15, all shares must be recalculated after dropping Jammu & Kashmir. Inter‑se shares of FC‑11 to FC‑14
are exclusive of the States’ shares of service taxes.
161Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 8.5 Ratios of Share in Devolution to Share in Population: Non‑NEH States
State FC‑11 FC‑12 FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
High per capita GSDP
Goa 1.62 2.00 2.25 3.17 3.25
Telangana 0.83 0.71
Karnataka 0.94 0.85 0.84 0.92 0.71
Haryana 0.45 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.51
Tamil Nadu 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.66 0.67
Gujarat 0.56 0.71 0.60 0.61 0.69
Maharashtra 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.67
Kerala 0.97 0.85 0.83 0.89 0.69
Average (High per capita GSDP) 0.70 0.71 0.63 0.70 0.68
Middle per capita GSDP
Andhra Pradesh* 1.02 0.98 1.67 1.04 0.97
Punjab 0.48 0.54 0.60 0.68 0.78
Rajasthan 0.98 1.01 1.02 0.95 1.05
Odisha 1.39 1.42 1.35 1.31 1.28
West Bengal 1.03 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.98
Chhattisgarh 1.29 1.15 1.43 1.59
Madhya Pradesh 1.48 1.13 1.17 1.24 1.29
Average (Middle per capita GSDP) 1.04 1.02 1.13 1.07 1.11
Low per capita GSDP
Jharkhand 1.26 1.01 1.13 1.19
Uttar Pradesh 1.21 1.17 1.17 1.07 1.07
Bihar 1.78 1.35 1.25 1.11 1.15
Average (Low per capita GSDP) 1.26 1.23 1.18 1.09 1.11
Memo
Jammu & Kashmir 1.29 1.30 1.48 1.76
All Non‑NEH States 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.95
Source: Derived from Table 8.4
Notes: *See the explanation below.
Census 2001 population shares have been used to calculate the ratios under the Eleventh and Twelfth FCs,
and Census 2011 population shares for those under the Thirteenth to Fifteenth FCs. For the Fifteenth FC,
the population shares have been recalculated from those shown in by excluding Jammu & Kashmir.
162Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
8.69 Among middle per capita GSDP States, devolutions to Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and
West Bengal have hovered around the corresponding population shares. Devolution to Punjab,
which served as the benchmark State from which most FCs calculated the per capita income
distance until the FC‑10, has remained consistently well below its share of the population. The
remaining States in this category - Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh - have received
devolutions well above their population shares. Surprisingly, their shares in devolution have
exceeded the corresponding population shares by a wider margin than those of the low per capita
GSDP States.
8.70 Devolution shares of the three low‑income States - Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar,
have consistently stayed above their corresponding population shares, but not by as wide a
margin as Odisha, Chhattisgarh or Madhya Pradesh. In the case of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the
shares have been significantly lower during the award periods of the last two FCs than those of
the earlier three FCs. In all likelihood, the introduction of forest as a criterion under the FC‑14
shifted the devolution shares from these (and other) States to Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh.
With more than 3 per cent share in the forests, Jharkhand could make some gains from the
inclusion of the forest as a criterion. A final point is that, under the FC‑11, the large 62.5 per
cent weight assigned to the per capita income‑distance criterion worked especially to the
advantage of Bihar, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. At the time, per capita GSDP
in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh were much closer to those of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh than today.
Northeastern and Hilly States
8.71 Table 8.6 and Table 8.7 provide devolution and population shares analogous to Table
8.4 and Table 8.5, respectively for NEH States. The last row of Table 8.6 reveals that the NEH
States have jointly received significantly more per capita devolution than the overall devolution
per capita. Moreover, the ratio of devolution share to the population share has steadily risen
from 1.1 under the FC‑11 to 1.99 under the FC‑15. Under the FC‑15, these States have received
twice the average level of devolution in per capita terms. Therefore, on average, the NEH States
are amply compensated for their cost disadvantage on account of hilly terrain.
8.72 Beyond the aggregate ratio, there is considerable variation among different NEH States.
Despite its high per capita GSDP status, Sikkim received over seven times the overall per capita
devolution under the FC‑15. Arunachal Pradesh received almost fifteen times the overall per
capita devolution, and twice that of Sikkim. Mizoram received more than five times the average
per capita devolution. Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur each received three or more times the
average per capita devolution under the FC‑15. Even Tripura, which is located on a flat terrain,
received 2.3 times the per capita devolution across all States under the FC‑15. Only Assam
among the northeastern States received a more modest 1.2 times the overall per capita
devolution within the Northeast under the FC‑15. Its share has declined under the last two FCs.
163Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 8.6 Population and Devolution Shares from Eleventh to Fifteenth FCs: NEH States
Population Population
States Share FC‑11 FC‑12 Share FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
(2001) (2011)
High per capita GSDP
Sikkim 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.24 0.37 0.39
Middle per capita GSDP
Uttarakhand 0.84 - 0.94 0.85 1.12 1.05 1.12
Himachal Pradesh 0.60 0.68 0.52 0.58 0.78 0.71 0.83
Mizoram 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.09 0.27 0.46 0.50
Arunachal Pradesh 0.11 0.24 0.29 0.12 0.33 1.37 1.76
Tripura 0.32 0.49 0.43 0.31 0.51 0.64 0.71
Nagaland 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.17 0.31 0.50 0.57
Total (Middle per capita
2.16 1.83 2.68 2.12 3.32 4.73 5.49
GSDP)
Low per capita GSDP
Meghalaya 0.23 0.34 0.37 0.25 0.41 0.64 0.77
Assam 2.63 3.29 3.24 2.62 3.63 3.31 3.13
Manipur 0.23 0.37 0.36 0.24 0.45 0.62 0.72
Total (Low per capita
3.09 4.00 3.97 3.11 4.49 4.57 4.62
GSDP)
All NEH States 5.30 6.01 6.88 5.28 8.05 9.67 10.50
Source: Reports of FC‑11 to FC‑15; Census of India 2001 and 2011
Note: Inter‑se shares of FC‑11 to FC‑14 are exclusive of the States’ shares of service taxes. Population
shares have been calculated inclusive of Jammu & Kashmir. For the FC‑15, the 2011 Census shares should
be recalculated by excluding Jammu & Kashmir.
Views of the State Governments
8.73 Consultation with the States’ Chief Ministers and their teams was the most enriching
experience of the Commission. Each State argued its case passionately, backed it by data, charts,
analysis, and arguments. Despite the wide variety of views expressed, some patterns emerge
from the suggested criteria and associated weights for horizontal devolution that each State
provided in its memorandum. Below, we summarise these patterns, classifying them under five
major categories.
164Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
Table 8.7 Ratios of Share in Devolution to Share in Population: NEH States
States FC‑11 FC‑12 FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
High per capita GSDP
Sikkim 3.6 4.6 4.8 7.4 7.8
Middle per capita GSDP
Uttarakhand 1.12 1.32 1.24 1.32
Himachal Pradesh 1.13 0.87 1.34 1.22 1.43
Mizoram 2.22 2.67 3.00 5.11 5.56
Arunachal Pradesh 2.18 2.64 2.75 11.42 14.67
Tripura 1.53 1.34 1.65 2.06 2.29
Nagaland 1.10 1.30 1.82 2.94 3.35
Average (Middle per capita GSDP) 0.85 1.24 1.57 2.23 2.59
Low per capita GSDP
Meghalaya 1.48 1.61 1.64 2.56 3.08
Assam 1.25 1.23 1.39 1.26 1.19
Manipur 1.61 1.57 1.88 2.58 3.0
Average (Low per capita GSDP) 1.29 1.28 1.44 1.47 1.49
All NEH States 1.13 1.30 1.52 1.83 1.99
Source: Derived from data in Table 8.6
Note: Census 2001 population shares have been used to calculate the ratios under the FC‑11 and FC‑12,
and Census 2011 population shares for those under the FC‑13 to FC‑15. For the FC‑15, the population
shares have been recalculated from those shown in Table 8.6 by excluding Jammu & Kashmir.
8.74 First, we have States that have pitched for a continued dominance of equity in the
devolution, recommending a weight for the per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance criterion equal to or
larger than that assigned by the FC‑15, which is 45 per cent. Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar,
Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Odisha, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh recommend retaining the
current weight of 45 per cent for the criterion. States recommending a higher weight include,
with the corresponding weight in the parentheses, Punjab (47.5 per cent), Assam, Jharkhand,
Tripura and West Bengal (50 per cent), Manipur (55 per cent). Some States have additionally
recommended including the Multidimensional Poverty Index by NITI Aayog among the
devolution criteria. These include Assam and Madhya Pradesh (5 per cent), Chhattisgarh and
Gujarat (10 per cent) and Bihar (17.5 per cent). Some States recommend including a measure
of contributions by the States to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), such as Sikkim (5
per cent), Mizoram (7.5 per cent) and Goa (12.5 per cent). Finally, Chhattisgarh, Himachal
165Sixteenth Finance Commission
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab and West Bengal have also recommended the
inclusion of the proportion of SCs, STs, or both, in the total population among the criteria.
8.75 Second, many States have recommended reducing the weight assigned to the
per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance criterion. A subset of these States has also recommended assigning a
larger role to efficiency, by including the States’ contributions to the nation’s GDP, or
incremental GDP over a base period. States recommending a lower weight for the
per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance criterion than currently existing weight, include Haryana (15 per
cent), Telangana (20 per cent), Chhattisgarh and Sikkim (25 per cent), Karnataka (25 per cent
for the square root of per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance), Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Goa and Kerala (30
per cent), Tamil Nadu (35 per cent with GSDP adjusted for the purchasing power parity),
Maharashtra (37.5 per cent) and Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Uttarakhand (40
per cent). States that recommended the inclusion of the States’ contribution to GDP among the
devolution criteria include Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (2.5 per cent), Gujarat (5‑10 per
cent), Sikkim (10 per cent), Tamil Nadu (12.5 per cent), Karnataka (20 per cent), and Telangana
(50 per cent).
8.76 Third, the tax effort is another efficiency‑based criterion which finds frequent mention
in the States’ recommendations, albeit with a small weight. Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand and
West Bengal recommended including this variable among the devolution criteria with its current
weight of 2.5 per cent. States that recommended an increase in its weight include Manipur (3
per cent), Assam, Goa, Punjab and Telangana (5 per cent), Uttar Pradesh (10 per cent) and
Haryana (35 per cent).
8.77 Fourth, many States have recommended maintaining the current weight of the forest and
ecology criterion or increasing it. Assam, Bihar, Goa, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Mizoram and
Odisha have recommended retaining the 10 per cent weight assigned by the FC‑15. States
recommending an increase in the weight include Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal
Pradesh and Jharkhand (12.5 per cent), Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Nagaland (15 per
cent), Manipur (17 per cent for the forest‑to‑total area ratio) and Andhra Pradesh, Sikkim,
Tripura and Uttarakhand (20 per cent). A few other States have also recommended keeping
forest and ecology among the criteria but with a weight smaller than 10 per cent.
8.78 Fifth, the population criterion continues to enjoy wide support. The States also generally
agree on the reliance on the 2011 Census population figures for this purpose. The recommended
weights vary from 5 per cent (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana) to 32.5 per cent (Kerala). The
closely related demography variable, based on the TFR, also receives frequent mention among
the suggested criteria. States supporting its inclusion include Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat,
Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Tripura (5 per cent), Haryana and Uttar
166Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
Pradesh (7.5 per cent), Maharashtra, Odisha and Telangana (10 per cent), Karnataka, Nagaland,
Punjab and Rajasthan (12.5 per cent), Assam (12.5 per cent with a floor of 2.1 on TFR), Goa
(12.5 per cent with the floor of 1.0 on TFR), Tamil Nadu (15 per cent), Andhra Pradesh and
West Bengal (20 per cent) and Kerala (22.5 per cent). Annexure 8.1 gives the details of criteria
and weights suggested by the States.
Views of the Union Government
8.79 The Union’s submission to this Commission views horizontal devolution as a key
instrument of India’s fiscal federalism that has steadily evolved from a purely equity‑based
exercise to one that blends equity and performance‑based criteria. This shift, shaped by
successive FCs, reflects a deliberate nudge to States towards greater fiscal self‑reliance, prudent
financial management, and efficient use of resources.
8.80 While recognizing the importance of population, income distance, and environmental
factors like forest cover and geography, the Union noted a gradual reduction in the weight of
pure equalization criteria and a growing space for performance‑linked measures such as tax
effort and fiscal discipline. Against this backdrop, it recommended a recalibration of the formula
that restores fiscal discipline, measured comprehensively through indicators of deficits, debt,
and recoveries from State entities like electricity distribution companies, to reward sustained
prudence.
8.81 The Union also expressed concern about the disruptive volatility caused by major
formula changes between Commissions. As a solution, it recommended introducing caps and
collars on per capita shares under each parameter, ensuring that no State experiences abrupt
gains or losses, and that transfers remain predictable for fiscal planning.
Devolution Criteria and Recommendations
8.82 In its approach to horizontal devolution, this Commission has been guided by two
principles. First, the change in the States’ shares in the portion of the divisible pool assigned to
them as a part of the vertical devolution should be gradual. This means that any changes to the
criteria and weights we recommend should take into account the magnitude of change in the
States’ shares they imply. In this respect, particular care must be taken concerning States that
experience a reduction in their share over that under the FC‑15.
8.83 Second, with growing ambition of the country as the backdrop, due recognition must be
given to efficiency and especially the States’ contributions to growth. Accordingly, for the first
time, this Commission decided to add the State’s contribution to GDP among its horizontal
devolution criteria. Taking cognizance of the principle of gradualism, however, we decided that
the weight assigned to the criterion should be such that it spells only a directional change without
167Sixteenth Finance Commission
causing a drastic shift in the States’ shares. We provide the details on how we implemented this
criterion below.
Devolution Criteria and Associated Weights
8.84 Other than introducing the contribution to GDP as a criterion, we rely on five criteria
that have been employed by previous FCs: population, demography, area, forest and
per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance. In some cases, we make adjustments to the criteria that are novel,
however. We spell out these adjustments below, with further details provided in the Technical
Note at the end of the chapter.
Population
8.85 In keeping with the longstanding practice, described in the section on the devolutions by
the past FCs, we continue to include population among the criteria. In conformity with the
uniform recommendation by nearly all States, we implement this criterion by awarding each
State an allocation based on its share in the Census 2011 total population of the twenty‑eight
States. We assign a weight of 17.5 per cent to this criterion. We note here that whenever any of
our variables are combined with population, we rely on the 2011 Census figures. In this respect,
we have fully transitioned from the 1971 Census population to the 2011 Census population data.
Demographic Performance
8.86 The FC‑15 had introduced the TFR as one of the criteria for devolution. It awarded each
State a per capita share in proportion to its inverse TFR. To convert the per capita share into
total, it used the 1971 Census population. It reasoned that the shift from the 1971 Census
population to the 2011 Census population in implementing the population criterion, as mandated
by its terms of reference, had led to too large a loss in the devolution shares of States that had
successfully arrested the growth rate of the population between 1971 and 2011. The inverse
TFR offset some of that loss.
8.87 The Commission deliberated the merits of this criterion at length. There are arguments
that under the changed circumstances, the advantages of slower population growth had been
replaced by the fears of an aging population, as exemplified by the experiences of Europe, Japan
and China. The Commission found itself in sympathy with the view that as India travels on the
growth path, it faces the risk of aging before it becomes rich. This could adversely impact the
country’s growth prospects. Therefore, the justification for basing devolution on inverse TFR
became weak over time. Accordingly, the Commission considered several alternative criteria
that could replace it without large shifts in the States’ shares in devolution. Unfortunately, this
effort proved unsuccessful in that the alternative criteria implied a larger shift in the shares than
what would be desirable.
168Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
8.88 Therefore, while we are of the firm view that a reward for the lower population growth
through TFR or other indicators must be phased out in due course from the devolution criteria,
we have opted for a gradual transition by reducing the weight of the demographic performance
variable from 12.5 per cent by the FC‑15 to 10 per cent. In addition, we have replaced TFR,
which is a derived indicator from population data, with population growth, which is directly
calculable from the Census figures. Specifically, we set the per capita devolution to a State in
proportion to the inverse of its population growth between 1971 and 2011 Censuses. We convert
this per capita devolution into total by multiplying it by the 2011 population. The Technical
Note at the end of the chapter provides the precise formula.
Area
8.89 We have continued to include the share of a State’s area in the total area of the
twenty‑eight States among our devolution criteria. Recent FCs have assigned every State a
minimum share equalling two per cent in translating this criterion into practice. We noted in our
earlier discussion that this assignment has two undesirable implications: i) with twelve States
qualifying for the assignment, other States lose a substantial part of their actual share, and (ii)
the assignment creates large inequity between States with an area just above two per cent and
those with a small area and a small population in per capita terms. This Commission deliberated
on these issues and concluded that a correction in this respect was required. Following the
principle of gradualism and recognizing that a complete elimination or even a sharp reduction
in the floor would have too large an impact on some small States, it opted for reducing the floor
to 1.5 per cent. The Technical Note at the end of the chapter provides the precise formula. We
assigned a weight of 10 per cent to this criterion.
Forest
8.90 During our consultations, some States had asked the Commission to include open forests
in defining this variable. A handful of States had also recommended rewarding States for the
expansion of the forest over a base period. We have incorporated both suggestions. The Forest
Survey Report (FSR) defines very dense forest (VDF) cover as having a canopy density of 70
per cent and above, moderately dense forest (MDF) cover as having the canopy density of 40-
70 per cent, and open forest (OF) cover as having the canopy density of 10‑40 per cent. We
define a weighted forest area by assigning a weight of 0.30 to OF, 0.65 to MDF, and 1.0 to VDF.
These weights are the ratio of the mid‑point of the range for that category of forest to the
mid‑point of the range for VDF. We have combined the share of weighted forest area of the
State in the weighted forest area of all States and the share of increase in weighted forest area
of the State in the increase in weighted forest area of all States in the ratio of 80:20 to arrive at
the forest variable. For this purpose, the increase is calculated from 2015 to 2023 and for cases
169Sixteenth Finance Commission
where there is a decrease, change is taken as zero. The Technical Note at the end of the chapter
provides the precise formula. We assign a weight of 10 per cent to this variable.
Per capita GSDP Distance
8.91 This is now a well‑accepted and dominant equity variable. It is aimed at correcting for
differences in fiscal capacity among States by devolving more to States with lower per capita
GSDP. Most of the past FCs have set the benchmark per capita GSDP, from which the distance
is measured, equal to the average per capita GSDP of the State with the highest average per
capita GSDP among the large States. For this purpose, we use average per capita income of
states over 2018‑19 to 2023‑24 excluding the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21.
8.92 Shifts in per capita GSDPs in recent years have resulted in very narrow gaps among the
per capita GSDPs of the three States with the highest per capita GSDPs (excluding Goa and
Sikkim). Therefore, the per capita GSDP distances of the States with the second and third
highest per capita GSDPs from the one with the highest per capita GSDP become too small to
result in any meaningful devolutions to them.
8.93 To get around this problem, we take the average of the top three highest per capita GSDP
States as the benchmark per capita GSDP. For this purpose, we exclude Goa and Sikkim. We
then take the distance of the per capita GSDP of the State with the fourth‑highest per capita
GSDP from this average. We assign this same distance to all four highest per capita GSDP
States, as well as Goa and Sikkim. For the remaining States, we take the distance of their per
capita GSDP from the average of the top three. Per capita devolution is set in proportion to the
per‑capita‑GSDP‑distance so calculated. To convert this devolution into total, we multiply by
the 2011 population of the State. The Technical Note at the end of the chapter provides the
precise formula employed to calculate each State’s devolution. We assign a weight of 42.5 per
cent to this criterion.
8.94 Following the past FCs, we eschew introducing the indicators of equity, such as
multidimensional poverty and shares of SC and ST populations in the total population, as criteria
for devolution. The Commission concluded that per capita GSDP is a more direct measure of
the State’s fiscal capacity to provide public services. It also correlates positively with other
measures of equity and therefore indirectly captures them.
Contribution to GDP
8.95 This is a new criterion we are introducing in recognition of India’s growth ambition.
Many States have also recommended to us the inclusion of this criterion. We define the State’s
contribution to GDP by the share of its GSDP in all States’ GSDP. In implementing the criterion,
however, we found that these contributions are dispersed very widely, especially at the top and
170Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
bottom ends, giving rise to large differences in the implied devolutions to the States. To
moderate these differences, we have modified the criterion by defining the State’s share as the
ratio of square root of its GSDP to sum of square root of GSDP of all States. Further details on
the implementation of the criterion are provided in the Technical Note at the end of the chapter.
We assign a weight of 10 per cent to this criterion.
8.96 We note that just as the per capita GSDP distance serves as a surrogate for other
equity‑related criteria such as poverty and SDG achievements, the contribution to GDP serves
as a surrogate for efficiency‑based criteria such as tax effort and fiscal discipline. On a per capita
basis, the proportionately larger contribution to GDP is indicative of generally better economic
management. Specifically concerning tax effort, we note that this criterion exhibits a limited
variation across States. Variation in the tax‑effort weighted population shares of the States,
which form the basis of devolution under this criterion, is determined principally by variation
in the population shares. The correlation coefficient between tax‑effort weighted population
shares and their population shares is 0.98 in our data. With some exceptions, the criterion
allocates funds in the same proportion as population shares.
Recommendation
8.97 Based on the above criteria and weights, the Commission has worked out the shares of
the twenty‑eight States in the portion of the divisible pool assigned to the States. These criteria,
their assigned weights and shares of States are reported in Table 8.8 and Table 8.9 below.
Table 8.8 Formula for Horizontal Devolution
Criteria Weight (percentage)
Population (2011) 17.5
Demographic Performance 10
Area 10
Forest 10
Per Capita GSDP Distance 42.5
Contribution to GDP 10
Total 100
171Sixteenth Finance Commission
Table 8.9 Inter se Share of States
States Share (percentage)
Andhra Pradesh 4.217
Arunachal Pradesh 1.354
Assam 3.258
Bihar 9.948
Chhattisgarh 3.304
Goa 0.365
Gujarat 3.755
Haryana 1.361
Himachal Pradesh 0.914
Jharkhand 3.357
Karnataka 4.131
Kerala 2.382
Madhya Pradesh 7.347
Maharashtra 6.441
Manipur 0.626
Meghalaya 0.631
Mizoram 0.564
Nagaland 0.481
Odisha 4.420
Punjab 1.996
Rajasthan 5.926
Sikkim 0.335
Tamil Nadu 4.097
Telangana 2.174
Tripura 0.641
Uttar Pradesh 17.619
Uttarakhand 1.141
West Bengal 7.215
Total 100
172Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
Technical Note: Horizontal Devolution Formula
Our horizontal devolution is based on six criteria: 1) Population, 2) Demographic Performance,
3) Area, 4) Forest, 5) Per‑capita GSDP distance, and 6) Contribution to GDP. In the formulas
below, we represent them by index i with i = 1, 2, … 6. Each criterion is assigned an index value
corresponding to its order in this list. We index the States by j, with j = 1, 2, …, 28. The share
of State j in the States’ share in the divisible pool is written as,
(i) S = (cid:963)(cid:2874) WC j = 1, 2, …, 28.
j (cid:2919)(cid:2880)(cid:2869) (cid:2919) (cid:2919)(cid:2920)
In equation (1), we define various symbols as follows:
S = Share of State j in the States’ share in the divisible pool.
j
W = Weight assigned to criterion i in the devolution formula. For example, for i =1, which is
i
the population, we have W = 17.5 per cent or 0.175.
1
C represents the share of State j in the part of the States’ portion of the divisible pool disbursed
ij
based on criterion i.
With the W already specified by the devolution criteria, we only need to spell out how the C
i ij
are determined. This is done separately for each criterion below.
1) Population (i = 1)
Under this criterion, each State receives a share in the portion of the States’ share in the divisible
pool, devolved based on population, equalling its share in the total population of the 28 States.
Denoting by N the population of State k (k = 1, 2, … 28) as per the 2011 Census, we have,
k
(cid:2898)
(ii) C = (cid:3168) j = 1, 2, …, 28.
1j (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) (cid:2898)
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169)
2) Demographic Performance (i = 2)
Under this criterion, each State receives a per capita amount in proportion to the inverse
population growth between 1971 and 2011. The higher the population growth, the lower the
proportionate per‑capita amount. Denoting by G the growth in population from 1971 to 2011
k
in State k, that State’s share in the portion of the States’ share in the divisible pool devolved
according to this criterion is,
(cid:3117)
(cid:2898)
(iii) C =
(cid:3139)(cid:3168) (cid:3168)
j = 1, 2, …, 28.
2j (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) (cid:3117) (cid:2898)
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117)(cid:3139)(cid:3169) (cid:3169)
3) Area (i = 3)
Under this criterion, each State receives a share in the portion of the States’ share in the divisible
pool in proportion to its share in the total geographical area of the 28 States, subject to a floor
of 1.5 per cent. For this purpose, the States, having geographical area less than 1.5 per cent of
173Sixteenth Finance Commission
the total geographical area of all 28 States, are assigned a share of 1.5 per cent; and the shares
of the other States are reduced in proportion of their respective share in the total geographical
area of all States, so as to restore the sum across all States to unity. Denoting by A the area of
k
State k (k = 1, 2, … 28) in the total area of all 28 States, we have,
(iv) C = 0.015 or 1.5 per cent for all j = 1, 2, …, 28 whose share of geographical
3j
area in total geographical area of 28 States is less than or equal to 1.5 per cent (i.e. A (cid:3409)
(cid:2920)
0.015 or 1.5 per cent),and
(cid:2885)
(v) C 3j = (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) (cid:3168) (cid:2885) (cid:1499){1−(n(cid:1499)0.015)} for all j and k = 1, 2, …, 28 whose A (cid:2920) >
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169)
1.5 per cent or 0.015,
where n is the number of States having A (cid:3409)0.015 or 1.5 per cent.
(cid:2920)
4) Forest (i = 4)
Under this criterion, we have two components: i) based on the State’s share in the forest area of
all 28 States and ii) the State’s share in the increase in forest area of all States between 2015 and
2023. The former is assigned a weight of 80 per cent and the latter 20 per cent to derive the
forest variable. For this purpose, the forest area itself is defined as a weighted sum of very dense
forest (VDF), moderately dense forest (MDF) and open forest (OF), with weights of 1.0, 0.65
and 0.30 respectively. Denote by F (k = 1, 2, … 28) the forest area, which is, weighted sum of
k
the three types of forests, in State k. Then, the share of State j in the States’ portion of the
divisible pool, devolved based on the forest variable, is written as,
(cid:2890) ∆(cid:2890)
(vi) C = 0.8 (cid:3168) + 0.2 (cid:3168) j = 1, 2, …, 28.
4j (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) (cid:2890) (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) ∆(cid:2890)
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169) (cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169)
For States experiencing a decline in the forest area between 2015 to 2023, ∆F = 0.
k
5) Per Capita GSDP Distance (i = 5)
Under this criterion, each State receives a per‑capita share in the portion of the States’ share in
the divisible pool devolved based on the per‑capita GSDP distance criterion in proportion to the
difference between a target per‑capita GSDP and its own per‑capita GSDP. We denote the
per‑capita target GSDP by y* and the per‑capita GSDP of State k by y (k = 1, 2, …, 28). The
k
share of State j in the States’ portion of the divisible pool, devolved based on the per capita
GSDP distance criterion, is written as,
((cid:2935)(cid:1499) (cid:2879)(cid:2935))(cid:2898)
(vii) C = (cid:3168) (cid:3168) j = 1, 2, …, 28.
5j (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) ((cid:2935)(cid:1499)(cid:2879)(cid:2935) )(cid:2898)
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169) (cid:3169)
We define y* as the average of the per‑capita GSDPs of the three large States with the highest
per‑capita GSDPs: Telangana, Karnataka and Haryana. For these three States, Goa and Sikkim,
the latter two being small States with the highest per‑capita GSDPs in the country, we set y*‑y
k
equal to the difference between y* and the per‑capita GSDP of the large State with the fourth
174Chapter 8: Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
highest per‑capita GSDP, which is, Tamil Nadu. Per‑capita GSDP of each State is derived as its
average nominal per‑capita GSDPs during 2018‑19 to 2023‑24 excluding the COVID‑19 years
of 2020‑21.
6) Contribution to GDP (i = 6)
Under this criterion, each State receives a share in the portion of the States’ share in the divisible
pool, devolved based on the contribution to GDP, equalling the share of squared root of its
GSDP in the sum of squared root of GSDPs of all 28 States. Denoting by Y the GSDP of State
k
k (k = 1, 2, … 28), we have,
(cid:958)(cid:2909)
(viii) C = (cid:3168) , j = 1, 2, …, 28.
6j (cid:963)(cid:3118)(cid:3124) (cid:958)((cid:2909) )
(cid:3169)(cid:3128)(cid:3117) (cid:3169)
The GSDP of each State is measured as the average of its nominal GSDPs from 2018‑19 to
2023‑24, excluding the COVID‑19 year of 2020‑21.
175ASSESSMENT OF
9
STATE FINANCES
9
AND
10 Chapter 9
GRANTS-IN-AID
9.1 Article 280(3)(b) of the Constitution mandates the Finance Commission (FC) to
recommend the principles for determining grants‑in‑aid of State revenues from the Consolidated
Fund of India. Complementing this, Article 275(1) makes provision for these grants, stating,
“Such sums as Parliament may by law provide shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund of
India in each year as grants‑in‑aid of the revenues of such States as Parliament may determine
to be in need of assistance, and different sums may be fixed for different States”. Article 275(2)
further stipulates that, until Parliament enacts a law under clause (1), the President may exercise
this power, but only after considering the FC’s recommendations once it is constituted. Since
Parliament has never legislated under Article 275(1), grants‑in‑aid continue to be implemented
based on the Commission’s advice. In line with these Constitutional provisions, paragraph 4(ii)
of the current Commission’s Terms of Reference (ToR) mandates it to recommend both the
guiding principles and the quantum of grants‑in‑aid to States under Article 275, except for
purposes specified in the provisos to clause (1). This chapter presents those recommendations.
9.2 Grants under Article 275(1) may be general‑purpose, sector‑specific, or State‑specific.
General‑purpose grants, commonly known as revenue deficit grants (RDGs), bridge the gap
between a State’s revenues and expenditures and have been awarded by all fifteen FCs. Sector-
and State‑specific grants address particular needs, such as health, education, or geographical
challenges, but have been given only intermittently. The First Finance Commission introduced
such grants, which have continued since then. But following the rise in States’ share of the
divisible pool to 42 per cent by the Fourteenth Finance Commission, the Union Government
largely discontinued releasing them. Accordingly, the present Commission confines its analysis
to revenue deficit grants.
177Sixteenth Finance Commission
Brief Background
9.3 To date, FCs have awarded revenue deficit or ‘gap’ grants exclusively to fill the post
devolution gap between revenues and expenditures on the revenue account. The first four FCs
(1952‑1969) based their assessments of State revenues and expenditures on past trends. Their
approach was to apply past trends to estimate revenue gaps. They did not yet apply any
normative benchmarks to evaluate whether State expenditure levels were efficient or whether
State revenues reflected adequate fiscal effort.
9.4 Under the Fifth to Eighth Commissions (1969‑1989), there was progressively greater
recognition of the limitations of assessments based on the past trends. These Commissions
began adopting more sophisticated approaches to assessing the revenues and expenditures,
introducing certain normative elements, particularly on the expenditure side. For example,
allowances for pay revisions and standardised norms for maintenance expenditure were
gradually incorporated. Yet, the gap‑filling nature of these grants remained predominant, and
the Commissions themselves acknowledged the risk of creating adverse incentives – States with
larger deficits tended to qualify for larger grants, potentially undermining fiscal discipline.
9.5 A more definite shift occurred under the Ninth Finance Commission (1989‑95), with its
ToR explicitly directing it to follow a normative approach to evaluating revenues and
expenditures during the award period. The Commission moved to evaluating what States ought
to be able to raise by way of revenues, given their fiscal capacity, and what they ought to spend,
rather than projecting past trends forward. This Commission employed regression analysis to
establish common norms for tax effort and the costs of providing public services across States.
This normative approach was intended to delink grants from actual deficits and ensure that
States did not receive larger transfers merely because of weaker fiscal effort or inefficient
expenditure management.
9.6 The Tenth to Twelfth FCs (1995‑2010) found the approach of FC‑9 to suffer from serious
limitations particularly due to the heterogeneity of initial endowments of public institutions,
such as schools and hospitals, different geographical terrains, and varying governance
capabilities across States. Hence, they shifted away from regression analysis and adopted an
approach based on informed judgments, particularly with respect to excluding certain
expenditures from their assessments. The FC‑11 broke new ground by making a part of the RDG
conditional on meeting certain benchmarks. The FC‑12 was particularly emphatic that RDGs
should be phased out for general category States by the terminal year of its award period
(2009‑10). Following the FC‑12 recommendations, RDGs were now viewed as temporary
instruments to help States transition to a situation of balanced revenue accounts. To this end,
FC‑12 proposed a scheme linking debt relief to debt consolidation. It provided for debt
write‑offs, conditional on enacting and adhering to a Fiscal Responsibility Law, which set clear
targets for eliminating the revenue deficit and reducing the fiscal deficit. Accordingly, the 2000s
178Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
decade saw the emergence of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Acts
across States.
9.7 Thanks to the debt consolidation and write‑off scheme proposed by the FC‑12, the
assessment of revenues and expenditures by the Thirteenth Finance Commission (2010‑2015)
revealed that it needed to award revenue deficit grants to only eight special category States. It
projected a revenue surplus for all general category States plus Assam, Sikkim and Uttarakhand,
during each year of its award period. The Commission explicitly stated that the objective was
for all States to achieve revenue balance by the terminal year of its award period.
9.8 Unfortunately, by the time the Fourteenth Finance Commission (2015‑20) came along,
revenue deficits of States had reappeared. Despite the large increase in devolution to States and
the adoption of a normative approach to assessing revenues and expenditures, it still identified
substantial post‑devolution revenue deficits for many States, including some which did not
receive RDGs recommended by FC‑13. Following the closure of the Planning Commission and
consequent impending end to the distinction between plan and non‑plan expenditures, it
included plan expenditures also in its assessments. It awarded sizeable grants in the first year of
the award period, with the amounts tapering down to significantly smaller sums by the terminal
year. However, in line with earlier FC trends, the actual revenue deficits did not decline
commensurately as assessed by FC‑14 even with the sizeable award of RDG.
9.9 Perhaps in view of the persistence of large revenue deficits despite the significant jump
in the States’ share in the divisible pool and significant revenue deficit grants under the FC‑14,
the ToR of the Fifteenth Finance Commission (2020‑26) explicitly mandated it to consider
“…whether revenue deficit grants be provided at all”. Upon its own normative assessment, the
Commission concluded that such grants remained necessary but emphasised that the grants
should not become open‑ended. Applying a normative framework, it set the goal of zero revenue
deficit by 2025‑26 for all non‑NEH States. It recommended grants to seventeen States, heavily
front‑loading them in the first three years of the award period. This was mainly due to the impact
of COVID‑19 and the post‑COVID recovery projected by FC‑15 – the initial years were
estimated to have relatively lower revenues and higher expenditure, with revenues improving
in later years, thereby reducing or even eliminating the gap.
9.10 It is instructive to compare the sum of the normatively constructed revenue deficits of
the States with the sum of their actual revenue deficits, where the latter include devolution but
not the RDG. This is done for the last six FCs as visible in Figure 9.1, where the solid curve
depicts the path of normatively constructed revenue deficit and the dotted one that of the actual
revenue deficit, inclusive of devolution but exclusive of RDG. It may be noted that, except for
the FC‑13, each of the remaining five FCs has begun its first year of the award period with a
high normatively assessed revenue deficit as compared to the last year of previous FC, which
steadily tapers down to a negligible level by the end of the terminal year.
9.11 The dotted line graph in Figure 9.1 shows that the actual revenue deficit bears little to
no systematic relationship with the normatively determined one. Despite the expectation of a
near‑zero revenue deficit in the terminal year by each FC, except for a handful of years, the
179Sixteenth Finance Commission
actual revenue deficit has not fallen below 0.5 per cent of GDP throughout the three‑decade
period. On the other hand, the normatively assessed revenue deficit has never exceeded 0.5 per
cent of GDP during this period. Similarly, the Figure 9.2 shows the number of States assessed
to be in deficit, with the orange bars showing the number of States with actual revenue deficit
and the large difference between the two in most of the years tells the same story. Obviously,
States do not feel any obligation to move towards the normatively projected path.
Figure 9.1 Actual and Normatively Assessed Revenue Deficit of Revenue Deficit States
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
-
Source: Finance Accounts of States, FC Reports
Figure 9.2 Number of States with Actual and Normatively Assessed Revenue Deficit
Source: Finance Accounts of States, FC Reports
180
PDG
fo
%
69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 52-4202 62-5202
Actual Deficit Normative Deficit
FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
30
25
20
15
10
5
-
setatS
fo
rebmuN
69-5991 79-6991 89-7991 99-8991 00-9991 10-0002 20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202 52-4202 62-5202
Actual Deficit States Normative Deficit States
FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
The Principles Governing Grants‑in‑Aid
9.12 Before outlining our approach to grants‑in‑aid, it is necessary to discuss the principles
underlying it. The natural starting point for this discussion is the set of principles enunciated by
FC‑1. Of particular relevance to us are its first three of a total of six principles. In the following,
we first summarise the three principles as articulated by the Commission itself and then explain
our interpretation of them1.
9.13 Budgetary Needs: The budget is the necessary starting point for assessing the need for
grants‑in‑aid. FC‑1 postulates that several adjustments to the budgets are necessary before
arriving at an assessment of the grants. They include the removal of “…abnormal or unusual
and non‑recurrent items of receipt or expenditure which may vitiate comparisons unless these
are excluded”. These adjustments should reduce all budgets to a comparable basis.
9.14 Tax Effort: “The extent of self‑help of a State should determine the eligibility for, as well
as the amount of, help from the Centre”. While recognising that States may differ in terms of
the scope of additional taxation, FC‑1 drew attention to the importance of tax effort by States,
noting, “a State which is prepared to raise the maximum amount of revenue through taxation is
better entitled to Central assistance than a State which does not itself act sufficiently in the same
direction. … Assistance to such a State [a State in the latter category] may have the effect of
postponing action by the State to increase its own taxation”.
9.15 Economy in Expenditure: Prescriptions offered by FC‑1 in the single paragraph under
this title are sufficiently important to warrant the reproduction of this paragraph in entirety: “An
allowance should be made for possibilities of economy in expenditure. The principle of self‑help
also implies that a State should utilise its existing resources to good account before it makes a
claim for assistance from the Centre. We should like to emphasise here that it is not the purpose
of any system of grants‑in‑aid to diminish the responsibility of the State Governments to balance
their own budgets. The method of extending financial assistance should be such as to avoid any
suggestion that the Central Government have taken upon themselves the responsibility for
helping the States to balance their budgets from year to year. If the amount of grants‑in‑aid were
to be merely in proportion to the financial plight of a State, a direct premium might be placed
on impecunious policies and a penalty imposed on financial prudence. On the other hand, if a
State is eligible for a grant on other grounds, it should not be precluded from this benefit, merely
because its budget is in order as a result of its sound financial management”.
9.16 These are sound principles that have stood the test of time. Subsequent Commissions
have explicitly or implicitly endorsed them. Indeed, the normative assessments by most of the
FCs have, directly or indirectly, followed these very principles. The application of higher tax
buoyancies observed in some States to the assessments of tax revenues of States with lower
buoyancies is in the spirit of the tax‑effort principle. Likewise, the exclusion of certain subsidies
1 Report of the FC-1, Ch VII, paragraphs 17-19, pp 96-7. All quotations in our summary below are taken from these paragraphs.
181Sixteenth Finance Commission
and other items when assessing expenditures follows the principle of budgetary needs. Finally,
the principle of economy in expenditure explains the systematically lower normatively assessed
expenditure than that actually observed.
9.17 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the assumption of enforceability through
normative assessments, implicit in the statement of these principles, has not played out at all as
originally envisioned. Successive Commissions have provided larger revenue deficit grants in
the early years, which taper down to negligible levels towards the end of their award period, in
the hope that the breathing room so provided would encourage States to balance their revenue
accounts. However, this hope has not been realised, with revenue deficits becoming a
near‑permanent feature of the budgets of some States. Fiscal discipline, successfully achieved
through the conditional debt relief scheme of the FC‑12, has been lost once again.
9.18 The combined revenue balance of all States, which had turned into a surplus in 2006‑07,
2007‑08 and 2008‑09 and again in 2010‑11, 2011‑12 and 2012‑13, returned to a deficit in
subsequent years. The revenue deficit of all States reached 0.3 per cent of their aggregate GSDP
in 2022‑23 and 0.4 per cent in 2023‑24. Whereas only five States exhibited a revenue deficit in
2011‑12, their number jumped to twelve in 2023‑24. Several of these States that have availed of
RDGs have persistently remained in deficit. In the meantime, revenue deficit grants have
increased from 1.1 per cent of the gross tax receipts under the FC‑13 to 2.2 per cent and 1.9 per
cent, respectively, under the FC‑14 and FC‑15. These large and persistent revenue deficits have
obvious adverse implications for the States’ capital expenditures and macroeconomic stability.
9.19 These outcomes have partially resulted from a neglect of one of the prescriptions FC‑1
itself had provided under the ‘Economy in expenditure’ principle. The Commission had warned
that the system of grants‑in‑aid should not be such as to “diminish the responsibility of the State
Governments to balance their own budgets”. It was categorical in stating that the method of
extending grants should avoid giving any impression that “the Central Government have taken
upon themselves the responsibility for helping the States to balance their budgets from year to
year”.
Assessments by the Past Finance Commissions
9.20 The pattern observed above in the assessed revenue gap and, therefore, the grants
originate from the way the assessment of the revenues and expenditure has been done by the
successive FCs, especially in recent decades. To the extent that the assessment by FCs is based
on past revenues and expenditures, the prospect of a grant filling the gap between them
potentially creates a perverse incentive for States: knowing that the FC grant would fill the gap,
they need not work hard on revenue collection and can afford to be profligate on expenditures.
It was perhaps in recognition of this problem that, beginning with the FC‑7, Commissions began
to follow a ‘normative’ approach to assessing revenues and expenditures. Beginning with the
FC‑9, the ToRs explicitly directed the Commissions to follow such an approach. The idea was
that the normative approach would result in the Commissions estimating the revenues that States
182Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
should collect, given their potential, and expenditures they should incur, given the likely
availability of revenues and development priorities. Such an approach was expected to eliminate
the perverse incentive.
9.21 The later Commissions have chosen to apply informed judgments to the latest available
Finance Accounts to arrive at their assessments of the States’ future needs. This has involved
making various adjustments and assumptions for projecting receipts as well as expenditures for
the award period of the particular FC. The adjustments included the removal of non‑recurring
items, such as debt relief and waivers, as well as certain discretionary subsidies, including power
and food, from estimated expenditures. These adjustments aimed to make the State expenditures
comparable across States.
9.22 In principle, the normative approach should have worked well; however, in practice it
proved to be only partially true. FCs have come to realize that expenditures such as interest
payments on debt, salaries and pensions – the so called ‘committed’ expenditures – are beyond
a State Government’s control and must be included in full in their assessments of expenditures.
But this means that if a State decides to add a large number of employees to its rolls,
expenditures on their salaries become a part of the committed expenditures that form the basis
of revenue gap and grant assessment by FCs in perpetuity.
9.23 Equally, it is a challenge to distinguish between subsidies and transfers that are
normatively acceptable expenditures and those that are not. Such a choice inevitably introduces
an element of arbitrariness. Conventionally, FCs have treated power and food subsidies by States
as being outside normatively acceptable expenditures. Yet, it is not immediately clear why the
subsidies to all on water or cash transfers to large groups, should be exempt from such exclusion.
9.24 The normative approach faces a similar dilemma in assessing revenues. It is reasonable
to assume that under such an approach, a State with a significantly lower tax‑to‑GSDP ratio than
another with a similar per capita income, geography and demographics should be able to raise
this ratio. Yet, in practice, such an expectation has repeatedly failed to be realised, resulting in
persistent revenue shortfalls.
9.25 After making adjustments to finance accounts in an attempt to make them comparable
across States, the Commissions made assumptions concerning growth rates to be applied to
various components of receipts and expenditure for the purpose of making projections for the
award period. These normative assumptions were made with the expectation that States will
raise their respective tax efforts to mobilize resources and exercise due control over
expenditures. Consideration was also given to equalizing the standards of basic social services
to aid lagging States in improving the level of public services.
9.26 During our consultations, many State Governments observed that the projections made
by FCs were not realistic, as they overestimated the States’ own revenue receipts (ORR) while
underestimating their expenditure requirements. They have stated that in the past, normative
assessments have systematically assumed higher‑than‑actual growth rates for revenues and
lower‑than‑actual growth rates for expenditures, resulting in higher revenue deficits than those
predicted by FCs.
183Sixteenth Finance Commission
9.27 Figure 9.3 provides some evidence supporting the States’ view. It shows the buoyancies
of tax revenues as prescribed by the past five FCs and as observed post‑facto. In the spirit of
normative assessment, FCs have implicitly or explicitly incorporated certain improvements in
tax administration into their revenue estimates. However, these improvements have never been
realized.
Figure 9.3 Prescribed and Actual Buoyancies during Various FC Periods
Prescribed Actual
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
-
FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
Source: Finance Accounts of States and FC reports
Note: The buoyancy figures for FC‑15 are till 2023‑24.
Views of the State Governments
9.28 During its State visits, the Commission received varying submissions on the subject of
RDGs. States such as Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh expressed
scepticism about the effectiveness of RDGs, calling for their abolition or overhaul due to
concerns regarding fiscal discipline. Others, such as Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh,
Kerala, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura and
West Bengal emphasised the indispensability of RDGs for maintaining fiscal balance, fulfilling
responsibilities for basic services, and addressing cost disabilities.
9.29 The States opposed to the continuation of RDGs argue that they create perverse
incentives, promoting fiscal laxity by rewarding States that fail to raise adequate revenue or curb
expenditures. They contend that RDGs have not helped States achieve revenue surplus and
instead created a moral hazard. They propose a shift toward performance‑based incentives and
expand the States’ share in divisible pool, rather than continuing to rely on RDGs. Karnataka
has recommended discontinuing the normative approach used to arrive at the RDGs, as it fails
to account for actual fiscal pressures arising from exogenous shocks, such as the COVID‑19
pandemic, expenditure commitments, including Pay Commission awards, social welfare, and
centrally sponsored schemes’ cost escalations, and revenue‑side uncertainties, including GST
volatility.
184Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
9.30 Arguments of States favouring RDGs are centred on fiscal constraints, mostly of a
structural nature, high delivery costs, inadequate tax devolution and the need for equity. Some
of the NEH States have described RDGs as a lifeline owing to sparse populations and high
infrastructure and establishment costs, including salary expenditures. Nagaland cites special
Constitutional provisions and argues for additional assistance in the form of RDGs. Others have
viewed RDGs as essential support for ensuring that States start with a revenue balance every
year, as horizontal tax devolution alone is insufficient. Odisha proposes expanding the scope of
deficit grants to include capital account needs. Andhra Pradesh views it as essential due to
bifurcation‑related liabilities and provisions in the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.
Assam, while supporting RDGs in principle, suggests that a two‑stage devolution mechanism
for the northeastern States, aligned with their fiscal needs, could obviate RDG requirements.
Most of the RDG‑receiving States have been critical of the tapering of RDGs, requesting a
realistic assessment of their needs.
Views of the Union Government
9.31 In its memorandum to the Commission, the Union Government has favoured the
discontinuation of RDGs due to the merger of plan and non‑plan finance, as well as the increase
in States’ share in the divisible pool by the FC‑14. It has argued that the fiscal reforms incentives
provided by the FC‑11 and FC‑12 enabled the States to achieve fiscal consolidation and reach
overall revenue balance. This allowed the FC‑13 to avoid recommending RDGs for the general
category States. The scenario has reversed with the FC‑14 and FC‑15 recommending RDGs
even for the large and high‑income States. This is despite the hike in the share of States in
vertical devolution, partly due to a decline in States’ own revenue effort and increase in revenue
expenditure driven by higher dependence on Union transfers. RDGs thus carry with them a
perverse incentive and are ineffective in addressing structural gaps. The most notable
improvement in the revenue balance is witnessed when the FCs recommend incentive
mechanisms linked to reforms that promote fiscal prudence, like in the case of FC‑12.
Our Approach
9.32 The Finance Accounts from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 constitute a key source of the data we
employ for our assessment. Where necessary, we also use the 2024‑25 RE and 2025‑26 BE. We
collected additional data as required from the State Governments through the State Data Portal
of the Sixteenth Finance Commission.
9.33 As a first step, GSDP of each State has been projected using the comparable GSDP data
at market prices for the years 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation (MoSPI). The elasticity of each State’s GSDP growth with respect to the
aggregate GSDP growth of all States has been calculated by taking the ratio of a particular
State’s trend growth rate (TGR) to the TGR of all States’ GSDP over the period from 2011‑12
to 2023‑24. These State‑specific elasticities are then applied to the estimated nominal GDP
growth rate to derive the GSDP growth rates of various States during the period from 2024‑25
to 2030‑31.
185Sixteenth Finance Commission
Revenue Receipts
9.34 As pointed out in the review of State finances in Chapter 5, 86 per cent of the own
revenues of the States comes from their tax revenues. Therefore, we assessed tax efficiencies of
the States using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), based on data from 2001‑02 to 2023‑24.
The SFA is an analytical tool used to estimate the maximum attainable output (for example,
potential OTR) given a set of observable inputs (for example, GSDP and economic structure).
By constructing an efficiency frontier, SFA quantifies how far each unit (in this case, a State)
falls short of its potential due to inefficiency, rather than random variation. Unlike traditional
regression models, which treat all deviations from the conditional mean as random noise, SFA
separates inefficiency from random error, using a composite error term. This enables the
generation of efficiency scores that reflect each State’s relative performance against an estimated
frontier.
9.35 Our analysis shows that the mean OTR efficiency in the model is 0.887 (ranging from
0.785 to 0.947). It indicates that tax efficiencies, as measured by this exercise, are highly
correlated with the tax‑GSDP ratios of the States. The implication is that States with lower
tax‑GSDP ratios have lower collection efficiency, as shown in Figure 9.4. We are encouraged
by the finding that the overall efficiency is improving, as illustrated in Figure 9.5, and that the
differences are converging, as shown in Figure 9.62. Therefore, there is ample scope and
possibility of improvement in tax revenues of the States by increasing the tax efficiency.
Figure 9.4 Comparison between OTR‑GSDP Ratio and Efficiency Score of OTR
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Note: Average OTR‑GSDP ratio and Average Efficiency scores over the period 2021‑22 to 2023‑24
2 Sigma convergence is a statistical approach to determine if the disparities in outcome (efficiency scores) among entities (States)
decrease over time.
186
oitaR
PDSG/RTO
Efficiency ScoreChapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
Figure 9.5 Average Efficiency Score of OTR
0.92
0.90
0.88
0.86
0.84
0.82
0.80
0.78
0.76
Figure 9.6 Sigma Convergence of Efficiency Score of OTR
9.36 This analysis indicates that many States collect significantly lower taxes than their
potential. Bridging the efficiency gap could have generated substantially more revenue. In
principle, this unrealized revenue could have helped largely close the revenue gap and maintain
fiscal sustainability without requiring new taxes. States could have generated an additional tax
revenue of approximately ₹2 lakh crore in 2023‑24, if they were to operate at their individual
maximum potential level. In the scenario that the States were to operate at the average of best
187
erocS
ycneiciffE
20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
noitaiveD
dradnatS
20-1002 30-2002 40-3002 50-4002 60-5002 70-6002 80-7002 90-8002 01-9002 11-0102 21-1102 31-2102 41-3102 51-4102 61-5102 71-6102 81-7102 91-8102 02-9102 12-0202 22-1202 32-2202 42-3202Sixteenth Finance Commission
10 efficiency levels observed across years and across States, they could have generated an
additional tax revenue of approximately ₹1.5 lakh crore. In an alternate scenario, if the States
were to operate only at the average efficiency level of top three best performing States in
2023‑24, they could have still generated an additional tax revenue of approximately ₹1 lakh
crore.3
9.37 For the assessment of revenue receipts, the base year (2025‑26) figures of tax revenues
are projected by compounding the tax revenues of three years (2021‑22, 2022‑23 and 2023‑24)
to 2025‑26 at the State‑specific trend growth rate (TGR) observed from 2018‑19 till 2023‑24
and then taking the average of these three figures.
9.38 For the award period, we have applied a State‑specific growth rate on base year tax
revenue figures thus arrived. For this purpose, we have categorized the States into three groups
based on their assumed buoyancies. For States with higher tax potential, we have assumed a
buoyancy of 1.15; for States that operate at or near their potential level, we have assumed a
buoyancy of 1.05. The rest of the States have been assigned a buoyancy of 1.1. We have assumed
a buoyancy of 1.05 for all NEH States except Assam, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. We
find that these three States have higher tax potential and have therefore assigned them higher
buoyancy. The resultant assumed growth rate in tax revenues has been capped at 12 per cent for
every State. This has been done to keep the assumptions realistic for States for which a high
GSDP growth rate is assumed.
9.39 Non‑tax revenues constitute only 14 per cent of States’ own resources and do not follow
any consistent trend. For projecting a credible roadmap, non‑tax revenues have been assumed
to grow at 7 per cent per annum over the base year figures. The base year figures for non‑tax
revenues have been calculated in the same manner as tax revenues, however, using the TGR
from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 with a floor TGR of 2 per cent.
9.40 The share in Union taxes has been calculated based on our recommendations for vertical
and horizontal devolution, as well as the projections for the gross tax revenues of the Union
Government and the divisible pool and grants‑in‑aid (net of RDG) has been projected to grow
at the rate of 7 per cent annually.
Revenue Expenditure
9.41 A major portion of States’ revenues go towards meeting committed expenditure
comprising of salaries, pensions and interest payments. Our analysis shows that expenditure on
these items vary significantly amongst States. Per capita salary expenditure of non‑NEH States
in 2023‑24 varies from as high as ₹11,000 in States like Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Kerala down
to ₹4,500 in (cid:37)ihar. Similarly, per capita pension expenditure of non‑NEH States in the same
year varies from as high as ₹(cid:26),000 in (cid:46)erala to as low as ₹2,000 in Bihar. The per capita salary
and pension expenditures of NEH States is about double that of non‑NEH States. Figure 9.7
shows a definite positive relation between the per‑capita salary and pension expenditure of
States and the revenue deficit.
3 Similar findings on the potential for additional tax revenue generation by states have been reported across multiple studies
(RBI, 2024; Rao & Azharuddin, 2025).
188Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
Figure 9.7 Relationship between RD/GSDP (percentage) with per capita Salary and
Pension Expenditure for Non‑NEH States (2023‑2024)
5
PB
4
3 AP
RJ
2 WB CH KL
TN 1 HR
KA MH
0 TS
BR
-1 MP
UP
GJ -2
JH
-3
-4 OD
-5
4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
9.42 The base year salary expenditure of States has been calculated by first adjusting the
actuals of 2023‑24 by taking its average with 2021‑22 and 2022‑23 expenditures compounded
at the TGR from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 and then applying the TGR to the adjusted actuals of
2023‑24. For States having high salary expenditure, that is, where salary expenditure exceeds
60 per cent of the TRE net of interest and pension in the case of NEH States and 45 per cent in
the case of non‑NEH States, the salary expenditures during the award period has been projected
at a growth of 5 per cent on the base year’s salary expenditure. For the remaining States, it has
been projected to grow at 9 per cent. Pension payments have been projected to grow at State
specific TGRs over the base year pension expenditure, calculated the same way as done for
salaries.
9.43 Interest payments for each year are then calculated as a product of the effective interest
rate and the average debt stock projected for each year. The State‑wise effective interest rate has
been calculated by dividing the interest payments for 2023‑24, for which the latest accounts are
available, by the average debt stock of 2023‑24, estimated as the average of the debt stock at the
beginning and end of 2023‑24. The debt stock from 2024‑25 to the end of the award period is
calculated by allowing additional net borrowing of 3 per cent of projected GSDP per annum for
each State.
9.44 However, the committed expenditure is not the only cause of revenue deficit of the
States. We carried out a detailed analysis of the discretionary expenditures of the States,
especially that on subsidies and transfers. We present a comprehensive analysis of the same in
Chapter 14. As observed in that chapter, there has been an acceleration in expenditure on
subsidies and cash transfers by the State Governments, especially in the recent years. Our
analysis shows that the expenditure on subsidies has increased from about ₹4 lakh crore in
2018‑19 to almost ₹10 lakh crore in 2025‑26 BE. While power subsidies have been a constant
burden on State finances and we deal with them in greater detail in Chapter 13, recent increase
in subsidies and transfers is driven by unconditional cash transfers being given by States. These
189
)%(PDSG/DR
5 PB
4
AP
RJ
3 WBCH KL TN
2 HR
1 KA BR MH
0
MP
UP TS
-1 GJ
JH
-2
-3 OD
-4
-5
- 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
Per capita Salary Expenditure (₹)
)%(PDSG/DR
(cid:51)er capita (cid:51)ension Expenditure (₹)
Source: Finance Accounts of States, Budget documents; population projections by MoH&FWSixteenth Finance Commission
have increased from a meagre ₹(cid:26)3,000 crore in 2018‑19 to a whopping ₹4.14 lakh crore in
2025‑26 BE, far exceeding the power subsidies in that year. We have also highlighted that this
is leading more and more States to incur revenue deficit, thereby borrowing to meet revenue
expenditure.
9.45 For subsidies, such as those on power, food and transport, base‑year expenditure has
been calculated by averaging the expenditures in 2022‑23 and 2023‑24 and applying an annual
growth rate of 8 per cent to the resultant average to arrive at base year. It is expected that the
States reduce these subsidies by 10 per cent each year during the award period. To obtain the
base‑year expenditure on other beneficiary‑oriented schemes, growth rate of 4 per cent has first
been applied to the expenditures on them in 2023‑24 and 2024‑25 RE to arrive at the base year.
The average of the number so derived and the 2025‑26 BE expenditure has been taken as the
base year estimate. It has been noticed that the expenditures on these schemes have spiked in
some States in 2024‑25 RE and 2025‑26 BE. For States with spikes in 2025‑26 BE expenditures,
appropriate adjustments have been made. A conservative 5 per cent growth rate to the base‑year
estimate of expenditure on these schemes has been applied to obtain the projected amounts for
the award period.
9.46 The remaining revenue expenditures, that is, total revenue expenditure net of interest,
salaries and pensions, and subsidies and transfers, have been classified as ‘other revenue
expenditures’ (ORE). They are spread across the categories of general services, social services
and economic services. First, the 2023‑24 actuals of ORE have been adjusted by taking its
average with 2022‑23 expenditures compounded at 9 per cent. This has been adjusted for some
States to ensure that it does not vary greatly from the trend exhibited in previous years. The
projections for the award period for ORE have been obtained by applying a 9 per cent annual
growth rate to these adjusted actuals of 2023‑24.
9.47 Summary of our assessment of State finances is shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Assessment of State Revenue Receipts and Revenue Expenditures of
All States (₹ crore)
2026‑27 2027‑28 2028‑29 2029‑30 2030‑31
GSDP 4,04,12,911 4,48,58,331 4,97,92,748 5,52,69,950 6,13,49,645
Revenue Receipts, 50,88,548 56,42,430 62,58,321 69,43,309 77,05,306
of which
Own Revenue Receipts 29,92,066 33,16,900 36,77,805 40,78,853 45,24,579
Transfers from Union 20,96,482 23,25,530 25,80,515 28,64,456 31,80,727
Revenue Expenditure, 51,44,907 55,40,089 59,80,564 64,70,258 70,13,591
of which
Interest Payments 6,90,206 7,68,667 8,55,812 9,52,613 10,60,155
Pensions 7,10,656 7,97,524 8,95,266 10,05,271 11,29,105
190Chapter 9: Assessment of State Finances and Grants-in-Aid
Revenue Deficit Grants
9.48 Our review and assessment of State finances in general, and that of tax revenues,
committed expenditure and discretionary expenditures in particular shows that there is
significant scope of increasing revenues and rationalising expenditure. We firmly believe that
the cause of revenue deficit of States, as it stands today, lies in these factors. With the pandemic
behind us, States need to improve tax efficiency and rationalise their expenditure to eliminate
the revenue deficit, which is hovering around 0.3 per cent of GDP post‑COVID, as detailed in
Chapter 5. We had also noted in our review of State finances that size of the budget of the States
exhibits annual variations in either direction up to one percentage point of GDP in response to
changing economic environment during 2011‑12 and 2023‑24. Even committed expenditure of
State Governments recorded a fall after the COVID-19 pandemic and stood at 6.9 per cent of
GDP in 2023‑24 compared to 7.8 per cent in 2020‑21 and 7.1 per cent in 2011‑12. This points
towards certain possible scope for downward flexibility in economising establishment expenses.
9.49 A fundamental problem with recurrent revenue deficit grants across successive FCs
typically exemplifies the problem of time inconsistency where fiscal policies that appear optimal
ex ante by the FCs are not adhered to ex post by the States once expectations of central assistance
are internalized. When States anticipate that shortfalls in their revenue account will be
compensated through RDGs, the incentive to undertake difficult but necessary fiscal reforms
such as rationalizing subsidies, improving tax administration, or curbing revenue expenditures
weakens. Over time, this softens fiscal discipline and embeds dependency rather than resilience.
9.50 Therefore, in continuation of the diminishing trend of the revenue deficit grants
recommended by FC‑15, which reduce to near‑zero level by 2025‑26, we do not recommend
any revenue deficit grants to States. We also do not recommend any sector‑specific or
State‑specific grants. In next two chapters, we turn to local body grants and grants for financing
disaster relief.
191LOCAL BODY
10
GRANTS
Chapter 10
10.1 Following Articles 280(3)(bb) and 280(3)(c) of the Constitution, the ToR of the present
Commission direct it to recommend “the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund
of a State to supplement the resources of the panchayats and municipalities in the State on the
basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State”.
10.2 The provisions for measures to expand the resources of the rural and urban local bodies
(RLBs and ULBs) themselves flow from the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution,
brought into force in 1993. The two amendments provide the framework for the devolution of
authority and finances to RLBs and ULBs, respectively. They specify the functions and fiscal
powers that the State legislatures may devolve to the panchayats and municipalities. These two
amendments also incorporate provisions for regular local body elections. However, full
devolution of governance and financial powers to the local bodies by the State Governments, as
envisaged in the Constitutional amendments, still remains a work in progress.
10.3 Successive Finance Commissions (FCs) have interpreted the phrase ‘measures needed
to augment’ resources of the States as recommendations of grants‑in‑aid from the Consolidated
Fund of India and suggestions to expand the volume of the local bodies’ own fiscal resources.
Since local bodies fall under the State List of the Constitution, the grants from the Union are
expected to supplement, not substitute, the resources transferred by the States on the
recommendations of the State Finance Commissions (SFCs).
10.4 Reports of the SFCs have lacked uniformity in the approach adopted, periods covered
and the quality of data and analyses. Time periods of appointments of SFCs by different States
have also differed markedly. As a result, the past FCs have been unable to base their
193Sixteenth Finance Commission
recommendations on the SFC reports. This Commission too has faced these difficulties and has
been unable to base its recommendations on the reports of SFCs.
Past Finance Commissions: A Review
10.5 Consequent to the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution, the Tenth Finance
Commission (FC‑10, 1995‑2000) provided for an ad‑hoc grant of ₹100 per capita for the rural
population based on the 1971 census and an ad‑hoc grant of ₹1,000 crore for municipalities to
meet their primary obligations. The Eleventh Finance Commission (FC‑11, 2000‑05) provided
a grant of ₹8,000 crore for the panchayats and ₹2,000 crores for the municipalities for its
five‑year award period. The Twelfth Finance Commission (FC‑12, 2005‑10) recommended a
total grant of ₹25,000 crore which was divided between the panchayats and ULBs in the ratio
of 80:20. The Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC‑13, 2010‑15) felt that the local bodies should
also benefit from the buoyancy of Union taxes and recommended that the local bodies be
transferred a percentage of the divisible pool of taxes (over and above the share of the States)
after converting this share to grant‑in‑aid. The grants for the local bodies were equivalent to
1.93 per cent of the divisible pool for 2010‑15. The grants were segmented into 26.82 per cent
urban share and 73.18 per cent rural share based on their respective populations as per the 2001
census. The Fourteenth Finance Commission (FC‑14, 2015‑20) recommended grants amounting
to ₹2,8(cid:26),436 crore for its award period. (cid:55)he grants recommended for panchayats were ₹2,00,292
crore and those for municipalities amounted to ₹8(cid:26),143 crore.
10.6 The Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC‑15, 2020‑26) provided for a total of ₹4,36,361
crore in grants for local bodies in its second report covering the years 2021‑26. Against the
backdrop of COVID‑19, FC‑15 had a provision of ₹(cid:26)0,051 crore specifically for the primary
health sector in local bodies. (cid:44)t had also kept aside ₹8,000 crore for the incubation of new cities
and ₹450 crore for shared municipal services. (cid:55)he balance of ₹3,5(cid:26),860 crore was divided into
₹2,36,805 crore for R(cid:47)(cid:37)s and ₹1,21,055 crore for ULBs.
10.7 The ULB grants were further divided between Million‑Plus Cities (MPCs) and
Non‑Million‑Plus Cities (NMPCs). Expressed as a percentage of the divisible pool, the total
grant of ₹4,36,361 crore by FC‑15 amounted to 3.2 per cent. Leaving out the special grants like
those for health and incubation of new cities, the grant of ₹3,5(cid:26),860 crore for R(cid:47)(cid:37)s and U(cid:47)(cid:37)s
was 2.6 per cent of the divisible pool.
10.8 The quantum of funds allocated for Local Bodies (LB) has steadily increased from
approximately 1.4 per cent of the divisible pool during FC‑10 to 3.2 per cent during FC‑15.
Successive FCs have also recommended an increase in the urban share within the overall local
body grants due to the increasing share of the urban population. It has increased from 20 per
cent each year under FC‑11 to 35 per cent in the last year of the FC‑15 award period, 2025‑26.
194Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
10.9 Figure 10.1 shows the local body grants during the award periods of previous FCs in
rupees, and as a percentage of the divisible pool. In parallel, Table 10.1 shows the actual
releases.
Figure 10.1 Local Body Grants Recommended by Successive
Finance Commissions
Note: FC‑15 grant as a percentage of divisible pool (3.2 per cent) includes grants for health, incubation of
new cities and shared municipal services.
Table 10.1 Previous FCs Grants Recommended versus Actual Releases (₹ crore)
RLBs ULBs
Recommended Released Released Recommended Released Released
(per cent) (per cent)
FC‑10 4,381 3,576 81.6 1,000 834 83.4
FC‑11 8,000 6,602 82.5 2,000 1,752 87.6
FC‑12 20,000 18,927 94.6 5,000 4,470 89.4
FC‑13 64,408 58,257 90.5 23,111 18,980 82.1
FC‑14 2,00,292 1,79,491 89.6 87,144 74,259 85.2
FC‑15 2,36,805 1,75,182 74.0 1,21,055 75,718 62.6
Source: FC‑15 report and data received from the Department of Expenditure for FC‑15 period (up to July
2025)
195
183,4
%4.1
000,1
000,8
%8.0
000,2
000,02
%2.1
000,5
804,46
111,32
%9.1
292,00,2
441,78
%8.3
057,06
052,92
%0.6
550,12,1
508,63,2
%2.3
2,50,000 7.0%
6.0%
2,00,000
5.0%
1,50,000
4.0%
3.0% 1,00,000
2.0%
50,000
1.0%
- 0.0%
FC-10 FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15 FC-15
(Interim)
erorc
₹
tnec
rep
Rural local bodies Urban local bodies % Divisible Pool (RHS)Sixteenth Finance Commission
Criteria for Horizontal Distribution of Local Body Grants
10.10 While population and area have been uniformly used by all five commissions since the
beginning of local body grants to calculate inter se distribution, the use of other criteria, such as
per capita Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) distance, index of deprivation, index of
decentralisation and revenue effort, has varied across them. Table 10.2 details various criteria
used by different commissions. Note that the last two FCs have chosen to rely solely on
population and area.
Table 10.2 Criteria and Weights (percentage) for Distribution of Grants for Local Bodies by
Finance Commissions
FC‑10 FC‑11 FC‑12 FC‑13 FC‑14 FC‑15
Criteria
RLB ULB
Population 100 40 40 50 90 90
Census 1971 1971 2001 2001 2011 2011
Geographical Area - 10 10 10 10 10
Per capita GSDP
- 20 20 10 20 - -
Distance
Index of
Decentralization/ - 20 - 15 - -
Devolution
Index of
- 10 - - -
Deprivation
Revenue Effort - 10 20 - - -
Proportion of SCs /
- - - 10 - - -
STs in Population
FC Local Body
Grants Utilization - - - 5 - -
Index
Conditionalities and Reforms Linked with Grants
10.11 FCs have linked the release of FC grants, either in full or in part, to certain performance
requirements and/or tied them to particular usage, to push reforms in accounting, transparency
and core functions. FC‑10 advised States to design schemes and provide guidelines for grants,
196Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
required local bodies to contribute matching funds and prohibited the use of grants for salaries.
FC‑11 prioritised audit and financial databases, recommending that any grant funds be allocated
to the provision of essential services such as health, education, water, sanitation and public
transportation, while maintaining salary ban. FC‑12 emphasised the need for improvement in
service delivery in water and sanitation and modernisation of financial systems. It tied 50 per
cent of the urban grant to the collection, segregation and transportation of waste materials.
10.12 FC‑13 introduced performance grants, requiring States to submit detailed budget
supplements for Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), implement audit systems, establish
ombudsmen, ensure electronic fund transfers within five to ten days, legislate SFC members’
qualifications and empower the local bodies to collect property tax. FC‑14 proposed a 90:10
split between basic and performance grants for RLBs and an 80:20 split for ULBs, with
performance linked to own‑source revenue improvement and audited account submissions.
10.13 FC‑15 allocated 60 per cent as tied grants and 40 per cent as untied grants. The tied
grant was further divided equally (30 per cent each) between (i) drinking water and rainwater
harvesting and (ii) provision of sanitation and solid waste management.
Conditionality for Accounts and Audit
10.14 Successive FCs have made important recommendations to improve local body
financial management, especially with respect to preparation, availability and audit of local
body accounts, recognising it as a critical reform agenda. FC‑11 suggested that the Comptroller
and Auditor General (CAG) of India be given oversight of the maintenance and auditing of local
body accounts, with audit reports to be reviewed by dedicated committees of State legislatures.
FC‑12 emphasised the need for disaggregated financial data in formats prescribed by the CAG
and called for modernised systems and databases for efficient account management.
FC‑13 proposed the continuation of Technical Guidance and Supervision of Local Fund Audit
Departments (LFADs) by the CAG while also suggesting measures for strengthening LFADs.
FC‑14 stressed the importance of clearly distinguishing various revenue sources‑such as own
revenues, assigned taxes, State grants, Finance Commission transfers and funds for agency
functions‑in local body accounts. It supported the continuation of CAG’s technical role and
urged timely auditing and compilation of accounts. Further, it stipulated that eligibility for
performance grants for both Gram Panchayats and ULBs would be contingent upon the
submission of audited annual accounts pertaining to a fiscal year not earlier than two years
preceding the year in which the local body sought to claim the grant.
10.15 Building on the recommendations of predecessor Commissions, FC‑15 mandated the
timely availability of accounts, both provisional (for fiscal year T‑1) and audited (for fiscal year
T‑2), of individual local bodies online in the public domain as an entry‑level condition for the
197Sixteenth Finance Commission
local body grants in year T. These conditions have resulted in a significant improvement in the
preparation and availability of financial accounts for both ULBs and RLBs, giving a fillip to
transparency and facilitating more informed decision‑making.
Exempted Areas
10.16 According to the Constitution (Articles 243M and 243ZC), the 73rd and the 74th
Amendments do not apply to the Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas where the States have not
enacted laws for the establishment of duly elected panchayats and municipalities.
Post‑enactment of the Panchayats Extension to Schedule Areas Act (PESA), 1996, the areas that
remain exempted are given in Table 10.3.
Table 10.3 Areas Not Covered Under the Provisions of Parts IX/ IX‑A
State/ Area Within a State Provisions Under Which Exempt
Exempt under Article 243 M(1) and 243 ZC(1) and
Meghalaya covered by Sixth Schedule as per Article 244(2),
except selected areas of Shillong municipal Areas
Exempt under Articles 243 M(1) and 243 ZC(1),
with two administrative districts Lawngtlai and
Mizoram
Siaha covered by Sixth Schedule as per Article
244(2)
Exempted under Articles 243 M(1) and 243 ZC(1)
Assam: Bodoland, Dima Hasao and
and Covered by Sixth Schedule as per Article
Karbi Anglong districts
244(2)
Tripura Tribal Areas are exempted under Articles
Tripura 243 M(1) and 243 ZC(1) and covered by Sixth
Schedule as per Article 244(2)
Exempt under Article 243 M(2)(a) and not covered
Nagaland
by the Sixth Schedule
Manipur: Hill areas for which district Exempt under Article 243 M(2)(b) and not covered
councils exist by the Sixth Schedule
West Bengal: Hill areas of the district Exempt under Articles 243M (3)(a) /243ZC (2) of
of Darjeeling, covered by the the Constitution and not covered by Sixth
Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Schedule
10.17 FC‑10 recommended allocating grants to all States, including those not constitutionally
required to establish PRIs. This was aimed at ensuring that, even in the absence of formal
panchayats, local‑level representative bodies in such States receive financial support. FC‑11
introduced conditionalities, stipulating that grants to Exempted Areas would be released only
198Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
after the respective States enacted legislation to extend the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendments. FC‑12 took a more lenient approach by not distinguishing between Exempted and
Covered areas; instead, it entrusted States with the responsibility of distributing the grants,
considering ongoing efforts to amend the Sixth Schedule. FC‑13 explicitly allocated ₹1,35(cid:26)
crore for these areas, guided by Constitutional provisions such as Parts IX and IX‑A and Articles
244, 275 and 280. In contrast, FC‑14 made no allocation for these areas, marking a shift from
earlier practice. FC‑15, however, reintroduced grants for Exempted Areas based on the logic
followed by FC‑13.
State Finance Commissions
10.18 Articles 243‑I and 243‑Y of the Constitution mandate setting up SFCs at the State level
for the eligibility of the transfer of resources from the State to the local bodies. Successive FCs
have also recognised the potential role of SFCs in promoting fiscal decentralisation upto local
governments. They specifically highlighted the need for timely constitution, adequate resources
and prompt action on the recommendations of SFCs.
10.19 FC‑11 urged the SFCs to provide a detailed analysis of the resources of State and local
governments and measures for improvement of local governments’ financial standing. FC‑12
recommended that the SFCs identify issues requiring action by the Union Government. Both
FC‑12 and FC‑13 recommended that SFCs undertake a normative assessment of revenues and
expenditures of the local bodies. FC‑13 also recommended the creation of a common template
for SFC reports.
10.20 FC‑14 emphasised the need for strengthening the SFCs. FC‑15 recommended that each
State appoint the SFC promptly and ensure that its recommendations are acted upon.
Additionally, an explanatory memorandum should be laid before the State legislature on or
before March 2024 to facilitate the availing of grants.
Stakeholder Consultations
10.21 The Commission held extensive consultations with various stakeholders on the issue
relating to the transfer of resources to local bodies. Apart from formal representations of Union
and State Governments, the Commission separately interacted with representatives of various
local bodies during each of our visits to the States and also visited several Gram Panchayats
(GPs) and a few ULBs during these visits.
Views of the Union Government
10.22 The Union Government recommended inter se sharing of local body grants to States
on the basis of population with 50 per cent weight, area with 15 per cent weight and States’ net
transfer of funds to local bodies with 35 per cent weight. It has further recommended that the
State‑wise allocation of local body grants be split into a rural‑urban component based on the
2011 Census, to account for varying rates of urbanisation across the States.
199Sixteenth Finance Commission
10.23 The Union Government emphasised that the core funding requirements of the local
bodies should be addressed by State Governments in line with the intent of the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments. Effective devolution of functions listed in the Eleventh and
Twelfth schedules was essential for empowering local bodies as the Constitutionally mandated
third tier of governance and also for making Union grants for local bodies more effective.
10.24 It advocated a shift in approach for grants from the Consolidated Fund of India to
‘measures’ needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of States by emphasising two enablers.
The first enabler could be ensuring measurement of efforts through modifications in accounts
of States and local body accounting classification, and the second enabler could be assignment
of functions to local bodies in accordance with the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules of the
Constitution.
10.25 It also suggested that transfer of resources to local bodies should be linked with their
financial performance in areas such as cost recovery for services. The role of the Union grants
may shift to supplementing the SFC‑recommended resources for local bodies. It was
underscored that the transfer of revenue sources to local bodies builds their accountability
towards providing quality citizen services.
10.26 Further, empowerment of local bodies to levy and collect property tax, betterment levy,
urban planning fee including value capture charges and parking fee and purpose based cess such
as cess on stamp duty, cess on motor vehicle tax, establishment of a functional GIS‑based
property tax system to increase the buoyancy of property tax collections, adoption of modern
building bye‑laws, implementation of transit oriented development and incentivisation of their
inter‑local body distribution based on performance in levy and collection of user charges were
also discussed.
10.27 It was also suggested that at least fifty per cent of the local body grants should be
allocated to capital expenditure with the goal of improving expenditure quality and promoting
fiscal prudence.
Ministry of Panchayati Raj
10.28 Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR) emphasised digitisation of the revenue collection
mechanism and generation of own sources of revenue (OSR). MoPR also suggested a list of
projects, including the construction and upgradation of panchayat bhawans and digital
infrastructure upgradation of around 2 lakh Gram Panchayats, for which earmarked grants could
be given to the RLBs. It further recommended including the maintenance of assets created under
Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM) and Swachh Bharat Mission‑Gramin (SBM‑G) among the uses of the
grants.
200Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
10.29 Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) suggested a phased increase in the
share of ULBs within the total local body grants from thirty‑five per cent in 2025‑26 to forty
per cent in 2030‑31, alongside earmarking funds for Rurban/Peri‑Urban areas and augmenting
urban local body capacity in crucial domains like accounting, engineering and urban planning.
It emphasised the need to augment the OSR of ULBs and innovative mechanisms such as
transit‑oriented development and value capture financing. It suggested that the conversion of
census towns to statutory towns should be incentivised to promote planned urbanisation.
10.30 It suggested bringing uniformity in accounting standards and informed of its initiatives
towards harmonised municipal accounting as per the recommendations of FC‑15, including
development of an ERP solution with a finance module integrated with Public Financial
Management System (PFMS). It also informed of the exercise for mapping of the existing Chart
of Accounts (CoAs) of ULBS with the CoA of the Union Government and requested funds for
these initiatives.
Ministry of Jal Shakti
10.31 The Ministry requested resources for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) pertaining to
drinking water and sanitation assets created under the schemes Jal Jeevan Mission and Swachh
Bharat Mission (Gramin). In addition, it recommended providing tied and untied grants based
on the FC‑15 model, classifying 40 per cent of the total grants as untied and 60 per cent as tied
for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). The Ministry recommended dividing the tied grant
equally between water and sanitation. The Ministry also proposed performance grants tied to
the recovery of O&M charges with respect to drinking water supply and to promote specific
behavioural and functionality‑based outcomes with respect to sanitation.
Other Ministries
10.32 Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change proposed continuation of air
quality grant for 42 MPCs and inclusion of three more MPCs (Kannur, Kochi and Kollam),
which were excluded under the FC‑15 period. Further, the Ministry proposed the inclusion of
51 cities with a population of 5‑10 lakh for air quality grants. The Ministry of New and
Renewable Energy recommended a ₹50,000 crore grant for local bodies to solarise government
loads, common lighting, water supply and government assets ensuring sustained asset
operations.
Views of the State Governments
10.33 In the State Governments’ memoranda, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and
Uttarakhand have recommended allocating rural‑urban grants in the ratio of 60:40 due to rapid
urbanisation, whereas Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala and Telangana have recommended grants
to rural and urban, as per their proportion to their respective population of the State. Tamil Nadu
201Sixteenth Finance Commission
stated that the urban population receives less per capita grant than rural areas, which is
inadequate given the rapid pace of urbanisation.
10.34 The States had varied views on the weights assigned to parameters for the inter se
distribution of local body grants. While some States recommended continuation of the existing
parameters of population and area, others suggested additionally using the index of
decentralisation, the index of deprivation, income distance, forest cover, SC/ST population and
the contribution of agricultural and allied sectors to GSDP.
10.35 Almost all the State Governments expressed their views on grant‑related
conditionalities in their State memoranda. States like Chhattisgarh, Mizoram, Sikkim, West
Bengal and so on, advocated for either no tied grants, or a larger share of untied grants as
compared to 40 per cent under FC‑15. States also mentioned difficulty regarding meeting the
condition that the rise in property tax be at the same rate as nominal GSDP. Several States also
suggested the removal of the ₹2,500 ceiling on the levy of professional tax.
10.36 Karnataka urged to remove conditions such as the constitution of the SFC and audit of
accounts of local bodies. Other States like Jharkhand, Manipur, etc sought relaxation in
conditionalities to be minimum or no conditionalities. Kerala and Maharashtra suggested that
no additional conditionalities beyond those levied by the FC should be imposed.
10.37 Uttar Pradesh recommended flexible funds under which half of the grants may be
allocated to unique local priorities and the remaining half supports broader national or State
policy goals. Rajasthan also suggested to relax the conditions for tied grants to allow panchayats
with greater flexibility in allocation of funds for local priorities.
10.38 Tamil Nadu suggested disbursal of funds at a higher frequency, quarterly or monthly,
whereas Haryana has recommended grants to be disbursed in a single instalment each year.
States like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh urged streamlining fund release to optimise utilisation.
10.39 Several States like Assam recommended financial assistance through a one‑time grant
to help aid infrastructure development and provide basic service delivery for newly formed
ULBs in the State. Some States were of the view that FC should permit meeting expenses on
salary payment out of its grants.
10.40 Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Tripura
suggested grants for undertaking urban infrastructure projects for basic services such as
sewerage treatment, public transport, green spaces, affordable housing, storm water disposal
system, disaster relief and mitigation and capacity building. Odisha suggested a special
grant to promote the structured development of peri‑urban areas and Meghalaya recommended
a dedicated infrastructure grant to address the high cost of delivering services in difficult
terrain.
202Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
10.41 Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Sikkim proposed that 10 per cent of the LB grants
be earmarked for the Northeastern States and made an explicit recommendation that
Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) be eligible for the FC grant.
Representatives of Local Bodies
10.42 During its State visits, the Commission engaged in detailed interactions with elected
representatives from RLBs and ULBs at all tiers, including those from the ADCs. The key
suggestions emerging from these discussions are summarised below:
(i) In almost every State, representatives of local bodies sought either an increase in
untied grants, or a relaxation or omission of the bifurcation between tied and untied
grants, to allow greater flexibility in expenditure by local bodies as per their
respective priorities.
(ii) It was further suggested that the existing system of devolving funds to all three tiers
of PRIs – Gram Panchayats, Panchayat Samitis and District Panchayats – be
continued to ensure comprehensive rural development.
(iii) Additionally, it was proposed that the criteria for grant distribution be based not
solely on population, but also on factors such as the States’ geographical location,
resource endowments and economic conditions.
(iv) Representatives of ULBs in several States requested infrastructure development
funds for priority sectors, including the improvement of roads, drains, sanitation,
solid and liquid waste management, stormwater drainage, street lighting, desilting of
drains, capacity building, digitisation, urban mobility, technical support and the
development of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. They
further requested grants for social themes, encompassing child and women
development, education and health and family welfare, in consonance with the
achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
(v) Similarly, representatives of RLBs sought financial support for safe drinking water,
sanitation (including Solid Waste Management), lighting and infrastructure
development, alongside capacity building and staffing.
(vi) Local bodies also advocated for a more efficient and timely grant disbursal. It was
further suggested that the grants be released in a single instalment annually.
Studies Commissioned
10.43 The Commission had undertaken the following studies to analyse various issues related
to local bodies.
(i) Recommendations of the latest State Finance Commissions across States in India
through the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA).
203Sixteenth Finance Commission
(ii) Principles of Devolution to Urban Local Bodies through Janaagraha Centre for
Citizenship & Democracy.
(iii) Draft Municipal Reform Blueprint through Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship &
Democracy.
(iv) Identification and Financing of Urbanisation in India through the Indian Institute for
Human Settlements (IIHS).
(v) Incentivising the Transition of Census Towns to Statutory Towns through the World
Bank.
(vi) Comprehensive Review of Panchayat Finances and Measures to Augment their
Revenues through the Institute of Rural Management Anand (IRMA).
(vii) Status and Impact of Finance Commission Grants to Rural Local Bodies through the
Institute of Economic Growth (IEG).
Conferences organised on Local Bodies
10.44 As a part of extensive consultation, the Commission organised the following
conferences on local bodies:
(i) Finance Commission’s Conclave – Devolution to Development in collaboration with
the Ministry of Panchayati Raj.
(ii) National Conference of Mayors and Chairpersons on Strengthening Urban Local
Government in India, in collaboration with Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship &
Democracy.
(iii) Conference on Urban Finances with the Asian Development Bank.
10.45 The outcomes from these studies and conferences have informed and enhanced our
understanding of the local bodies and their financing. Additional information on the above
studies and conferences is provided in Chapter 1 and the related Annexures.
Issues, Analysis and Approach
10.46 We recognise that expanding urbanisation is critical to raising the living standards in
both urban and rural areas. Workers who migrate to urban areas do so in response to superior
economic opportunities that help them raise their own as well as their extended families’
living standards. In addition, such migration increases land per worker in rural areas, thereby
boosting average worker productivity in these areas. With 46 per cent of its workers still in
agriculture, very little land is available on a per‑worker basis. Almost half of the land holdings
in India are smaller than half a hectare, with their average size being a little less than a quarter
hectare.
204Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
10.47 From the overall productivity standpoint, with 46 per cent of the workforce and only
17.8 per cent value added (at current prices) in agriculture in 2023‑24, average value added per
worker in industry and services combined is 3.9 times that in agriculture. Therefore, the
movement of workers out of rural into urban areas, which is strongly correlated to the movement
out of agriculture into industry and services, holds considerable potential to raise the overall
value added per worker.
10.48 Considering this important role of urbanization in contributing to both rural and urban
incomes, in our recommendations for ULB grants, we have paid explicit attention to an
improvement in urban infrastructure of mid‑size cities so that they are better prepared to
respond to the rising demands of urbanization. Additionally, we have recognised that there
is a pressing need for a good rural‑to‑urban transition framework to facilitate smooth and
timely incorporation of peri‑urban areas, administered as rural areas, into existing adjoining
ULBs.
10.49 Our approach has also been guided by the need to continue the focus on the areas of
water management and solid waste management. We acknowledge that large‑scale assets have
been created at the ground level relating to these priority areas and in the absence of proper
operation and maintenance support, they may remain underutilised or even deteriorate.
10.50 We have paid special emphasis on the need for local bodies to generate their own
resources. Currently, the own resources generated by the vast majority of local bodies, both rural
and urban, are minuscule. They remain heavily, if not entirely, dependent on the Union and
State Governments to carry out their mandate. The FC‑15 had incorporated a mechanism to
incentivize ULBs to increase their own‑source revenues by linking release of the grant to growth
in property‑tax revenue. We have taken forward this incentivisation effort.
10.51 Successive FCs have stated that the primary responsibility for the provision of fiscal
resources for RLBs and ULBs rests with the State Governments. In this respect, the role of SFCs
is extremely important and in our recommendations, we have ensured that States constitute the
SFCs and regularly act on their recommendations. To underscore the responsibility of States to
transfer resources to local bodies, we have also linked a part of our grant to some matching
funds from them.
10.52 The Commission considers that transparency and accountability are of paramount
importance for the effective functioning of local bodies. This has been a constant area of focus,
even for previous FCs. We find that significant progress has been made on this front, but much
remains to be done to ensure the timely availability of accurate accounts and their audits.
Thrust on Urbanisation
10.53 Urbanisation is a catalyst for economic development. Cities concentrate resources,
including physical and human capital, infrastructure and civil amenities, thereby fostering
consumption, innovation and employment opportunities.
205Sixteenth Finance Commission
10.54 The Census of India classifies the population of a census town as urban. It defines a
census town as any contiguous land area with (i) a population of 5,000 or more, (ii) a population
density of 400 persons per square km or more and (iii) 75 per cent or more of the male population
engaged in non‑agricultural occupations. However, a large number of census towns do not have
an urban administration; that is, they are not statutory towns.
10.55 In this Commission’s view, timely and rule‑based identification of urban areas, coupled
with proper planning and adequate financing, are crucial for imparting impetus to India's
urbanisation while concurrently enhancing the productivity and liveability of its cities. Ideally,
each State should establish a clear transition policy to ensure the timely and rule‑based
identification of areas attaining urban characteristics. This policy should include a well‑defined
and time‑bound mechanism and a phased approach for their transition to urban administrative
units. The transition period should be utilised to establish appropriate urban administrative
capacities and mechanisms for urban planning, the provision of urban services and infrastructure
to citizens and the seamless transfer of records and information to the new administration. In
essence, such policies should be aimed at raising the resources, infrastructure, services and
political and administrative capacities to urban levels. In Box 10.1, we describe the Rural Urban
Transition Policy of Odisha, notified on 27 June 2023, as a starting point for States interested in
putting such a policy in place.
Box 10.1: Odisha’s Rural Urban Transition Policy
Odisha has adopted a systematic and forward-thinking approach to urbanization in peri-urban areas
through its Rural Urban Transition policy (June 2023). This policy establishes a clear roadmap for
the transition of these areas into Urban Local Bodies by proactively endeavouring to provide urban-
level services and infrastructure even before formal urban recognition. This vision is supported by
budgetary allocations and dedicated handholding to bolster local political and bureaucratic
capabilities. Employing a hub-and-spoke governance model led by a high-level steering committee
and the State Urban Development Agency as the hub and District Urban Development Agencies and
Development Authorities as the spokes, the policy creates a robust administrative mechanism. This
mechanism also ensures citizen engagement and representation from local body representatives of
the concerned ULBs and RLBs, alongside the expertise of urban planners, urban designers,
development economists, infrastructure experts and IT specialists. The policy outlines specific
factors for the selection and ranking of areas for transition, including population, density, contiguity
with existing municipalities, revenue mobilization potential, land structure, employment structure,
economic importance and details concerning mobility/transport and infrastructure. It envisions
targeted interventions in urban planning and design, enhancing urban governance capacities and
resources, establishing political representation aligned with urban norms, developing essential
infrastructure and institutions and creating effective systems for revenue mobilization. This policy
underscores the critical importance of a planned and phased transition as the foundation for
systematic urbanization, aiming to prevent the numerous problems associated with haphazard and
unrecognised urban growth.
206Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Resource Mobilisation by Local Bodies
10.56 The importance of own sources of revenues cannot be overemphasised. Among RLBs,
OSR is collected by Gram Panchayats in most States. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are among the
exceptions, with OSR in these States collected by District Panchayats. Block Panchayats are
typically the least empowered to generate OSR in most States. Annexure 10.1 contains the
figures for OSR generated by all three tiers of RLBs in the States for the period 2019‑20 to
2023‑24.
10.57 Panchayats across India face significant challenges in mobilising their own revenue,
resulting in a heavy reliance on grants, which often constitute over 90 per cent of their revenues.
And it is quite evident that these grants come with usage restrictions, limiting panchayat
autonomy. The Report of the Expert Committee of MoPR on OSR of RLBs highlights that OSR
of these bodies covers merely 6‑8 per cent of their total expenditure.
10.58 Despite being legally empowered to collect various taxes and fees, many panchayats
fail to tap into these revenue streams due to a lack of clear statutory or administrative provisions,
capacity constraints and weak enforcement mechanisms. On the margin, the grants have also
worked as a disincentive to mobilise OSR.
10.59 The ongoing implementation of the SVAMITVA (Survey of Villages Abadi and
Mapping with Improvised Technology in Village Areas) Scheme, launched in April, 2020,
promises to lay a robust foundation for the growth of property taxes in rural areas, ultimately
leading to enhanced OSR generation and improved financial self‑sufficiency for RLBs. This
scheme identifies the owners of rural properties, which is an important and necessary step
towards property tax collection.
10.60 As per the RBI report on Municipal Finances, 2024, it has been observed that the own
revenue sources are not adequate for meeting the revenue expenditure of most of the municipal
bodies, thereby affecting their functional and financial autonomy. Municipal revenues are
disproportionately concentrated in the larger ULBs.
10.61 The OSR figures of ULBs for all the States for the period 2019‑20 to 2023‑24, as
collected by the Sixteenth Finance Commission (FC‑16) from the States through the cityfinance
portal, are provided in Annexure 10.2. Our analysis1 shows that municipal corporations, which
account for 50 per cent of the total ULB population as per Census 2011, account for 80 per cent
of the total ULB OSR. In contrast, municipalities and town panchayats, which account for 36
per cent and 14 per cent of the ULB population as per the 2011 Census, collect only 16 per cent
and 4 per cent of ULBs’ OSR, respectively. Among the States, the ULBs of Maharashtra and
1 Based on the data provided by States on cityfinance portal
207Sixteenth Finance Commission
Gujarat lead in the generation of OSR per capita in 2023‑24, while States like Bihar, Jharkhand,
Manipur and Meghalaya lag.
10.62 According to the analysis by Janaagraha2, OSR contributes 51 per cent of total municipal
revenues for all categories of ULBs in India. As expected, the share of OSR in the total revenues
declines as the size of the ULB declines. For ULBs with a population larger than 40 lakh, OSR
accounts for 61 per cent of total revenues. For ULBs with a population between 5 lakh and 40
lakh, this proportion declines to 55 per cent and for those with a population of less than 5 lakh,
to just 32 per cent.
10.63 The heavy dependence of local bodies on Union and State Governments for revenues
undermines the independence of these bodies as well as their accountability for service delivery
to the local population. Partially motivated by these considerations, the FC‑13 and FC‑15
recommended the enhancement of OSR through improved collection of property/ house tax.
FC‑13 also suggested payment of service charges on Union and State Government properties
and sharing of mining royalties with local bodies.
10.64 Out of all the tax sources available to local bodies, property tax offers the greatest
revenue potential. However, it remains underutilised by both ULBs and RLBs. Therefore,
successive FCs have recommended measures to increase property tax collection by these bodies.
FC‑15, in particular, made notification of minimum property tax rates (for 2022‑23) and
specified growth in property tax (from 2023‑24 onwards) as entry‑level conditions for availing
ULB grants.
10.65 However, the potential of property tax remains unrealised. An analysis conducted by
Janaagraha3, covering 3,895 ULBs representing 81 per cent of the total ULBs, reveals that
against a total property tax demand of ₹69,93(cid:26) crore in 2022‑23, only ₹36,662 crore was
collected. While the property tax collections have increased, growth rate has narrowed,
indicating saturation and difficulty in meeting property tax growth condition in the later years
of the award period of FC‑15. According to the data provided by MoHUA as of March 2025,
the number of State claims for FC grants went down from 22 States in 2023‑24 to 16 States in
2024‑25 due to the mandatory condition of the property tax growth. The overwhelming majority
of the ULBs that could not meet this condition of FC‑15 belong to the category of cities with
less than 1 lakh population.
10.66 Janaagraha’s analysis4 on property tax’s contribution in the total OSR of ULBs for
2021‑22 shows that while it is more than 60 per cent in Bihar, Karnataka and UP, it remains less
than 10 per cent in Rajasthan. There are additional large variations within each State across
2 As per the study conducted by Janaagraha for the Commission wherein annual financial statements of 2,646 cities for 2020-
21 on cityfinance portal were analysed.
3 self-reported property tax data available on cityfinance.in as on 01 April 2024
4 Janaagraha’s analysis of audited statements of 3,322 ULBs covering 23 States available on cityfinance portal
208Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
ULBs. Incomplete and inaccurate property records, low coverage, undervaluation of properties
and suboptimal collection efficiency are some of the reasons for low collection.
10.67 There is an urgent need to take steps to augment property taxes in the country to
strengthen local body finances. States need to take the following steps for the enhancement of
property tax collections:
(i) Enactment of appropriate rules and regulations for efficient levy and collection of
property tax.
(ii) Adoption of a GIS‑based digital property tax register and linking with GIS‑based
master plan of the cities will ensure automatic updating of the property tax register
whenever the master plan is revised. The register hence will reflect accurate current
land use enabling upward revision of property tax.
(iii) Mandating periodic enumeration and regular updating of property tax in line with
the increase in guidance value in State acts and rules.
(iv) An online self‑assessment mechanism with a system for raising demand/sending
reminders and a process for random scrutiny of self‑assessment forms in urban areas.
(v) Utilizing unique property IDs for the creation and maintenance of property databases
facilitates efficient property tax billing and collections. This property database may
be appropriately linked with other databases, like water, sewerage, electricity, trade
license and building permissions for automatic verification of property attributes and
assessment records
10.68 Figure 10.2 shows the OSR generated by all three tiers of RLBs seen as a percentage of
primary sector Gross State Value Added (GSVA) across States in 2023‑24. While the overall
levels are low, there is significant variation across States. The ratio of OSR to primary sector
GSVA ranges from 2.38 per cent in Kerala to nil in the North‑Eastern State of Arunachal
Pradesh and only 0.03 per cent in Bihar. Similarly, Figure 10.3 depicts OSR generated by ULBs
as a percentage of non‑primary sector GSVA across States in 2023‑24. It can be seen that the
percentage varies from 1.40 per cent in Maharashtra to 0.02 per cent in Manipur and Meghalaya.
This disparity is indicative of the diverse degrees of devolution of powers for resource
generation, the differences in the statutory landscape and administrative capacities and other
related factors.
209Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 10.2 OSR of RLBs (percentage of Primary Sector GSVA, 2023‑24)
Source: OSR data based on information provided by States on FC‑16 portal, GSVA 2023‑24 data provided
by MoSPI.
Note: Jharkhand, Mizoram and Nagaland reported NA and Meghalaya provided only ADCs OSR which have
been excluded from the RLBs OSR.
Figure 10.3 OSR of ULBs (percentage of Non‑Primary Sector GSVA, 2023‑24)
Source: OSR data based on information provided by ULBs on the cityfinance.in portal for FC -16 as on
28 August 2025 for 4,621 ULBs, GSVA 2023‑24 data provided by MoSPI.
210
83.2
97.1
12.1
69.0
07.0
55.0
73.0 33.0 13.0 92.0 22.0 12.0 02.0 11.0 70.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 10.0 00.0 00.0
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
AVSG
yramirP
fo
% sa
RSO
BLR
04.1
48.0
35.0
54.0
14.0
93.0
43.0 33.0 13.0
32.0
02.0 91.0 91.0 81.0 81.0
51.0
31.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
90.0 90.0 90.0
50.0 50.0 30.0 20.0 20.0
1.60%
1.40%
1.20%
1.00%
0.80%
0.60%
0.40%
0.20%
0.00%
AVSG
yramirP
noN
fo
%
sa
RSO
BLUChapter 10: Local Body Grants
Accounts and Audit
10.69 The National Municipal Accounting Manual (NMAM), formulated in 2004, represented
the first significant and concerted effort to introduce a uniform structure to the accounting
practices of ULBs across the country. However, due to the absence of statutory backing, its
adoption has been inconsistent and incomplete, both across different States and within
individual States. Consequently, some States and larger ULBs continue to adhere to their own
distinct accounting systems, often employing non‑comparable accounting heads.
10.70 Based on the accounting data reported by the States for 97 per cent of ULBs through the
cityfinance portal, 66 per cent follow accrual accounting, 21 per cent cash accounting and 13
per cent mixed cash‑accrual accounting. There exist significant State‑wise differences as well.
For instance, around 98 per cent of ULBs in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Telangana adhere
to accrual accounting in comparison to only 7 per cent in Goa and Punjab and 6 per cent in
Nagaland. Such variation makes the examination, audit and a meaningful inter‑State comparison
extremely difficult.
10.71 An effort is currently underway at MoHUA to develop an Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) solution for ULBs. It aims to facilitate the entry of financial transactions and the
preparation of accounts in a manner integrated with the PFMS. MoHUA is also currently
engaged in an effort to map the existing CoAs of ULBs with the CoA of the Union Government.
The Union Government has also announced an Urban Data platform for improved governance.
The Commission recommends extending the digital platform's capabilities to support ULBs in
preparing accounts and financial reports.
10.72 In contrast to ULBs, RLBs have made excellent progress in providing the accounts data
through the adoption of the e‑Gram Swaraj platform. This web‑based portal serves as a unified
system facilitating planning, progress reporting and work‑based accounting for over 2.5 lakh
RLBs across the nation.
10.73 RLBs uniformly adhere to the cash‑based Model Accounting System (MAS). This
system offers a simplified accounting framework tailored to the needs of all three tiers of the
PRIs. The accounting structure captures the fund flows under numerous schemes and its CoAs
align with that of the Union and State Governments.
10.74 In this context, we support the continuation and strengthening of the arrangements for
Technical Guidance and Supervision by the CAG. State Governments should augment the
capabilities of their Local Fund Audit Departments (LFADs) by investing in skill development
and addressing manpower shortages.
Data Sources
10.75 For RLBs, we procured data from States via specific formats on our dedicated portal.
We also leveraged relevant data provided by MoPR, including information available on the
e‑GramSwaraj portal. For ULBs, data was collected by the Commission through the cityfinance
portal and also provided by the MoHUA. Owing to the concerted efforts of Union Ministries
and the conditionalities stipulated by previous FCs, the availability of local body data has
211Sixteenth Finance Commission
significantly improved over the years. The primary challenge is now shifting from the
availability to the reliability and consistency of data across various platforms.
10.76 Although availability of financial data is largely there, the reliability and consistency
issues impeded our analysis of data as well. Multiple rounds of efforts were required to obtain
data free of obvious errors. Nevertheless, some data quality issues persisted until the very end.
This experience has led us to conclude that there is an urgent need to address issues related to
the quality and reliability of financial data relating to local bodies.
State Finance Commissions and Transfers by States
10.77 Successive FCs have encountered challenges in effectively utilizing the SFC reports for
formulating recommendations concerning local bodies. After FC‑15 made the constitution of
SFCs and submission of their reports a precondition for the disbursal of local body grants, there
has been a significant improvement on this score. However, most of the other issues highlighted
by previous FCs have persisted. Table 10.4 shows the status of the constitution of SFCs in
various States5 as of May 2025.
Table 10.4 Status of Constitution of SFCs
Name of States Last SFC Constituted
Assam, Himachal Pradesh and Kerala VII
Bihar, Haryana, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, VI
Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya V
Pradesh and Tripura
Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Manipur and Nagaland IV
Arunachal Pradesh, Goa III
Mizoram, Telangana II
Source: Data compiled by the Indian Institute of Public Administration and information collected from the
States (as on May 2025)
10.78 Due to accounting‑related limitations, the Commission was unable to make a precise
assessment of State transfers to local bodies beyond the transfers under centrally sponsored
schemes (CSS) and FC funds from the Finance Accounts of the States. Consistent with the
Constitution, States must shoulder the responsibility of assessing the resource requirements of
local bodies and make necessary transfers. The role of the grants from the Consolidated Fund
of India, based on the recommendation of the FC, should be only supplementary. States should
transparently report all transfers, including those from the Consolidated Fund of India on the
recommendation of the Finance Commission, transfers under CSS, SFC grants and other grants
from the State Government, separately for ULBs and RLBs in their budgets. These transfers,
5 Meghalaya has yet to constitute SFC, though it has notified The Meghalaya State Finance Commission Act, 2012 and The
Meghalaya State Finance Commission Rules, 2013
212Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
with all their components, should also be reported in Appendix III of the State Finance
Accounts. The Commission believes that financial reporting should adhere to standardised
formats to ensure consistency and comparability across all local bodies, thereby enabling the
future integration of data from the Union Government, State Governments and local bodies.
States may expand their Integrated Financial Management Systems (IFMS) to incorporate a
separate module that integrates information from multiple sources, which would facilitate the
generation of fiscal outturns for both ULBs and RLBs in each State.
10.79 The data provided by the Accountant Generals of the States for 2022‑23 indicates that
States such as Haryana and Maharashtra transferred significant State funds to ULBs, whereas
States like Andhra Pradesh, Nagaland and West Bengal have lagged in making the transfers.
Karnataka and Kerala lead in transferring State funds to RLBs, whereas Andhra Pradesh, Assam
and West Bengal lag.
10.80 There are two more issues related to SFCs deserving attention. First, it has been
suggested that FC should play a gap‑filling role, based on the expenditure requirements of local
bodies and revenues from their own sources and grants from the States assessed by the SFCs.
Such an approach runs the risk of making the States and the local bodies complacent in their
revenue‑raising efforts. A better alternative is to link the FC grants to States’ own grants to local
bodies and revenue efforts by the local bodies themselves.
10.81 Second, in Articles 280(3)(bb) and 280(3)(c), the Constitution directs the FC to make its
recommendations on RLBs and ULBs ‘on the basis of the recommendations made by the
Finance Commission of the State.’ However, as successive commissions have noted and this
Commission has also experienced, serious obstacles remain in the way of meaningfully basing
our recommendations on those provided by SFCs. As we do not anticipate these obstacles going
away anytime in the foreseeable future, in conformity with FC‑11, we recommend that the
above‑quoted expression be dropped from the relevant articles through a Constitutional
amendment. We also recommend that NITI Aayog may study the functioning of SFCs across
States and may publish a compendium of the good practices of the SFCs for the reference of all
the States.
Grants for Local Bodies
10.82 In determining grants for local bodies, we have been guided by the history of RLB and
ULB grants, trends in their utilisation, likely population growth of rural and urban areas and the
fiscal resources available with the Union Government.
10.83 We recommend that grants for RLBs be classified into basic and performance
components and those for ULBs into basic, performance, urban infrastructure and urbanisation
premium components.
10.84 (cid:58)e recommend a total allocation of ₹7,91,493 crore as grants for duly constituted RLBs
and ULBs for our award period spanning from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. Out of this amount, we
allocate ₹56,100 crore for a special infrastructure component and ₹10,000 crore for urbanisation
premium, which we take up later. The remaining amount is allocated to RLBs and ULBs in
213Sixteenth Finance Commission
60:40 ratio, considering the projected urbanisation level of 40.73 per cent6 by 2031, coupled
with the elevated cost of service delivery in urban areas. Each of the rural and urban component
is sub‑divided into basic and performance components in 80:20 ratio. Table 10.5 shows the
aggregate rural and aggregate urban grants over the five years of the Commission’s award
period. The performance components of both RLB and ULB grants are further divided into two
equal halves, labelled RLB/ ULB performance component and State performance component.
The RLB performance component begins in the third year of the award period for RLBs and the
ULB performance component begins in the second year for ULBs. State performance
component begins in the second year for both RLBs and ULBs.
Table 10.5 Local Body Grants of FC‑16 (₹ crore)
Year 2026‑27 2027‑28 2028‑29 2029‑30 2030‑31 Total
Rural 55,909 71,300 92,166 1,02,303 1,13,558 4,35,236
Basic 55,909 62,059 68,885 76,462 84,873 3,48,188
RLB Performance Component 0 0 13,023 14,455 16,046 43,524
State Performance Component 0 9,241 10,258 11,386 12,639 43,524
Urban 45,272 68,219 74,126 80,682 87,958 3,56,257
Basic 37,272 41,372 45,923 50,975 59,583 2,32,125
ULB Performance Component 0 6,161 6,839 7,591 8,425 29,016
State Performance Component 0 6,161 6,839 7,591 8,425 29,016
Special Infrastructure Component 6,000 12,525 12,525 12,525 12,525 56,100
Urbanisation Premium 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 10,000
Total 1,01,181 1,39,519 1,66,292 1,82,985 2,01,516 7,91,493
Allocation of the RLB Grant to States and Further Down
10.85 We next consider the inter se distribution of the RLB component of the grant. Once this
is done, the grant allocated to a specific State must be allocated among the three levels of the
PRIs: Gram Panchayat, Block Panchayat and District Panchayat. The final allocation is to
individual Gram Panchayats, Block Panchayats and District Panchayats within the three levels
of PRIs.
6 World Urbanisation Prospects 2018 by Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.
214Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
10.86 For State‑level inter se allocation, we assign a 90 per cent weight to the projected rural
population for 20267 and 10 per cent to the total area of the State. The State wise inter se shares
are in Annexure 10.3.
10.87 Within each State, the distribution of grants to duly constituted RLBs of all tiers may be
undertaken as per the latest accepted recommendations of the respective SFC. In the absence of
the SFC recommendations, the tier‑wise distribution to RLBs may be in conformity with the
percentages recommended in Table 10.6. The high share of Gram Panchayats has been allocated
keeping in view their greater role and responsibilities with respect to the delivery of civic
services.
Table 10.6 Inter‑tier RLB Grant Sharing Within a State
Number of Tiers GP BP DP
Three 80 per cent 10 per cent 10 per cent
Two 90 per cent - 10 per cent
One 100 per cent - -
10.88 Within a particular tier of RLB, the distribution may be as per the latest accepted SFC
recommendations or, in the absence of SFC recommendations, based on population and area in
the ratio 90:10. The basic grant accrues during all five years of the award period, the RLB
performance grant accrues from the third to the fifth year and the State performance grant from
the second to the fifth year. State‑wise shares and volumes of basic and performance
components, divided in the ratio of 80:20, are given in Annexures 10.5, 10.6 and 10.8
respectively. As explained later, conditionalities apply to the performance components of the
grant.
Allocation of the ULB Grant to States and Further Down
10.89 In case of ULB grant, we first considered the State‑level inter se allocation of the basic
and performance components of the grant. We will return to the allocation of the Special
Infrastructure and Urbanization Premium grants later. For the allocation of the basic plus
performance components among the States, we assign a weight of 90 per cent to the 2026 urban
population and a 10 per cent weight to an index based on own‑source revenue (OSR). For the
latter, we first calculate the ratio of the sum of OSRs across all ULBs within each State for the
latest available 3 years, 2021‑22 to 2023‑24,8 to the sum of GSVA from secondary and tertiary
sectors for the same three years9. We then set the share of a State within the 10 per cent of the
total ULB grant equal to its population weighted by this ratio divided by the sum of the
7 Population Projections for India and States 2011-2036, July 2020, as per Report of the Technical Group on Population
Projections of Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
8 Data provided by the urban local bodies to FC-16 on cityfinance portal
9 Provided by MoSPI
215Sixteenth Finance Commission
populations of all States weighted by the corresponding OSR‑to‑GSVA ratio. The State wise
inter se shares are in Annexure 10.4 and the specific year‑wise grants, quantum of basic and
performance components for each State are detailed in Annexures 10.5, 10.7 and 10.9
respectively. The basic component accrues all five years of the award period and the
performance component from the second to the fifth year.
10.90 Within each State, the distribution of grants to duly constituted ULBs may be undertaken
as per the latest accepted recommendations of the respective SFC. In the absence of SFC
recommendations, 90 per cent of the State grant should be allocated according to the ULB’s
share in the sum of population of all ULBs and 10 per cent according to the OSR‑based criterion,
as exposited above.
Treatment of Exempted Areas
10.91 With reference to areas outside the purview of Part IX and Part IX‑A of the Constitution,
we recognise the developmental aspirations and essential service delivery needs of the
significant population living in these regions. To address these needs equitably, we recommend
treating these areas on par with local bodies in other areas. This is in keeping with the tradition
set by FC‑13 and FC‑15. We recommend that the concerned State Governments make
allocations for these areas on par with our recommendations with respect to the local bodies.
Conditionalities for Availing Grants
Entry Level Conditions
10.92 Consistent with the Constitution, we recommend three eligibility conditions that must
be fulfilled before any local body grant is awarded. First, there should be a duly constituted body
in place as required in Part IX and Part IX‑A of the Constitution.
10.93 Second, there must be publicly available online, in the fiscal year T, provisional accounts
of all RLBs and ULBs of the State for the fiscal year T‑1 and audited accounts for the fiscal year
T‑2. Since this condition is being continued from FC‑15, it will be applicable from the very first
year of the award period. In cases where only a fraction of the local bodies meets this condition,
grants should be disbursed to the State in proportion to the local bodies that meet this condition,
with the condition applied separately to RLBs and ULBs. The audited accounts of ULBs should,
at least, include the Balance sheet, Income and Expenditure statement, Cash Flow statement
with the necessary schedules.
10.94 The third eligibility condition relates to the formation of the SFC. FC‑15 had made the
constitution of SFCs and the laying of an explanatory memorandum before the State legislature
by 31 March 2024 a mandatory condition for States to avail local body grants for the fiscal years
2024‑25 and 2025‑26. This condition demonstrably exerted a significant positive influence on
the constitution of SFCs by various States and the subsequent laying of their reports and the
corresponding Action Taken Reports (ATRs) in the respective State legislatures. Annexure
10.12 shows the list of States that formed their SFCs after the recommendations of FC‑15.
216Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
10.95 Acknowledging the notable progress achieved by States in constituting SFCs and laying
their ATRs in the State legislatures, we are inclined to continue with the conditionality
established by the FC‑15, albeit with certain modifications aimed at fostering the
institutionalisation of timely SFC constitution within the States' administrative frameworks.
Therefore, we recommend that all States comply with the Constitutional provision of forming
the SFC on the expiry of five years from the formation of the previous SFC. The ATR must be
tabled in the State legislature within 6 months of submission of the SFC report.
The Conditionality for Local Body Performance Component
10.96 The ULB and RLB grant has been divided into basic (80 per cent) and performance
(20 per cent) components, with the latter divided into two equal halves: RLB/ULB performance
component and State performance component. The basic component may be made available to
the States upon fulfilment of the three entry‑level (eligibility) conditions as explained in
preceding paras. However, for each of the performance component, we recommend a qualifying
condition.
10.97 Gram Panchayats have the necessary powers of taxation and levying user charges, with
many of them already raising significant amounts in OSR. Therefore, to receive the RLB
performance component of the RLB grant in fiscal year T, we recommend that Gram Panchayats
raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 2.5 per cent per annum
compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower, subject to a minimum
amount of ₹1200 per household per annum. (cid:58)e have calculated the amount of ₹1,200 per
household per annum based on user charges for services such as drinking water, sewerage and
solid waste management, which are currently being collected in various States. The
recommendation does not imply that the Gram Panchayats collect ₹1200 from each household
annually, but rather that the total OSR from all streams, including rental income, income from
assets, user charges and so on, should cumulatively e(cid:84)ual or exceed ₹1200 per household per
year.
10.98 For Block Panchayats, we recommend that they qualify for the RLB performance
component of the RLB grant if 75 per cent of Gram Panchayats within their jurisdiction qualify
for it. For District Panchayats, we recommend that to qualify for the grant in year T, District
Panchayats raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 2.5 per cent per
annum compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower.
10.99 For a ULB to qualify for the ULB performance component grant in year T, we
recommend it raise in year T‑1, minimum 1.05 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 5 per cent per annum
compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower. Based on the ULB OSR
data reported by all States (Annexure 10.2), this growth constitutes a reasonable target.
The Conditionality for State Performance Component
10.100 Our data analysis shows that there is significant heterogeneity in transfers of resources
to local bodies by the States. While some States are making substantial transfers to local bodies,
217Sixteenth Finance Commission
others provide at best limited funding to them. We have emphasised above that the primary
responsibility of making adequate financial resources available to local bodies rests with the
States. Transfers from Union, based on the recommendations of FCs, are meant to only
supplement the State consolidated funds. Therefore, we recommend that the release of State
performance components of the RLB and ULB grants in year T be contingent upon the State
transferring from its own resources, in the year T‑1, grants to local bodies amounting to 20 per
cent or more of the basic FC grant recommended by us for the year T‑1, starting from the second
year. Revenues assigned and shared statutorily with the local bodies by the State would be
included in these transfers for ascertaining the quantum of the transfers for the purposes of this
condition.
In the Event of a Failure to Fulfil the Conditionality
10.101 If any of the conditionality discussed in this section goes unfulfilled, the undisbursed
portion of a State's local body performance grants would be disbursed according to the following
methodology:
(i) The undisbursed portion of LBs failing to fulfil the conditionality in the case of the
LB performance component grant of a State will be distributed to the performing
LBs of the same State.
(ii) Undisbursed portion of the State performance component due to the failure of a State
to fulfil the conditionality would be distributed among the performing States
according to the above‑mentioned State‑level inter se criteria. In turn, each recipient
State will add the amount to its State performance component of the grant.
(iii) The distribution of the undisbursed performance component of the grants, among the
States and among the local bodies within a State, as the case may be, would follow
the formulas spelled out above for the distribution of local body grants.
10.102 It is emphasised that this entire process would be conducted separately for RLBs and
ULBs. The entry level conditions and performance conditions, along with their year of
applicability, are presented in Annexure 10.10. The entry level conditions are mainly intended
to sustain reforms initiated by previous FCs, whereas the performance conditions are directed
towards bolstering the financial self‑sufficiency of the local bodies and ensuring that States
discharge their Constitutional duties.
10.103 To ensure that local bodies function as effective institutions of local self‑governance,
achieve fiscal autonomy and meet the aspirations of their citizens, Capacity building of the
functionaries of the local bodies and the staff of local bodies is necessary. Creating a robust
Learning Management System will go a long way in providing continuous learning
opportunities and effectively strengthening the capacity of local bodies. This system could serve
as a centralised platform for targeted training materials aimed at addressing the unique needs of
local bodies. Such a system could also provide tailored content based on regional and
State‑specific needs and share national and international best practices. By collaborating with
218Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
State Governments and local bodies, the content can be customised to reflect the challenges and
priorities of each area, ensuring that training is both relevant and practical. MoHUA and MoPR
can work towards conceptualising and rolling out such a system so that the functionaries in the
local bodies are geared up to meet the present‑day challenges.
Tied and Untied Components
10.104 The flagship CSS schemes of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM), Atal Mission for
Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) and the Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM) have
demonstrably generated a substantial impact on the ground across the nation within the critical
national priority areas of Drinking Water and Sanitation. These initiatives have not only
established significant infrastructure but have also fostered widespread awareness and
facilitated notable behavioural changes. This progress, coupled with sustained funding from
governmental sources, including FC‑15 tied component, has yielded lasting positive outcomes
in these priority sectors by 2025.
10.105 The proactive measures under the JJM have resulted in over 81 per cent of the more than
19 crore rural households being connected with tap water. Under AMRUT, water treatment
plants with a cumulative capacity of 4,649 million litres per day and sewage treatment capacity
of 4,429 million litres per day, along with 1.49 crore sewer connections, have been established.
Similarly, under SBM‑Urban, alongside the construction of nearly 64 lakh Individual Household
Latrines, waste collection has witnessed a remarkable 97 per cent increase between 2014‑15 and
2024‑25, now encompassing 93,600 wards nationwide, while waste processing has surged from
18 per cent of waste generated in 2014‑15 to 78 per cent in 2024‑25. Building upon the
significant success in toilet construction and promoting behavioural change towards sanitation
under SBM‑Gramin, the current focus has shifted towards creation of ODF plus villages. This
entails not only sustaining the ODF status but also establishing comprehensive arrangements for
Solid and Liquid Waste Management, ensuring visual cleanliness within the villages. As
reported by the Ministry of Jal Shakti, over 3.99 lakh villages out of India's more than 6.5 lakh
villages have been declared as ODF model villages. This unequivocally supports the conclusion
that sustained governmental efforts, in conjunction with active citizen engagement, have created
a massive on‑ground impact in these national priority areas.
10.106 This collective progress underscores India's commitment in enhancing the quality of life
for its citizens and demonstrates its dedication to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 6 on
Clean Water and Sanitation, while also advancing towards a climate‑resilient future. The
Commission also observed that the utilization of tied funds recommended by the FC‑15 has
been higher in the area of Sanitation and Solid Waste Management compared to Drinking Water
Supply for both RLBs and ULBs. This may reflect greater progress of Union and State schemes
in Sanitation and Solid Waste Management on the one hand and greater scope for the effective
utilization of funds in Drinking Water on the other.
219Sixteenth Finance Commission
10.107 Therefore, we recommend tying 50 per cent of the basic component and leaving the
remaining 50 per cent of the basic component and the entire performance component untied.
The tied component should be directed towards ‘Sanitation and Solid Waste Management’
and/or ‘Water Management’. Within the tied component, full flexibility should be available to
local bodies to address their needs, including O&M expenditures for the above tied items.
10.108 The untied component of the local body grants would be 50 per cent of the basic
component which is 80 per cent of the total LB grants (40 per cent) and 100 per cent of the
performance component which is 20 per cent of the total LB grants (20 per cent), subject to
fulfilment of both the performance conditions, adding up to a total of 60 per cent of the basic
plus performance grants. A significantly enhanced percentage of untied funds over the previous
FC would empower local bodies to address locally identified needs and the flexibility inherent
in their utilisation would lead to higher rates of both disbursal and utilisation. During
consultations, representatives of Local Governments from various States have repeatedly
underscored the importance of increasing the proportion of untied funds to effectively address
locally felt needs.
10.109 We also recommend that no local body should be allowed to spend more than 20 per
cent of the untied allocation on the construction and maintenance of roads10. Moreover, the
untied grants should not be used for the payment of salaries or other establishment‑related
expenditure. The Gram Sabha would pass resolutions for specific activities to be undertaken
under both tied and untied grants by a Gram Panchayat and similar resolutions would be needed
at the level of Block Panchayat and District Panchayats as well. Likewise, activities under the
tied and untied grants in urban areas should be undertaken based on the resolutions passed by
the concerned ULBs.
10.110 We also recommend that the practice of publishing Service Level Benchmarks (SLBs),
mandated for MPCs by the FC‑15, may be continued and extended to all ULBs. To enhance the
credibility of the self‑reported figures for SLBs by cities and establish a reliable database of
service data that can be effectively leveraged for decision‑making, planning and initiatives
aimed at improving the levels of services provided to citizens by the ULBs, a certain degree of
authentication, perhaps in the form of a third party assessment or audit, may be introduced into
the system to verify these self‑reported figures. MoHUA may collaborate with State
Governments, ULBs and CAG in developing such a verification mechanism.
10.111 We extensively reviewed the compliance of conditions recommended by the previous
Commission by the States and the subsequent release of grants. We observe that, in general, the
North Eastern States face difficulties in complying with the conditions on time and,
consequently, in claiming the grants. Therefore, we recommend that, once the operational
guidelines are issued, MoPR and MoHUA should organize regional workshops to familiarize
States with the current Commission’s recommendations, the operational guidelines, the
10 including but not limited to all types of paved surfaces such as bituminous/black-topped/asphalt, cement concrete/concrete,
interlocking concrete block pavements, gravel, mud and so on.
220Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
modalities to be followed for compliance and the process of claiming grants, with special focus
on the North Eastern States. The concerned ministries should, as far as possible, actively support
and handhold the North Eastern States throughout this process.
Urbanisation Premium
10.112 In our earlier discussion in this chapter, we have emphasised the importance of
urbanisation in general and the rural‑to‑urban transition in particular. We have also argued in
favour of a formal rural‑to‑urban transition policy. However, as peripheral areas are merged into
the adjacent municipalities as a part of implementing such a policy, the existing ULB itself faces
a transition problem. It must immediately begin working on the provision of infrastructure and
services to the newly incorporated area at the same level as those in the existing areas of the
municipality. Yet, it takes a while to complete the formalities necessary to begin raising tax
revenue from this area. The only way to speedily complete the transition for the municipality is
to divert resources from existing municipal areas to the newly incorporated area.
10.113 To tide over this initial challenge, we recommend a one‑time grant as an incentive for
the merger of peri‑urban villages into an adjoining larger ULB with an existing population of
not less than one lakh. We have assessed the total quantum of urbanisation premium to be
₹10,000 crore for the complete award period, to be disbursed as a one‑time eligibility amount
of ₹2,000 per person, calculated over the population (based on Census 2011 population) of the
new area being incorporated in the ULB. These grants should be made available to States to
support the establishment of essential administrative structures and provide certain citizen
services in the peri‑urban areas transitioning from rural to urban status through mergers with an
existing ULB. The final beneficiary of the grant should be the relevant municipal body, which
may use it for the upgradation of basic infrastructure in the newly included areas or the
upgradation of capacity for the provision of civic services in them.
10.114 Previously, we have highlighted the importance of a transparent standing rural‑to‑urban
transition policy. We recommend the formulation of such a Transition Policy as a precondition
for claiming the urbanisation premium grant. Some of the components of the Rural to Urban
Transition Policy of the State could be:
(i) Identification of transitional settlements among qualifying settlements after every
Census and at a regular interval not exceeding 3 years, with the stipulation of
covering at least one‑third of qualifying settlements for transition.
(ii) Detailed procedure for identification, assessment and notification of transitional
areas.
(iii) Detailed Transition plan (with approximately 3‑year horizon) for:
(a) Impact assessment on finances, manpower, service delivery and infrastructure.
(b) Financial and institutional support to raise the citizen service delivery and
infrastructure standards up to certain minimum pre‑defined levels.
221Sixteenth Finance Commission
(c) Phased levy of taxes such as property tax and user charges
(d) Implications on master plan and land use conversion regulations.
(e) Institutional continuity with respect to office, assets, records and staff.
(f) Public consultations and citizen communication.
(iv) Roles and responsibilities among State Government departments/agencies, district
administration, erstwhile RLB and the newly created ULB, along with an
appropriate grievance redressal mechanism.
Infrastructure Upgradation in Urban Growth Centres
10.115 In previous paras, the Commission has underscored the importance of urbanization for
economic growth. The urban population of India has grown more than four times in the last fifty
years. This kind of rapid urbanisation requires urgent upgradation of urban infrastructure in
Indian cities. In the past, the migrating population has flocked in disproportionately large
numbers to the large cities with populations of 4 million or more. Considering this fact, there is
a need to invest in the upgradation of cities with populations of less than 4 million. Such an
upgradation will create more centres of growth in the country, thereby lightening the burden on
the cities with populations of 4 million or more. It will also enhance the living standards while
keeping the cost of living low. Industry may also find locating in these areas attractive due to
the lower wages it will have to pay in the medium size cities than in larger cities.
10.116 One of the major challenges that these cities face is the presence of obsolete, poorly
maintained and inadequate drainage systems, coupled with apathy towards natural drainage
paths, which leads to poor wastewater management. While this is adversely impacting quality
of life in these cities due to poor sanitation levels, it is also causing avoidable damage to other
infrastructure, such as roads and clean drinking water supply systems. With the impact of
climate change clearly visible, cities are experiencing high‑intensity rainfall events with erratic
frequency, leading to flooding events that the existing drainage systems are unable to handle.
This is not only causing inconvenience to the urban population but also has a negative economic
impact due to disruption in economic activities. Cities need to have a drainage master plan,
invest in and maintain their drainage systems. An illustrative example of comprehensive
interventions achieving a decisive impact in wastewater management through the judicious
leveraging of diverse funding sources is exemplified by Indore City, as detailed in Box 10.2.
10.117 Therefore, we recommend that a Special Infrastructure Component for selected ULBs
be tied to the development of a comprehensive wastewater management system in cities with
populations less than 40 lakh but more than 10 lakh, as per the 2011 Census, limited to two per
State. We provide the list of these cities in Annexure 10.11. This amount is to be used to finance
projects worth up to ₹5,000 crore in cities with a population of 15 lakh or more and up to ₹3,500
crore in cities with a population of less than 15 lakh, wherein the share of the Union Government
would be 60 per cent of the project cost and the remaining cost would be contributed by the
222Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
State Government and the concerned ULB. The aggregate amount under this component would
amount to ₹56,100 crore.
Box 10.2 Swachha Indore
Indore has consistently topped the Swachh Survekshan rankings for seven consecutive years,
achieving recognition as India's first Water Plus city and a 7-Star rated city. Prior to this, Indore, like
numerous other Indian urban centres, contended with significant challenges, including extensive
garbage accumulation, presence of stray cattle, insufficient waste management infrastructure, nearly
a century of accumulated legacy waste, widespread discharge of untreated sewage into rivers and
nallahs and sub-optimally managed secondary storage bins. The remarkable transformation from this
State to its current position at the forefront of cleanliness rankings was realised through a
comprehensive set of actions, fundamentally centred upon Jan Bhagidari, or citizen participation.
Efficient liquid waste management was achieved through comprehensive interception of household
and grey water sewage outfalls into rivers and stormwater drains, coupled with the establishment of
a robust sewerage network. The city expanded the access to Sanitation services through increase in
community toilets, standalone urinals, individual household latrines, etc. A comprehensive sewerage
network consisting of 3 centralised and 7 decentralised co-treatment Sewage Treatment Plants
(STPs) was constructed to adequately handle the wastewater generated in the city. Initiatives also
included cleaning of Saraswati river as well as 200+ km of nallahs while also reclaiming nallahs as
community spaces. The treated water was reused and 100+ km of piped network was created to carry
treated water from STPs.
These achievements were facilitated by leveraging funds from schemes such as Atal Mission for
Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) and Smart Cities Mission, alongside the
utilisation of OSR. Furthermore, the city deployed innovative financing mechanisms, including the
issuance of green bonds and trading in carbon credits.
These actions were further complemented by initiatives fostering behavioural change, primarily
through comprehensive awareness campaigns, community-based programmes and active
engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The confluence of these diverse
initiatives and concerted funding efforts has yielded a decisive impact within the city of Indore.
10.118 These projects should lead to the development of a comprehensive wastewater
management system and can be undertaken in the following indicative areas:
(i) Upgradation of the existing drainage network, including the separation of stormwater
and underground drainage systems.
(ii) Extension of network to the uncovered areas.
(iii) Identification of problem areas and taking up area‑specific works.
(iv) Restoration of natural drainage pathways and development of green infrastructure
essential for wastewater management.
(v) Reduction of non‑revenue water.
223Sixteenth Finance Commission
(vi) Development of monitoring systems and systems to ensure the free flow of
wastewater.
10.119 In the first year of the award period, the selected ULBs would be required to conduct a
detailed study on the kind of interventions required for comprehensive wastewater management
within the allocated amount. The ULBs would be required to prepare detailed project reports
with year‑wise milestones and financial outlays. The tripartite MoU would be signed between
the MoHUA, the State Government and the ULB. MoU should have project details, year‑wise
milestones and financial outlays. Grants should be released after the signing of the MoU for the
first milestone and upon achieving the project milestones for the next milestone.
10.120 In addition to capital expenditure on creating infrastructure assets under this grant, the
concerned ULB may ensure the necessary awareness initiatives, wherever applicable. The cities
should enhance their capabilities to bear the future operation and maintenance expenditure of
the assets created under the scheme from their own sources of revenue.
Timely Release of Grants
10.121 We recommend that the local body grants shall continue to be released in a minimum
of two equal instalments each year, consistent with the existing practice and subject to the
fulfilment of the conditions stipulated by the Commission.
10.122 The basic component can be released on fulfilment of the entry‑level conditions, some
of which are not relevant every year, such as the conduct of elections for the constitution of local
bodies or the formation of the SFC and the submission of ATR on their reports. For the
performance component, the State should provide the details of achievement on both of the
performance parameters. The Union Government should ensure that where a set of local bodies
within the State meet the conditions, the grants due to them are released without waiting for the
rest. The release of the urbanisation premium component should be claimed by the State when
mergers, as explained earlier, are notified. The release of the special infrastructure component
should be made separately for each city upon achieving milestones as outlined in the MoU.
10.123 Furthermore, it is recommended that State Governments ensure the transfer of these
grants‑in‑aid to their respective local bodies within ten working days of their receipt from the
Union Government. Any delay in this transfer beyond the stipulated ten working days shall
obligate the State Governments to release the funds along with interest, calculated at the
effective rate of interest applicable to market borrowings/State Development Loans for the
preceding financial year.
10.124 We recommend that no further conditions, other than those explicitly indicated in this
chapter, should be imposed either by the Union Government or the State Governments for the
release of local body grants to the ULBs and RLBs.
224Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
Summary of Recommendations
(i) We recommend that the States should develop a citizen friendly GIS based property tax
IT system for efficient enumeration, assessment and collection of property tax.
(paragraph 10.67)
(ii) We recommend extending the Urban Data platform's capabilities to support ULBs in
preparing accounts and financial reports.
(paragraph 10.71)
(iii) The existing arrangements for Technical Guidance and Supervision by the CAG should
be continued and strengthened to improve the quality of audit and accounts of local
bodies in the States. State Governments should augment the capabilities of their Local
Fund Audit Departments (LFADs) by investing in skill development and addressing
manpower shortages.
(paragraph 10.74)
(iv) The States should transparently report all transfers to local bodies, including those from
the Consolidated Fund of India on the recommendation of the Finance Commission,
transfers under centrally sponsored schemes, State Finance Commission grants and other
grants from the State Government, separately for ULBs and RLBs in their budgets.
These transfers, with all their components, should also be reported in Appendix III of
the State Finance Accounts.
(paragraph 10.78)
(v) In Articles 280(3)(bb) and 280(3)(c), the Constitution directs the FC to make its
recommendations on RLBs and ULBs ‘on the basis of the recommendations made by
the Finance Commission of the States.’ We recommend that the above‑quoted
expression be dropped from the relevant articles through a Constitutional amendment.
(paragraph 10.81)
(vi) We recommend that NITI Aayog may study the functioning of SFCs across States and
may publish a compendium of the good practices of the SFCs for the reference of all the
States.
(paragraph 10.81)
(vii) We recommend that the grants for RLBs be classified into basic and performance
components and the grants for ULBs be classified into basic, performance, urban
infrastructure and urbanisation premium components. The aggregate national grant
allocation for basic and performance components, put together has been divided in the
ratio of 60:40 between RLBs and ULBs. Inter se, the division between basic and
performance components is recommended in the ratio of 80:20 for both RLBs and ULBs.
(paragraphs 10.83 and 10.84)
225Sixteenth Finance Commission
(viii) A total allocation of ₹7,91,493 crore as grants recommended for duly constituted RLBs
and ULBs for our award period spanning from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31.
(paragraph 10.84)
(ix) For RLBs, inter‑State distribution is based on a 90:10 ratio of projected rural population
(2026) and area, respectively. For ULBs, the States' share has been determined by a
90:10 ratio of projected urban population (2026) and the OSR of ULBs, respectively.
(paragraphs 10.86 and 10.89)
(x) Within each State, the distribution of grants to duly constituted RLBs of all tiers and to
duly constituted ULBs may be undertaken as per the latest accepted recommendations
of the respective SFCs. In the absence of the SFC’s recommendations, the tier wise
distribution to RLBs may be in conformity with the prescribed percentages. Within a tier
of RLB, the distribution may be as per the latest accepted SFC recommendations or in
the absence of SFC recommendations based on population and area in the ratio 90:10.
For ULBs, the distribution may be as per the latest accepted SFCs recommendations or
in the absence of SFC’s recommendations, based on urban population and OSR of ULBs
in the 90:10 ratio.
(paragraphs 10.87, 10.88 and 10.90)
(xi) The concerned State Government shall make allocations for exempted areas on par with
the Commission’s recommendations with respect to local bodies.
(paragraph 10.91)
(xii) There should be a duly constituted body in place as required in Part IX and Part IX‑A of
the Constitution to claim local body grants. This would be the first entry level condition.
(paragraph 10.92)
(xiii) Online availability in public domain in year T of audited accounts for all ULBs and
RLBs of a State for the T‑2 fiscal year and provisional accounts for the T‑1 year would
be the second entry‑level condition to avail local body grants for the year T.
(paragraph 10.93)
(xiv) All States must comply with the Constitutional provisions pertaining to the regular
constitution of SFCs due as per the Constitutional provision, that is, on expiry of five
years of constitution of previous SFC and ensure laying of ATRs in the State legislature
within 6 months of submission of the SFC report as a prerequisite to claim their local
body grant. This would be the third entry level condition to claim local body grants from
the first year of the award period, that is from 2026‑27.
(paragraph 10.95)
226Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
(xv) The ULB and RLB grant has been divided into basic (80 per cent) and performance (20
per cent) components, with the latter divided into two equal halves: RLB/ULB
performance component and State performance component. The basic component may
be made available to the States upon fulfilment of the three entry‑level (eligibility)
conditions.
(paragraph 10.96)
(xvi) For Gram Panchayats to receive the RLB performance component of the RLB grant in
fiscal year T, we recommend that Gram Panchayats raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025
times its OSR in year T‑2 or 2.5 per cent per annum compounded growth applied over
OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower, subject to a minimum amount of ₹1200 per
household per annum. This will be applicable from the third year of the award period,
that is, 2028-29 onwards.
(paragraph 10.97)
(xvii) For Block Panchayats, we recommend that they qualify for the RLB performance
component of the RLB grant if 75 per cent of Gram Panchayats within their jurisdiction
qualify for it. For District Panchayats, we recommend that to qualify for the grant in year
T, District Panchayats raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025 times its OSR in year T‑2 or
2.5 per cent per annum compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever
is lower. Both of these will be applicable from the third year of the award period, that is,
2028-29 onwards.
(paragraph 10.98)
(xviii) For ULBs to qualify for the ULB performance component grant in year T, we
recommend it raise in year T‑1, minimum 1.05 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 5 per cent
per annum compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower. This
will be applicable from the second year of the award period, that is, 2027-28 onwards.
(paragraph 10.99)
(xix) We recommend that the release of State performance components of the RLB and ULB
grants in year T be contingent upon the State transferring from its own resources, in the
year T‑1, grants to local bodies amounting to 20 per cent or more of the basic FC grant
recommended by us for the year T‑1, starting from the second year.
(paragraph 10.100)
(xx) If any of the performance conditionalities goes unfulfilled, the undisbursed portion of a
State's local body performance grants would be disbursed according to the prescribed
methodology.
(paragraph 10.101)
227Sixteenth Finance Commission
(xxi) Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs and Ministry of Panchayati Raj can work towards
conceptualising and rolling out a Learning Management System for the functionaries
and staff of local bodies so that the functionaries in the local bodies are geared up to
meet the present‑day challenges.
(paragraph 10.103)
(xxii) 50 per cent of the basic component should be tied and the remaining 50 per cent of the
basic component and the entire performance components should remain untied. The tied
component should be directed towards ‘Sanitation and Solid Waste Management’ and/or
‘Water Management’.
(paragraph 10.107)
(xxiii) We recommend that no local body should be allowed to spend more than 20 per cent of
the untied allocation on the construction and maintenance of roads. Moreover, the
untied grants should not be used for the payment of salaries or other
establishment‑related expenditure.
(paragraph 10.109)
(xxiv) The practice of publishing Service Level Benchmarks should be continued and extended
to all ULBs along with introduction of a third‑party assessment or audit mechanism in
the system to enhance the reliability of the self‑reported figures.
(paragraph 10.110)
(xxv) MoPR and MoHUA should organize regional workshops to familiarize States with the
Commission’s recommendations, the operational guidelines, the modalities to be
followed for compliance and the process of claiming grants, with special focus on the
North-Eastern States.
(paragraph 10.111)
(xxvi) The total quantum of urbanisation premium, for incentivising rural to urban transitions,
to be ₹10,000 crore for the complete award period with a fixed per capita one‑time
eligibility amount to be ₹2,000 per person (based on Census 2011 population). The
release of urbanisation premium component should be claimed by the State on mergers
of peri‑urban villages into adjoining larger ULB with existing population not less than
One lakh and formulation of an appropriate Rural to Urban transition policy.
(paragraphs 10.113 and 10.114)
(xxvii) A Special Infrastructure Component for selected ULBs with the outlay of ₹56,100 crore
to facilitate decisive intervention in comprehensive wastewater management in urban
growth centres.
(paragraph 10.117)
228Chapter 10: Local Body Grants
(xxviii)The local body grants shall continue to be released in minimum two equal instalments
each year, consistent with the existing practice and subject to the fulfilment of the
conditions stipulated by the Commission.
(paragraph 10.121)
(xxix) The Union Government should ensure that where a set of local bodies within the State
meet the conditions, the grants due to them are released without waiting for the rest.
(paragraph 10.122)
(xxx) State Governments should ensure the transfer of the grants‑in‑aid to their respective local
bodies within ten working days of their receipt from the Union Government. Any delay
in this transfer beyond the stipulated ten working days shall obligate the State
Governments to release the funds along with interest, calculated at the effective rate of
interest applicable to market borrowings/State Development Loans for the preceding
financial year.
(paragraph 10.123)
(xxxi) No further conditions, other than those explicitly indicated in this chapter, should be
imposed either by the Union Government or the State Governments for the release of
local body grants to the ULBs and RLBs.
(paragraph 10.124)
229FINANCING OF
11
DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
CHAPTER 11: FINANCING OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
11.1 Financing of Disaster Risk Management initiatives in India has evolved significantly
over the years. Earlier, the focus was mainly to finance relief and rescue operations, but now the
framework has expanded to cover recovery, rehabilitation, mitigation and capacity building.
The current ToR for the Commission specifically mandate “a review of the present arrangements
on financing Disaster Management initiatives, with reference to the funds constituted under the
Disaster Management Act, 2005, and to make appropriate recommendations thereon”. While
the Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC‑15) recommended the continuation of the Disaster
Response Funds (SDRF and NDRF), it also proposed the constitution of Mitigation Funds
(SDMF and NDMF) with earmarked allocations specifically for mitigation activities which were
mandated by the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (hereinafter called the DM Act). As a result,
all funds envisaged under the DM Act have been constituted by all the States as well as by the
Union. The only exception is the constitution of the district‑level disaster response and
mitigation funds (DDRF and DDMF), which FC‑15 found not to be a practical idea. Yet, FC‑15
recognized the need for allocations for district administration and local governments for
efficient management of disasters. In addition to operationalisation of these statutory funds, the
rising frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, causing widespread impact on lives,
livelihoods, housing, and infrastructure, necessitate a deeper examination of varying disaster
risk financing requirements of States within this review.
11.2 Disaster severely disrupts progress, destroys the hard‑earned outcomes of developmental
efforts and often pushes back societies by years, sometimes decades. Consequently, there has
been a paradigm shift from merely responding to disasters towards adopting efficient mitigation
practices, both in India and globally. This shift recognises not only the increasing frequency and
intensity of disasters but also emphasises the imperative to limit the impact of disasters to cause
havoc to the lives and livelihoods.
231Sixteenth Finance Commission
Institutional Framework
11.3 India has progressively built a robust legal, institutional, and administrative framework
for disaster management. A defining moment came with the enactment of the DM Act, 2005,
which provided a comprehensive legislative basis for disaster management in the country. The
Act provided for the establishment of key institutions at National, State, and District levels: the
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) headed by the Prime Minister, the State
Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs) headed by Chief Ministers, and the District
Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) headed by District Collectors/ Deputy
Commissioners/ District Magistrates.
11.4 The NDMA, as the apex body, is responsible for formulating policies, plans, and
guidelines for disaster management, ensuring their enforcement and coordination across
ministries, departments, and States. It oversees the application of funds for mitigation and
preparedness, and exercises superintendence over the National Disaster Response Force. The
National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), under the NDMA’s guidance, focuses on
capacity building, training, research, and information management related to disaster risk
reduction. NDMA’s mandate covers both natural and man‑made disasters.
11.5 Supporting the NDMA is the National Executive Committee (NEC), chaired by the
Union Home Secretary, and comprising Secretaries of key Union Ministries and Departments.
It assists in policy implementation, prepares the National Plan for Disaster Management,
coordinates disaster response activities, and ensures compliance with NDMA’s directives.
11.6 At the State level, the SDMAs, chaired by Chief Ministers, are responsible for approval
of State Disaster Management Plans in accordance with national guidelines, coordinating plan
implementation, allocating mitigation funds, and integrating disaster risk measures into
departmental development plans. To aid the SDMAs, each State has a State Executive
Committee, headed by the Chief Secretary, which monitors plan implementation and
coordinates information flow with the NDMA.
11.7 At the district level, DDMAs serve as the planning, coordinating, and implementing
bodies for disaster management, following guidelines set by NDMA and SDMA. DDMAs
prepare and implement district disaster management plans and monitor compliance by local
authorities and district departmental offices.
11.8 Local authorities, including panchayat raj institutions, municipalities, autonomous
district councils, cantonment boards, and development authorities, play a critical role in disaster
management at the grassroots level. They are responsible for developing disaster management
plans, building capacity among their personnel, and undertaking relief, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction activities in disaster‑affected areas in their respective jurisdictions.
11.9 NIDM plays a pivotal role in capacity development, functioning as a ‘Centre of
Excellence’ for training, research, and documentation in disaster management. It collaborates
232Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
with research institutions and knowledge networks to develop national‑level information bases
and supports the training needs of disaster management personnel across the country.
11.10 For specialised response during disasters, the DM Act mandates the constitution of the
National Disaster Response Force, comprising battalions from different paramilitary forces
strategically located across the country. The National Disaster Response Force units work
closely with State Governments and train State Disaster Response Forces. Their role includes
rapid deployment for search and rescue, emergency medical assistance, and relief operations.
11.11 In cases of severe calamities, Inter‑Ministerial Central Teams are deployed to assess
damage and recommend assistance. Their assessments are scrutinised by the Inter‑Ministerial
Group headed by the Union Home Secretary (or the Secretary, Agriculture for agricultural
disasters), and the recommendations are placed before the High‑Level Committee comprising
key Cabinet Ministers for final approval.
11.12 Disaster management is inherently multi‑disciplinary, and it engages all ministries and
departments of the Union and States. At the national level, the National Crisis Management
Committee, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, coordinates responses to major disasters with
serious or national implications.
11.13 The primary responsibility for disaster management rests with the States. The DM Act
mandates the preparation of disaster management plans, the integration of risk reduction into
development programmes, the establishment of early warning systems, and the allocation of
dedicated funds for disaster management by State Governments.
11.14 At the operational level, DDMAs serve as critical hubs for planning, coordination, and
implementation. The armed forces continue to play a crucial role in disaster response,
particularly in extreme scenarios, providing communication support, search and rescue
operations, health and medical facilities, and transportation. Their expertise, rapid response
capabilities, and resources make them indispensable during major disasters. At the national
level, the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff is a member of the NEC to ensure better
coordination between civil and military authorities during disaster situations.
11.15 States have also strengthened their internal disaster response capabilities by establishing
State Disaster Response Forces, providing an important first line of defence during disasters
alongside the National Disaster Response Force.
Recommendations by the Past Finance Commissions
11.16 Financing of disaster management in India has undergone a structural transformation
from the concept of Margin Money by the Second Finance Commission (FC‑2) to the
institutionalisation of mitigation funds by FC‑15.
11.17 FC‑2 introduced the concept of ‘margin money’ which was to be used in the event of
calamities of moderate nature. It was estimated based on the average annual expenditure on
relief over the previous decade. This arrangement was followed till the Eighth Finance
233Sixteenth Finance Commission
Commission (FC‑8) which also mandated 50 per cent contribution from the Union. FC‑8 also
recommended that fire be treated as a disaster in the same way as floods, cyclones and
earthquakes. The Ninth Finance Commission (FC‑9) recommended a new arrangement for
financing relief expenditure by setting up the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF). The Union would
contribute 75 per cent of the CRF while the States would contribute 25 per cent. The Tenth
Finance Commission (FC‑10) recommended the continuation of the CRF and setting up of a
National Fund of Calamity Relief (NFCR) to assist the States affected by severe calamities. The
Eleventh Finance Commission (FC‑11) reviewed the functioning of the NFCR and found that
not only had the entire corpus of the fund been exhausted in three years, but it also failed to
make adequate funds readily available for meeting the requirements of calamities of rare
severity. FC‑11 dissolved the NFCR and recommended the setting up of a National Calamity
Contingency Fund (NCCF) with an initial corpus of ₹500 crore which was to be recouped
through the levy of a special surcharge on central taxes. The Twelfth Finance Commission
(FC‑12) recommended the continuation of CRF and NCCF and also recommended that
landslides, avalanches, cloud bursts and pest attacks be added to the list of notified disasters.
11.18 When the Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC‑13) deliberated on the issue of disaster
relief and management, the DM Act, 2005 had already come into effect, which provided for
response and mitigation funds at National and State levels. FC‑13 reviewed the disaster risk
financing arrangements in the light of these statutory provisions and recommended that the CRF
be merged into the SDRFs of individual States and that the NCCF be merged into the NDRF. It
also suggested that the contributions to the SDRFs be shared between the Union and States in
the ratio of 75:25 for general category States, and 90:10 for special category States. The size of
SDRF for States was estimated based on past expenditure. Fourteenth Finance Commission
(FC‑14) followed the expenditure‑driven approach of previous Finance Commissions (FCs),
and it also made a significant recommendation that up to 10 per cent of the funds available under
the SDRF could be used by State Governments for disasters that are not included in the notified
list of disasters of the Union Government but are considered as ‘disasters’ within the local
context.
11.19 FC‑15 made many far‑reaching recommendations with respect to disaster risk
management. It departed from the 100 per cent expenditure‑based approach to inter se allocation
of funds followed by past FCs and recommended a mix of Disaster Risk Index (DRI) based
approach and past expenditure‑based approach. It brought mitigation efforts to the centre stage
of disaster management discourse by constituting mitigation funds at both the State and Union
levels. It also recommended sub‑windows for response and relief, recovery and reconstruction
and capacity building on the one hand and various earmarked allocations for specific purposes
such as mitigation of urban flooding and modernisation of fire services on the other.
Trends in Allocation for States
11.20 The allocation for disaster management has seen a substantial increase over the award
periods of the last five FCs. FC‑15 recommended a significant increase of 161 per cent to
₹1,60,153 crore over the period from 2021‑22 to 2025‑26. The allocation by the previous
234Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
Commissions is shown in Figure 11.1. Figure 11.2 shows the release of Union share against
allocation. While releases against total allocation are 98 per cent in FC‑13 and FC‑14, it is
around 93 per cent during the first four years (till 31 March 2025) of FC‑15 award period.
Source: Past FC Reports
2Figure 11(cid:17)(cid:21) (cid:36)(cid:79)(cid:79)oca(cid:87)(cid:76)on an(cid:71) (cid:53)e(cid:79)ease of (cid:56)n(cid:76)on (cid:54)hare for (cid:87)he (cid:54)(cid:87)a(cid:87)e (cid:41)(cid:88)n(cid:71)s (₹ crore)
1,00,000 95,632
89,082
80,000
60,000
45,761 45,506
40,000
25,847 25,336
20,000
0
FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
Source: State Finance Accounts, past FC reports, and MHA
Trends in Releases from the National Funds to the States
11.21 Figure 11.3 shows the releases from the National Funds, NDRF and NDMF to the States
based upon the States' proposals. During the award period of FC‑15 (2022‑2026), a total of
₹68,463 crore was recommended, out of which ₹10,385 crore was released during 2022‑2024,
and ₹13,(cid:26)(cid:26)4 crore for 2024‑25 RE and ₹15,060 crore for 2025‑26 BE were provisioned.
235
)erorc
₹(
1Figure 11.1 (cid:36)(cid:79)(cid:79)oca(cid:87)(cid:76)on of (cid:39)(cid:76)sas(cid:87)er (cid:41)(cid:88)n(cid:71)s (cid:87)o (cid:54)(cid:87)a(cid:87)es (cid:69)(cid:92) (cid:51)as(cid:87) (cid:41)(cid:38)s (₹ crore)
1,80,000
1,60,153
1,60,000
1,40,000
1,20,000
1,00,000
80,000
60,000 61,219
40,000
11,007
20,000 33,581
21,333
0
FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15
Allocation Release
)erorc
₹(Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 11(cid:17)3 (cid:53)e(cid:79)eases fro(cid:80) (cid:49)(cid:39)(cid:53)(cid:41) an(cid:71) (cid:49)(cid:39)M(cid:41) (₹ crore)
70,000
57,504
60,000
50,000
39,219
40,000
30,000
20,000
17,559
13,388
8,819
10,000
0
FC-11 FC-12 FC-13 FC-14 FC-15*
Source: Budget documents
Stakeholder Consultation
11.22 We held detailed discussions with various stakeholders on this subject as part of our
overall consultation process. In addition to Union and State Governments, interactions were also
held with NDMA, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), the Principal
Accountant General (Audit) of each State, and two thematic workshops were organised on
various aspects of disaster management. First workshop on Disaster Risks Financing was
organised in collaboration with the World Bank, and second on Disaster Risk Reduction -
Special Focus on Himalayan Disaster Resilience in collaboration with NIDM and the University
of Ladakh. Disaster Management was also an important theme of the regional workshops, as
explained in Chapter 1.
Views of State Governments
11.23 Comprehensive DRI: In their memoranda, some States have requested that the DRI be
modified to include more disasters, with their scores increased in some of the hazards.
11.24 Climate Change & Extreme Weather Events: Some States have argued that due to
increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall, heatwaves,
and cloudbursts, which have resulted in increasing severity of droughts, landslides, and floods,
the Commission should consider increasing allocations for relief, response, and mitigation
efforts.
11.25 Union’s share and State’s share: Many States have proposed that the sharing pattern
in SDRF and SDMF be changed to 90:10 between the Union and the States and certain North
Eastern & Hilly States (NEH) have proposed 100 per cent funding of the State funds by the
Union Government.
236
)erorc
₹(
* FC-15-Actuals for 21-22 to 23-24, 24-25 RE, 25-26 BEChapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
11.26 Flexibility between sub‑allocations: States are facing issues in shifting funds across
the sub‑windows of SDRF and between SDRF and SDMF. Some States have requested a
complete end to the suballocations, thereby giving them complete flexibility in allocating
funds.
11.27 Recommendation on increasing the number of notified disasters: There is an
increasing demand for notifying more disasters, such as lightning and heatwaves, by the States
in their memoranda due to the increased coverage of such disasters.
11.28 Views on norms of expenditure: The norms of relief assistance are periodically
reviewed after the award of successive Commissions. FC‑15 had also recommended periodic
revision of the norms of assistance. The Union issued revised norms on 11 July 2023 which
many States have underlined as being very low in comparison to the needs of their States and
hence have proposed upward revision in the norms of assistance.
11.29 Delay in sanctioning funds from NDRF: A few States have flagged the delay in
approval and disbursal of funds from NDRF.
Views of Union Government and Central Agencies
11.30 The Union Government in its memorandum has submitted that annual allocation of
disaster management funds to be set at 0.15 per cent of base year GDP with 5 per cent annual
increase and splitting funds at the National and State level in the ratio of 30:70. It was also
suggested to allocate SDRF and SDMF funds based on 60 per cent weight to past expenditure,
15 per cent weights each to area and population, and 10 per cent to States’ own preparedness.
The accumulating balance was suggested to be corrected using a revised DRI. It also proposed
continuation of the multi‑window architecture of FC‑15 (response and relief, recovery and
reconstruction, preparedness and capacity building and earmarked allocations), together with
allowing the mitigation projects approved under NDMF in the FC‑15 period to be completed
from FC‑16 funds. The Union also submitted for embedding disaster mitigation and
reconstruction measures into regular development plans by taking a ‘whole of government’
approach. The cost‑graded sharing of Union assistance under NDRF and NDMF may be allowed
to continue as per FC‑15, except for the response and relief window. The NDRF window may
only be used to fill vital gaps left unfilled by other regular windows, like State schemes, SDRF,
CSS, and CS schemes.
11.31 NDMA emphasised the need for incorporating emerging disaster risks like glacial lake
outburst flood, coastal erosion, heat waves, forest fires and lightning in the disaster management
framework and requested dedicated funds for specific disaster management initiatives. It also
called for the activation of district‑level disaster management funds, mobilising resources for
local governments and urban resilience, along with establishing various risk pools – hazard
mortality and captive insurance, national catastrophic risk insurance pool, and national
catastrophic bond.
11.32 The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) highlighted that FC‑15 recommended central
assistance from NDRF and NDMF on a graded cost‑sharing basis as 10 per cent State
237Sixteenth Finance Commission
contribution for assistance up to ₹250 crore, 20 per cent assistance up to ₹500 crore, and 25 per
cent assistance above ₹500 crore. The Union Cabinet on 21 October 2021 revisited and
dispensed with graded cost sharing by States under NDRF for response and provided for
adjusting 50 per cent balance of SDRF on the date of NDRF release. MHA suggested that greater
flexibility in SDRF may lead to increased allocation for relief and response, overshadowing
other disaster management aspects. MHA also highlighted that the present rules allow
expenditure of mitigation funds on lightning and heatwave which are non‑notified disasters.
MHA emphasised that while the previous Commission had provided for dedicated mitigation
funds at the Union and States, and several earmarked allocations, there were some delays in
issuing the corresponding guidelines. However, MHA noted that the systems are now firmly in
place.
11.33 MHA also raised concerns about the huge opening balances lying unspent with the
State Governments and recommended that the Commission may consider putting a cap on
cumulative balance, beyond which the annual allocation may stop or be diverted to the
mitigation fund.
11.34 MHA strongly supported that the amount earmarked for mitigation activity should be
sufficient to make an impact, and some percentage of mitigation funds needs to be allowed for
central agencies and project monitoring units. MHA suggested that financing through
multi‑lateral technical assistance should also be taken into account for the preparation of the
comparative index. Also, modalities need to be evolved for the convergence of identical
schemes/ programmes with earmarked resources to avoid duplication. It is also highlighted by
MHA that the nomenclature of the fund as State Disaster Risk Management Fund and National
Disaster Risk Management Fund is contrary to the provisions of the DM Act. MHA emphasised
that the Commission may come up with strong recommendations with respect to ensuring
transparency and accountability in the management of funds. MHA strongly favoured that
allocation of funds to various districts in DDRF out of SDRF may be left at the discretion of the
State Government. MHA highlighted that due to procedural delays in issuing the guidelines and
sanctioning the projects, the activities related to recovery and mitigation, which are long‑term
in nature, should be allowed to spill over beyond the FC period.
Studies Commissioned
11.35 A few research studies were undertaken to assess the need and impact of disaster risk
financing and extreme weather events. CDRI, along with Council on Energy, Environment and
Water (CEEW), had undertaken work on improving the DRI under the active guidance of the
Commission. The World Bank has undertaken a study on the fund utilisation of SDRF, SDMF,
NDRF & NDMF, and a review of DRI, as well as an analysis of extreme weather events, climate
change, and economic impacts while IIT Roorkee has undertaken a study on financing disaster
risk management. The outcomes from these studies have informed and enhanced our
understanding of disaster risk management and its financing.
238Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
Implementation and Outcomes of Recommendations of FC‑15
11.36 The recommendations of FC‑15 marked a significant shift in the country’s approach to
managing disasters. Therefore, it is both timely and appropriate to undertake a detailed analysis
of how the recommendations were implemented by the States, Union and NDMA.
11.37 The releases of the central share of SDRF by the Union Government are timely. For most
of the States, the releases against allocation in SDRF have been in the range of 95‑100 per cent
for the years 2021‑22 to 2024‑25. However, the releases of the central share for SDMF for
2021‑22 to 2024‑25 have been around 80 per cent.
11.38 During our interactions with the MHA and NDMA, it was highlighted that the releases
for SDMF are lower than the allocation compared to the releases for SDRF, mainly due to the
delay on the part of the States in constituting the mitigation fund. It was also observed that the
utilisation from SDMF is also on the lower side due to the delay in issuing guidelines. Utilisation
data was collected from the States along with the details of projects being implemented through
SDMF. A preliminary analysis of the projects indicated that an entire spectrum of projects
focused on mitigation against various disasters has been undertaken, such as flood protection
walls, firefighting systems, dam protection and restoration, deepening and widening of storm
water drains, installing alarm systems, lightning arresters, ground water recharge and
installation of doppler radars, and so on.
11.39 Figure 11.4 shows the trend in expenditure of States on disaster management during
2011‑12 to 2023‑24. The expenditure on relief has increased gradually from ₹11,070 crore in
2011‑12 to ₹25,638 crore in 2023‑24, with distinct peaks during the COVID‑19 years.
3Figure 11.4 Aggregate Expenditure of States on Relief on Account of Natural Calamity
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
Source: State Finance Accounts of all States
Note: Figures pertain to the total of major head 2245 - (05 SDRF net transfer) - (08 SDMF net transfer) -
(103 NDRF net transfer) + Net direct disbursement from public accounts
239
)erorc
₹(Sixteenth Finance Commission
11.40 At the national level, NDRF has three separate sub‑windows – Response and Relief
(40 per cent), Recovery and Reconstruction (30 per cent), and Preparedness and Capacity
Building (10 per cent). Against a total recommended allocation of ₹68,463 crore made for
NDRF and NDMF by FC‑15, ₹54,770 crore was allocated for NDRF. Within NDRF, the
releases in response and relief sub‑window got the maximum share, which is at 54.3 per cent.
Table 11.1 provides the allocations and releases so far by the Union Government following
FC‑15 recommendations.
Table 11.1 Allocation and Release of Sub‑windows (cid:88)n(cid:71)er (cid:49)(cid:39)(cid:53)(cid:41) (₹ crore)
Release (till 31
Funding Windows Allocation
July 2025)
Response & Relief 27,385.00 14,855.00
Recovery & Reconstruction 20,539.00 818.74
Resettlement of Displaced People Affected by Erosion 1,000.00 Nil
Preparedness & Capacity Building 6,846.00 2,778.58
Modernisation of Fire Services under Preparedness & 5,000.00 1,214.68
Capacity Building
Source: MHA
11.41 From the total NDMF allocation of ₹13,693 crore, FC‑15 also recommended four
earmarked allocations, that is Catalytic Assistance to Twelve Most Drought‑prone States,
Managing Seismic and Landslide Risks in Ten States, Reducing Risk of Urban Flooding in
Seven Most Populous Cities, and Mitigation Measures to Prevent Erosion. The MHA has also
undertaken various mitigation programmes in addition to the earmarked allocations. Table 11.2
provides the relevant allocation and release data.
112.1 All Table 11.2 Allocation and Release in S ub-(cid:90)(cid:76)n(cid:71)o(cid:90)s (cid:88)n(cid:71)er (cid:49)(cid:39)M(cid:41) (₹ crore)
Release
Earmarked Funds Allocation
(till 31 July 2025)
Catalytic Assistance to Twelve Most Drought-prone States 1,200.00 350.00
Managing Seismic & Landslide Risks in Ten States 750.00 Nil
Reducing Risk of Urban Flooding in Seven Most Populous Cities 2,500.00 709.54
Mitigation Measures to Prevent Erosion 1,500.00 Nil
National Glacial Lake Outburst Floods Risk Mitigation Programme 150.00 27.73
Forest Fire Mitigation Project 818.92 Nil
Mitigation Project for Lightning Safety 186.78 Nil
Landslide Risk Reduction and Mitigation Project 1,000.00 4.54
National Project for Strengthening Community Based Disaster Risk
163.32 Nil
Reduction Initiative in PRI
Source: MHA
240Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
11.42 While recommending new sub‑windows and earmarked allocations, FC‑15 specifically
suggested that newly created funding windows need to be supported through the development
of guidelines, and that NDMA should lead that process. However, significant amount of time
was involved in issuing the guidelines and subsequent delays in formulation, processing, and
approval of proposals were key reasons for the lower percentage of fund releases and utilisation.
11.43 The MHA has operationalised the National Disaster Management Information System
(NDMIS), in which all States are expected to feed data related to expenditures on various items
of relief against every disaster. Due to this effort of MHA and most of the States, for the first
time, granular data with respect to expenditure incurred against each disaster is available to
FC‑16 for review and use in further decision making. Some States have also given suggestions
on how the portal can be improved based on the challenges they face in feeding data into
NDMIS. We therefore recommend MHA to conduct a rigorous consultation with the States on
various features of the portal to further upgrade it so that NDMIS becomes a repository of all
disaster‑related data.
11.44 An analysis of the expenditure data from the NDMIS portal reveals that at the aggregate
level, flood accounted for the majority of the expenditure, followed by drought, State‑specific
disasters, and cyclones in that order. They together account for 92 per cent of the total
expenditure. The pie chart in Figure 11.5 shows the expenditure pattern of the notified disasters,
including State‑specific disasters, from 2019‑20 to 2023‑24. Similarly, a detailed analysis of the
expenditure on relief items after removing COVID‑19 expenditures indicates that more than
half of the total expenditure is incurred on relief measures related to agricultural inputs (55.6
per cent), followed by that on people as ex gratia (23.4 per cent) and on infrastructure (13 per
cent).
Our Approach
11.45 We have considered the representations of all the States and the Union, as well as
discussed, the subjects extensively during various conferences and consultations with multiple
stakeholders. We have also extensively reviewed how the recommendations of FC‑15 were
implemented. Based on our assessment and review, we are guided by the following
principles.
(i) The institutionalisation of relief and mitigation funds, along with increased
allocations, has better equipped the States to respond to disasters. We are in favour
of continuing with the same arrangement for disaster risk financing, as provided
under the law. Although the guidelines for mitigation funds were delayed, these
projects should be continued and brought to fruition, with greater flexibility in both
selection and execution at the Union and State levels, a point we will return to in
discussing our recommendations.
(ii) The introduction of DRI has mapped the States’ Hazard, Exposure, and
Vulnerabilities into the allocation of funds in a novel fashion. This index can be
241Sixteenth Finance Commission
updated to take account of new data and additional disasters, and its application to
the allocation of funds can be further refined. We have included more granular
datasets and better aligned the construction of DRI and its application to fund
allocation in line with international practices.
(iii) Based on our study of the methodology and experience of the past FCs for the
assessment of disaster funding needs, we also appreciate the importance of past
expenditures as an indicator of the immediate future needs of the States. Therefore,
in our assessment, we continue to assign the past expenditures an important role.
(iv) While the recommendations of FC‑15 are yet to be implemented in their entirety,
partly due to delays caused by the pandemic and the time taken to issue guidelines,
we believe that the necessary systems are now in place at both the Union and State
levels, and the reforms initiated by FC‑15 should be taken forward.
(v) We have also given adequate emphasis on the use of technology for managing
disasters effectively and the availability of reliable data for informed
decision‑making.
4Figure 11.5 Disaster‑wise Expenditure of States (2019‑20 to 2023‑24)
Cloud burst
Cold-wave/ frost
State Specific 0.32% 1.12%
13.27%
Cyclone
6.94%
Pest Attacks
0.94%
Drought
17.26%
Landslide
2.59%
Earthquake
0.002%
Hailstorm
1.94%
Fire
0.51%
Flood
55.09%
Source: National Disaster Management Information System, MHA
242Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
Risk Assessment – The Disaster Risk Index
11.46 FC‑15 quantified disaster risk by assigning scores to the probability of hazards striking
a State, and the extent of vulnerability. A composite score was developed for each State, leading
to an index that ranks States based on risk scores. Four major hazards, namely cyclone, drought,
earthquake, and flood, were taken into account, assigning a maximum score of 15 marks for
each, with 60 as the total maximum score for these hazards. In addition, 10 marks were given
to all States for their share of smaller hazards in the ‘other’ category. A vulnerability score of
30 marks was assigned based on the below poverty line population of each State in 2011‑12 (as
per Tendulkar methodology) on a graded basis and was added to the hazard score to arrive at a
DRI score out of 100 for each State.
11.47 In order to account for exposure, the respective State’s area is scaled by the per square
kilometre allocation of Maharashtra and the State’s population is scaled by the per capita
allocation of Maharashtra (Maharashtra was used as the benchmark State by FC‑15). Both these
values have been given a weight of 15 per cent each. These were added to the average
expenditure of the State with a weight of 70 per cent. The number so arrived was multiplied by
a factor of (1+DRI) to arrive at the final allocation for each State.
11.48 We have revisited the DRI methodology. Internationally accepted definition of Disaster
Risk is an interaction of Hazard, Exposure, and Vulnerability as per the United Nations Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). It emphasises that disaster risk emerges from the interaction of weather or
climate events, which constitute the physical contributors to disaster risk, with exposure and
vulnerability, the contributors to risk from the human side. Caribbean Disaster Emergency
Management Agency (CDEMA) also explains disaster risk through the interplay of three main
components – Hazards, Vulnerability and Exposure. Hence, as per international practice,
Disaster Risk represents the potential for loss and damage to susceptible people, property, and
livelihoods during a hazard event. It is determined as a function of hazard, exposure and
vulnerability. Importantly, the DRI is a multiplicative function of these three variables – disaster
risk only exists when Hazard, Exposure and Vulnerability intersect.
11.49 The Hazard variable has been expanded to include new disasters. The expanded hazard
list includes a total of ten disasters: flood, drought, cyclone, earthquake, landslides, hailstorms,
cold wave, cloud burst, lightning, and heatwave. The latter two are in the State‑specific disaster
category. To evaluate the hazard profiles of the States, credible and objective datasets were
acquired from expert agencies like the Indian Meteorology Department, Central Water
Commission, Geological Survey of India, National Centre for Seismology, Bureau of Indian
Standards and Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. It was also ensured that the datasets
used and the methodology adopted to arrive at the index for the States are objective and
scientifically sound. Hazard scores have been assigned to each State for each disaster based on
its relative position on the data scale, using quintile breaks. Subsequently, a composite hazard
243Sixteenth Finance Commission
score for each State has been calculated based on a weighted sum of the hazard scores of that
State for each of the disasters, where the weights have been chosen based on the proportion of
expenditure incurred on the management of that disaster.
11.50 The Exposure variable is based on the projected population as of October 2026, as
estimated by the Technical Group of Population Projections 2020, constituted by the Ministry
of Health & Family Welfare. As indicated earlier, the main elements of exposure for most
disasters are crops and infrastructure, which are highly correlated with the population.
Therefore, it was decided to rely on the population for measuring exposure. In addition,
parameters like area are already included in the hazard score, as it is mostly based on indicators
such as flood‑prone area and drought‑prone area. Therefore, reliance solely on the population
to measure exposure avoids duplication.
11.51 For the Vulnerability variable, it was decided to use the per‑capita income of the States
(average from 2018‑19 to 2023‑24, leaving out the COVID‑19 year, 2020‑21) as it had a high
correlation with many indicators of vulnerability, including poverty. It is also an indicator of
effective per capita economic resources available to manage disaster risk and the capacity for
prevention and mitigation of disasters. In the final step, hazard, exposure and vulnerability are
multiplied to arrive at a DRI score for each State.
11.52 We base 30 per cent of the allocation on the DRI and 70 per cent on the average
expenditure of the State over the period 2011‑12 to 2023‑24, excluding the two COVID‑19
years, 2020‑22. The base year allocation was inflated by 5 per cent each year. A detailed
description of the methodology of the DRI, along with data sources, is provided in Annexure
11.1. The DRI scores of each State is presented in Annexure 11.2. A brief description of our
suggested DRI is also provided in Box 11.1.
Box 11.1 Methodology of State Level Allocation for SDRF and SDMF
Allocation=70% (Inter se allocation based on AE) + 30% (Inter se allocation based on DRI)
Where:
(cid:120) AE = Average Expenditure
(cid:120) DRI = Disaster Risk Index
DRI of the State i,
(cid:2160)(cid:2174)(cid:2165) = (cid:2164) (cid:1499)(cid:2161) (cid:1499)(cid:2178)
(cid:2191) (cid:2191) (cid:2191) (cid:2191)
(cid:120) (cid:2164) = (cid:963)(cid:2869)(cid:2868) (cid:1875) (cid:1499)(cid:1834) where (cid:1834) is the hazard score of State i for hazard k and (cid:1875) is the
(cid:2191) (cid:3038)(cid:2880)(cid:2869) (cid:3038) (cid:3036)(cid:3038) (cid:3036)(cid:3038) (cid:3038)
weight adopted for hazard k for each of the 10 hazards, viz floods, drought, cyclone,
landslide, earthquake, hailstorm, cold wave, cloud burst, heatwave, lightning.
(cid:120) (cid:2161) = Exposure of State to hazards (score based on adjusted inter se population).
(cid:2191)
(cid:120) (cid:2178) = Vulnerability of the States (score based on per capita income).
(cid:2191)
244Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
State and National Level Allocations
Allocation for SDRF and SDMF
11.53 For our award period, the State‑wise allocation is based on assigning 30 per cent weight
to the DRI and 70 per cent weight to average expenditure from 2011‑12 to 2023‑24 (excluding
COVID‑19 years of 2020‑21 and 2021‑22). For arriving at the figures related to expenditure on
disaster relief, the States’ expenditure booked under major head (MH) 2245 for the period
2011‑2024 (excluding the COVID‑19 years of 2020‑21 and 2021‑2022) was taken. From these
values, the net values of transfers to the Public Accounts of SDRF, SDMF, and NDRF under
MH 2245 were subtracted. Some States debit a part of the expenditure on disasters directly from
the SDRF maintained in the Public Account. This expenditure is added to the adjusted
expenditure under MH‑2245. The NDRF releases for each year have, then, been subtracted from
these values to remove the impact of relief expenditure met from NDRF and then the values
were inflation adjusted and averaged to arrive at the expenditure for a State.
11.54 A provision was made for a 5 per cent increase every year for annual allocation during
our award period. A total allocation of ₹2,04,401 crore has been arrived at for the SDRF and
SDMF together for the period 2026‑27 to 2030‑31.
11.55 The funds meant for the States shall continue to be divided between SDRF and SDMF
in the ratio of 80:20. A total of ₹1,63,521 crore is recommended for SDRF and ₹40,880 crore
for SDMF. The State‑wise allocation for SDRF and SDMF is provided in Annexure 11.3 and
Annexure 11.4, respectively. The States will have full flexibility to use SDRF funds between
their two sub‑windows- Response and Relief and Recovery and Reconstruction. However, a
shift of allocation between SDRF and SDMF should not be allowed as these are two separate
funds under the Act.
11.56 As per the DM Act, ‘preparedness’ means “the state of readiness to deal with a
threatening disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof.” The Act further defines
‘mitigation’ as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or
threatening disaster.” Hence, activities related to ‘preparedness’ and ‘mitigation’ have to be
undertaken in the pre‑disaster phase, in anticipation of the disaster, and to ensure the vulnerable
population is not impacted severely and is better equipped to deal with the disaster. Hence, we
recommend that Preparedness and Capacity Building should come under the SDMF and NDMF,
as it is a pre‑disaster activity, unlike response, relief, recovery, or reconstruction, which are all
post‑disaster events.
11.57 Since SDRF and SDMF are statutory funds and their existence is essential for State
Governments to handle upcoming disasters, the closing balances in SDRF & SDMF as on 31
March 2026 should be allowed to be carried forward during FC‑16 as the opening balance.
Accumulating Balance of SDRF
11.58 There are cases of large accumulating balances of the SDRF in the accounts of the States.
The Commission has deliberated on this issue and recommends limiting the funds in accordance
245Sixteenth Finance Commission
with needs‑based criteria. We recommend that during our award period, if the unspent balance
under SDRF exceeds the sum of past three years’ total annual allocation of SDRF, further
releases may be temporarily withheld. The withheld funds are to be released as and when the
balance drops below the preceding three years’ total allocation.
Allocation of Funds for National Funds (NDRF & NDMF)
11.59 The allocation for the National Funds is based on the actual expenditure (from 2015‑16
to 2023‑24), revised estimates (2024‑25), and budgeted estimates (2025‑26) of NDRF and
NDMF. These values have been adjusted for 5 per cent inflation. The inflation‑adjusted
expenditure over the 11 years is averaged and then further increased by 10 per cent to arrive at
the base amount. The base amount has been increased by 5 per cent for the 2026‑27 allocation
of ₹14,370 crore and annual increase of 5 per cent for the remaining award period has also been
provided.
11.60 A total of ₹79,406 crore is recommended for the National Funds as shown in Table 11.3.
This fund will be used for relief and rescue, mitigation, recovery and reconstruction, and
capacity building. The sub‑allocation within the above amount between response and relief,
recovery and reconstruction and mitigation may be left flexible for better utilisation of resources.
2Table 11.3 Allocation for National Funds during FC‑16 Award (cid:51)er(cid:76)o(cid:71) (₹ crore)
Year 2026‑27 2027‑28 2028‑29 2029‑30 2030‑31 Total
Allocation 14,370 15,089 15,843 16,637 17,467 79,406
Cost‑sharing between the Union and the States
11.61 Disaster management in the country is a shared fiscal responsibility between the Union
and the States. The States’ contribution promotes active ownership, accountability, efficient
fund utilisation and better disaster preparedness. Hence, we recommend a sharing pattern of
75:25 for non‑NEH States and 90:10 for NEH States for SDRF and SDMF, continuing the
existing sharing arrangements between the Union and States. The Union share and State share
for SDRF and SDMF are provided in Annexure 11.5 and Annexure 11.6.
11.62 In the case of NDRF and NDMF, FC‑15 recommended graded cost sharing for all States
uniformly. We observe that smaller States are finding it difficult to match the share, which could
reach 25 per cent for projects above ₹500 crore. Considering this fact, we recommend a different
graded cost‑sharing mechanism for non‑NEH States and NEH States. The non‑NEH States will
continue to bear the same graded cost as outlined in Table 11.4. However, NEH States will bear
a uniform 10 per cent cost‑sharing against assistance from NDRF (other than relief and response
window) and NDMF, irrespective of the project size.
246Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
Table 11.4 Cost‑sharing for Assistance under
NDRF (other than Relief and Response Window) and NDMF
Union Assistance (₹ (cid:38)rore) Cost Sharing for Non‑NEH States
Up to 250 10 per cent
251 - 500 20 per cent
Above 500 25 per cent
Norms of Assistance
11.63 The MHA has periodically revised the norms of assistance in consultation with the States
and concerned Union Ministries. The Commission recommends a revision of the assistance
norms periodically in line with existing practice.
List of Notified Disasters
11.64 The DM Act defines a disaster as “a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence
in any area, arising from natural or manmade causes, or by accident or negligence which results
in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of, property, or
damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond
the coping capacity of the community of the affected area.”
11.65 At present, the disasters covered under the SDRF include cyclone, drought, earthquake,
fire, flood, tsunami, hailstorm, landslides, avalanche, cloudburst, pest attack, frost and cold
waves. Additionally, States are permitted to utilise up to 10 per cent of the SDRF allocation for
providing immediate relief to victims of natural disasters that are not part of the list notified by
the Union Government but are considered locally significant. This is contingent upon the State
having notified such disasters, along with clear and transparent norms and guidelines, duly
approved by the State Executive Committee.
11.66 We note that eleven States have already notified heat wave as a State‑specific disaster.
Many States, in their memoranda, have strongly advocated for the inclusion of heat wave among
the notified disasters under the national framework. Extreme heat events disproportionately
affect vulnerable populations. Over the past four decades (1981‑2022), the frequency and
intensity of hot days in India have significantly increased, with notable heatwaves recorded in
2013, 2016, 2019, 2022, and 2024.
11.67 Moreover, there has been a marked rise in the number of very warm nights during the
last decade. These warmer nights prevent the human body from recovering from daytime heat,
thereby escalating the risk of heat‑related illnesses such as heatstroke. According to data from
the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), Ministry of Home Affairs, a total of 3,798 deaths
were reported due to heat or sunstroke in India between 2018 and 2022.
247Sixteenth Finance Commission
11.68 While the Union Government has allowed States to undertake mitigation efforts related
to heat waves through the SDMF and NDMF, it is equally important to enable States to provide
immediate relief to the vulnerable population affected by heat waves through the SDRF.
11.69 Similarly, the escalating threat of lightning across India demands its urgent recognition
as a national disaster. The Annual Lightning Report released in collaboration with Indian
Meteorological Department (IMD) for 2020‑2021 documented a significant 34 per cent increase
in lightning strikes nationwide, totalling approximately 18.5 million events, a rise of over 4.7
million over the previous year.
11.70 The inherent dangers of lightning are undeniable. Capable of unleashing 100 million to
1 billion volts, billions of watts of electricity, and temperatures exceeding 35,000 degrees
Fahrenheit (IMD), lightning possesses destructive power comparable to other recognised
disasters. Tragically, NCRB data confirms lightning as the leading cause of death from ‘forces
of nature’ in India. In 2022 alone, it accounted for a devastating 35.8 per cent of all natural
hazard fatalities (2,887 out of 8,060 deaths in total).
11.71 The impact of lightning disproportionately affects the most vulnerable populations.
Agricultural labourers working in open fields, lacking natural shelter and exposed to conductive
water bodies, face heightened risks. Similarly, those residing in structurally weak mud houses
are more susceptible to ground strikes. This pattern of impact underscores the socio‑economic
dimensions of lightning's destructiveness. While sixteen States have already recognised
lightning’s calamitous potential by notifying it as a disaster, a unified national declaration is
crucial to ensure consistent relief and mitigation efforts for all affected communities.
Recognising lightning as a national disaster will enable the allocation of necessary resources,
the implementation of robust early warning systems, and the development of targeted safety
measures to protect lives and livelihoods, particularly for those most at risk.
11.72 Although States currently have the flexibility to use 10 per cent of SDRF allocations for
State‑specific disasters, the rising severity, frequency, and impact of heat waves and lightning
warrant their inclusion in the nationally notified list of disasters. Both heatwaves and lightning
are severe events that have caused significant loss of life. Given their scale and the fact that they
often exceed the coping capacity of affected communities, they merit inclusion in the list of
notified disasters at the national level.
11.73 In line with the precedents and the evolving disaster landscape, we recommend that the
Heatwave and Lightning be added to the national list of notified disasters under the SDRF
framework. We also recommend that the existing practice of allowing up to 10 per cent of SDRF
funds to be used against disasters within the local context, and which are not in the list of notified
disasters, should continue.
Capacity Constraints and Systems Development
11.74 During our review of the various funds constituted for disaster management, especially
the earmarked allocations, it was observed that despite increased funding, utilisation remained
weak due to a lack of institutional capacity, including at the national level.
248Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
11.75 Historically, the machinery in the States and the Union operates relatively swiftly and
with efficiency in organising relief and response efforts, but significant differences still exist
between the States. While some States have integrated and automated digital systems, which
can be effectively utilised for swift disbursal of relief during calamities, others still follow an
extensive manual process in the identification of affected people, collecting documentary
evidence, uploading the beneficiaries list in treasury systems, and so on, which leads to huge
delays in the disbursal of relief during calamities.
11.76 Capacities need to be built at a rapid pace and on scale, at the Union and the States, with
respect to preparedness, planning and execution of mitigation works, as well as recovery and
reconstruction. Inadequate capacity in these areas leads to delays in the formulation of
operational and technical guidelines, preparation, submission and approval of project proposals,
release and utilization of funds. Even after four years of institutionalising funds for mitigation
at the State and Union levels, the utilisation of funds remains abysmal.
11.77 Going forward, the disaster landscape should also be focused on preparedness,
mitigation, recovery and reconstruction as much as its focus on response and relief. The
expenditure pattern should reflect the actual need for each of these activities. Investment in
preparedness and mitigation should be prioritised to ensure that people endure minimal impact
from such disasters. We strongly recommend that the NDMA undertake a comprehensive
analysis of institutional capacity gaps at all levels and propose targeted measures to strengthen
SDMAs.
Use of Technology in Disaster Management
11.78 Technology has become a mainstay in effective disaster management, and it enables a
shift from reactive and relief‑centric approaches to proactive, predictive, and preventive
strategies. The amendment to the DM Act in 2025 enunciates a bold vision with respect to
handling disasters by emphasising preparedness and mitigation in addition to relief and rescue.
Embracing technological solutions is the key to realising this vision. Adopting cutting‑edge
technologies at all stages of disaster management is imperative in the light of the growing
frequency and intensity of disasters.
11.79 Technological tools are indispensable not only for early warning systems and real‑time
hazard monitoring but also for logistics management, damage assessment, relief distribution,
and long‑term recovery planning. For instance, artificial intelligence and machine learning
models can be used to predict flooding patterns, wildfire spread, and cyclone paths with greater
accuracy. Similarly, geospatial technologies, remote sensing, and satellite imagery, provided by
agencies like Indian Space Research Organisation and National Remote Sensing Centre, can
play a critical role in vulnerability mapping and planning.
11.80 The effective deployment of such tools, however, depends on the availability of
high‑quality, granular, and interoperable data sets and the presence of trained personnel who
can interpret and act on this information. It is essential that NDMA take a lead role in promoting
open data frameworks by coordinating with key institutions and institutions of repute both in
private and in public.
249Sixteenth Finance Commission
11.81 In this context, Mission Mausam, being implemented by the Ministry of Earth Sciences,
is a major step forward. The mission focuses on enhancing forecasting capabilities, real‑time
data dissemination, and strengthening responses to climate‑sensitive hazards such as urban
flooding, heatwaves, and cyclones. While challenges such as geographic diversity and
infrastructure gaps persist, the Commission recommends that NDMA actively support and may
align mitigation resources with Mission Mausam’s initiatives to maximise impact.
11.82 MHA and NDMA should consult with the States, expert agencies, research institutions
and private stakeholders and make suitable provisions in the guidelines and provide for fund
allocations so that technological interventions become an integral part in all the
stages‑mitigation (prevention and risk reduction), preparedness, response and relief and
recovery‑of the disaster management cycle.
11.83 The National Disaster Management Information System (NDMIS), an MHA initiative,
is a commendable initiative for monitoring funds disbursal under NDRF and SDRF. NDMIS
aims to bring States onto a unified platform for disaster reporting and accounting, providing
disaster‑wise and relief item‑wise data, facilitating inter‑State comparison.
11.84 The NDMIS, in its current form, may necessitate further streamlining and integration
with other systems to fully realise its potential as the unified disaster database of the country.
The Union Government should gather user feedback on the portal and carry out necessary
improvements in the system.
11.85 We recommend that NDMIS should morph into a comprehensive disaster management
information system for both the Union and the States. Such a system should capture real‑time
transaction‑level disaster data, serving as a single source for disaster information. To ensure the
effective adoption of NDMIS, we recommend that complete data feeding and validation for a
Financial Year by 31 May of the succeeding year be a necessary condition for States to avail the
Union share of SDRF/SDMF from the second year of the award period.
11.86 We also recommend that MHA and the States collaborate further to enhance the utility
of this portal by making it the primary medium for States to submit their memoranda using
standardised forms in the event of disasters and for the subsequent release of funds by the Union
Government to the States. This will help streamline the process of NDRF relief disbursement
and avoid delays, as all necessary information and details can be sought and provided through
the portal.
Accounting Norms and Procedures
11.87 The Commission's analysis of the State Finance Accounts for assessing expenditure on
disasters by various States has revealed departures from the MHA’s SDRF guidelines for
booking disaster expenditure. Such practices include directly booking expenditure from the
Public Account without utilising the Major Head 2245 or booking expenditure under sub‑heads
of the transfer head 2245‑05‑101 instead of the relevant sub‑major and minor heads of Major
Head 2245. These deviations complicate the accurate assessment of disaster expenditure by
250Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
States. This issue is further compounded when States withdraw funds for transfer to bank
accounts to incur disaster expenditure and make investments from those bank accounts, rather
than from the treasury. As such, we recommend that the existing MHA norms pertaining to the
booking of disaster‑related expenditure and investment should be strictly adhered to, with
compliance regularly audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India.
Alternative Instruments of Disaster Financing
11.88 FC‑15 had recommended insurance‑based financing for supplementation of public fund
mechanisms in disaster financing. However, the envisioned supplementation through insurance
remains at a nascent stage, except in the domain of crop insurance, where a substantial increase
in coverage, both in terms of crops and area, has been observed. The limited availability of
disaster‑related insurance products, low insurance penetration, insufficient awareness, and
issues concerning affordability and accessibility have impeded its wider adoption. The
prevailing preference among governments is for post‑disaster pay‑outs rather than proactive risk
coverage through insurance mechanisms.
11.89 As a successful initiative of partnership between the Union, States, and the private
sector, the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare is implementing the Pradhan Mantri
Fasal Bima Yojana, which is the world's largest crop insurance scheme. In this scheme, the
Union Government and State Governments together contribute 85‑90 per cent of the premium.
Despite this substantial support, farmer penetration has reached 40 per cent over the past eight
years. Out of the total farmer applications enrolled under the scheme in 2024‑25, 6.5 per cent,
17.6 per cent and 48 per cent are pertaining to tenant, marginal and loanee farmers respectively.
Technology‑based assessment of the crop losses and timely disbursal of claims hold the keys to
the success of this scheme in the future.
11.90 Another success story stands out from Nagaland. The State has emerged as a pioneer in
experimenting with parametric insurance for disaster risk in India. Nagaland’s Disaster Risk
Transfer Parametric Insurance Solution represents the first initiative of its kind in India to
comprehensively insure an entire State against the impact of extreme rainfall, thereby offering
financial protection to the State's population and critical infrastructure. An extensive network of
automated weather stations has enabled the State to define specific excess rainfall triggers,
facilitating accurate and timely pay‑outs. This initiative is a collaborative effort between the
Nagaland State Disaster Management Authority, SBI General Insurance, and major global
reinsurers such as Munich Re and GIC Re. However, this initiative, despite its success, currently
remains an isolated example and is limited in scale and scope.
11.91 Insurance interventions and mechanisms like catastrophe bonds warrant a
comprehensive study by the Union and State Governments to assess their affordability,
applicability, and scope for customisation according to specific needs. Furthermore, innovative
financing mechanisms for the payment of insurance premiums need to be evolved to facilitate
greater affordability. Department of Financial Services and NDMA are also working on a single
251Sixteenth Finance Commission
peril parametric insurance product, as confirmed in the Standing Committee report on Finance,
submitted to Lok Sabha in December 2024. We recommend that the concerned ministries
examine and finalise such insurance products in line with global best practice.
Summary of Recommendations
(i) The allocation of disaster management funds for the States is based on past expenditures
and Disaster Risk Index (Hazard, Exposure and Vulnerability). A total corpus of
₹2,04,401 crore has been recommended for SDRF and SDMF together, for the award
period from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31. The State‑wise allocations are provided in Annexures
11.3 and 11.4
(paragraphs 11.53 and 11.54)
(ii) The corpus should be divided between the SDRF and SDMF in the ratio of 80:20. The
SDRF allocation is ₹1,63,521 crore and that of SDMF is ₹40,880 crore. Under SDRF
there should be flexibility for reallocation between Response and Relief and Recovery
and Reconstruction. Preparedness and Capacity Building will now fall under SDMF and
NDMF.
(paragraphs 11.55 and 11.56)
(iii) The accumulating balance under SDRF should be limited to the extent that if the unspent
balance under SDRF exceeds the sum of past three years annual allocation of SDRF,
further releases may be temporarily withheld. The funds withheld will be released if the
States’ balances reduce below the threshold of past three years annual allocation.
(paragraph 11.58)
(iv) The total allocation of ₹79,406 crore is recommended based upon past expenditures for
disaster management at the national level (for NDRF and NDMF).
(paragraphs 11.59 and 11.60)
(v) States are to contribute 25 per cent of the funds of SDRF and SDMF except the NEH
States which shall contribute 10 per cent, and the rest is to be provided by the Union
Government. The total share of Union Government works out to ₹1,55,915.85 crore.
(paragraph 11.61)
(vi) The graded cost sharing of central assistance through the NDRF (except Response and
Relief) and NDMF should be maintained. States are to contribute 10 per cent for
assistance up to ₹250 crore, 20 per cent for assistance up to ₹500 crore and 25 per cent
for all assistance exceeding ₹500 crore. However, NEH States should contribute 10 per
cent of all central assistance under NDRF and NDMF.
(paragraph 11.62)
252Chapter 11: Financing of Disaster Management
(vii) The norms of assistance should be revised periodically by the Ministry of Home affairs
in line with existing practice.
(paragraph 11.63)
(viii) Heatwave and Lightning should be added to the list of notified disasters at the National
level.
(paragraph 11.73)
(ix) The National Disaster Management Information System (NDMIS) should be
transformed into a comprehensive disaster management system for both the Union and
the States. The system should capture real‑time transaction‑level disaster data, serving
as a single source for disaster information, and minimizing the compliance burden on
States.
(paragraph 11.85)
(x) Complete feeding and validation of data in NDMIS portal (for a Financial Year by the
31 May of the succeeding year) will be a necessary condition for States to avail the
Disaster Management Grant from the second year of the award period, that is 2027‑28.
(paragraph 11.85)
(xi) MHA and States should collaborate to enhance the utility of NDMIS by making it the
primary medium for States to submit their memorandum using standardised forms in the
event of disasters and for subsequent release of funds by the Union Government to the
States.
(paragraph 11.86)
(xii) Commission recommends that the existing MHA norms pertaining to the booking of
disaster‑related expenditure and investment should be strictly adhered to, with
compliance regularly audited by the CAG.
(paragraph 11.87)
253THE PATH TO
12
MACRO AND
FISCAL STABILITY
12. Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
12.1 As India charts its path toward becoming a developed economy, ensuring macro and
fiscal stability is both more urgent and more complex than ever. Elevated government debt and
high debt servicing requirements could exert downward pressure on development spending,
especially capital expenditure, essential for growth. Fragile global economic systems and
uncertain geopolitical situations pose a big challenge to growth as well as stability. With the
pandemic and its medium‑term impact behind us, it is time for the Union and State Governments
to consolidate their finances to create enough fiscal space for development spending towards
the broader growth objective.
12.2 As we have reviewed in Chapter 3, government debt has been coming down from its
peak in the early years of the millennium, with a small exception during the global financial
crisis. However, due to the fiscal expansion undertaken by the Union as well as State
Governments to counter the adverse impact of COVID‑19, government debt shot up to a level
of 87 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21. Post pandemic, governments have come back to the path of
fiscal consolidation, and the debt level came down to 80.5 per cent of GDP by the end of 2023‑24
and is estimated to come down further to 75.5 per cent by the end of 2025‑26.
12.3 Due to the high level of debt incurred during the pandemic, interest payments of general
government stood at 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24, up from 4.7 per cent in 2019‑20.
Fortunately, revenue receipts of the general government are also at a high level of 20.2 per cent
of GDP in 2023‑24 with scope for further increase. We discuss the implications of the roadmap
for Union and State Governments for debt and fiscal deficit.
255Sixteenth Finance Commission
Fiscal Consolidation and Past Commissions
12.4 The Eleventh Finance Commission (FC‑11), for the first time, looked into the fiscal
roadmap and recommended that States restore balance on their revenue account, while the Union
limits its revenue deficit to no more than 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the end
of their award period. It recommended reducing the combined fiscal deficit to 6.5 per cent of
GDP and lowering the debt‑to‑GDP ratio to around 55 per cent. The Twelfth Finance
Commission (FC‑12) recommended a legislative framework for the States on the lines of the
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act of the Union Government,
mandating the elimination of revenue deficit and reducing fiscal deficits to 3 per cent of gross
state domestic product (GSDP) by 2008‑09. It recommended certain debt relief, contingent upon
States implementing a fiscal reform legislative framework and adhering to it.
12.5 In the backdrop of the global financial crisis, the Thirteenth Finance Commission
(FC‑13) recommended that States with a revenue balance should maintain it and those that still
have a deficit, should eliminate it by 2014‑15. It also recommended maintaining the fiscal deficit
at 3 per cent of GSDP, except for special category States. It laid down a consolidated deficit
target of 3 per cent and 2.4 per cent of GDP for the Union Government and State Governments,
respectively, with a combined deficit of 5.4 per cent of GDP by the end of its award period. It
set a combined debt‑GDP target of 68 per cent. The Fourteenth Finance Commission (FC‑14)
recommended a ceiling on the fiscal deficit at 3 per cent of GDP from 2016‑17 up to 2019‑20
for the Union Government. For States, the fiscal deficit targets and annual borrowing limits were
anchored to an annual limit of 3 per cent of GSDP. The award period of the Fifteenth Finance
Commission (FC‑15) followed the implementation of Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana
(UDAY) scheme and the COVID‑19 pandemic. It recommended restoring the fiscal deficit of
States to 3 per cent of GSDP by 2022‑23. It suggested bringing total liabilities down from 89.9
per cent in 2020‑21 to 85.7 per cent in 2025‑26.
Views of the State Governments
12.6 Many States have requested debt relief to help them reduce their debt burden, which has
increased post‑COVID. Some States have also sought the restructuring of National Small
Savings Fund (NSSF) loans. Odisha has recommended that the Union Government should take
the burden of exchange rate fluctuations on account of external loans. Uttar Pradesh has
suggested that the process of taking approvals under Article 293(3) should be eased. Kerala has
pointed out that the recent interpretation of Article 293(3) to include borrowings by some of its
parastatals is constraining the State in its ability to finance infrastructure requirements.
12.7 Various States have made suggestions regarding the FRBM framework, including
making provisions for effective revenue deficit (revenue deficit minus grants given for capital
expenditure) for States on the lines of the Union, carry forward of unutilised borrowings of the
past, and allowing additional borrowings in cases of higher growth or in cases of natural
disasters.
256Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
Fiscal Roadmap
12.8 In our assessment of Union and State finances, we have laid out a roadmap for the fiscal
deficit for our award period, wherein we have tried to strike a balance between the need for
fiscal consolidation and growth. We feel that this would provide the necessary stimulus for
India’s growth trajectory.
Fiscal Deficit
12.9 The roadmap for fiscal deficit has been worked out keeping in mind the requirement of
government expenditure, especially in social and infrastructure sectors, to achieve the desired
growth path. After climbing to its highest ever level of 9.2 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21, the
fiscal deficit of the Union Government came down to 5.5 per cent in 2023‑24. It is further
estimated to come down to 4.4 per cent of GDP in the Union Budget for 2025‑26. We have
assessed that this should come down to 3.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the award period in
2030‑31. We have estimated that out of this deficit of the Union Government, 0.5 per cent of
GDP would be for onward lending to States, mostly under Special Assistance to States for
Capital Investment (SASCI), to promote capital investment by the States.
12.10 We see that the fiscal deficit of States, after rising to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21
during the COVID‑19 pandemic, came down to 2.9 per cent in 2023‑24, out of which 0.4 per
cent on account of SASCI, which was considered over and above the regular deficit limit of the
States. Therefore, we have recommended that States’ fiscal deficit should continue to be capped
at 3 per cent of their respective GSDP. To ensure the stability of the debt of a State Government,
this should be strictly enforced as per the provisions of clause (3) of Article 293 of the
Constitution. It is assumed that the on‑lending by the Union Government under SASCI will be
over and above this limit, as is currently being done.
12.11 Table 12.1 shows the year‑wise fiscal deficit roadmap for the Union and the fiscal deficit
limit for the States. As explained earlier, the roadmap for States excludes expenditure met
through SASCI, while the roadmap for the Union Government includes it.
Table 12.1 Fiscal Deficit Roadmap of Union and State Governments
(percentage of GDP)
Year Union Government State Governments
2026‑27 4.2 3.0
2027‑28 4.0 3.0
2028‑29 3.8 3.0
2029‑30 3.6 3.0
2030‑31 3.5 3.0
257Sixteenth Finance Commission
Government Debt
12.12 As we have pointed out, government debt, which had soared in the aftermath of
COVID‑19, is now on its downward trajectory. As a consequence of the reduction in the fiscal
deficit of the Union Government, its outstanding debt will also follow a downward trajectory.
However, debt being a stock variable, the reduction will be slow. The outstanding debt of the
Union Government is projected to come down from 56.4 per cent of GDP by the end of 2023‑24
to 47.6 per cent of GDP by the end of the award period.
12.13 Since the reduction in debt stock takes time, the impact on interest payments is also
relatively slow. It is estimated that this reduction in outstanding debt will yield a reduction of
0.5 per cent of GDP in the interest payments of the Union Government.
12.14 As explained in Chapter 5, the fiscal deficit of the State Governments has remained
within a narrow band around the 3 per cent mark. Overall, excluding SASCI, outstanding debt
of State Governments stood at 25.7 per cent of GDP by the end of 2023‑24. Since the deficit
will be subject to a ceiling of 3 per cent of GSDP, the outstanding debt of State Governments
will be 27.2 per cent of GDP in 2030‑31, provided all States borrow up to their limit. The average
fiscal deficit for States for past decade has been 2.7 per cent of GDP. With SASCI assumed to
be over and above the 3 per cent fiscal deficit limit for States, the debt stock of States including
SASCI will be 29.9 per cent of GDP by the end of the award period. This additional debt on the
books of State Governments will not adversely impact the sustainability of their debt since this
is interest free.
12.15 However, as we have pointed out in our inter‑State comparison in Chapter 5, the
challenge lies not in the overall debt of the State Governments but in the inter‑State differences.
At the end of 2023‑24, the outstanding debt of different State Governments of non‑NEH States
ranged from 15.7 per cent of GSDP, in the case of Odisha, to 42.9 per cent of GSDP, in the case
of Punjab. With adherence to the 3 per cent cap, it is expected that this difference would narrow
down, in addition to stabilisation of the overall debt.
12.16 Consequently, the combined debt of the Union and States is projected to fall steadily
from 77.3 per cent of GDP to 73.1 per cent over our award period. It may be noted that in all
these projections, the external debt of the Union Government is valued at historical exchange
rates and not the current exchange rates1.
Off‑Budget Borrowings
12.17 Off‑budget borrowings (OBBs), that is, borrowings not incurred directly by
governments but by their entities and serviced by the government, have been a major source of
fiscal risk. These borrowings do not appear transparently in the government’s accounts.
Although the Union Government discloses them in the Union Budget and some States have
1 Valuing external debt at current exchange rate increases the outstanding liabilities of Union Government by 1 per
cent of GDP in 2025-26
258Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
adopted similar reporting obligations in their FRBM Acts, the reporting of OBBs by States has
not been transparent.
12.18 The Union Government has been incurring such liabilities, known as extra budgetary
resources (EBR), for various purposes, including payment of subsidies, and the outstanding
amount on this account is of the order of 0.46 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24. However, the Union
Government has discontinued this practice since 2022‑23, and since the outstanding amount is
small, it is not an imminent risk factor for overall fiscal stability. The Union Government should
continue with the practice of full disclosure on these extra budget borrowings and ensure that
further liabilities are directly contracted on the budget rather than off budget.
12.19 Off‑budget borrowings are a significant risk factor to fiscal stability when it comes to
States. As stated earlier, there is a lack of disclosure of off‑budget borrowings amongst States.
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) has been reporting OBBs in the State Finance
Audit Reports (SFAR), but there, too, the consistency is less than desirable. At times, the
reporting in SFARs is not fully comprehensive, and there is heterogeneity in reporting amongst
different States. Instances of heterogeneity and even discontinuity are seen in the case of some
States.
12.20 For the last few years, the Ministry of Finance has been collecting this information for
the purposes of fixing borrowing limits for States and putting it in the public domain. As per the
data available with the Ministry of Finance, the extent of off‑budget borrowing is coming down,
as shown in Figure 12.1.
Figure 12.1 Off‑budget Borrowings by States (percentage of GDP)
0.35 20
18
0.30
16
0.25 14
12
0.20
10
0.15
8
0.10 6
4
0.05
2
- -
2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25
Source: https://doe.gov.in/rti‑information‑department‑of‑expenditure
259
PDG
fo
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sa
BBO
BBO
detroper
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setatS
fo
rebmuN
Number of States (--RHS) OBB (as % of GDP)Sixteenth Finance Commission
12.21 To better understand the issue, the World Bank conducted a study for the Commission,
covering 12 States. It examined the types of OBBs being contracted, as well as the associated
challenges and risks. The most common type of OBBs involves an entity controlled by the
government incurring a debt under government guarantee to fund a government project or
programme. In turn, the government provides financial assistance from the budget to service
that debt. However, other types of OBB exist. Under one such type, a government allows its
revenue to be escrowed to the entity, and the entity borrows on the strength of this stream of
revenues. In some cases, the government postpones payment of dues to the implementing
agency, as it sometimes does in the case of a subsidy, with an undertaking to pay it later. The
entity then borrows on the strength of this undertaking, and the government services the debt
when it becomes due.
12.22 Off‑budget borrowings pose a risk to fiscal stability, as it can become a vehicle for
borrowing in excess of the prescribed limits. Some of the practices, such as not crediting
government revenues to the consolidated fund but instead escrowing them directly, could also
be unconstitutional under Article 266. We recommend that, building on the example set by the
Union Government, States should completely discontinue this practice and bring all off‑budget
borrowings into their budgets.
12.23 However, if, for some reason, such borrowings have to be undertaken, there should be a
framework for regular reporting on an annual basis, preferably as a part of the budget. This
reporting should include entity‑wise details of borrowings, giving the outstanding balance at the
beginning of the year, amount borrowed during the year, amount repaid during the year, amount
outstanding at the end of the year, interest paid, assistance received from the government for
debt servicing, the purpose of borrowing and the amount spent for the purpose. A suggested
format, as in Annexure 12.1, could be adopted for this purpose. It is also recommended that
disclosure in this format should be included in the State Finance Accounts by the CAG.
12.24 Structural challenges in reporting off‑budget borrowings will persist, since disclosures
by the CAG will have to rely on data furnished by State entities. Lending institutions are also in
a position to provide an alternative source of data to strengthen the reporting framework for
off‑budget borrowing. Given that much of the financing of State entities originates from banks
and government‑owned financial institutions such as PFC, REC, and NABARD, we recommend
designing a framework under which lending institutions periodically report the loans extended
to State‑owned entities where the government has the commitment to provide assistance for debt
servicing.
Legal Framework
12.25 The foundation of fiscal rectitude emanates from the fiscal responsibility legislation
(FRL) of the Union and the States. This legislation has been in existence for about twenty years
now. In addition, the Union Government uses the powers conferred upon it by clause (3) of
article 293 of the Constitution to ensure that the borrowings of States remain within the limits
recommended by the Finance Commissions.
260Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
Fiscal Responsibility Legislation
12.26 The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act was enacted by the
Parliament in 2003 to establish a system of rule‑based fiscal management at the Union. States
followed suit, and by 2007, all States, barring a few, had enacted legislation as well. These Fiscal
Responsibility laws (FRLs) laid the foundation of prudent fiscal management and led to notable
improvements in States’ fiscal management. On average, States maintained their fiscal deficit
at 2.2 per cent of GDP during the decade following the enactment of FRLs, well below the
prescribed ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP, compared to an average of 3.8 per cent of GDP during
1997‑98 to 2004‑05.
12.27 States were also supported by the debt relief recommended by FC‑12 and FC‑13.
Combined with strong GDP growth, these efforts facilitated a sustained reduction in deficits and
debt. The general government debt‑to‑GDP ratio fell from 83.6 per cent in 2003‑04 to 67.9 per
cent by 2007‑08 just before the global financial crisis.
12.28 While most States have adhered to fiscal targets, the commitment of some States has
been less encouraging. There have been repeated amendments to the FRBM Acts of certain
States to alter fiscal targets, effectively shifting the goalposts, particularly with respect to deficit
and debt thresholds. For example, Himachal Pradesh amended its FRBM Act in 2023 to revise
the fiscal deficit target to 6.0 per cent for the year 2022‑23. Similarly, through an amendment in
2025, West Bengal raised the ceiling on debt stock, mandating that the maximum debt stock of
38.0 per cent of GSDP be maintained up to 2029‑30. Arunachal Pradesh amended its Act in
2022 and removed the revenue surplus target. Even the Union FRBM Act, 2003, has undergone
a series of amendments, the most significant being in 2018 when the targets for revenue deficit
and effective revenue deficit were completely removed.
12.29 There are also differences in the FRBM Acts of the States in terms of scope and depth.
A few States (for example, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Karnataka and Goa) have
explicitly covered guarantees and off‑budget items under the ambit of their FRL framework.
Some States (for example, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala) have institutionalised and
explicitly mentioned a reporting mechanism to the legislature in case FRL targets are breached.
12.30 Through amendments to the State FRBM acts, States have generally aligned their fiscal
deficit ceilings or debt paths in response to recommendations of successive Finance
Commissions. Almost all States relaxed the targets during the COVID‑19 pandemic. A few
States either removed or avoided binding themselves to fiscal targets. For example, during
2021‑22, Arunachal Pradesh dropped the revenue surplus target and outstanding debt to GSDP
ratio targets in its amendment, while West Bengal repeatedly extended fiscal deficit relaxations
beyond the original 3 per cent ceiling.
12.31 A few States have also undertaken measures to enhance transparency and oversight. The
FRLs of Goa and Odisha empower independent agencies to review compliance, while Karnataka
mandates regular monitoring by a Fiscal Management Review Committee. Odisha went further
by establishing a Budget Stabilisation Fund to build fiscal buffers during revenue surplus years.
261Sixteenth Finance Commission
Karnataka also explicitly included Public Sector Enterprise (PSE) and Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) borrowings under total liabilities, bringing more off‑budget borrowings into the fiscal
net.
12.32 The inconsistencies and overall lack of uniformity in coverage, flexibility, and
transparency mechanisms highlight the need to address the existing limitations and develop a
more effective FRL framework. FRLs are critical to ensuring adherence to fiscal consolidation
as they provide legislative commitment for the same. Therefore, we recommend that
governments take necessary action to amend FRLs in line with the fiscal consolidation roadmap
recommended by us. FRBM Acts should require governments to report to the legislature if the
deficit or debt limits prescribed under the legislative framework are breached. We also
recommend expanding the definition of fiscal deficit and debt to uniformly include all
off‑budget borrowings.
Article 293(3) of the Constitution
12.33 Another key instrument that has reinforced the adherence to fiscal deficit limits by the
States has been clause (3) of Article 293 of the Constitution. Under this provision, as long as
States have an outstanding loan from the Union Government, they require its consent before
they can borrow upon the security of their Consolidated Funds. Since there has been a practice
of the Union Government extending financial assistance to States in the form of a loan, this
condition has been fulfilled at all times for all States. As a result, this mechanism has been
extremely useful for effective fiscal management. We strongly recommend that this provision
of the constitution should continue to be used to ensure that the borrowings of the States follow
the recommended fiscal roadmap.
12.34 In our review, we have seen instances where States have breached borrowing limits
mainly due to inaccurate assessment of financing from their Public Accounts. Since this practice
poses a risk, we recommend that mechanisms be put in place to estimate the financing of the
fiscal deficit out of the Public Account as accurately as possible.
12.35 Off‑budget borrowings are another source of risk, which can be used to side‑step the
administration of borrowing limits under these provisions. It is essential that if States resort to
OBB, they do so within the overall permitted limits set by the Union Government under Article
293(3). While approving borrowings for States under Article 293(3), the Union Government
must take OBBs into account.
12.36 FC‑14 had recommended that, for determining yearly borrowing limits, GSDP should
be estimated by applying the annual average growth rate of the actual GSDP observed during
the latest three years for which actual GSDP data are available. The FC‑15 had recommended
the continuation of the same practice, and we recommend the same.
Debt Management
12.37 During the last two decades, the debt profile of the Union and the State Government has
undergone significant changes. Following the discontinuation of plan loans from Union to State
Government, as recommended by FC‑12, the share of market loans in the debt profile of States
262Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
has increased. Subsequently, the borrowings by States from the NSSF have tapered off.
However, with the introduction of SASCI, the stock of loans from the Union Government to
States has again started increasing.
Market Borrowing by the States
12.38 In recent years, States have increasingly relied on market borrowings to finance their
deficits. The share of State Government borrowings in total government borrowings has risen
significantly since 2015‑16. States accounted for about 33 per cent of total government
securities issued in 2015‑16, which increased to 43 per cent in 2024‑25. Consequently, States
hold around 36 per cent of outstanding securities in 2025‑26, compared to 24 per cent in
2015‑16. Higher market borrowings by the States also arises from the fact that the States are not
availing NSSF.
7.7
KA
PB
GJ
7.6 MH SK AR AS GA NL
7.5 UK U HP R RJ HP AP
CH TS
7.4 TN
KL MP
7.3
Union
7.2
7.1
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
Source: Data provided by RBI
12.39 Figure 12.2 depicts the weighted average coupon rate for 10‑year tenor securities issued
by the States in 2023‑24 and 2024‑25 and their debt levels in the preceding years. It also depicts
the weighted average coupon rate of similar tenor securities issued by the Union Government
in that year. It is evident that the yield for the States’ securities is not related to the States’ debt
levels. Also, the States continue to borrow at a higher cost than the Union Government, even
though there is hardly any credit and default risk. It is evident that in the absence of the default
risk, the market mechanism will not create incentives for better fiscal management.
12.40 Furthermore, many States are maintaining sizeable average cash balances on a persistent
basis, which carries a cost. States need to devise a mechanism for more optimal cash
management using the instruments that are readily available to them to avoid such build up.
263
)42-3202(
dleiY
egarevA
dethgieW
7.5
7.4 ML HR
7.3 AS HPB P NL
MH RJ CH GA 7.2 GJ AP
MZ
OD KL
7.1 KA MP BR
7.0
Union
6.9
6.8
10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
Debt/GSDP (2022-23)
)52-4202(
dleiY
egarevA
dethgieW
Figure 12.2 Weighted Average Coupon Rate of State Government Securities vis-à-vis
Debt Position of the States
Debt/GSDP (2023-24)Sixteenth Finance Commission
Debt Maturity Profile
12.41 The Union Government has been financing close to 65‑70 per cent of its Fiscal Deficit
through domestic Market Borrowings by issuing Government Securities (G‑Secs) in the last
several years. It is observed that the Union Government has made a gradual shift towards issuing
securities across different maturity buckets, with a clear move towards issuing G‑Secs with
residual maturity of over 30 years as can be seen in Table 12.2.
Table 12.2 Maturity Profile of Government Securities (percentage of Amount Raised)
Union Government State Governments
Maturity Bucket
2015‑16 2024‑25 2015‑16 2024‑25
Above 1 year & up to 5 years - 15.21 0.78 5.42
Above 5 years & up to 10 years 37.66 32.96 98.54 28.96
Above 10 years & up to 15 years 24.22 13.64 0.68 31.19
Above 15 years & up to 30 years 36.59 10.49 - 33.73
Above 30 years 1.52 27.70 - 0.70
Source: Data provided by RBI
Figure 12.3 Weighted Average Maturity (Years) and Weighted Average Yield
(per cent) of Union and State Government Securities Issued During the Year
Wt. Av. Maturity-States Wt. Av. Yield-States
Wt. Av. Maturity-Union Wt. Av. Yield-Union
25.0 8.50
8.00
20.0
7.50
7.00
15.0
6.50
6.00
10.0
5.50
5.0 5.00
Source: Data provided by RBI
12.42 At the aggregate level, the State Governments finance almost 80 per cent of their fiscal
deficit through market borrowings by issuing State Government Securities (SGSs). They have
followed the same pattern by issuing securities in the longer tenors. However, the issuance is
more dispersed across maturity buckets, with a few States like Kerala and Telangana issuing
securities with 40‑year maturity also for the first time in the last few years. State Governments,
which were almost entirely issuing 10‑year SGSs in 2015‑16, have now dispersed the securities
across different maturity buckets. Consequently, as depicted in Figure 12.3, the weighted
264Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
average maturity of securities issued every year has been on the rise, whereas the weighted
average yield has been lowering vis‑à-vis 2015‑16, with the yield differential between States
and Union Government securities intact.
Figure 12.4 Maturity Profile of Outstanding Debt Stock (as on 31 March 2025)
Union All States & UTs
40%
35% 33% 34% 33%
30% 27% 28%
25%
20% 17% 17%
15% 11%
10%
5%
0%
0-5 Years 5-10 years 10-15 years >15 years
Source: Data provided by RBI
Figure 12.5 Bucket‑wise Maturity of State Government Securities (as on 31 March 2025)
0-5 years 5-10 years 10-15 years >15 years
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Chhattisgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Odisha
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Telangana
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Uttarakhand
West Bengal
Source: Data provided by RBI
265Sixteenth Finance Commission
12.43 As shown in Figure 12.4, the debt maturing in the next ten years as a proportion of total
outstanding debt is 61 per cent for the Union Government and 67 per cent for the State
Governments. Figure 12.5 depicts the State‑wise distribution of the maturity profiles.
Redemption Pressure and Roll‑over Risk
12.44 Due to increased financing of deficit from market borrowings by States, the redemption
has increased to 1.0 per cent of GDP. Our analysis shows that while there is no specific roll‑over
risk, there are small kinks in the redemption profiles of State market borrowings, specifically in
the first year of the award period and later in 2029‑30 and 2030‑31, which is mainly due to
additional borrowing raised during the pandemic. Figure 12.6 shows the projected redemptions,
assuming that States continue to finance around 80 per cent of their deficit through market
borrowings, for three scenarios of GDP growth rate, namely, 11.5 per cent, 11 per cent and 10.5
per cent.
Figure 12.6 Redemption Profile of State Borrowings (percentage of GDP)
Actual Nominal Growth @11.0%
Nominal Growth @10.5% Nominal Growth @11.5%
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
-
Source: Data provided by RBI
12.45 To smooth out the redemption profile, the Union Government has adopted strategies like
switch auctions and buybacks. Switch auction involves buying back near‑term securities by
issuing longer‑term securities, thus helping to smoothen out the maturity profile of the
outstanding debt stock. States should actively explore adopting such strategies to manage their
redemption pressures in specific years.
Secondary Market Liquidity
12.46 The Union Government issues more than 90 per cent G‑Secs through re‑issuances, which
is a distinctive feature of its Debt Management Strategy. Although State Governments have
266Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
started issuing securities in the longer tenures, very much like the Union Government, they are
lagging behind in the reissuance of securities, which has been limited to around 10 per cent.
This has led to proliferation of State securities which has further led to thin trade in the
secondary market in SGS segment due to low outstanding stock of each individual security
issued. For instance, as per the data from the Reserve Bank of India, as on 31 March 2025, there
are more than 5,200 State Government securities outstanding of approximately ₹63.99 lakh
crore, against just 116 Union Government securities totalling to ₹112.16 lakh crore. (cid:55)hus, the
average Union Government security stands at approximately ₹96,600 crore, whereas for States,
it is as low as approximately ₹1,230 crore.
12.47 Further, the Union Government has issued fresh securities in the standard tenors of 3, 5,
7, 10, 14, 30, 40 and 50 years, with a 15‑year security (replacing with 14‑year security)
introduced beginning in 2024‑25. In contrast, State Governments have issued securities for all
yearly tenures, ranging from 2 years to 31 years, as well as for 35 and 40‑year tenures. Indeed,
they have gone even further by issuing securities with half‑yearly tenures, such as 3.5, 4.5, 5.5,
6.5, 7.5, all the way up to 15.5 years.
12.48 These factors have contributed to further thinning of an already thin market. The result
is that States end up paying an ‘illiquidity premium’ markup on the prevailing yields of Union
Government Securities. If States also adopt the practices of re‑issuances and standard tenors,
the liquidity of State securities would increase, leading to better price discovery and, therefore,
a reduction in the interest rate spread over Union Government Securities.
Long‑Term Fiscal Roadmap
12.49 Our path for the award period will take the debt of Union and State combined to 73.1
per cent of GDP by the end of the award period. Correspondingly, the fiscal deficits of the Union
Government and the State Government would be 3.5 and 3 per cent of GDP respectively, with
the Union Government’s fiscal deficit including 0.5 per cent of GDP in interest‑free SASCI
loans to States for capital expenditure.
12.50 We are of the opinion that given the requirement of the country to develop world class
infrastructure, the Union and State Governments will have to maintain a high level of capital
expenditure for coming decade or two. With States maintaining a revenue balance, a combined
deficit of 6.5 per cent fiscal deficit for the Union and States, including 0.5 per cent of on‑lending
by Union to States for capital expenditure, would be required to achieve the desired level of
capital expenditure. This would imply a fiscal deficit of 3.5 per cent of Union Government
including SASCI and 3 per cent for States excluding SASCI.
12.51 If both levels of government stick to these levels of fiscal deficits in future years, with
an annual GDP growth rate of 11 per cent, the outstanding debt of the Union Government would
reach 38.8 per cent of GDP, and that of State Governments would nearly stabilise near 32.1 per
cent of GDP by 2042‑43. Given that 0.5 per cent of GDP of the Union Government’s deficit
goes towards on‑lending to States, the debt of Union and States combined would reach a level
of 66.1 per cent of GDP by 2043.
267Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 12.7 Long‑term Debt Trajectory for Union and States Combined (percentage of GDP)
for the Next Two Decades
FC-16 Projected Path Nominal Growth at 10.5%
Nominal Growth at 11% Nominal Growth at 11.5%
85.0
79.3
80.0
75.0 73.1
70.0
68.1
66.1
65.0
64.1
60.0
12.52 With a lower GDP growth rate of 10.5 per cent per annum, the government debt would
reach the 68.1 per cent mark and with a marginally higher growth rate of 11.5 per cent per
annum, debt would be 64.1 per cent of GDP, as is illustrated in Figure 12.7. We expect that the
fiscal roadmap discussed in this chapter will put India on the desired rapid growth path. It is
aspirational but pragmatic.
12.53 However, we have also noticed that, while budgets have shown a healthy trend,
excessive borrowings, especially to finance avoidable non‑developmental expenditures, such as
those on public‑sector enterprise losses and poorly targeted subsidies, can have a significant
adverse impact on future budgets. It is essential to address this problem on an urgent basis. In
the next three chapters, we discuss reforms in three key areas where reining in avoidable
expenditures can strengthen the Union and State Government finances, namely, persistent power
distribution company losses, poorly targeted subsidies and transfers, and poorly performing
public sector enterprises.
Summary of Recommendations
(i) We recommend that States’ fiscal deficits continue to be capped at 3 per cent of their
respective GSDP. To ensure the stability of State Government debt, this limit should be
strictly enforced in accordance with clause (3) of Article 293 of the Constitution. It is
assumed that on‑lending by the Union Government under SASCI will be over and above
this limit, as is currently the practice. The Union Government should reduce its fiscal
deficit to 3.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the award period.
(paragraphs 12.9 and 12.10)
(ii) States should completely discontinue the practice of incurring off‑budget borrowings
and bring all such borrowings onto their budgets. If, for any reason, off‑budget
268Chapter 12: The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
borrowings are undertaken, there should be a framework for their regular annual
reporting, preferably as part of the budget. A suggested format, as in Annexure 12.1, may
be adopted for this purpose. The CAG should include disclosure in this format in the
State Finance Accounts.
(paragraphs 12.22 and 12.23)
(iii) Lending institutions are also in a position to provide an alternative source of data to
strengthen the reporting framework for off‑budget borrowing. We recommend that a
framework should be put in place under which lending institutions periodically report
the loans extended to State‑owned entities where the government has the commitment
to provide assistance for debt servicing.
(paragraph 12.24)
(iv) There are inconsistencies and lack of uniformity in coverage in the existing FRL
framework of the States. We recommend that governments take necessary action to
amend FRLs in line with the fiscal consolidation roadmap recommended by us. FRBM
Acts should require governments to report to the legislature if the deficit or debt limits
prescribed under the legislative framework are breached. We also recommend expanding
the definition of fiscal deficit and debt to uniformly include all off-budget borrowings.
(paragraph 12.32)
(v) The mechanism under Article 293(3) of the Constitution mandates that States obtain the
Union’s consent before borrowing against the security of their Consolidated Funds, as
long as they have any outstanding loans from the Union Government. This mechanism
has been extremely useful for effective fiscal management. We recommend that this
constitutional provision continue to be used to ensure that the States’ borrowings adhere
to the recommended fiscal roadmap.
(paragraph 12.33)
(vi) There have been instances where States have breached borrowing limits, mainly due to
inaccurate assessments of financing from their Public Accounts. We recommend that
mechanisms be instituted to estimate the financing of the fiscal deficit from the Public
Account as accurately as possible, so that the fiscal deficit limit can be enforced
effectively.
(paragraph 12.34)
(vii) For determining yearly borrowing limits, we recommend that the practice of estimating
GSDP by applying the annual average growth rate of the actual GSDP observed during
the latest three years for which actual GSDP data are available, should be continued.
(paragraph 12.36)
(viii) To smooth out its debt redemption profile, the Union Government has been following
strategies such as switch auctions and buybacks. We recommend that States also actively
explore adopting similar strategies to manage their redemption pressures in specific
years.
(paragraph 12.45)
269REFORMS IN THE
13
POWER SECTOR
CHAPTER 13REFORMS IN THE POWER SECTOR
13.1 In a modern economy, a steady supply of electricity at affordable prices is essential for
the smooth functioning of all sectors, including households, government, agriculture,
manufacturing, mining, and services. With the ongoing electrification of not only motor vehicles
and railways but also airplanes, the transportation sector is also expected to become increasingly
reliant on electricity. A vibrant power sector is a necessity for sustained rapid growth.
13.2 One extremely positive development in the past two decades in this sector has been the
electrification of all willing households in the country. Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran
Yojana (RGGVY) was launched in 2005 to rapidly expand rural electrification. In 2014, Deen
Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) supplanted RGGVY. Later, in 2017, the
Union Government launched Pradhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana (SAUBHAGYA) to
electrify 100 per cent of households nationwide. The efforts and investments under these
schemes have yielded handsome results.
13.3 According to the 2011 Census, the proportion of households with electricity in India that
year was 67.2 per cent. According to the National Family Health Survey‑4, this figure rose to
88.2 per cent by 2015‑16. By the end of fiscal year 2021‑22, electricity had reached all willing
households, leading the government to close down the SAUBHAGYA scheme1. In parallel,
India has expanded its electricity generation and transmission capacities to ensure that electricity
is available to households, businesses, and the government around the clock. As a result, by the
end of 2024, the daily average availability of electricity stood at 21.9 hours in rural areas and
1 See the Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India, note dated July 28. 2022, at
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1845839#:~:text=Under%20Deen%20Dayal%20Upadhyaya%
20Gram,31st%20March%2C%202019%20respectively (accessed June 15, 2025).
271Sixteenth Finance Commission
up to 23.4 hours in urban areas. Per‑capita electricity consumption has increased from 957
Kilowatt‑hour (kWh) in 2013‑14 to 1,395 kWh in 2023‑24, representing a 45.8 per cent rise2.
13.4 While these are commendable achievements, electricity distribution within the sector
remains plagued by technical and economic inefficiencies, as well as financial fragility. This
chapter is primarily devoted to an assessment of the efforts made to overcome these
inefficiencies and fragilities, as well as possible solutions. We begin with a brief introduction to
the workings of the sector and where distribution fits within it.
Distribution within the Electricity Sector
13.5 The power sector has three major components: generation, transmission, and
distribution. Electricity generation, whether it be thermal, hydro, solar, wind, or nuclear, is
predominantly concentrated in large plants, which are generally located far away from where
electricity users - households, businesses, and the government - are. The role of transmission is
to deliver electricity from the generation plant to a receiving substation located near the users
of electricity. Distribution handles the last‑mile delivery, transporting electricity from the local
receiving substation to individual users.
13.6 In electricity generation, the private sector has emerged as a significant player in recent
years. Its share in the total installed capacity rose from 15.5 per cent in 20093 to 54.3 per cent
in 20254. This increase in share has come at the expense of both the central and state public
sector generation companies. The share of central public sector companies in total generation
capacity declined from 33.1 per cent in 2009 to 22.5 per cent in 2025, and that of state public
sector companies from 51.4 per cent to 23.2 per cent over the same period.
13.7 In India, transmission is almost entirely in the public sector. Private entry is permitted,
but it is a recent and, so far, a minor phenomenon. With substantial interstate transmission
activity, the Union Government is the dominant player in this area. State‑level entities generally
handle intra‑state transmission.
13.8 Being primarily an intra‑State activity, electricity distribution is mostly performed by
State‑level entities. For approximately the first fifty years after independence, electricity policy
and institutional structure were governed by the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Among other
things, the Act mandated the creation of a State Electricity Board (SEB) in each State with the
regulation and management of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution as its key
functions. By the 1960s, the SEBs had evolved into vertically integrated monopolies,
encompassing generation, transmission, distribution, and regulation under a single umbrella.
2 See PIB note dated January 1, 2025, at
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2089243#:~:text=Rise%20in%20Per%20Capita%20Electricity,
957%20kWh%20in%202013%2D14 (accessed June 15, 2025).
3 Central Electricity Authority’s Executive summary on Power Sector, March 2009 (https://cea.nic.in/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/exe_summary-03-3.pdf)
4 Central Electricity Authority’s Executive summary on Power Sector, May 2025, p.9 (https://cea.nic.in/wp-
content/uploads/executive/2025/06/Executive_Summary_May_2025_Aztual_Updated.pdf)
272Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Progress in the provision of electricity during the first fifty years of independence remained
slow, with SEBs performing highly inefficiently.
13.9 The launch of economic reforms in 1991 led the State of Odisha to take the lead in
reforming its electricity sector by enacting the Odisha Electricity Reform Act, 1995. Soon after,
the Union Government began its own reform process through the Electricity Regulatory
Commissions Act, 1998. It provided for the establishment of statutorily independent Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions
(SERCs) for fixing electricity tariffs.
13.10 However, it was the comprehensive Electricity Act, 2003 which kick‑started a genuine
transformation of the sector. Among other things, this Act provided for the unbundling of SEBs
into separate generation companies (GENCOs), transmission companies (TRANSCOs), and
distribution companies (DISCOMs) and laid out the powers and functions of CERC and SERCs.
The provision has led a majority of States and some Union Territories (UTs) to unbundle their
SEBs into the three companies and delegate the responsibility for distribution to independent
DISCOMs, with some even privatizing the latter. Of the remaining States and UTs, some have
assigned the task of distribution to companies that additionally handle generation and
transmission, or only generation. Only a handful of small States, UTs, and specific parts of the
States of Kerala and Maharashtra now rely on the State power departments to handle electricity
distribution.
13.11 In the post‑reform era, DISCOMs occupy a unique place in the electricity supply chain.
They serve as intermediaries between GENCOs which supply electricity, and households,
various government entities, and businesses that consume electricity. Because generation plants
require a large upfront investment due to indivisibilities and electricity output is spread over
multiple decades, GENCOs require long‑term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with
DISCOMs when committing their investments. However, if DISCOMs are heavily indebted,
they are not a credible buyer party to such agreements. Under such circumstances, even if
GENCOs are prepared to invest in generation and consumers are prepared to pay for electricity,
the necessary investment would fail to occur.
13.12 Being mostly State‑owned, DISCOMs in India do not face the same pressure to be
efficient and cost‑effective as commercial entities do. Additionally, in many instances, SERCs
are not strictly guided by regulatory principles to fix tariff at cost‑recovery levels. These and
other factors to be discussed later combine to keep DISCOMs as a whole in perpetual losses,
undermining their credibility as the buyer party to PPAs. State Governments, which own the
DISCOMs, get around the problem by implicitly guaranteeing payments to GENCOs. However,
over time, DISCOMs’ losses and interest payments on them accumulate. High interest rates paid
by DISCOMs, relative to those on government debt, accentuate the problem, and eventually
force the government to partially or wholly assume the debt. This in turn kickstarts the next
round of losses, debt accumulation, and bailout.
273Sixteenth Finance Commission
13.13 Three such bailouts have been undertaken in 2000‑01, 2012‑13, and 2015‑16. Even after
the third round, DISCOMs’ financial health has not improved, with their debt at the end of
2023‑24 already at the highest ever level of ₹(cid:26).5 lakh crore5. These cycles of losses, debt, and
bailouts have obvious detrimental effects on state finances, a subject of immense concern to the
FC, calling for a detailed analysis of the electricity distribution sector.
13.14 Problems afflicting the distribution sector can be categorised into two broad areas:
technical and economic inefficiency, and financial fragility. Post‑1991 reforms have targeted
both types of problems, and, in principle, our discussion of them below could examine them
separately. However, reforms aimed principally at problems in one area also have components
that address problems in the other area or at least impact upon them. Accordingly, rather than
discussing the two sets of reforms separately, the account that follows presents them in a
chronological order, describing the reforms in the two areas side by side. It is worth noting that
we interpret the term ‘reform’ broadly in this chapter to include interventions aimed at
improving operational efficiency.
The Early Reforms: 1995‑20106
13.15 As noted in the introduction, the earliest effort at reforming the electricity sector after
the launch of the broader economic reforms in 1991 was made by the Odisha government under
the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995. Under it, the government split its SEB into a
transmission and distribution company called Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO), two
separate power generation companies, and a SERC. Later, in 1999, it separated distribution from
GRIDCO into four distribution companies and privatized them between 1999 and 2001.
However, for various reasons that are not relevant here, the privatisation effort was unsuccessful.
13.16 The Union Government initiated the nationwide reform of the electricity sector with the
enactment of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998. This Act established the CERC
and included enabling provisions for SERCs. However, few States took advantage of the
provision.
The First Bailout: 2000‑01
13.17 In the meantime, high transmission and distribution losses, power theft, unreimbursed
tariff subsidies, poor metering, billing, and collection, and tariffs below cost resulted in the SEBs
accumulating a massive ₹41,4(cid:26)3 crore in dues to the coal and power Central (cid:51)ublic Sector
Undertakings (CPSUs)7. The dues not only created cash‑flow problems for the CPSUs but also
posed a threat to downstream banks with exposure to the power and energy sectors. To resolve
this crisis, the Union Government implemented the One‑Time Settlement Scheme in 2001,
under which participating State Governments took over this debt, issued tax‑free bonds for the
5 Power Finance Corporation Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023-24, May 2025, Table 2, p. ii.
6 A more detailed account of the reforms in the distribution sector can be found in NITI Aayog, “Diagnostic study of the power
distribution sector,” April 2019, Annexure B, pp. 76-99.
7 Report of the Expert Group on Settlement of SEB Dues, May 2001
274Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
amount owed (at an interest rate below what SEBs had been paying), and cleared the dues of
CPSUs. The States were also required to commit to power sector reforms, including the
unbundling of SEBs, regulatory compliance, and loss‑reduction plans. The scheme restored the
financial health of CPSUs and provided breathing space for SEBs.
Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program, 2002‑03
13.18 Closely on the heels of the 2001 bailout, the Union Government launched the
Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program (APDRP) in 2002‑03 to enhance the
financial viability of SEBs. The program provided financial assistance to States for investments
and reforms aimed at reducing Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses8 of SEBs
and improving the performance of distribution in urban areas. However, it had limited success
due to weak enforcement. AT&C losses of SEBs, Power Departments, and TRANSCOs selling
directly to consumers showed some improvement, falling from 38.86 per cent in 2001‑02 to
33.82 per cent in 2004‑059.
The Electricity Act, 2003
13.19 Almost concurrently with the APDRP, the Union Government enacted the landmark
Electricity Act, 2003, to implement transformative reforms in the electricity sector. Its main
provisions included:
(i) Unbundling of SEBs into GENCOs, TRANSCOs, and DISCOMs.
(ii) De‑licensing of, and therefore, free entry into generation.
(iii) Open access, whereby customers buying electricity above a specified threshold would
be free to choose their electricity supplier.
(iv) Reduction in cross‑subsidy, provided to one set of customers at the expense of another
through a below‑cost price to the former and an above‑cost price to the latter.
(v) Multiple distribution licensees in the same area to foster competition.
(vi) Appointment of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) at the Union level.
13.20 Overall, the Act aimed to create a more open, transparent, and competitive electricity
market. While it undoubtedly placed India on the path to modernising the electricity sector,
progress towards this goal has been significantly slower than in the telecommunications sector
which was placed on the reform path around the same time. As described in the introduction to
8 The AT&C loss of a DISCOM is the difference between its total electricity purchase and the electricity on which it collects
charges, as a percentage of the total electricity purchased. The loss has four sources: technical loss as electricity travels on
transmission and distribution lines, theft along distribution lines, underbilling, and under-collection on what is billed. AT&C
losses are measured as a percentage of physical units of electricity purchased, such as kilowatt-hours. They are related to the
DISCOM’s economic losses but are not an exact measure of it. Economic losses also depend on the DISCOM’s purchase and
sales prices. Conventionally, the economic loss per kilowatt-hour of electricity is measured as the difference between the average
cost of supply (ACS) and average revenue realised (ARR) per kilowatt-hour of electricity. These are explained in greater detail
in later sections of this chapter.
9 CAG Report no. 16 of 2007
275Sixteenth Finance Commission
this chapter, unbundling of generation, transmission, and their corporatisation varied across
States and UTs. It took nearly two decades to accomplish this change.
13.21 The opening of entry into generation has had greater success, with private companies
rapidly expanding their share of the installed capacity. However, the problems stemming from
the weak financial conditions of DISCOMs have hindered their progress. Open access is
permitted but restricted through high cross‑subsidy surcharges and delays in granting
permissions. With reference to provisions to limit cross‑subsidies to 20 per cent of average
supply cost, the cross‑subsidy received by certain classes of consumers is almost 40 per cent in
States like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu,
Telangana, and West Bengal in 2023‑2410. The provision for multiple licensees has failed to
materialise due to a lack of separation between the distribution grid and electricity supply
functions. CERC and SERCs have been appointed, but whereas CERC has functioned well,
SERCs have not been fully effective in implementing cost‑reflective tariffs. Thus, there remains
considerable scope for further reform in the distribution sector, a subject to which we will return
below.
The National Electricity Policy, 2005 and Related Reforms
13.22 In 2005, the government formulated the National Electricity Policy, emphasising
universal access, greater competition, private participation, and greater efficiency and financial
viability in the distribution sector.
13.23 To improve access to electricity in rural areas, the Union Government launched the
RGGVY, a scheme already mentioned in the introduction. To improve the financial viability of
distribution utilities, it introduced the National Tariff Policy in 2006, providing guidelines on
setting cost‑reflective tariffs and reducing cross‑subsidies. The tariff policy also called for a
multi‑year tariff framework to bring predictability and incentivize performance.
13.24 To improve efficiency in electricity distribution in urban areas, the government
introduced the Restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program (R‑APDRP)
in mid‑2008. It was a revamped version of the 2002‑03 APDRP, for IT enablement &
strengthening of the distribution sector in urban areas. Its goal was to establish IT systems that
would help DISCOMs collect reliable and accurate data, enabling them to achieve sustained
loss reduction. The specific goal was to bring down AT&C losses to 15 per cent on a sustained
basis for five years in the project area11. Funds were initially provided in the form of loans, but
the scheme allowed for their conversion into grants upon successful completion of the project12.
13.25 While RGGVY was successful in significantly expanding access to electricity in rural
areas, the impact of the reforms was limited. The implementation of the National Tariff Policy
10https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/fs___a/2025/06/Book_2024.pdf (p.32)
11 Report of the CAG on Restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program, Report No. 30 of 2016, p. 4.
12 Ministry of Power press note dated December 1, 2014.
https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=112254#:~:text=The%20scheme%20will%20help%20in,Gr
am%20Jyoti%20Yojana(DDUGJY) (accessed June 15, 2025).
276Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
varied substantially across States, with key objectives, such as reducing cross‑subsidies and
adopting full cost‑recovery tariffs, remaining unfulfilled. R‑APDRP was unsuccessful in
achieving its objectives of reducing AT&C losses to below 15 per cent on a sustained basis.
This has been attributed to delays in implementation, lack of third‑party verification,
inconsistencies in data reporting, among other things. In its performance audit report on
R‑APDRP (Report No. 30, 2016), the Comptroller and Auditor General of India noted
discrepancies in AT&C loss data and found them unreliable. Only a few States such as Andhra
Pradesh and Kerala had AT&C losses less than 15 per cent among all States13.
More Reforms and Bailouts: 2011‑25
13.26 The reforms undertaken during the 2000s advanced the modernization of the distribution
sector to some degree but failed to adequately address both operational efficiency issues and the
financial fragility problem of DISCOMs. Nationally, the average AT&C losses remained high
at 26.0 per cent in 2010‑11 and 26.6 per cent in 2011‑1214. By 31 March 2011, the accumulated
losses of the State D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms had reached a staggering ₹1.9 lakh crore or 2.4 per cent of GD(cid:51)15.
Unsurprisingly, as the 2010s unfolded, reforms aimed at both operational efficiency and
financial stability continued.
The Second Bailout: Financial Restructuring Plan, 2012
13.27 Recognising the problem, a new Financial Restructuring Plan (FRP) for DISCOMs was
announced in 2012, to restore power purchasing capacity of the debt‑ridden DISCOMs, and to
enable banks to recover their loans16. Under this bailout, participating State Governments were
to take over 50 per cent of DISCOMs’ outstanding liabilities, converting them into bonds to be
issued to banks. In turn, banks were to restructure the remaining debt from short‑term to
long‑term, with a moratorium on principal repayments of up to 3 years, lenient repayment terms,
and a waiver of penal interest.
13.28 The participating States were also subject to certain conditions, including improvement
in several operational parameters such as eliminating the gap between Average Cost of Supply
(ACS) and Average Revenue Realised (ARR) (termed as the ACS‑ARR gap), and setting targets
for progressive reduction in short‑term power purchase by State‑owned DISCOMs, and enacting
the Model State Electricity Distribution Responsibility Bill, 2013, during the moratorium
period. In all, seven States signed for FRP, but none met the conditions of improvement in the
operational parameters, or enacted the Model State Electricity Distribution Responsibility Bill,
13 Report of the CAG on Restructured Accelerated Power Development and Reform Program, Report No. 30 of 2016, Ch. 5
14 Power Finance Corporation, “Report on the Performance of State Power Sector Utilities for the years 2009-10 to 2011-12,”
p. 4-iii and “Report on the Performance of State Power Sector Utilities for the years 2010-11 to 2012-13,” p. 4-iii.
15 Ministry of Power PIB note dated September 25, 2012. See
https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=87971#:~:text=The%20scheme%20would%20be%20appli
cable,as%20on%2031st%20March%2C%202011 (accessed June 15, 2025).
16 https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=87951 (accessed on July 22, 2025)
277Sixteenth Finance Commission
2013. Ultimately, FRP offered only short‑term relief to the participating States, without
addressing the underlying issue of large DISCOM losses which continued to rise.
Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana and Integrated Power Development
Scheme, 2014
13.29 Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) was launched in 2014 for
various rural electrification works, strengthening and augmentation of sub‑transmission and
distribution infrastructure and electrification of villages across the country.
13.30 Integrated Power Development Scheme (IPDS), also launched in 2014, provided fiscal
resources for strengthening sub‑transmission and distribution networks in urban areas, metering
of distribution transformers, feeders, and consumers in urban areas, and deployment of smart
meters. This scheme subsumed R‑APDRP, with the fiscal resources previously approved for the
latter being shifted to it17. Both schemes were closed in 2022 upon completion of works18.
17F
The Third Bailout: Ujjwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana
13.31 The FRP scheme notwithstanding, accumulated losses and outstanding liabilities of
D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms had reached ₹3.8 lakh crore and ₹4.3 lakh crore, respectively, as of 31 March 201519.
The high debt not only undermined DISCOMs’ ability to make capital investments of their own,
but also to credibly sign PPAs with GENCOs. This adversely impacted the investment in
generation and, ultimately, the ability of the government to rapidly expand the availability of
electricity to all households.
13.32 Recognising these problems, the Union Government introduced the Ujjwal DISCOM
Assurance Yojana (UDAY) scheme, which allowed State Governments to assume 75 per cent
of the outstanding DISCOM debt over a two‑year period. Under the scheme, States were to issue
UDAY bonds to banks and other financial institutions to raise the necessary funds and repay
DISCOM debt to the lending banks. The lending banks were to restructure the remaining 25 per
cent of the debt to bring the cost down for DISCOMs. In turn, DISCOMs were to commit to
reductions in AT&C losses and the ACS‑ARR gap. To enforce these reductions, DISCOMs
were given target dates to achieve specified reductions in the loss of power through
transmission, theft, and poor metering20.
Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme, 2021‑22 to 2025‑26
13.33 In the wake of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Union Government launched Revamped
Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS), a large‑scale scheme with a proposed outlay of ₹3.03 lakh
crore, and an estimated gross budgetary support from the Union Government of ₹9(cid:26),631 crore
17 Ministry of Power at https://www.ipds.gov.in/Form_IPDS/About_IPDS.aspx (accessed June 14, 2025).
18 As per reply of Ministry of Power to Lok Sabha starred question no. 329 on 23.03.2023
19 NITI Aayog, “Diagnostic study of the power distribution sector,” April 2019, p. 97.
20 For more details on the UDAY scheme, see the Ministry of Power office memorandum of November 20, 2015, at
https://powermin.gov.in/pdf/Uday_Ujjawal_Scheme_for_Operational_and_financial_Turnaround_of_power_distri
bution_companies.pdf (accessed June 14, 2025).
278Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
for the duration of five years from 2021‑22 to 2025‑26. Among the scheme’s objectives are a
systematic reduction in AT&C losses to pan‑India levels of 12 per cent to 15 per cent, and
elimination of the ACS‑ARR gap by 2024‑25. The scheme subsumes DDUGJY, IPDS, and the
2015 Prime Minister's Development Package for the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir.
13.34 RDSS provides financial support for the installation of prepaid smart metering and
system metering, upgradation of the distribution infrastructure, training and capacity building,
as well as other enabling and support activities. As of December 2024, the AT&C losses at the
national level have reduced from 22.32 per cent in 2020‑21 to 16.28 per cent in 2023‑24, while
ACS‑ARR gap decreased from ₹0.(cid:26)1(cid:18)k(cid:58)h to ₹0.19(cid:18)k(cid:58)h during the same period21.
Financial Assistance and Reforms Outside the Targeted Schemes
13.35 In addition to the intermittent one‑time support measures described above, the Union
and State Governments have provided State DISCOMs with recurring revenue and capital
support through subsidies, equity infusions, and grants for electrification and network
strengthening schemes, such as the DDUGJY and SAUBHAGYA. To further incentivise
reforms in electricity distribution, the Union Government has relaxed the State Governments’
borrowing limit from 3 per cent of gross state domestic product (GSDP) to 3.5 per cent, provided
that the States implement a set of specified power sector reforms.
13.36 The Union Government has also provided assistance to DISCOMs through policy
nudges, including a push for the issuance of timely tariff orders, the implementation of automatic
passthrough of fuel costs in some States, and smoothening DISCOMs' payables to GENCOs.
As per the data provided by Ministry of Power to this Commission in August 2024, tariff orders
for 2024‑25 were issued for twenty‑one States22. The Electricity (Late Payment Surcharge and
Related Matters) Rules 2022 were introduced to tackle cash flow challenges faced by GENCOs
and TRANSCOs, and to provide timely payments across the power sector. These rules have
been successful in reducing the total unpaid bills by D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms from ₹1.4 lakh crore in (cid:45)une
2022 to ₹24,684 crore in December 202423. These rules have been amended in 2024 to further
streamline financial efficiency.
The Past Finance Commissions’ Views and the Current Scenario
13.37 Previous FCs have pointed to various State Government subventions in the power sector
as an important source of drain on the State finances. They have consistently called for reforms
that would eliminate the need for such subventions. For example, the FC‑13 noted that the lack
of periodic tariff revisions, and ineffective implementation of the Electricity Act, 2003 were key
reasons for the poor financial health of power sector utilities. FC‑13 recommended a reduction
in transmission and distribution losses through metering, feeder separation, strict anti‑theft
measures, prioritisation of unbundling, and strengthening of regulatory institutions to improve
the efficiency of the power sector.
21 As per reply of Ministry of Power to Rajya Sabha Unstarred question no. 1270 on 10.03.2025
22 Except Arunachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Nagaland, Telangana, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh.
23 As per reply of Ministry of Power to Lok Sabha Unstarred question no. 2906 on 12.12.2024
279Sixteenth Finance Commission
13.38 By the time the FC‑14 was appointed, the losses and debt of State DISCOMs had reached
unsustainable levels. Unsurprisingly, expressing serious concern about the state of affairs,
FC‑14 attributed the sector’s fragile health to a lack of or infrequent revisions of tariffs,
inefficiencies in power supply, as demonstrated by increasing financial gaps, and an absence of
autonomy in SERCs. Among the solutions, it recommended implementing 100 per cent
metering in a time‑bound manner and amending the Electricity Act, 2003 to make it more
stringent and effective.
13.39 Most recently, the FC‑15 took note of the continuing systemic issues in the power sector
and called for robust sector‑wide reforms. FC‑15 suggested that the Ministry of Power develop
a monitorable performance index based on State‑specific targets. It went on to recommend that
the ministry offer financial incentives to top‑performing States as measured by this index.
13.40 This Commission held consultations with the Ministry of Power, the Ministry of New
and Renewable Energy, and the States’ Accountants General. During discussions with them,
we learned that the issues raised by the past FCs remain very much alive. While some progress
has been made, issues of infrequent revisions or outright non‑revisions of tariffs, as well as
technical and economic inefficiencies at all levels, continue to persist.
Impact on State Finances
13.41 The modernisation of the power sector, of which distribution is an integral and critical
part, is an important step towards the transformation of India into a developed country. The
immediate concern arises from the adverse impact on the State finances stemming from repeated
bailouts and regular infusions of fiscal resources into public‑sector DISCOMs. It is no surprise
that, as briefly discussed, past FCs consistently called for reforms in this area.
13.42 Under UDA(cid:60), all participating States were to issue bonds worth ₹2.69 lakh crore, which
accounted for 75 per cent of the DISCOM losses. During 2015‑1(cid:26), the bonds worth ₹2.32 lakh
crore were issued, which became part of the States’ outstanding liabilities. Power subsidies
booked by D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms amounted to ₹2.62 lakh crore for 2023‑24 as compared to ₹1.29 lakh crore
for 2018‑19. Table 13.1 provides a calculation of power subsidies for each of the twenty‑eight
States for years 2018‑19 to 2023‑24.
13.43 In addition to tariff subsidies, some State Governments also disburse grants for the
takeover of losses, which amounted to ₹43,600 crore for the 2022‑23 fiscal year24. Pressed by
revenue shortage, States were often delaying the payment of governmental dues (subsidy plus
charges payable for electricity consumption by government departments), which becomes a
revenue‑side problem for DISCOMs. However, the extent of this problem has reduced since
introduction of RDSS. According to the information provided by Ministry of Power, the legacy
dues of government departments to D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms reduced from ₹50,286 crores in 2020‑21 to
₹12,036 crores in 2022‑23 and the gap between subsidy billed versus received has become
24 12th Integrated Rating and Ranking: Power Distribution Utilities (PFC, March 2024)
280Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
negligible. At the national level, State Governments collectively disbursed 97.4 per cent of the
total booked subsidies for the year 2023‑2425.
Table 13.1 Power Subsidy by States (₹ crore)
State 2018‑19 2019‑20 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Uttar Pradesh 16,630 19,351 10,417 22,439 26,335 33,384
Tamil Nadu 12,123 13,793 21,373 20,625 26,122 32,098
Rajasthan 21,204 22,734 14,264 22,644 24,515 27,038
Madhya Pradesh 9,813 13,968 14,914 23,413 27,136 26,842
Karnataka 10,063 12,265 14,282 17,450 14,097 23,933
Punjab 8,886 9,394 10,236 13,443 20,200 18,177
Telangana 4,978 5,224 9,965 11,141 17,912 16,016
Andhra Pradesh 2,161 7,363 6,601 11,353 18,660 15,133
Bihar 6,914 5,953 7,523 8,950 12,716 13,952
Maharashtra 10,520 11,127 9,636 12,028 13,484 13,090
Gujarat 7,628 8,310 9,159 10,380 12,058 10,395
Jharkhand 2,490 2,845 1,872 3,658 3,240 8,996
Haryana 7,371 6,983 5,579 6,750 6,768 7,145
Chhattisgarh 2,079 4,691 4,394 3,800 5,362 6,694
West Bengal 1,944 1,019 1,375 1,550 1,965 2,989
Arunachal Pradesh 653 646 801 957 842 1,209
Himachal Pradesh 579 406 526 1,646 1,100 1,148
Goa - 260 - 36 - 959
Kerala 38 38 934 381 383 842
Assam 1,641 1,404 1,350 1,301 1,151 732
Nagaland 337 421 443 420 472 486
Manipur 536 403 401 424 311 423
Meghalaya 163 20 115 680 284 274
Mizoram 313 365 408 299 204 198
Tripura 27 94 80 79 124 99
Odisha 233 18 6 5 5 23
Uttarakhand - - 11 - 1 -
Sikkim - 26 - - - -
Total 1,29,322 1,49,120 1,46,664 1,95,853 2,35,447 2,62,276
Source: Finance Accounts of Respective States.
Note: In addition to explicit subsidies provided, the figure includes the grant/assistance by the State to
SEB/State DISCOMs.
25 13th Annual Integrated Rating and Ranking: Power Distribution utilities (February 2025)
281Sixteenth Finance Commission
DISCOM Losses and Borrowings
13.44 Mounting debt, short‑term borrowing, and accumulated losses have been a perpetual
burden on DISCOM finances. Because the losses are disproportionately concentrated in eight
States, the burden on those States is even more acute. These eight States accounted for 83 per
cent of the total accumulated losses of state sector D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms, amounting to ₹5.86 lakh crore of
the total ₹(cid:26).08 lakh crore in 2023‑24. Figure 13.1 provides a graphical representation of the
shares of the eight States with their names.
Figure 13.1 State‑wise Accumulated DISCOM Losses
(percentage of Aggregate Losses of All State‑owned DISCOMs, 2023‑24)
Andhra Pradesh,
4%
Kerala, 5%
Other States, 17%
Madhya Pradesh, 10%
Uttar Pradesh, 13%
Maharashtra, 5%
Rajasthan, 13%
Telangana, 9%
Tamil Nadu, 24%
Source: PFC Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023‑24 (Updated May 2025)
13.45 Seven26 out of the eight States shown in Figure 13.1, which account for 83 per cent of
the State DISCOM losses, also account for 78 per cent of the total debt by State DISCOMs in
2023‑24. The seven States and their corresponding debt, as well as the annual growth in debt
are shown in Table 13.2. As can be seen, this debt has been on a growing trajectory, increasing
from ₹4.(cid:26)1 lakh crore to ₹(cid:26).42 lakh crore between March 2019 and March 2024.
26 Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and Uttar Pradesh.
282Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Table 13.2 DISCOM Debt (Top Seven States) and their Annual Growth
(as on 31 March of Each Year, ₹ crore)
Year 2018‑19 2019‑20 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Total Debt of 4,71,461 4,79,766 5,55,686 5,92,727 6,61,263 7,42,460
DISCOMs
Growth (%) 6% 2% 16% 7% 11% 12%
1,13,438 1,24,413 1,37,632 1,47,716 1,59,431 1,73,521
Tamil Nadu
12% 10% 11% 7% 8% 9%
54,538 48,934 53,030 65,945 79,611 92,225
Rajasthan
-14% -10% 8% 24% 21% 16%
35,197 38,092 38,254 44,075 58,325 84,171
Maharashtra
20% 8% 0% 15% 32% 44%
59,212 58,326 81,952 82,047 78,307 67,936
Uttar Pradesh
2% -1% 41% 0% -5% -13%
18,023 24,463 31,375 36,364 51,464 65,710
Andhra Pradesh
17% 36% 28% 16% 42% 28%
Madhya 46,052 49,112 50,702 52,473 49,145 50,843
Pradesh 22% 7% 3% 3% -6% 3%
17,934 22,202 31,032 30,138 35,239 46,127
Telangana
25% 24% 40% -3% 17% 31%
Source: PFC Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023‑24 (Updated May 2025)
13.46 A rise in debt, accompanied by a commensurate rise in revenues or assets, makes the
possibility of self‑liquidation of debt likely. For eight States27, the growth in debt between
2018‑19 and 2023‑24 has outpaced their growth in revenues and assets, making the
self‑liquidation of debt unlikely. These States account for 36 per cent of the total outstanding
debt in the sector in 2023‑24.
13.47 Figure 13.2 shows the accumulated losses as per cent of their GSDP for top fifteen States
in terms of these losses in 2023‑24. These States combined account for 99 per cent of
accumulated losses of DISCOMs in the country. The aggregate accumulated losses of
State‑owned DISCOMs which stood at 1.5 times of the aggregate revenue‑deficit of States in
2021‑22 increased to 6.8 times in 2023‑24. In States like Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan, the
accumulated losses of DISCOMs account for more than 6 per cent of their GSDP, which is the
highest among all States.
13.48 The measurement of DISCOM losses involves comparing the cost of supplying
electricity per kWh to customers with the revenue realised per kWh sold. The former is referred
to as the ACS, and the latter is the ARR. ACS‑ARR gap represents the loss per kWh of electricity
27 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Telangana.
283Sixteenth Finance Commission
sold. Multiplying ACS, ARR, and ACS‑ARR by the total kWh of electricity sold yields the total
cost, total revenue, and total loss of the DISCOM.
Figure 13.2 Accumulated Losses for States in 2023‑24 (percentage of GSDP)
0%
-1%
-2%
-3%
-4%
-5%
-6%
-7%
Source: PFC Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023‑24 (Updated May 2025)
13.49 The principal source of DISCOM revenues is from operations, including subsidy from
the State. The State Governments subsidises certain consumers, including farmers and
low‑income households. DISCOMs do not collect revenues from these consumers to the extent
of the subsidy. It receives this part of the revenue from the State Government in the form of a
subsidy. With the extent of consumer subsidisation varying greatly across States, the shares of
revenues from operations and the subsidy in DISCOM revenues also vary significantly.
13.50 In 2023‑24, nationally, revenues per kWh from operations and the subsidy accounted for
71.0 per cent and 20.7 per cent of the ARR, respectively 28. Ten States 29 exhibited a
higher‑than‑average share of the subsidy in their ARR. DISCOMS in some major States such
as Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab, are heavily reliant on subsidy income,
accounting for 40 per cent, 35 per cent, 47 per cent and 41 per cent of their ARR, respectively.
Five States30 report more than 15 per cent of ARR from ‘other revenues’, which is much higher
than the national average of 8.3 per cent.
13.51 While ACS‑ARR is a measure of a DISCOM’s economic loss per kWh of electricity
sold, the AT&C loss represents loss due to operational inefficiency, measured in physical units
of electricity. It measures the percentage of electricity purchased by the DISCOM for which it
fails to collect any revenues. It is a physical measure of the effective loss of electricity in transit,
28 Power Finance Corporation Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023-24, May 2025.
29 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab and Rajasthan.
30 Arunachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Tamil Nadu and Telangana
284
udaN
limaT
nahtsajaR hsedarP
ayhdaM
anagnaleT dnahkrahJ hsedarP
rattU
alareK anayraH rahiB hsedarP
arhdnA
hragsittahhC dnahkarattU bajnuP akatanraK arthsarahaMChapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
where the loss may occur on the wire as electricity travels on the sub‑transmission and
distribution lines, or due to theft through unauthorised connections, bypassing meters, meter
tampering or falsifying meter readings through underbilling, and on account of under‑collection
on what is billed.
The following equation measures this loss:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
AT&C Loss (as % of energy purchased)=�1− × � 𝑋𝑋 100
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
13.52 The first fraction inside the brackets in this equation may be interpreted as billing
efficiency, and the second as collection efficiency. The larger the former, the greater the billing
efficiency and the smaller the loss due to inefficient transmission and distribution lines and theft.
The larger the latter, the greater the efficiency of bill collection. Data are available to measure
both the billing and collection efficiencies.
13.53 The AT&C loss does not measure the economic loss (which is measured by ACS‑ARR
gap), but it has an important bearing on it. Economic loss depends not just on the proportion of
electricity purchased for which no revenue is collected, but also on the purchase and sale price
of electricity. The higher the purchase price, the lower the sale price, and the higher AT&C loss,
the higher is the economic loss. The sale price is nothing but the electricity tariff set by the
regulatory authority. Therefore, whether or not the regulatory authority sets tariffs at
cost‑reflective levels is crucial to the profitability of DISCOMs.
Figure 13.3 State‑wise Comparison of Billing and Collection Efficiencies, and AT&C
Losses with All‑State Average, 2023‑24
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: PFC Report on Performance of Power Utilities 2023‑24 (Updated May 2025)
285
egatnecreP
hsedarP
arhdnA
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA rahiB hragsittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH hsedarP
lahcamiH
dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN bajnuP nahtsajaR mikkiS udaN
limaT
anagnaleT arupirT hsedarP
rattU
dnahkarattU lagneB
tseW
Billing efficiency (BE) Collection efficiency (CE)
AT&C losses (ATC) BE average (All States)
CE average (All States) AT&C average (All States)Sixteenth Finance Commission
13.54 The bars in Figure 13.3 show the average billing and collection efficiencies and AT&C
losses of DISCOMs in the twenty‑eight States. Additionally, the dotted lines of matching colour
indicate the average billing and collection efficiencies, as well as AT&C losses, across the
twenty‑eight States. Predictably, States with high billing and collection efficiencies have low
AT&C losses. Non‑NEH States in which AT&C losses continue to be higher than the all‑State
average of 16.37 per cent include Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan,
Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
The Conundrum of Sustained Reforms, Repeated Loss, Debt and
Bailout Cycles
13.55 In this chapter, we have deliberately provided a detailed history of reforms and outcomes
in the distribution sector. This is to underscore the fact that, despite concerted efforts to address
operational and economic efficiency issues, the problem of accumulating DISCOM losses and
debt has persisted. Three explicit bailouts were given over a period of two decades, weakening
the finances of the affected States each time. Yet DISCOMs have the largest ever quantum of
debt today. It must be asked as to whether there is something inherent in the current governance
structure that leads to this outcome. A plausible hypothesis is that, without a major policy shift
to realign the incentives of key actors involved, it will be difficult to avoid cycles of loss
accumulation, high DISCOM debts, and bailouts.
13.56 There are three main actors whose actions determine the profit‑loss calculus of
DISCOMs: DISCOMs themselves, the SERC, and the State Government. We consider the
incentives of each actor below.
13.57 As State‑owned entities, DISCOMs are not subject to the same commercial pressures as
private entities. On their own, they are less likely to invest in closing the avenues to electricity
theft, billing dues, and collecting dues. Governments have made repeated efforts to address each
of these problems. Nevertheless, comparisons carried out by the Power Finance Corporation
(PFC) show that, while the average AT&C losses for private DISCOMs in the country is 12.12
per cent in 2023‑24, this loss is 16.37 per cent for State‑owned DISCOMs. To be sure, some
State‑owned DISCOMs, such as those in Gujarat and Haryana, have been performing well. But
a large majority of them perform significantly worse. In its twelfth rankings of distribution
utilities for the year 2022‑23, PFC rated fifty‑five DISCOMs altogether, of which thirteen were
private and forty‑two State‑owned. All DISCOMs rated twenty‑seventh and below were found
to be State‑owned, while six of the top ten were privately owned. In the latest thirteenth
rankings, fifty‑two DISCOMs were rated, of which ten were private and forty‑two were
State‑owned. Once again, all those ranked thirtieth and below were State‑owned, while five of
the top ten were private.
286Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
13.58 There are many instances where State regulators have not fixed tariff at cost‑recovery
levels guided by factors other than purely regulatory principles. Because State Governments
subsidise farmers and low‑income households, they have a vested interest in keeping electricity
tariffs low to keep their subsidy bill low. Low tariffs undermine the profitability of DISCOMs.
However, if these DISCOMs are State‑owned, they have no strong reason to oppose such tariffs.
On the other hand, if DISCOMs are private, they are more likely to not only vocally oppose low
tariffs but also challenge them in the Appellate Tribunals and courts.
13.59 Finally, incentives for State Governments, especially those with a short‑term horizon,
also favour letting the losses accumulate on the books of DISCOMs. Populism pushes
governments toward expanding subsidies to electricity users. But the scarcity of fiscal resources
constrains them. As just noted, one way to circumvent this is to pressure the SERC into keeping
tariffs low. However, there are two additional avenues to controlling budgetary expenditures by
the States. First, the States can delay paying the subsidy that is due and allow DISCOMs to
finance it by borrowing. Second, the government can also delay paying its electricity bills. In
the past, it was a common practice for governments to delay paying electricity dues and to
reimburse subsidies to DISCOMs.
13.60 It is essential to note that, although this scenario is plausible, it is not inevitable. A State
Government, that believes in financial discipline and has a long‑term perspective, would
recognise that keeping tariffs low, avoiding subsidy payments, and delaying electricity bill
payments might offer greater budgetary flexibility in the short term, but would lead to higher
costs in the long term. For in the long run, State Governments will have to assume the
DISCOM’s debt, which will add to their budgetary interest payments for many years to come.
The Gujarat and Haryana Governments, all of whose DISCOMs were ranked among the top
dozen in the PFC rankings of 2022‑23 and 2023‑24, clearly appreciate the logic behind this
argument.
Way Forward and Recommendations
13.61 Our discussion in the previous section leads us to conclude that while efforts to improve
operational efficiency of DISCOMs through various IT‑driven instruments, as well as to cut
their economic losses by promoting greater independence of SERCs and ensuring timely
payments of subsidies and government bills must continue, the time is ripe for proactively
promoting the privatisation of DISCOMs. In the early 2000s, there was significant momentum
for privatisation, but it was lost over the following two decades. It is now time to revive that
momentum.
287Sixteenth Finance Commission
13.62 We find that one of the major roadblocks in privatisation efforts is the high level of debt
on the books of DISCOMS, especially where it has been incurred not to create physical assets
but to maintain liquidity for operations. To create incentives for privatisation, a mechanism
needs to be devised for shielding the private investor from the accumulated debt burden, after
DISCOM takeover. For this purpose, States may create a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which
will function as a warehouse for the accumulated working capital and other loans not backed by
any asset. This transfer will make the DISCOMs a better investment opportunity. The debt of
the S(cid:51)(cid:57) can be negotiated for closure(cid:18)prepayment by the State Governments or will eventually
have to be serviced by the States.
13.63 While the outgo that the State Governments will have to bear towards closure or
repayment of this loan will not be leading to creation of physical assets, it will have extremely
positive effect on the fiscal health of the States in the long run. Therefore, to incentivise States
towards privatisation, we recommend that the prepayment or eventual repayment of this debt
could be treated eligible for assistance under the special incentive scheme for capital investment
(SASCI) of the Union Government. This assistance could be made available to the State as and
when the repayment of the debt comes up but only after the DISCOM has been privatised by
the State.
13.64 Privatisation of DISCOMs will serve not only the short‑term goal of resolving the
problem of losses‑debt‑bailout cycle but also help modernise the distribution sector. It will help
promote greater competition and efficiency, while also paving the way for SERCs to act
effectively. It will also facilitate other reforms, such as putting an end to cross‑subsidies and
promoting open access. If the Union Government also decides to implement the reform of
separating the wire from electricity supply along with DISCOM privatisation, the introduction
of multiple suppliers to encourage competition, as was the pathway adopted in the
telecommunications industry, will be less contentious.
13.65 While privatization of DISCOMs provides a more definitive and sustainable solution to
the repeated cycles of debt and bailout, if a solution is sought within the public ownership
framework, the States of Gujarat (Case Study 1) and Haryana (Case Study 2) provide two
examples that are worth emulating. All four of Gujarat’s State‑owned DISCOMs have
consistently featured among the top 10 utilities (State and Private distribution utilities included).
In the case of Haryana, both of its DISCOMs emerged from a heavy debt following the
successful implementation of UDAY. They have consistently shown financial profits since
2017‑18 and ranked 6th and 11th with A+ grade in the latest, 2023‑24, PFC ranking.
288Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
Case Study 1 - Efficient Management of State‑owned DISCOMs in Gujarat
During the analysis of State‑owned power distribution sector in the country, it is noticed that Gujarat’s
State‑owned DISCOMs have consistently ranked among the top rated DISCOMs in the country, with all four
of them featuring among the top 10 utilities (State and Private distribution utilities included) successively in
the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Annual Integrated Rating and Ranking reports of PFC.
Gujarat's power sector has achieved this through technological integration, regulatory reforms, and
consumer‑centric initiatives and established a benchmark in advancing sustainable, consumer‑focused power
distribution. This feature presents the main drivers that enabled this transformation which other States can
emulate, to effectively address the problem plaguing the sector.
Policy Reforms:
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL), plays a pivotal coordinating role in tariff filings and power
procurement, supported by the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC) through a transparent
and prudent tariff determination process.
GUVNL manages power procurement for all four DISCOMs in the State through a single buyer model, which
helped achieve economies of scale and reduce power procurement cost. This centralised model enables better
planning, procurement, and dispatch of power across the State. It ensures timely filing of tariff petitions by
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution companies by 30th November each year, facilitating a uniform
and aligned approach. This coordination helps ensure full cost recovery for generation, transmission, and
distribution utilities, safeguarding their financial sustainability.
Technological Innovations:
Distribution losses in Gujarat have significantly declined as a result of targeted interventions that harnessed
technology for efficiency such as adoption of high voltage distribution systems (HVDS) to reduce technical
and commercial losses, underground cabling for network reliability and safety, GPRS enabled metering and
billing to improve accuracy and arresting leakages.
These measures have enabled real‑time monitoring, efficient fault detection, and transparency in consumer
affairs, thus significantly improving reliability and reducing outage durations.
Operational Transparency:
GERC conducts a well‑structured and transparent tariff approval process with public hearings and
opportunities for consumer feedback. Tariffs are finalised before the start of the financial year, and all prudent
and justified costs are allowed for recovery, ensuring that no regulatory assets or revenue gaps are created.
Tariff structure follows the National Tariff Policy guidelines, ensuring that for all consumers, except
agriculture, cross‑subsidy is limited to ±20 per cent of the average cost of supply across consumer categories.
This promotes both affordability and equity while maintaining utility viability.
To manage fuel and power cost volatility, GERC has a formula‑based mechanism for Fuel and Power
Purchase Price Adjustment, first introduced in 2004 and revised in 2013. These adjustments are computed
289Sixteenth Finance Commission
quarterly based on actual costs and automatically passed through in the following quarter’s tariff, as per fuel
charge formula, avoiding sudden tariff spikes and reducing interest burden from working capital needs.
Apart from this, the State has implemented the following administrative and regulatory measures which have
contributed to its efficient management of the DISCOMs and reduction of losses:
(i) Strict enforcement against power theft through designated police stations and courts, regular
inspection drives and theft assessments
(ii) State Government releases subsidies in advance, based on prevalent norms, which helps ensure
healthy cash flow for DISCOMs. As a result, Gujarat’s State‑DISCOMs have an interest cost of 0.97
per cent of per unit cost of supply (for 2023‑24), as against all State sector average of 7.44 per cent.
The combination of reliable supply, transparent billing, and responsive grievance redressal has led to
increased consumer trust, improved payment behaviour, and more efficient electricity use. Additionally, a
cost‑reflective, formula‑driven tariff structure, backed by rigorous prudence checks by GERC, has also
supported in the long‑term financial health and operational viability of Gujarat’s power utilities.
Case Study 2 - Efficient Management of State‑owned DISCOMs in Haryana
Both the DISCOMs of Haryana have registered financial profits since 2017‑18 with improved operational
efficiencies and reduction of AT&C losses. This case study provides some of the key factors contributing to
reforms in Haryana DISCOMs.
Regulatory Reforms and Compliances:
The DISCOMs comply with the regulatory process by timely filing the ARR and True‑up Petitions each year,
by 30th November, in accordance with the Multi Year Tariff (MYT) regulations. Subsequently, tariff orders
are issued by 31 March annually.
The tariff orders are being issued after considering the true‑up of previous year and undertaking necessary
tariff rationalisation in rates and terms and conditions of tariff. Additionally, the determination of agriculture
pump set subsidy is carried out in the tariff order based on the cost of supply, which is fully reimbursed by
the State Government every year.
D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms are levying the Fuel (cid:51)rice and (cid:51)ower (cid:51)urchase Adjustment Surcharge (F(cid:51)(cid:51)AS(cid:18) FSA) in a timely
manner.
Open Access provisions have also been actively facilitated, allowing eligible consumers to procure electricity
from alternate sources, thereby fostering competition and efficiency in the electricity market. Over the years
the tariff rationalisation has been undertaken, and the level of cross‑subsidy is largely kept within the limits
prescribed by the National Tariff Policy, that is within ±20 per cent of the cost of supply.
Debt Restructuring and Low‑Cost Debt:
From 2020‑21 onwards, the annual reduction in interest burden for Haryana D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms is ₹2,113 crore and
the corresponding gain on account of efficiency improvement that is due to reduction in AT&C losses, is
approximately ₹3,000 crore per annum, indicating massive savings due to the successful implementation of
290Chapter 13: Reforms in the Power Sector
UDA(cid:60). Haryana D(cid:44)SC(cid:50)Ms on average resorted to capital borrowings of nearly ₹1000 crore every year from
commercial banks resulted in significant savings.
Measures Taken for Improving Operational Efficiency:
(i) Theft detection: The anti‑theft provisions of Electricity Act, 2003 were effectively implemented
with revision of SOP for theft detection and strengthening of dedicated police stations for theft
detection. During last 10 years from 2015‑16 to 2024‑25, theft cases numbering 6,54,961 were
registered involving penalty of ₹2,229.42 crore.
(ii) 24x7 supply in rural domestic sector: For reducing losses in rural domestic sector relocation of
meters on poles, replacement of bare conductor with armoured cable, replacement of defective and
electromechanical meter with electronic meter was undertaken with the community participation of
villagers.
(iii) Energy consumption agriculture pump set subsidy: Various measures were taken for containing the
agriculture subsidy. Mandating star rating of motors, drip irrigation and mandating solar agriculture
pump set pump up to 10 Brake Horsepower. Importantly under PM KUSUM scheme more than 1.5
lakh solar pumps have been installed in off grid mode.
(iv) Effective metering, billing and collection system: The centralised billing system was rolled out in
all the areas, which eliminated any billing errors in local billing system as was prevailing earlier.
Automatic reading for high value consumers got implemented along with data analytics.
(v) Augmentation of distribution infrastructure to meet the increasing demand and for reduction of
technical losses.
(vi) Implementation of right to service and auto appeal system: implemented for ensuring delivery of
services within prescribed timelines, wherein auto escalation to first and second Grievance
authorities are undertaken.
(vii) Call centre know‑your‑customer (KYC): The centralised call centre with toll‑free number 1912 was
implemented by Haryana DISCOMs and for efficient operations, KYC of consumers was updated
and also linked with State Government Database of Parivar Pehchan Patra.
(viii) Corporate governance: Various initiatives were taken for improving productivity like incentive and
reward schemes for providing information leading to detection of theft of electricity, and for the
good work of employees in improving DISCOM’s functioning. A new concept of ‘Area of
Responsibility’ was introduced. As part of this initiative, each official was made in charge of a small
manageable area and made responsible for the collection of KYC data, recovery of arrears,
replacement of meters and detection of possible causes of loss of revenue.
291CONTAINING AND
14
MAKING SUBSIDIES
EFFICIENT
CHAPTER 14
14.1 There are two reasons why successive Finance Commissions have drawn attention to
government subsidies, inclusive of cash and in‑kind transfers. First, their unbridled expansion,
with no offsetting cuts in other expenditures, can lead to large fiscal deficits, high public debt,
and ultimately fiscal instability. Second, if driven by populism, they may crowd out other
high‑priority expenditures, such as those on education, health, infrastructure, law and order, and
defence.
14.2 The vibrant ‘freebies’ debate, triggered by the recent proliferation of subsidies alongside
tight fiscal constraints, has added an additional element of urgency to these concerns. However
attractive these subsidies may seem from the immediate perspective, by creating permanent
entitlements, they can have a serious impact on the governments’ long‑term fiscal health. The
importance of exercising discretion when considering the expansion of subsidies cannot be
overstated. In fact, it is essential to pay attention not only to aligning the magnitude of
expenditures to potential revenues, but also to focus on their quality. Undue expansion of
subsidies can crowd out capital expenditures that are critical to long‑term growth.
The Challenge of Defining Subsidies
14.3 A major challenge confronting any empirically grounded analysis of subsidies, such as
the present one, is defining the concept of a subsidy itself. The government finances the bulk of
its expenditure from tax revenues, and those expenditures benefit one or the other section of the
citizenry, often without paying for the service received or with under recovery of cost incurred.
What part of this expenditure should be included in estimating subsidies, and what part should
be left out? This is a difficult question, as the discussion below explains.
293Sixteenth Finance Commission
14.4 There is general agreement that financing pure public goods, such as defence and internal
law and order, and providing them at no charge to citizens, does not constitute a subsidy1. As
long as the benefit from public goods to the citizenry exceeds the cost of their provision, they are
worth providing. Once provided, no citizen can be excluded from reaping the benefits of these
goods regardless of their ability to pay. Therefore, left to the market, pure public goods will not
be supplied even when they benefit all citizens. Financing them with public funds is the only
practical option.
14.5 Once we get past defence and internal law and order, examples of pure public goods are
rare. For example, items such as education and health, on which the Union and States spend
large sums, do not fulfil the condition of non‑exclusion. Because they can exclude non‑paying
customers from accessing education and healthcare services, private providers can profitably
supply them. For this reason, some economists have identified the under‑recovery of the cost of
supply of these services by the government as a subsidy2.
14.6 However, this is not an uncontested view. An alternative view is that, insofar as primary
education and primary healthcare services are concerned, universal access to them is a desirable
social goal. To the extent that a literate and healthy population benefits the entire society,
primary education and primary healthcare are ‘merit’ goods. Therefore, the society as a whole
must undertake to provide them free of charge to all regardless of their ability or willingness to
pay. In this view, under‑recovery of the cost of providing primary education and primary
healthcare is not a subsidy. We broadly accept this view in estimating subsidies in this report.
14.7 Beyond primary education and primary healthcare, the terrain gets more slippery. For
example, consider the financing of highways from taxpayer money. To the extent that the social
benefits from them exceed their costs, building them is desirable. But should they be financed
wholly from taxpayer money? In the past, the generally accepted answer was in the affirmative.
However, today, this answer is no longer accepted, and highway tolls and asset monetisation are
seen as legitimate means of cost recovery from highway users. By implication, is any
under‑recovery of the cost of building and maintaining highways not a subsidy? The same
questions may also be asked for the under‑recovery of costs of airports and railways. The answer
is not clear‑cut, however, as highways, airports and railways create ‘externalities’, that is,
benefits that go beyond their actual users, through increased economic productivity. In the case
of under‑recovery of low‑fare railway passenger travel, the merit‑goods argument may also
apply.
1 The academic literature distinguishes public goods from private ones based on two properties: non-exclusion and non-rivalry
in consumption. Non-exclusion means that once a public good is available, no citizen can be excluded from benefiting from it.
Non-rivalry means that the consumption of a public good by one citizen does not diminish its availability to another citizen. A
pure public good, such as defence, satisfies both these properties, while a pure private good, such as ice cream, lacks them. An
ice cream seller can deny his product to a customer unwilling to pay for it (exclusion), and once consumed by a customer, the
same ice cream is no longer available for consumption by another (rivalry in consumption).
2 For example, Mundle and Rao take the latter view. Thus, see Mundle, Sudipto, and M. Govinda Rao. 1991. "The Volume and
Composition of Government Subsidies in India: 1987-88". Economic and Political Weekly, May 4th, 1992.
294Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
14.8 This discussion highlights the challenges in defining and measuring subsidies. The
challenges magnify as we transition from conceptual analysis to data. Keeping this in mind, we
outline our approach in the context of the available data. We first consider the subsidies provided
by the twenty‑one larger States and then the Union.
Approach to Measuring State Subsidies
14.9 We adopt a conservative approach to identifying subsidies by focusing only on payments
that the State Governments make autonomously through their discretionary schemes, as outlined
in the detailed demand for grants. This approach automatically excludes expenditures incurred
for the provision of public goods or community‑level services provided by the government. Four
key elements of our approach are worth noting.
14.10 First, in measuring subsidies, we include only the purely discretionary items of
expenditure. For example, when considering subsidies provided by States, we exclude their
share in centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) since this expenditure is a means to access central
resources. However, we include in our measure any top‑ups by States to the CSS, as they are
discretionary and like a parallel State scheme.
14.11 Second, schemes included in our subsidy measure are those whose benefits flow to
identifiable individual beneficiaries in cash or kind. Schemes that provide community‑level
benefits or services or create a community asset are excluded. While a subsidy on agricultural
equipment, provided to a farmer, is included, expenditure on a scheme aimed at watershed
development is excluded. The latter is akin to a development scheme, potentially characterised
by externalities or public goods characteristics. We also exclude from our subsidy measure any
expenditure incurred as a part of relief and reconstruction following disasters such as
earthquakes and floods.
14.12 Third, we include only revenue expenditure in our subsidy measure, thereby excluding
all capital outlays, loans, or advances. This means that expenditures on asset creation, such as
those on infrastructure, are excluded. A grey area item is the government support to public sector
enterprises through equity that is not expected to result in any realisable return. Such capital
infusion is in the nature of a grant; however, we exclude it to limit our measure of subsidy to
revenue expenditures.
14.13 Finally, in measuring subsidies, we include schemes that provide subsidies on goods and
services as well as income support to individual beneficiaries. These subsidies are the converse
of indirect and direct taxes. Indirect subsidies distort product markets, while direct subsidies
distort labour‑leisure choices. With the emergence of Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT) and their
superior ability to efficiently target beneficiaries, income support schemes are gaining
popularity over product subsidy schemes. These are referred to as transfers. In this chapter, we
frequently use the terms ‘subsidies and transfers’ to emphasise the growing importance of
transfers within subsidies.
295Sixteenth Finance Commission
14.14 However, while we discuss transfers as a separate subsidy item where relevant, they are
integral to our total subsidy estimates. The transfers can be classified as either conditional or
unconditional transfers. The former are subject to performance along specified parameters,
while the latter are not. For example, a scholarship scheme linked to attendance and academic
performance is classified as a conditional transfer. An income transfer to all farmers, on the
other hand, is an unconditional transfer. Note that unconditional transfers have eligibility criteria
to identify beneficiaries. In this case, being a farmer is the criterion. However, once eligibility
is established, no further conditions apply.
14.15 The available data allow us to classify subsidies at two levels: sectors to which subsidies
are applied, and the type of subsidy. The sectors include agriculture, business, social security,
education, health, food, housing, transport, power, loan waiver(s) and cash transfers. A subsidy
within each sector can be further divided into four types: consumption, production, asset and
transfer. For example, a subsidy provided under the National Food Security Act, 2013, is a
consumption subsidy in the food sector. A production‑linked incentive (PLI) is a production
subsidy in the business sector. A subsidy on housing is an asset subsidy in the housing sector.
Finally, an old‑age pension is a transfer in the social security sector.
14.16 It is important to note that, in presenting the subsidy measures below, we deploy the
sectoral classification selectively, focusing only on the major categories. The period of analysis
is from 2018‑19 to 2025‑26, although the data for 2024‑25 are revised estimates (RE) and for
2025‑26 are budgeted estimates (BE). In our analysis of States, we exclude the seven small
northeastern States, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim and Tripura. Although we present the estimates for both the Union and States, the focus
is primarily on the latter.
Total Subsidies by States
14.17 The total subsidies and transfers by the twenty‑one States included in our analysis
amounted to ₹3.86 lakh crore in 2018‑19. Five years later, in 2023‑24, they almost doubled to
₹(cid:26).59 lakh crore. (cid:55)he estimate rose further to ₹9.59 lakh crore in 2024‑25 RE and ₹9.(cid:26)3 lakh
crore in 2025‑26 BE. As a percentage of the twenty‑one States’ combined gross State domestic
product (GSDP), the subsidy rose from 2.2 per cent in 2018‑19 to 2.7 per cent in 2023‑24. The
figure rose further to 3.0 per cent in 2024‑25 RE before falling back to 2.7 per cent in 2025‑26
BE. Figure 14.1 shows subsidies and transfers as percentage of GSDP. As a percentage of total
revenue expenditure (TRE), the subsidies and transfers have grown from 15.6 per cent in
2018‑19 to 20.0 per cent in 2023‑24, 21.3 per cent in 2024‑25 RE and 19.8 per cent in 2025‑26
BE.
14.18 Subsidy growth in the twenty‑one States during these years has primarily been driven
by increasing expenditure on large‑group, unconditional cash transfers, totalling ₹1.96 lakh
crore in 2025‑26 BE. These unconditional transfers to a large section of households have
emerged as a major pillar of policy in many States. The largest unconditional transfer schemes,
as per the 2025‑26 BE figures, are the Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana in Maharashtra, Gruha
Lakshmi in Karnataka and Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal.
296Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Figure 14.1 Subsidies and Transfers for Twenty‑one Larger States (percentage of GSDP)
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2025-26
(RE) (BE)
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
State Subsidies: Sectoral Shares
14.19 Figure 14.2 and Figure 14.3 show the sectoral shares of the subsidies and transfers in
the States’ total expenditures on the revenue account. The former focuses on a comparison of
subsidy composition between the beginning and terminal years of the period under
consideration, while the latter covers the composition each year, along with the evolution of the
level of subsidy in current rupees. The biggest shift in its composition has resulted from the
large‑group cash transfer schemes of the kind mentioned earlier. They have grown from a mere
3.0 per cent of all revenue subsidies in 2018‑19 to 20.2 per cent in 2025‑26 BE. The transfers
under the category ‘social‑security’ are also income transfers, but they are targeted at narrowly
defined groups, such as the elderly, widows and persons with disabilities.
Figure 14.2 Sectoral Shares of the Subsidies and Transfer Schemes
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
297
PDSG
%
2018-19 2025-26 (BE)
Health, Health,
Others
Education Education
17%
Others and and
26% Housing Housing Food
13% 11% 8%
Food
14%
Cash Cash
Transfers Transfers
3% 20%
Power
Social
27%
Security
11% Social
Power
Security
33%
17%Sixteenth Finance Commission
Power Subsidies
14.20 Power subsidies represent the largest single component of subsidies in the State revenue
accounts. Although it shows a decline compositionally from 32.9 per cent in 2018‑19 to 27.1
per cent in 2025‑26 BE, as Figure 14.3 shows, power subsidies item has continued to grow in
absolute terms throughout the period. The power sector is the biggest beneficiary of subsidies
provided by the State Governments. Although they are given to State distribution companies
(DISCOMs), the ultimate beneficiaries are specified groups of consumers to whom DISCOMs
provide electricity, free of charge or at subsidised tariffs, with a mandate from the State
Government. States also extend support to DISCOMs through loans and equity investments, but
these are capital account items that are excluded, as we focus only on the revenue‑account
subsidies.
Figure 14.3 Composition of State Subsidies on the Revenue Account
12,00,000
10,00,000
8,00,000
6,00,000
4,00,000
2,00,000
0
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2025-26
(RE) (BE)
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
14.21 As a percentage of revenue expenditure, actual power subsidies by the twenty‑one States
under consideration grew from 5.1 per cent in 2018‑19 to 6.8 per cent in 2023‑24. The total bill
for power subsidy in 2023‑24 was ₹2.60 lakh crore. Uttar Pradesh had the highest power subsidy
expenditure of ₹33,384 crore in 2023‑24, followed by (cid:55)amil Nadu with ₹32,098 crore and
Rajasthan with ₹2(cid:26),038 crore. Power subsidy saw the fastest annual growth in Andhra Pradesh
at 26.4 per cent between 2018‑19 and 2025‑26 BE, followed by Telangana at 22.0 per cent,
Jharkhand at 19.9 per cent and Punjab at 16.2 per cent. In 2023‑24, Punjab paid the highest
subsidy per capita of ₹5,893, followed by Telangana and (cid:55)amil Nadu at ₹4,195 and ₹4,169
respectively. Punjab accounted for the highest power subsidy as a percentage of TRE at 15.5 per
cent in 2023‑24.
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Health, Education and Housing Food Power Social Security Cash Transfers OthersChapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
14.22 Magnitude of power subsidies is greatly understated when measured by budget or
finance accounts alone. This is because a large part of this subsidy remains off‑budget or implicit
when provided and transforms into either debt or grant when it eventually finds its way back to
the budget. Since State Governments subsidise many power consumers, they have an incentive
to keep tariffs low. Additionally, DISCOMs in most States are publicly owned, and do not feel
the same commercial pressure as their privately owned counterparts. They incur transmission
and commercial losses due to low tariff, poor management of distribution lines, underbilling of
electricity sold and under‑collection of billed amounts. All these factors contribute to DISCOM
losses that are covered through borrowing from banks or other public sector entities under
explicit or implicit State Government guarantees and are not reflected in the State budgets.
However, as we discuss in the chapter on the power sector reforms, accumulated losses
eventually end up on the State Government’s books in the form of added debt. This additional
debt, in turn, contributes to the State’s debt service payments, which are reflected in its revenue
budget3.
Large‑Group Cash Transfers
14.23 The component that has witnessed the steepest rise in recent years is the large‑group
cash transfers, with a trend growth4 of 53.6 per cent over 2018‑19 to 2025‑26 BE, reaching
₹1.96 lakh crore in 2025‑26 BE. This consists of subsidies that are not directed to a specific
economic or social sector. With the ease and efficiency brought in by the JAM (Jan Dhan bank
accounts, Aadhar cards, Mobile phones) trinity, an increasing share of revenue expenditure is
being devoted to these schemes. In 2023‑24, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal spent
the highest percentage of their TRE on general cash transfer schemes, at 7.6 per cent, 7.1 per
cent and 6.6 per cent respectively.
14.24 Large part of the increase has happened after 2023‑24. For example, comparing the
2025‑26 BE with the actuals of 2023‑24 reveals that the jump in large‑group cash transfers in
Jharkhand is from 0.8 per cent of TRE to 13.0 per cent. Other States with sharp increases in
shares of large‑group cash transfers as a percentage of total revenue expenditure in 2025‑26 BE
over 2023‑24 are Maharashtra (6.2 per cent from 0.6 per cent) and Odisha (5.1 per cent from
nil). If major States continue to allocate rising proportions of revenue expenditures to
large‑group unconditional cash transfers, they will not only impose a significant burden on the
States’ budgets but also destabilise their finances in the long run.
Social Security Pensions
14.25 A related set of schemes is classified under social security pensions (SSPs). These
schemes provide pensions and welfare support to groups such as the elderly, widows, persons
3 See the study by the Asian Development Bank in this context: “A Study of Subsidies and Transfers in India,” Submitted to the
Sixteenth Finance Commission, Final Report, August 2025.
4 Trend growth rate of variable y is calculated by estimating the equation ln(y) = b + g.t, where t represents the year corresponding
to the y value, g is the estimated trend growth rate and b is a constant intercept. All growth rates in this chapter are trend growth
rates.
299Sixteenth Finance Commission
with disabilities and other vulnerable sections of society. The expenditure on SSPs reached ₹1.18
lakh crore in 2023‑24, well over double of ₹44,453 crore in 2018‑19 and is budgeted at ₹1.58
lakh crore in 2025‑26 BE.
14.26 In 2023‑24, the States with the highest expenditure on SSPs were Andhra Pradesh
(₹15,060 crore), Uttar (cid:51)radesh (₹10,240 crore) and (cid:55)elangana (₹10,182 crore). Per capita
expenditure on SSPs is slated to be the highest in Andhra Pradesh at ₹5,061 in 2025‑26 BE,
representing a large jump from ₹2,827 in 2023‑24. A similar trend in per capita expenditure on
SSPs is followed by (cid:46)erala at ₹3,(cid:26)(cid:26)0 in 2025‑26 BE, up from ₹1,762 in 2023‑24 and Telangana
at ₹3,348 in 2025‑26 BE, up from ₹2,667 in 2023‑24.
Agriculture
14.27 Agricultural subsidies encompass support for crop loans, interest subsidies, insurance,
seeds and other agricultural inputs. Loan waivers and power subsidies also apply to agriculture,
but they are included under a separate head. However, we have included cash transfers to
farmers under schemes such as Krushak Assistance for Livelihood and Income Augmentation
(KALIA) and top‑ups to the PM Kisan Samman Nidhi Yojna (PM KISAN) in agricultural
subsidies. The total agricultural subsidies have risen from ₹29,610 crore in 2018‑19 to ₹91,389
crore in 2025‑26 BE. Figure 14.4 shows that the share of unconditional transfers within
agricultural subsidies has risen considerably from 58.8 per cent in 2018‑19 to 70.2 per cent in
2023‑24 and 66.5 per cent in 2025‑26 BE. The largest cash transfer schemes in agriculture are
Rythu Bandhu in Telangana, Krishak Unnati Yojana in Chhattisgarh and Annadata Sukhibhava
in Andhra Pradesh. Chhattisgarh and Telangana provide the largest subsidies in this sector, with
amounts of ₹19,681 crore (1(cid:26).2 per cent of (cid:55)RE) and ₹15,26(cid:26) crore (9.1 per cent of TRE),
respectively, in 2023‑24.
Figure 14.4 Agricultural Subsidies by Type
2018-19 2025-26 (BE)
Asset Asset
Subsidy Subsidy
16% 13%
Consumption
Unconditional Consumption
Transfers Subsidy Unconditional Subsidy
59% 25% Transfers 20%
67%
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
300Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Food Subsidy
14.28 Several States provide food subsidies in addition to the subsidised food grains provided
by the Union Government under the National Food Security Act, 2013. In 2023‑24, States spent
₹54,463 crore on food subsidies in addition to ₹2.3 lakh crore by the Union. The States with
high per capita food subsidy expenditures in 2023‑24 were Chhattisgarh (₹2,934), Tamil Nadu
(₹1,722) and Karnataka (₹1,256).
Health and Education
14.29 In 2023‑24, States spent ₹72,286 crore on health and education subsidies, primarily
through scholarship schemes, the free distribution of inputs such as uniforms, subsidised
insurance premiums and treatment costs. At 9.5 per cent, health and education subsidies
accounted for a relatively small proportion of the total subsidies in 2023‑24. This suggests that
non‑merit goods account for a disproportionately large volume of State subsidies.
Unconditional Transfers by States
14.30 Given the sudden spike in their magnitude, special attention must be paid to
unconditional transfers by the States. It is important to recall that these are transfers made to
eligible beneficiaries without performance benchmarks or contingencies on the use of such funds.
The unconditional transfers have grown at a rate of 28.8 per cent between 2018‑19 and 2025‑26
BE. In absolute terms, they have grown from ₹73,099 crore in 2018‑19 to ₹2.63 lakh crore in
2023‑24 and are estimated to grow to ₹4.14 lakh crore in 2025‑26 BE, far exceeding the amount
allocated for power subsidies.
Figure 14.5 Sectoral Composition of Unconditional Transfers
2018-19 2025-26 (BE)
Agriculture
Agriculture 15%
24%
Social
Security
38%
Social Cash
Security Transfers
60% 16% Cash
Transfers
47%
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
14.31 In addition to this rapid growth, unconditional transfers have undergone a dramatic shift
in their sectoral composition, as seen in Figure 14.5. In 2018‑19, 60.4 per cent of all
301Sixteenth Finance Commission
unconditional transfers went to social security pensioners, followed by a quarter to farmers. In
the 2025‑26 budget year, large‑group cash transfer schemes have assumed a dominant role,
accounting for 47.4 per cent of the total unconditional transfers. This is the result of a 53.6 per
cent growth rate between 2018‑19 and 2025‑26 BE in large‑group cash transfer schemes. The
social security pensioners’ and farmers’ shares have declined to 37.9 per cent and 14.7 per cent
respectively in 2025‑26 BE.
14.32 Unconditional transfers are also witnessing a rapid geographical expansion, with an
increasing number of States embracing them as the preferred instrument of transfers. In 2018‑19,
Telangana was the lone State that allocated more than 10 per cent of its revenue expenditure to
unconditional transfers. By 2023‑24, the number of such States rose to six and by 2025‑26 BE,
to nine. A similar trend is observed for the number of States with over 5 per cent of their revenue
expenditure spent on unconditional transfers, as shown in Figure 14.6. The number of such
States more than doubled from four in 2018‑19 to nine in 2023‑24. By 2025‑26 BE, the number
of States with over 5 per cent of revenue expenditure allocated to unconditional transfers further
rose to thirteen. In terms of percentage of revenue expenditure allocated to unconditional
transfers, the top six States in 2023‑24 were Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, West
Bengal, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, in that order.
14.33 Notably, States that expanded expenditure on unconditional transfers also tended to be
those with a revenue deficit. In 2023‑24, out of the nine States with over 5 per cent of TRE
devoted to unconditional transfers, six were in revenue deficit, compared to two out of four such
States in 2018‑19. When we consider States with over 10 per cent of TRE devoted to
unconditional transfers, four out of six of them were in revenue deficit in 2023‑24. The majority
of States are financing their unconditional transfers by either borrowing or cutting capital
expenditures.
Figure 14.6 Number of States with Revenue Deficit Adopting Unconditional Transfers
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2025-26
(RE) (BE)
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
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UT>5% TRE and in RD UT>10% TRE and in RD UT>5% TRE UT>10% TREChapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
14.34 While the JAM trinity has helped reduce last‑mile leakages in transfer programs, issues
related to targeting remain. For instance, a recent ground verification of pension scheme
beneficiaries by the Andhra Pradesh Government in one village/ward secretariat of each district
revealed that 9.0 per cent of the beneficiaries were ineligible and had been wrongly included.
The share of beneficiaries found dead was also a significant 0.6 per cent. States are aware of such
issues, and some have taken measures to clean their beneficiary lists. Telangana utilised
integration of multiple government department databases under its Samagra Vedika initiative to
weed out ineligible and bogus beneficiaries. Similarly, Tamil Nadu under its Data Purity project
and Rajasthan under Jan Aadhaar have implemented integration of various databases under
multiple schemes and departments like transport, power, property tax, ration cards etc. By
employing IT enabled data analysis on such integrated databases, States have been able to
deduplicate and streamline beneficiary listing leading to substantial savings. Maharashtra has
undertaken an intensive verification exercise that utilises the Income Tax database to review the
beneficiary list of the Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana. Therefore, measures to better target benefits
must be strengthened by the enforcement of clearly defined exclusion criteria and by integration
of all available databases.
Interstate Comparison
14.35 There is a wide variation in subsidy levels among States. At ₹78,453 crore, Tamil Nadu
had the highest absolute level of subsidy in 2023‑24, followed by Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh
and (cid:55)elangana at ₹(cid:26)0,149 crore, ₹63,951 crore and ₹62,84(cid:26) crore respectively. (cid:55)he absolute
subsidy levels are somewhat misleading, as the State's size influences them. To neutralise the
size effect, we consider two alternative measures: subsidies as a proportion of GSDP and as a
proportion of population.
Figure 14.7 Subsidies and Transfers (percentage of GSDP)
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
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2018-20 2024-26 All States (2018-20) All States (2024-26)Sixteenth Finance Commission
14.36 In Figure 14.7, we depict the average subsidy as a proportion of GSDP for the first two
years and the last two years of the period under consideration, for each State under study. Each
dotted horizontal line represents the average of the subsidy‑to‑GSDP ratios across States shown
in the same colour bars. Two striking patterns emerge. First, with two exceptions – Rajasthan
and Goa – all the remaining nineteen States have witnessed an increase in subsidies, both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of GSDP. This increase has been particularly pronounced in
Jharkhand, Telangana, Odisha, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh.
14.37 Second, in certain States, subsidy levels as a proportion of respective GSDPs have
reached extremely high levels during the last two years under consideration. In the States of
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Telangana, they exceed 5 per cent. In Madhya Pradesh, Andhra
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Odisha and West Bengal – they stood between 3 per cent and 5 per
cent.
Figure 14.8 Per Capita Subsidy vs Per Capita GSDP (2023‑24)
18
TG
16
14
CG
12 AP
GA
10 TN KA
PB
8
MP HR
6 RJ HP
WB
4 JH OD GJ MH
KL
UP UK 2 BR AS
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Source: States’ Demand for Grants
14.38 In Figure 14.8, we plot per capita GSDP against per capita subsidy expenditure for
2023(cid:4154)24. Among the twenty‑one States, Telangana, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, in
descending order, ranked as the three largest providers of subsidies. Telangana's per capita
spending on subsidies in 2023‑24 was ₹16,460, more than nine times the amount spent by
Assam. At ₹1,(cid:26)0(cid:26) per capita, Assam had the lowest subsidy burden among all twenty‑one States.
An interesting observation is that, on average, States with higher per capita income spend more
on a per capita basis on subsidies. The lower‑per‑capita‑income States of Bihar, UP and Assam
are among the States with the lowest per capita subsidies. Telangana and Goa, both at the top end
of the per capita GSDP ladder, on the other hand, are among the three highest per capita subsidy
States. At the low‑income end, Chhattisgarh stands out in terms of its high per capita subsidy. At
the high‑income end, Uttarakhand and Kerala have the opposite distinction. This reveals the
iniquitous inter‑state variation of subsidy expenditure which is more a function of fiscal capacity
than aid required by the vulnerable and poor. Box 14.1 further discusses and compares intra state
issues in targeting of subsidies to the poor.
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Per Capita GSDP (₹ Thousand)Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Box 14.1 Targeting of Subsidies: Case of Household Power Subsidies
Well targeted subsidies and transfers are potential tools to address inequity and ameliorate poverty.
However, subsidies and transfers are not always observed to be progressive in nature. To understand
variation in subsidies and its targeting in various States, the Asian Development Bank did a study on
our behalf. In its report submitted to the Commission it has observed that the substantial chunk of
subsidies are actually getting pocketed by more well-off sections of the population thereby impeding
their redistributive role.
In case of power subsidies for instance, which are predominantly consumption-oriented subsidies, the
study compared the percentage of households receiving free electricity in the different consumption
quintile as shown at Table 14.1. It emerges that in States that provide subsidies to large groups of
households, subsidies become less progressive. Thus, the percentage of households in the highest
quintile, receiving free electricity vary from nil in States like Kerala and Goa, to around 85 per cent in
Tamil Nadu. States like Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, that provide
power subsidies to large groups, have somewhat more regressive benefits that flow disproportionately
to higher consumption households. On the other hand, Kerala, Goa, Gujarat and Odisha provide
relatively targeted access to free power, restricting it to specific groups such as SC/ST or to consumers
with less than 30 units per month. These are targeted and have a design that allows them to support an
improved quality of life of vulnerable populations with relatively less fiscal impact.
Table 14.1 Quintile-wise Percentage of Households Receiving Free Electricity
State Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
Tamil Nadu 89.5 89.7 92.3 93.2 85.2 89.5
Punjab 92.6 88.0 89.5 84.4 75.1 82.9
Karnataka 90.9 91.4 92.3 88.5 62.3 81.4
Rajasthan 83.9 81.9 83.0 77.6 59.8 77.3
Himachal Pradesh 84.7 84.4 80.0 73.8 69.7 75.6
Jharkhand 50.3 50.9 46.5 31.1 14.8 45.7
Madhya Pradesh 39.4 47.2 40.4 29.8 13.4 38.0
Telangana 21.5 21.4 27.1 28.9 15.4 22.7
Andhra Pradesh 25.2 20.1 19.1 14.8 8.9 15.8
West Bengal 10.3 7.2 5.7 2.8 1.6 6.5
Chhattisgarh 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.5 7.2 3.6
Bihar 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.9
Uttarakhand 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.8 3.4 1.7
Other States* 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.3
Source: Household Consumption Expenditure Survey, 2023-24, MoSPI
Note: *Other States include Assam, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Odisha, Gujarat, Goa,
Kerala
305Sixteenth Finance Commission
Extra‑Budgetary Subsidies by States
14.39 Some States have to resort to raising extra‑budgetary resources for financing subsidies
and transfers, either through off‑budget borrowings (OBB) or debt guaranteed by the State
Government. Since OBBs are serviced by the State Governments, they have a direct bearing on
the budget, and impact interest payments; debt guarantees are part of contingent liability. Some
States have established government corporations to access such financing. Kerala and Andhra
Pradesh have assigned a portion of their own revenues through legislation to these corporations
for financing subsidies. For example, Andhra Pradesh has assigned the Additional Retail Excise
Tax (ARET) to Andhra Pradesh State Development Corporation Limited, which also serves as a
medium for transfers and welfare schemes. Such means of financing are not transparently
reflected in the budget documents of States and contribute to the opacity of subsidies and
transfers. Table 14.2 lists some cases of OBB funding of subsidies and transfers.
Table 14.2 Funding of Subsidies Through Off‑budget Borrowing as on 31 March 2023
State Organisation Amount (₹ crore)
Andhra Pradesh DISCOMS including
Andhra Pradesh 26,466
APPCC
Andhra Pradesh AP State Civil Supplies Corporation 35,100
Chhattisgarh Chhattisgarh Rural Housing Corporation 1,792
Kerala Kerala Social Security Pension Ltd. 11,733
Uttar Pradesh UP Power Corporation Ltd. 3,488
Source: State Finances Audit Reports
Transparency in Accounting
14.40 The Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC‑13) had recommended proper disclosure of
subsidies. Subsequently, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) has introduced a
statement in the Finance Accounts in the form of an appendix on subsidies being provided by
the States, which is placed before the State Legislatures. However, significant differences remain
across States in the reporting of subsidies. There is a lack of standardisation in accounting and
transparent disclosure of subsidies and transfers, as it depends on how States classify their
schemes. We have found many instances of expenditures that constitute subsidies and transfers
but are classified as ‘assistance’, ‘grants,’ or ‘other expenditure.’
14.41 For example, schemes such as Magalir Urimai Thugai (for women heads of households)
in Tamil Nadu and Rythu Bharosa (for farmers and tenants) in Andhra Pradesh are reported as
subsidies in the respective States' finance accounts. However, schemes such as Orunodoi in
Assam and Gruha Lakshmi in Karnataka, which provide similar benefits to the target groups, are
not included among the reported subsidies in the finance accounts.
306Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
Trends in Subsidies by the Union Government
14.42 We now turn to a discussion of subsidies and transfers provided by the Union
Government. Union subsidies have had a long history of study and analysis by governmental
agencies and research scholars. Finance Commissions in the past have also written about them.
Keeping this in view, our discussion is limited to estimating their magnitude and assessing their
composition in recent years.
14.43 The Union Government publishes a statement of subsidies in Statement 7 of its budget.
However, it reflects only items booked under the subsidy object head. The Union’s statements
ignore other beneficiary‑oriented subsidy programs. For example, it books the interest subsidy
for housing under PM Awas Yojana as a subsidy. Yet, it excludes assistance for beneficiary‑led
construction of a house under the same scheme. Similarly, there are inconsistencies with how
the same scheme is reported across years. We observe this in the case of the Prime Minister
Employment Generation Program. It is listed as a subsidy in the 2025‑26 budget, but not in the
earlier budgets.
14.44 Union subsidies rose at the annual trend growth rate of 21.0 per cent from ₹2.(cid:26)6 lakh
crore in 2018‑19 to ₹6.33 lakh crore in 2023‑24 as shown in Figure 14.9. Their share in gross
domestic product (GDP) increased sharply from 1.5 per cent in 2018‑19 to 4.5 per cent in
2020‑21, due to the clearing of deferred liabilities on the food and other subsidy accounts, and
in response to COVID‑19, before moderating to 2.1 per cent in 2023‑24. Their share in the
Union’s revenue expenditure increased from 13.8 per cent in 2018‑19 to 18.1 per cent in
2023‑24. However, in 2024‑25 RE and 2025‑26 BE, Union subsidies show moderation reaching
1.90 per cent and 1.76 per cent of GDP, respectively.
Figure 14.9 Union Subsidies and Transfers
5.0 10
4.5 9
4.0 8
3.5 7
3.0 6
2.5 5
2.0 4
1.5 3
1.0 2
0.5 1
0.0 0
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2025-26
RE BE
Source: Union’s Demand for Grants
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14.45 The major drivers of the increase in the Union subsidy expenditure from 2018‑19 to
2023‑24 have been agriculture and fertilizer subsidies. The subsidies and transfers in agriculture
grew at a rate of 35.5 per cent per annum, rising from ₹13,178 crore in 2018‑19 to ₹88,641 crore
in 2023‑24. This is largely due to the introduction of the PM KISAN scheme, which provides
unconditional cash transfers to farmers. The fertilizer subsidies have grown at the rate of 27.4
per cent per annum during the same period, rising to ₹1.88 lakh crore in 2023‑24 from ₹(cid:26)0,605
crore in 2018‑19.
Composition of Union Subsidies
14.46 There has been a marked shift in the composition of Union subsidies since 2010‑11, when
they primarily consisted of food (31 per cent of all subsidies), fertilizers (25.8 per cent) and fuel
(17.5 per cent). By 2018‑19, fuel subsidies were reduced to negligible levels. Total subsidies
and transfers had moderated to 13.8 per cent of TRE of the Union from 20.8 per cent in 2010‑11.
The spike in subsidies in 2020‑21 to 28.8 per cent of TRE was largely due to the payment of
deferred liabilities to the Food Corporation of India (FCI). Thereafter, subsidies as a percentage
of TRE were sustained at elevated levels of 21.9 per cent in 2021‑22 and 24.1 per cent in
2022‑23, primarily due to allocations to food, fertilizer and housing as shown in Figure 14.10.
A reduction in these components moderated the subsidy expenditure to 18.1 per cent of TRE in
2023‑24, 16.5 per cent in 2024‑25 RE and 16.0 per cent in 2025‑26 BE. Despite the recent easing
of the subsidy burden, it remains elevated compared to pre‑COVID years.
Figure 14.10 Composition of Union Subsidies and Transfers
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2010-11 … 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 2025-26
RE BE
Source: Union’s Demand for Grants
308
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Agri Food Fertilizer Fuel Housing Health & Edu OthersChapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
14.47 It is helpful to do a further snapshot comparison of subsidy composition between years
2018‑19 and 2025‑26 BE to emphasise the evolving nature of subsidies. This is illustrated in
Figure 14.11, which uses a pie chart. While food and fertiliser have remained dominant,
comprising nearly two‑thirds of all subsidies and transfers, the share of agriculture subsidy has
increased substantially to 15.6 per cent in 2025‑26 BE from 4.8 per cent in 2018‑19, mainly due
to the large cash transfer scheme of PM KISAN. The share of housing sector subsidies has
declined substantially from 9.2 per cent to 3.7 per cent in the same period.
Figure 14.11 Change in Composition of Subsidies and Transfers between
2018‑19 and 2025‑26 BE
2018-19 2025-26 (BE)
Health &
Others Education Agriculture Others Health &
12% 7% 5% 13% Education
5%
Housing Agriculture
Housing 4% 15%
9%
Fertilizer
25%
Fertilizer
Food 27%
36%
Food
42%
Source: Union’s Demand for Grants
14.48 The estimates up to this point do not include off‑budget liabilities incurred by the Union
Government to finance subsidies and other scheme expenditures. A substantial amount of
expenditure on subsidy schemes was incurred outside the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI)
between 2016‑17 and 2021‑22. The extra budgetary resources were mainly mobilised through
the issue of government fully serviced bonds (FSBs) and loans from the National Small Savings
Fund (NSSF). FSBs have been utilised to fund subsidy schemes, such as Pradhan Mantri Awas
Yojana and Swachh Bharat Mission. As per Statement 27 of the Union Budget 2025‑26, a total
of ₹1.38 lakh crore was raised to fund various schemes of the Union Government from 2016‑17
to 2022‑23. (cid:50)f these funds, ₹81,10(cid:26) crore was allocated for subsidies and beneficiary schemes.
Additionally, as per Annexure VI of the 2021‑22 budget speech, between 2016‑17 and 2020‑21,
food subsidy amounting to ₹4.27 lakh crore was financed by loans from the NSSF to the FCI.
Incurring such large liabilities for subsidies and schemes outside the CFI introduces opaqueness
and underreporting of expenditure in the accounts. Recognising the need for greater transparency
and disclosure, the Union Budget 2021‑22 announced the discontinuation of financing of food
subsidy from NSSF loans. The Union Government discontinued using extra‑budgetary resources
309Sixteenth Finance Commission
for financing scheme expenditure after 2022‑23, thereby bringing all schemes and subsidy
expenditure under the budget. This change represents a significant reform by the Union
Government aimed at promoting transparency and full disclosure.
Observations by the Past Finance Commissions
14.49 Apart from the transparency issue raised by the FC‑13 and concerns about agricultural
loan waivers by the Fifteenth Finance Commission (FC‑15) regarding States, the past Finance
Commissions primarily focused on Union subsidies. In addition to explicit subsidies such as on
fertilizers, the Twelfth Finance Commission (FC‑12) expressed concern over implicit subsidies
as well, that results from the government's pricing of economic services below cost. FC‑12
recommended targeting the fertilizer subsidy more effectively to make it more progressive and
addressing the issue of low user charges in the power sector. The FC‑13 noted that the major
central subsidies – food, fertilizers and petroleum – were unevenly distributed and
disproportionately favoured wealthier States. It identified large‑scale subsidies as significant
fiscal barriers to inclusive growth, and advocated a fiscal trajectory characterised by
well‑targeted subsidies.
14.50 Focusing on petroleum subsidies, resulting from administered prices amid escalating
global crude prices, the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FC‑14) drew attention to increased
fiscal pressures from subsidy expenditures funded through oil bonds. The FC‑14 noted that these
subsidies undermined fiscal consolidation and called for better targeting of subsidies and
insulation of subsidies from frequent policy fluctuations.
14.51 Finally, the FC‑15 highlighted hidden off‑budget subsidies provided through entities
such as the FCI. The government delayed reporting of fertilizer subsidies by carrying them over
to subsequent fiscal years. Further, the Commission raised concerns over the ‘moral hazard’
associated with populist subsidy measures, specifically agricultural loan waivers. It called for
undertaking subsidy rationalisation as a part of broader administrative and institutional reform,
recommending systematic reviews of public sector enterprises, including dividend policies,
reserve allocations and subsidy management.
Recommendations
14.52 While subsidies and transfers have a legitimate role in redistribution and provision of
public goods or private goods with large positive externalities, imperatives of fiscal prudence
cannot be ignored. It is a matter of concern that the revenue balance in several States has turned
negative in recent years. It is not a coincidence that many of these States are also rolling out
large‑scale transfer schemes concomitantly. Borrowing for expenditure on schemes of subsidies
and transfers is not sound fiscal policy. The burgeoning demand on public expenditure adversely
affects the State’s fiscal health and calls for a reversal of the recent acceleration in the growth of
subsidies and transfers. Therefore, we recommend that States take steps to review and rationalise
their schemes of subsidies and retain only those schemes that target the poor effectively.
310Chapter 14: Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
14.53 Many subsidy schemes, especially those providing unconditional transfers, tend to have
large and untargeted beneficiary bases. These are not only inefficient but also impose a large
fiscal burden. They crowd out capital expenditure and other critical expenditures related to the
provision of basic services, such as education and health. Therefore, we recommend that
governments take immediate measures to rationalise the beneficiary base by having clearly
defined exclusion criteria and a rigorous review process to ensure that benefits reach the most
vulnerable. They should ensure that, through the rationalisation of schemes and the beneficiary
base, the revenue deficit is reduced and eventually eliminated.
14.54 There is a need to introduce sunset clauses, especially in schemes that provide subsidies
on non‑merit private goods and general unconditional transfers. We recommend that
governments establish mechanisms to review subsidies and transfers and include a sunset or exit
clause in their implementation mechanisms. Resorting to financing of subsidies and transfers
through off‑budget borrowings, guarantees, or assignment of revenues is fiscally imprudent. It
induces opacity in the accounting of subsidies and transfers. We recommend that such practices
of off‑budget borrowings for financing of subsidies be discontinued, and necessary measures
may be taken to discourage them.
14.55 There is an immediate need to adopt a uniform approach in accounting and disclosure of
subsidies and transfers. Therefore, we recommend that the CAG review the current practices
followed in the disclosure of such expenditure items in different States and ensure that
expenditures constituting subsidies and transfers are comprehensively covered in the Appendix
of Finance Accounts, irrespective of how governments classify them.
Concluding Remarks
14.56 During the course of this study, except for the petroleum subsidy, we did not encounter
any instances of a major subsidy or transfer scheme that was phased out. Once implemented, a
subsidy or transfer scheme remains in effect indefinitely. Like salaries, pensions and interest
payments on debt, subsidies in India have a tendency to turn into ‘committed’ expenditures.
This reduces the already limited space for other expenditures, including those on infrastructure,
health, education, and law and order. The ease of administration resulting from a well‑developed
IT infrastructure, as well as a large beneficiary base, has led to a rise of popularity of subsidies
among the electorate. Large‑group cash transfer schemes have proliferated recently; they have
the potential to continue proliferating rapidly. As the economy grows and more revenue
becomes available, there is likely to be political pressure to increase benefits under existing
schemes and/or launch new ones. Such a development could greatly undermine the future
financial stability of States and the Union. It may put a stress on the availability of funds for
development action. Both the Union and State Governments need to rethink introducing yet
more such schemes or extending the benefits under the existing ones. Such endless provisioning
will bequeath an ever‑shrinking fiscal space to successive governments.
311PUBLIC SECTOR
15
ENTERPRISES
REFORMS
15. CHAPTER 15
15.1 Beginning in the 1950s, as India embarked on its economic development, it adopted a
‘heavy industry first’ approach. The then Union Government also decided that over time, the
public sector would increase its share in industry by mobilizing savings and investing them in
the old and new Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs). This strategy continued through the
1960s and, indeed, was intensified in the 1970s through the nationalisation of several
private‑sector enterprises. Consequently, by 1981‑82, the public sector had come to account for
24 of the 30 largest firms by capital employed, and three‑fourths of paid‑up share capital1.
15.2 Given their limited role in industrialization during the early post‑independence decades,
the States’ public sector did not enter the production activity on a scale comparable to the
Union’s. Nevertheless, in areas open to the States, such as agriculture, infrastructure, finance,
and power, States launched State Public Sector Enterprises (SPSEs). In particular, by the early
1960s, the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) had evolved into vertically integrated monopolies
within their respective States. Given the need for electricity generation and distribution, by the
early 1960s, SEBs emerged as the recipient of the largest State investment. Of course, States
also invested in other areas, including manufacturing, with the number of SPSEs proliferating.
15.3 In this chapter, we undertake an empirical analysis of both CPSEs and SPSEs. However,
considering that a substantial body of literature already exists on CPSEs and the Union
Government has adopted the New Public Sector Enterprise Policy of 2021, we focus primarily
on SPSEs. After presenting the salient empirical facts associated with SPSEs and, briefly,
CPSEs, we recommend a set of possible reforms.
1 Frankel, Francine, 2005. India’s Political Economy 1947-2004: The Gradual Revolution, New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
p. 580.
313Sixteenth Finance Commission
State Public Sector Enterprises
15.4 Our data sources include General Purpose Financial Reports of CPSEs (Compliance
Audit) for various years, prepared by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, as
well as data provided to the Commission by CAG for more recent years up to 2023‑24. Our
analysis does not include public sector banks as they are not companies registered under the
Companies Act, 2013, and hence, not covered under the audit jurisdiction of CAG.
15.5 The CAG classifies CPSEs and SPSEs into three categories: Government Companies
(GCs), Statutory Corporations (SCs), and Government Controlled Other Companies (GCOCs).
GC is defined in Section 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013 as a company in which not less than
51 per cent of the paid‑up share capital is held by the Union Government, or by any State
Government or Governments, or partly by the Union Government and partly by one or more
State Governments, and includes a company which is a subsidiary of a Government Company.
Statutory Corporations (SCs) are companies set up under statutes enacted by the Parliament of
India or by a State Legislature. GCOCs are companies, other than GCs and SCs, that are owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Union Government, or by any State Government, or
jointly by the Union Government and one or more State Governments.
15.6 Figure 15.1 presents the total number of SPSEs across all States under these three
categories. As on 31 March 2023, there were 1,635 SPSEs in India. GCs where the State
Government’s stake in paid‑up capital is 51 per cent or more, account for the largest proportion
of SPSEs. Out of total, 1,414 SPSEs (86.5 per cent) are GCs. There are 135 GCOCs and 86 SCs
among the SPSEs. On a per‑state basis, the number of SCs works out to approximately three.
15.7 One of the major issues concerning SPSEs is the large number of non‑operational or
inactive enterprises. While there are some differences in how SPSEs are classified as ‘inactive’
in audit reports of various States, by and large, inactive SPSEs can be described as those that
have ceased to carry out their operations. Figure 15.2 provides a snapshot of active and inactive
SPSEs across different States. Data show that as many as 308 SPSEs across all States are
inactive as on 31 March 2023. These account for approximately 19 per cent of total SPSEs
across all States.
15.8 SPSEs operate across a wide spectrum of sectors, including power, manufacturing,
agriculture and allied activities, financial services, and a range of other services, such as water
provision, tourism and transport. Many of these enterprises function as State monopolies, while
others operate alongside the private sector in a competitive environment. Their performance
varies significantly across sectors and States.
15.9 We measure the economic significance of SPSEs by the turnover‑to‑Gross State
Domestic Product (GSDP) ratio. As on 31 March 2023, the total turnover of 1,069 SPSEs across
all States, for which data on turnover of SPSEs are available from CAG for the year of their
latest finali(cid:93)ed accounts, amounted to ₹14.5 lakh crore, which works out as approximately 5.7
per cent of all States’ GSDP during 2022‑23. However, there is a wide variation in the
contribution of SPSEs to the respective State’s GSDP.
314Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
15.10 Figure 15.3 shows the ratio of SPSEs’ turnover to GSDP for each of the twenty‑eight
States. As can be seen, this ratio varies from State to State, from almost negligible to more than
10 per cent of GSDP.
Figure 15.1 State‑wise Number of SPSEs
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG. Data as on 31 March 2023
Figure 15.2 State‑wise Number of Active and Inactive SPSEs
140 131
120 113
103 100
100 91
86
80 72
67 65
58
60 39 52 48 41
24 00 2137 26 216
1
1534 329
3
14 18 15 19 2433 16
3 2
16 1936 16 6127 311319
2 60
5217 015 124 9
0
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG. Data as on 31 March 2023
315
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hragsittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
massA hsedarP
lahcanurA
hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU
Non-NEH NEH
sESPS
fo
rebmuN
160 149
140 124 127
120 110 113
102
101
100 76 83 84
76 73
80
60
4951
52
37
40 28 32 30 33
17 1421 17 16
20 7 6 7
0
No. of Active SPSEs No. of Inactive SPSEs
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hragsittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS dnahkarattU arupirT
Non-NEH NEH
sESPS
fo
rebmuN
Government Companies Government Controlled Other Companies Statutory CorporationsSixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 15.3 SPSEs’ Turnover (percentage of GSDP)
12
10.9
10 9.5
9.2
8.6
8
7.2 7.3 7.3
7.1
6.7
6.2
5.8 5.7
6 5.5
4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1
3.7
4 3.5 3.4
3.2
2.9
1.9
2 1.6 1.4
1.1
0.3
0.03 0.02
0
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG
Note: Data on Turnover correspond to the year for which latest finalised accounts are available during the
year 2022‑23.
15.11 Profits are a crucial indicator of an enterprise's financial sustainability. As per the latest
available data, nearly 50 per cent of SPSEs (541 out of 1,107 SPSEs for which data on profit /
loss is available) across all States are either in loss or zero net profit. This statistic highlights the
highly fragile financial condition of SPSEs. Table 15.1 reports the number of profit‑making and
loss‑making SPSEs for each State as per their latest finalised accounts as on 31 March 2023.
Most of the north‑eastern and hilly (NEH) States exhibit a high proportion of loss‑making
SPSEs. Among other States (non‑NEH States), Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Telangana and
West Bengal stand out for a large proportion of loss‑making enterprises.
316
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hragsittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU setatS
llA
Non-NEH NEH
32-2202
ni
PDSG
fo
egatnecrep
ni
sUSP
fo
revonruT
% of Turnover of PSUs to GSDP during 2022-23
All India AverageChapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
Table 15.1 State‑wise Number of Profit and Loss‑making SPSEs
Number of Number of Number of SPSEs
States Profit‑making Loss‑making with Zero Profit/
SPSEs SPSEs Loss
Non‑NEH States
Andhra Pradesh 14 5 1
Bihar 16 15 5
Chhattisgarh 10 7 0
Goa 8 8 0
Gujarat 63 30 7
Haryana 19 11 1
Jharkhand 10 3 0
Karnataka 57 56 0
Kerala 58 66 4
Madhya Pradesh 11 12 9
Maharashtra 47 45 9
Odisha 17 8 8
Punjab 11 18 1
Rajasthan 27 17 3
Tamil Nadu 54 35 0
Telangana 6 11 1
Uttar Pradesh 39 27 0
West Bengal 33 32 0
NEH States
Assam 19 17 0
Arunachal Pradesh 1 5 0
Himachal Pradesh 13 8 0
Manipur 1 8 0
Meghalaya 3 14 2
Mizoram 1 4 0
Nagaland 1 4 0
Sikkim 11 6 0
Tripura 4 11 0
Uttarakhand 12 7 0
Total 566 490 51
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG
15.12 Figure 15.4 presents the State‑wise quantum of profits of profit‑making SPSEs, losses
of loss‑making SPSEs, and net profits/ losses of all SPSEs taken together for the years for which
latest finalised accounts were available during 2022‑23. During the year 2022‑23, a total of 490
SPSEs across States reported aggregate losses amounting to ₹1.14 lakh crore as per their latest
finalised accounts, while 566 S(cid:51)SEs reported combined profits of ₹43,162 crore, resulting in a
net loss of ₹(cid:26)1,355 crore at the aggregate level.
317Sixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 15.4 State‑wise Profit and Loss of SPSEs (2022‑23)
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG
15.13 Among non‑NEH States, the highest loss during 2022‑23 was recorded by SPSEs in
Uttar (cid:51)radesh (₹32,430 crore), followed by Rajasthan (₹18,814 crore), (cid:55)amil Nadu (₹16,048
crore) and (cid:55)elangana (₹11,9(cid:26)0 crore) as shown in the Figure 15.4. Among the NEH States,
S(cid:51)SEs in Uttarakhand recorded the highest losses at ₹1,2(cid:26)3 crore, followed by those in
Himachal (cid:51)radesh (₹605 crore) and Meghalaya (₹5(cid:26)3 crore). A significant aspect of the losses
incurred by SPSEs is that they are concentrated in the power sector. To underscore this point,
Figure 15.5 depicts net profits or losses of power and non‑power sectors’ SPSEs separately.
These non‑power sectors include agriculture and allied sectors, infrastructure, manufacturing,
mining and quarrying and services.
15.14 State‑wise top sectors with net losses and profits by SPSEs are presented in Annexure
15.1 and Annexure 15.2, respectively. It is observed that power sector SPSEs are the top
contributors to loss in seven out of the top ten non‑NEH States with the highest net SPSE losses.
Similarly, the power sector remains the highest loss‑making sector in five out of ten NEH States,
namely, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura and Uttarakhand. On the other hand,
there are three non‑NEH States, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and West Bengal, in which
power sector SPSEs earned the highest profit. Among NEH States, Assam and Sikkim earned
the highest profits in the power sector.
15.15 In sectors other than power, Andhra Pradesh recorded the highest loss, with one PSE
accounting for majority of this loss. SPSEs in agriculture and allied sector earned the highest
profits in Gujarat, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Uttarakhand. Similarly, SPSEs in the
infrastructure sector earned the highest profits in Bihar, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka,
Manipur, Punjab.
318
252,1- 848,2- 341,1- 81- 754,2- 15- 895,2-
054,7-
478,1- 149,1- 326,3- 797-
031,5-
418,81-
840,61-
079,11-
-32,430
787,2
813 978 16
729,9
940,1
45
231,3 963,1
255
338,1
270,7
023
842,1 065,2 758,3 071,2
338-
517,1
7.4-
4
591-
295
506-
02
64-
3.0
275-
6.1
6.3-
0.1
4.8-
8.0
212-
483,1
123-
12
372,1-
232
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
-5,000
-10,000
-15,000
-20,000
-25,000
-30,000
-35,000
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hrasittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU
Non-NEH NEH
)erorc
₹(
sso(cid:47)
dna
tifor(cid:51) Total Losses
Total Profits
Net Profit/LossChapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
Figure 15.5 Net Profit/ Loss of SPSEs in Power and Non‑power Sectors
15,000
10,000 7,470 6,275
5,131
5,000
43 998 637 398 -46 1,172
0 -3
-264 -1,041 -948 -662 -1 -575 -571 -300 -1,041
-5,000 -2,530 -1,872
-8,112
-4,810 -10,000
-15,000 -12,866
-15,983
-20,000 -17,560
-25,000
-30,000
-30,260
-35,000
Source: Data received from CAG.
Note: Net Profit/Loss data for SPSEs in the power and non‑power sector relate to the year for which latest
finalised accounts are available during 2022‑23 (1996‑2022). Data is not available for Nagaland for
2022‑23.
15.16 The poor financial performance of SPSEs becomes a burden on State budgets, resulting
in budgetary expenditures in the form of subsidies, grants, equity investments, and loans. Apart
from these budgetary expenditures, State Governments also provide guarantees against the loans
raised by the SPSEs. The financial support extended by State Governments to SPSEs in the form
of equity, loans, and grants/subsidies through the budget during the year 2022‑23 amounted to
₹2.5 lakh crore. Figure 15.6 shows State‑wise budgetary outgo to SPSEs for the year 2022‑23.
In the total budgetary outgo to SPSEs, the subsidies and grants component constituted almost
90 per cent of the total outgo. The composition of this State‑wise outgo during 2022‑23 is given
in Annexure 15.3. It is also worth noting that some States resort to off‑budgetary measures to
provide support to SPSEs.
15.17 Figure 15.7 shows the quantum of outstanding guarantees issued by the State
Governments to the power and non‑power sector SPSEs till 2022‑23. The highest volume of
outstanding guarantees across all States is issued to the power sector.
319
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hragsitahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU
Non-NEH NEH
)erorc
₹ ni(
sES(cid:51)S
fo
sso(cid:47)(cid:18)tifor(cid:51)
teN Power Sector (Net Profit /Loss)
Non-Power Sector (Net Profit/ Losses)
Total Net Profit/LossSixteenth Finance Commission
Figure 15.6 State‑wise Budgetary Outgo to SPSEs
Source: State Finances Audit Reports, 2024, CAG.
Figure 15.7 Outstanding Guarantees Issued to SPSEs by State Governments till 2022‑23
Source: Data received from CAG.
320
701,11
21
968,9
418
228,32
449
590,3
983,51
407,31
295,73
473,02
980,4
761
327,82
768,62
283,9
041,23
837,3
42
769,1
314 452
573,1
51 03 89 402 992
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hrasittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
rattU
lagneB
tseW
hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU
Non-NEH NEH
)erorc
₹
ni(
sES(cid:51)S
ot
ogtu(cid:50)
yrategdu(cid:37)
lato(cid:55)
072,05
193,22
133,4
013
370,1
229,01
148,4
752,63
163,62
350,8
0
480,5
563,71
175,89
867,98
0 1
061,1
794
671,1 879,2
04 19
305,4
88 53
1,20,000
1,00,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
hsedarP
arhdnA
rahiB hrasittahhC aoG tarajuG anayraH dnahkrahJ akatanraK alareK hsedarP
ayhdaM
arthsarahaM ahsidO bajnuP nahtsajaR udaN
limaT
anagnaleT hsedarP
lahcanurA
massA hsedarP
lahcamiH
rupinaM ayalahgeM maroziM dnalagaN mikkiS arupirT dnahkarattU
Non-NEH NEH
ot
stnemnrevoG
etatS
yb
seetnarauG
gnidnatstuO
)erorc
₹
ni(
sES(cid:51)S
Power Sector Guarantees
Non-Power Sector Guarantees
TotalChapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
Views of Past Finance Commissions
15.18 Various Finance Commissions (FCs) in the past have recognised and reiterated the
need to review SPSE performance and undertake reform measures to enhance public sector
enterprise (PSE) efficiency. As far back as 1978, FC‑7 had called for the need to improve the
financial health and accountability of PSEs. FCs ranging from FC‑7 to FC‑14 made several
key observations and recommendations for SPSEs. These recommendations include ensuring
that SPSEs at least cover their operating costs, maintain proforma commercial accounts to
enhance cost efficiency and improve their financial sustainability. FCs in past emphasised
structural reforms, such as restructuring of SPSEs - particularly of electricity boards and
transport undertakings. FCs have also recommended rationalising of subsidies, merging of
similar PSEs and downsizing through measures like the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, among
others.
Central Public Sector Enterprises
15.19 We next turn to a brief empirical analysis of CPSEs. For CPSEs, the annual Public
Enterprises Survey (PES) reports, published by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE)
provide a comprehensive picture of approximately 80 per cent of GCs, three out of the six SCs
(namely Airport Authority of India, Food Corporation of India, and Central Warehousing
Corporation), and 12 GCOCs. However, we continue to rely on CAG data for this analysis which
has a more exhaustive coverage of CPSEs and allow us to maintain consistency with our analysis
of SPSEs.
Table 15.2 Category‑wise Number of CPSEs
Number of CPSEs
Category of CPSEs
2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Statutory Corporations (SCs) 6 6 6 6
Government Companies (GCs) 506 490 501 527
Government Controlled Other
205 202 209 215
Companies (GCOCs)
Total Number of CPSEs 717 698 716 748
Source: General Purpose Financial Reports of CPSEs (Compliance Audit), CAG, various years, and data
provided to FC‑16 by CAG
Note: Number of CPSEs indicate those existing as on 31 March of the particular year.
321Sixteenth Finance Commission
15.20 Table 15.2 presents the number of CPSEs in the three categories identified earlier. The
total number of CPSEs in all three categories combined fluctuated between 698 and 748 over
the 2020‑21 to 2023‑24 period. In 2023‑24, the latest year for which data is available, 70.5 per
cent of the CPSEs are GCs. The six statutory companies under audit by the CAG include the
Airport Authority of India (AAI), Central Warehousing Corporation (CWC), Damodar Valley
Corporation (DVC), Food Corporation of India (FCI), Inland Waterways Authority of India
(IWAI), and National Highway Authority of India (NHAI). The number of GCOCs is large,
accounting for more than a quarter of all CPSEs.
15.21 Out of the total number of existing CPSEs, about 88‑92 per cent of CPSEs submitted
their financial statements to CAG for audit purposes during 2021‑22 to 2023‑24. Reasons why
CAG did not receive the remaining financial statements vary. In some cases, accounts were in
arrears for three or more years; in other cases, the companies were under liquidation, or the first
accounts were not yet due. Table 15.3 provides the number of CPSEs that submitted their
financial statements to CAG for audit purposes during the years 2020‑21 to 2023‑24. They
account for around 90 per cent of all CPSEs in the country. As data is available only for these
CPSEs, our analysis is limited to these companies.
Table 15.3 Category‑wise Number of CPSEs for which Financial Data is Available
Number of CPSEs
Category of CPSEs
(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:19)‑(cid:21)1 (cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)1‑(cid:21)(cid:21) (cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:21)‑(cid:21)3 (cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)3‑(cid:21)(cid:23)
Statutory Corporations (SCs) 6 (100%) 6 (100%) 6 (100%) 6 (100%)
Government Companies (GCs) 447 (88%) 448 (91%) 463 (92%) 490 (93%)
Government Controlled Other
180 (88%) 188 (93%) 186 (89%) 192 (89%)
Companies (GCOCs)
Total Number of CPSEs 633 (88%) 642 (92%) 655 (91%) 688 (92%)
Source: CAG
Note: The numbers in parentheses are CPSEs for which financial data is available as a percentage of total
CPSEs in the category and year shown.
15.22 Table 15.4 provides some basic financial data available on these CPSEs from 2020‑21
to 2023‑24. The total equity in CPSEs, as measured by paid‑up capital, was ₹(cid:26).5 lakh crore in
2020‑21, which doubled to ₹15.1 lakh crore in 2023‑24. As a percentage of GDP, this equity
322Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
amounted to 3.8 per cent in 2020‑21 and 5 per cent in 2023‑24. Of this total equity, the Union
Government contributed 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2020‑21 and 4 per cent of GDP in 2023‑24,
with the State Governments and other entities contributing the remainder. The turnover of these
enterprises was between 12.2 per cent and 13.9 per cent of GDP during the four years.
Table 15.4 Financial Data of CPSEs (₹ crore)
Particulars 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Paid‑up Capital / Total Equity 7,53,929 8,81,681 12,08,230 15,13,552
Central Government Equity 5,12,850 6,37,036 9,25,085 11,94,715
State Government Equity 34,744 38,861 43,363 46,863
Others’ Equity 2,06,335 2,05,784 2,39,782 2,71,974
Total Paid‑up Capital as 3.8 3.7 4.5 5.0
percentage of GDP
Central Govt. Equity as 2.6 2.7 3.4 4.0
percentage of GDP
Turnover of all CPSEs 24,26,562 32,85,208 35,38,135 37,28,960
Turnover as percentage of GDP 12.2 13.9 13.2 12.4
Source: General Purpose Financial Reports of CPSEs, various years and data provided by CAG
15.23 Next, we consider the profitability of CPSEs, a key indicator of economic performance.
The number of profit‑making CPSEs increased from 371 (58.6 per cent of a total of 633 CPSEs)
in 2020‑21 to 445 (64.7 per cent of 688 CPSEs) in 2023‑24, as can be seen in Table 15.5.
Examining the quantum of profits, it is evident that the total amount of profits earned by
profit‑making C(cid:51)SEs increased significantly from ₹2.1 lakh crore in 2020‑21 to ₹3.8 lakh crore
in 2023‑24. However, a significant number of CPSEs have also incurred losses. The number of
loss‑making CPSEs varied from 226 to 234 during the last four years, with the quantum of loss
also varying. Of the four years, the highest amount of combined loss was incurred during
2022‑23, amounting to ₹51,419 crore by 232 enterprises, which fell to ₹36,213 crore incurred
jointly by 226 enterprises during 2023‑24. The high number of loss‑making CPSEs and the
substantial quantum of total loss remain serious concerns.
15.24 A small fraction of CPSEs report zero profit or loss. The number of these enterprises
decreased from 28 in 2020‑21 to 13 in 2022‑23 but then rose again to 17 in 2023‑24. Taken as
323Sixteenth Finance Commission
a whole, CPSEs have earned a significant volume of profits in each of the four years shown. All
C(cid:51)SEs (for which financial data is available) combined earned a net profit of ₹3.5 lakh crore
during the year 2023‑24, significantly higher than ₹1.6 lakh crore earned during the C(cid:50)(cid:57)(cid:44)D‑19
year of 2020‑21.
Table 15.5 Profit Earned and Loss Incurred by CPSEs
Particulars 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Number of Profit‑Making 371 387 410 445
CPSEs
Profits of Profit‑Making 2,06,588 2,84,319 2,74,043 3,81,794
(cid:38)(cid:51)(cid:54)Es (₹ crore)
Number of Loss‑Making 234 228 232 226
CPSEs
Loss of Loss‑Making CPSEs 45,254 35,715 51,419 36,213
(₹ crore)
Number of CPSEs with Zero 28 27 13 17
Profit/Loss
Total Net Profit (+) / Loss (‑) 1,61,334 2,48,604 2,22,624 3,45,582
(₹ crore)
Source: General Purpose Financial Reports of CPSEs and data provided by CAG.
15.25 We next consider the performance of CPSEs by sector. Data show that the four top
profit‑earning CPSE sectors are petroleum, power, finance and coal. Together, they account for
approximately 90 per cent of the total net profits of CPSEs. Petroleum sector CPSEs have earned
the highest proportion of net profits across years, ranging from 28 per cent to 45 per cent of total
net profits by all CPSEs during the period from 2020‑21 to 2023‑24. As a corollary, CPSEs in
all other sectors (other than the top four sectors) collectively earned only 8‑12 per cent of net
profits during 2021‑22 to 2023‑24. The sector‑wise net profits earned by CPSEs during 2020‑21
to 2023‑24 are given in Figure 15.8.
15.26 Turning to the distribution of profits and losses across enterprises, in the last three
consecutive years for which we have CAG data, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has
been at the top of the profit‑making CPSEs list. ONGC contributed about 14 per cent of the total
profits earned by all profit‑making CPSEs. The quantum of profits earned by the top ten
profit‑making CPSEs is given in Annexure 15.4.
324Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
Figure 15.8 Sectoral Distribution of Net Profits of CPSEs
4,00,000
3,45,582
3,50,000
12.0%41,556
3,00,000
2,48,604 15.5%53,500
2,50,000 2,22,624
10.3%25,506 15.6%
11.8%29,283 8.4%18,748 53,773
2,00,000
1,61,334
19.6%43,580
20.4%
16.0%55,428
50,775
1,50,000 13.1%21,130
23.3%
24.3% 14.5%36,100 51,924
39,218
1,00,000
17.6%28,471 20.3%45,149 40.9%
43.0% 1,41,325
50,000
45.1% 1,06,941 28.4%
72,730 63,223
0
2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24
Source: Data provided by CAG for various years.
15.27 FC‑13 had recommended that the profit‑making PSEs pay a minimum amount of
dividend to the Government. In 2016, a detailed guideline was issued by the Union for CPSEs
to pay dividends to the tune of 30 per cent of their Profits after tax (PAT) or 5 per cent of their
net worth, whichever is higher. In 2023‑24, the (cid:84)uantum of dividends paid by C(cid:51)SEs was ₹1.3
lakh crore, up from ₹82,815 crore in 2020‑21, as shown in Table 15.6 below.
Table 15.6 Dividends Paid by CPSEs
Particulars 2020‑21 2021‑22 2022‑23 2023‑24
Total Profits of Profit‑Making CPSEs
2,06,588 2,84,319 2,74,043 3,81,794
(₹ crore)
(cid:39)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:76)(cid:71)en(cid:71) (cid:51)a(cid:76)(cid:71) (cid:69)(cid:92) (cid:38)(cid:51)(cid:54)Es (₹ crore) 82,815 1,15,629 1,15,458 1,34,019
Dividend as percentage of Profits 40.1 40.7 42.1 35.1
Non‑Tax Revenue (NTR) of Union
2,07,633 3,65,112 2,85,421 4,01,785
(cid:42)o(cid:89)ern(cid:80)en(cid:87) (₹ crore)
Dividend paid by CPSEs as percentage
39.9 31.7 40.5 33.4
of NTR of Union Government
Source: General Purpose Financial Reports of CPSEs for various years, data provided by CAG, and
Union Budgets.
Note: Dividend paid by CPSEs include those paid to Union Government and to other shareholders of
CPSEs.
325
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Petroleum Financial Services
Power Coal & Lignite
Others TotalSixteenth Finance Commission
15.28 As can be discerned from Table 15.6, the dividend paid by CPSEs increased by 61.8 per
cent between 2020‑21 and 2023‑24. The corresponding increase in the profits of profit‑making
CPSEs was larger at 84.8 per cent during this period. The implication is that the dividend as a
proportion of profits of profit‑making CPSEs fell from 40.1 per cent during 2020‑21 to 35.1 per
cent during 2023‑24. A final point is that dividends account for a significant proportion of the
Union Government’s non‑tax revenue (NTR). During the four years shown here, the proportion
of dividends paid by CPSEs varied from 31.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent of NTR.
15.29 The need to ensure reasonable returns on investment by the government in PSEs has
been consistently recommended by the last five FCs. They have expressed disappointment at
the substantial funds invested in PSEs and the low returns they have yielded. Additionally, PSEs
often occupy several times the land they use for their production activity, which remains
underproductive. Many CPSEs also remain inactive or in perpetual loss. The land they occupy
remains unused or underused. Given the high opportunity cost of land in areas where these
CPSEs are often located, bringing the land they occupy into productive use is likely to yield a
high return.
The Way Forward
15.30 Our analysis in this chapter shows that there is considerable scope for undertaking PSE
reforms to leverage their contribution to India’s economy. In absence of such reforms, with high
losses and valuable asset lock‑ins, especially land, PSEs burden the State exchequer.
Closure of Inactive PSEs
15.31 Out of a total of 1,635 SPSEs, 308 are currently inactive or have ceased to carry out their
operations. This calls for an evaluation of performance and closure of such inactive SPSEs to
reduce the fiscal strain, since many of them continue to receive budgetary support from State
Governments.
15.32 Similarly, the Public Enterprise Survey 2023‑24 (Appendix VIII, pp. 271‑2) lists 17
CPSEs under liquidation, 24 CPSEs approved for closure by the government and 31 CPSEs that
are non‑operational. The land and buildings owned by these CPSEs are valuable assets that can
be deployed in alternative productive uses.
PSEs Incurring Losses
15.33 Another important issue surrounding both CPSEs and SPSEs is the large number of
loss‑making units, and the large volume of losses incurred by them. Out of 1,107 SPSEs for
which data on profit and loss are available, 490 SPSEs incurred losses amounting to a total of
₹1.14 lakh crore as per their latest finalised accounts as on 31 March 2023. Like inactive SPSEs,
there is a need for stricter scrutiny of loss‑making SPSEs. One rule of thumb worth considering
is for the concerned department to mandatorily take to the Cabinet any enterprise incurring
losses in three out of four consecutive years for consideration for closure, privatization or
continuation. The Cabinet may then decide, depending on the strategic importance of the
enterprise.
326Chapter 15: Public Sector Enterprises Reforms
15.34 Almost one third of CAG‑audited CPSEs incurred losses in each of the years between
2020‑21 to 2023‑24. The losses of the loss‑making CPSEs, as per CAG data, varied from
₹36,213 crore to ₹51,419 crore over this period. (cid:55)here also exist multiple C(cid:51)SEs that remain
persistently in losses for several years, with their burden falling on the exchequer and ultimately
on the taxpayers. The most visible case of persistently loss‑making PSEs in recent years was
that of Air India. Its accumulated losses at the time of its privatization in January 2022 were
reported to exceed ₹85,000 crore. (cid:50)f the 58 loss‑making CPSEs that PES 2023‑24 (Statement
C, pp. 136‑8) lists, as many as 28 incurred losses in every one of the three years of 2021‑22,
2022‑23, and 2023‑24.
Power Sector SPSEs
15.35 Power sector SPSEs, primarily DISCOMs, account for the highest proportion of losses
incurred by SPSEs in the States. This issue has been taken up in detail in chapter 13 of our
report.
Accounts in Arrears
15.36 A common issue we observed across all twenty‑eight States is that many SPSEs
persistently had accounts in arrears for multiple years. As a result of various delays, 7,162
accounts of 1,237 SPSEs were in arrears as on 31 March 2023. At least 441 SPSEs had their
accounts in arrears for more than 3 years. State‑wise details of SPSEs with accounts in arrears
are given in Annexure 15.5. In the absence of finalised accounts, State Government’s
investments in such SPSEs remain outside the oversight of the State legislature. We observed
in State after State that non‑finalisation of accounts is one of the major problems in the closure
of SPSEs that have no record of a positive contribution to the economy. Each State needs to
make a concerted effort to ensure that all accounts in arrears are finalized. This effort in turn
will enable their audit by CAG and the assessment of such SPSEs for continuation, closure or
privatisation as soon as possible. Without such an effort, the problem of defunct and burdensome
SPSEs will persist, wasting valuable taxpayers’ money.
Privatisation of SPSEs
15.37 So far, the idea of State‑level privatisation of SPSEs has not received any attention
beyond electricity DISCOMs in the States. Even the subject of closure of SPSEs in perpetual
losses has received limited attention. The issue of inactive and underperforming SPSEs has been
a recurring theme of successive FCs. During our State‑visits, many State Governments shared
their visions for becoming developed States. A State‑level policy, similar to the Union’s New
Public Sector Enterprise Policy, must be an integral part of this vision.
327SUMMARY OF
16
RECOMMENDATIONS
Union Finances During the Award Period: An Assessment
1. While we acknowledge the role played by centrally sponsored schemes, we feel that there
is a need to rationalize their structure by linking the implementation with measurable, real‑time
output indicators for efficient use of resources. The Union Government should appoint a
high‑powered committee that does a fresh assessment of the schemes and recommends closure
of the schemes that are not spending resources productively.
(paragraphs 6.40 and 6.41)
Sharing of Tax Revenues: Vertical Devolution
2. In order to bring in more transparency about the divisible pool and the actual devolution,
we recommend that, every year, the Union Government disclose the data pertaining to net
proceeds as certified by CAG under Article 279.
(paragraph 7.30)
3. We recommend that the States’ share in the divisible pool is retained at 41 per cent.
(paragraph 7.68)
Sharing of Tax Revenues: Horizontal Devolution
4. To determine the inter se share of States, we relied on population, demographic
performance, area, forest, per‑capita‑income‑distance and contribution of the State to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) as criteria. The formula for horizontal devolution and weights assigned
to various criteria are given in Table 8.8. The shares of States in horizontal devolution for our
award period are given in Table 8.9.
(paragraph 8.97)
329Sixteenth Finance Commission
Assessment of States and Grants-in-Aid
5. Our assessment of State finances reveals that the cause of revenue deficit of States lie in
committed expenditures and discretionary expenditures and there is significant scope to increase
revenues and rationalise expenditures. The anticipation of revenue deficit grants by States
weakens the incentive to undertake difficult but necessary fiscal reforms such as rationalizing
subsidies, improving tax administration, or curbing revenue expenditures. In continuation of the
diminishing trend of the revenue deficit grants recommended by FC‑15, which reduce to
near‑zero level by 2025‑26, we do not recommend revenue deficit grants to States. We also do
not recommend any sector‑specific or State‑specific grants.
(paragraphs 9.48 to 9.50)
Local Body Grants
6. We recommend that the States should develop a citizen friendly GIS based property tax
IT system for efficient enumeration, assessment and collection of property tax.
(paragraph 10.67)
7. We recommend extending the Urban Data platform's capabilities to support ULBs in
preparing accounts and financial reports.
(paragraph 10.71)
8. The existing arrangements for Technical Guidance and Supervision by the CAG should
be continued and strengthened to improve the quality of audit and accounts of local bodies in
the States. State Governments should augment the capabilities of their Local Fund Audit
Departments (LFADs) by investing in skill development and addressing manpower shortages.
(paragraph 10.74)
9. The States should transparently report all transfers to local bodies, including those from
the Consolidated Fund of India on the recommendation of the Finance Commission, transfers
under centrally sponsored schemes, State Finance Commission grants and other grants from the
State Government, separately for ULBs and RLBs in their budgets. These transfers, with all
their components, should also be reported in Appendix III of the State Finance Accounts.
(paragraph 10.78)
10. In Articles 280(3)(bb) and 280(3)(c), the Constitution directs the FC to make its
recommendations on RLBs and ULBs ‘on the basis of the recommendations made by the
Finance Commission of the States.’ We recommend that the above‑quoted expression be
dropped from the relevant articles through a Constitutional amendment.
(paragraph 10.81)
330Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
11. We recommend that NITI Aayog may study the functioning of SFCs across States and
may publish a compendium of the good practices of the SFCs for the reference of all the States.
(paragraph 10.81)
12. We recommend that the grants for RLBs be classified into basic and performance
components and the grants for ULBs be classified into basic, performance, urban infrastructure
and urbanisation premium components. The aggregate national grant allocation for basic and
performance components, put together has been divided in the ratio of 60:40 between RLBs and
ULBs. Inter se, the division between basic and performance components is recommended in the
ratio of 80:20 for both RLBs and ULBs.
(paragraphs 10.83 and 10.84)
13. A total allocation of ₹7,91,493 crore as grants has been recommended for duly constituted
RLBs and ULBs for our award period spanning from 2026‑27 to 2030‑31.
(paragraph 10.84)
14. For RLBs, inter‑State distribution is based on a 90:10 ratio of projected rural population
(2026) and area, respectively. For ULBs, the States' share has been determined by a 90:10 ratio
of projected urban population (2026) and the OSR of ULBs, respectively.
(paragraphs 10.86 and 10.89)
15. Within each State, the distribution of grants to duly constituted RLBs of all tiers and to
duly constituted ULBs may be undertaken as per the latest accepted recommendations of the
respective SFCs. In the absence of the SFC’s recommendations, the tier wise distribution to
RLBs may be in conformity with the prescribed percentages. Within a tier of RLB, the
distribution may be as per the latest accepted SFC recommendations or in the absence of SFC
recommendations based on population and area in the ratio 90:10. For ULBs, the distribution
may be as per the latest accepted SFCs recommendations or in the absence of SFC’s
recommendations, based on urban population and OSR of ULBs in the 90:10 ratio.
(paragraphs 10.87, 10.88 and 10.90)
16. The concerned State Government shall make allocations for exempted areas on par with
the Commission’s recommendations with respect to local bodies.
(paragraph 10.91)
17. There should be a duly constituted body in place as required in Part IX and Part IX‑A of
the Constitution to claim local body grants. This would be the first entry level condition.
(paragraph 10.92)
18. Online availability in public domain in year T of audited accounts for all ULBs and RLBs
of a State for the T‑2 fiscal year and provisional accounts for the T‑1 year would be the second
entry‑level condition to avail local body grants for the year T.
(paragraph 10.93)
331Sixteenth Finance Commission
19. All States must comply with the Constitutional provisions pertaining to the regular
constitution of SFCs due as per the Constitutional provision, that is, on expiry of five years of
constitution of previous SFC and ensure laying of ATRs in the State legislature within 6 months
of submission of the SFC report as a prerequisite to claim their local body grant. This would be
the third entry level condition to claim local body grants from the first year of the award period,
that is from 2026‑27.
(paragraph 10.95)
20. The ULB and RLB grant has been divided into basic (80 per cent) and performance (20
per cent) components, with the latter divided into two equal halves: RLB/ULB performance
component and State performance component. The basic component may be made available to
the States upon fulfilment of the three entry‑level (eligibility) conditions.
(paragraph 10.96)
21. For Gram Panchayats to receive the RLB performance component of the RLB grant in
fiscal year T, we recommend that Gram Panchayats raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025 times its
OSR in year T‑2 or 2.5 per cent per annum compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26,
whichever is lower, subject to a minimum amount of ₹1200 per household per annum. This will
be applicable from the third year of the award period, that is, 2028-29 onwards.
(paragraph 10.97)
22. For Block Panchayats, we recommend that they qualify for the RLB performance
component of the RLB grant if 75 per cent of Gram Panchayats within their jurisdiction qualify
for it. For District Panchayats, we recommend that to qualify for the grant in year T, District
Panchayats raise, in year T‑1, minimum 1.025 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 2.5 per cent per
annum compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower. Both of these
will be applicable from the third year of the award period, that is, 2028-29 onwards.
(paragraph 10.98)
23. For ULBs to qualify for the ULB performance component grant in year T, we recommend
it raise in year T‑1, minimum 1.05 times its OSR in year T‑2 or 5 per cent per annum
compounded growth applied over OSR of 2025‑26, whichever is lower. This will be applicable
from the second year of the award period, that is, 2027-28 onwards.
(paragraph 10.99)
24. We recommend that the release of State performance components of the RLB and ULB
grants in year T be contingent upon the State transferring from its own resources, in the year
T‑1, grants to local bodies amounting to 20 per cent or more of the basic FC grant recommended
by us for the year T‑1, starting from the second year.
(paragraph 10.100)
332Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
25. If any of the performance conditionalities goes unfulfilled, the undisbursed portion of a
State's local body performance grants would be disbursed according to the prescribed
methodology.
(paragraph 10.101)
26. Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs and Ministry of Panchayati Raj can work towards
conceptualising and rolling out a Learning Management System for the functionaries and staff
of local bodies so that the functionaries in the local bodies are geared up to meet the present‑day
challenges.
(paragraph 10.103)
27. 50 per cent of the basic component should be tied and the remaining 50 per cent of the
basic component and the entire performance components should remain untied. The tied
component should be directed towards ‘Sanitation and Solid Waste Management’ and/or ‘Water
Management’.
(paragraph 10.107)
28. We recommend that no local body should be allowed to spend more than 20 per cent of
the untied allocation on the construction and maintenance of roads. Moreover, the untied grants
should not be used for the payment of salaries or other establishment‑related expenditure.
(paragraph 10.109)
29. The practice of publishing Service Level Benchmarks should be continued and extended
to all ULBs along with introduction of a third‑party assessment or audit mechanism in the
system to enhance the reliability of the self‑reported figures.
(paragraph 10.110)
30. MoPR and MoHUA should organize regional workshops to familiarize States with the
Commission’s recommendations, the operational guidelines, the modalities to be followed for
compliance and the process of claiming grants, with special focus on the North Eastern States.
(paragraph 10.111)
31. The total quantum of urbanisation premium, for incentivising rural to urban transitions,
to be ₹10,000 crore for the complete award period with a fixed per capita one‑time eligibility
amount to be ₹2,000 per person (based on Census 2011 population). The release of urbanisation
premium component should be claimed by the State on mergers of peri‑urban villages into
adjoining larger ULB with existing population not less than One lakh and formulation of an
appropriate Rural to Urban transition policy.
(paragraphs 10.113 and 10.114)
333Sixteenth Finance Commission
32. A Special Infrastructure Component for selected ULBs with the outlay of ₹56,100 crore
to facilitate decisive intervention in comprehensive wastewater management in urban growth
centres.
(paragraph 10.117)
33. The local body grants shall continue to be released in minimum two equal instalments
each year, consistent with the existing practice and subject to the fulfilment of the conditions
stipulated by the Commission.
(paragraph 10.121)
34. The Union Government should ensure that where a set of local bodies within the State
meet the conditions, the grants due to them are released without waiting for the rest.
(paragraph 10.122)
35. State Governments should ensure the transfer of the grants‑in‑aid to their respective local
bodies within ten working days of their receipt from the Union Government. Any delay in this
transfer beyond the stipulated ten working days shall obligate the State Governments to release
the funds along with interest, calculated at the effective rate of interest applicable to market
borrowings/State Development Loans for the preceding financial year.
(paragraph 10.123)
36. No further conditions, other than those explicitly indicated in this chapter, should be
imposed either by the Union Government or the State Governments for the release of local body
grants to the ULBs and RLBs.
(paragraph 10.124)
Financing of Disaster Management
37. The allocation of disaster management funds for the States is based on past expenditures
and Disaster Risk Index (Hazard, Exposure and Vulnerability). A total corpus of ₹2,04,401 crore
has been recommended for SDRF and SDMF together, for the award period from 2026‑27 to
2030‑31. The State‑wise allocations are provided in Annexures 11.3 and 11.4
(paragraph 11.53 and 11.54)
38. The corpus should be divided between the SDRF and SDMF in the ratio of 80:20. The
SDRF allocation is ₹1,63,521 crore and that of SDMF is ₹40,880 crore. Under SDRF there
should be flexibility for reallocation between Response and Relief and Recovery and
Reconstruction. Preparedness and Capacity Building will now fall under SDMF and NDMF.
(paragraph 11.55 and 11.56)
39. The accumulating balance under SDRF should be limited to the extent that if the unspent
balance under SDRF exceeds the sum of past three years annual allocation of SDRF, further
334Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
releases may be temporarily withheld. The funds withheld will be released if the States’ balances
reduce below the threshold of past three years annual allocation.
(paragraph 11.58)
40. The total allocation of ₹79,406 crore is recommended based upon past expenditures for
disaster management at the national level (for NDRF and NDMF).
(paragraph 11.59 and 11.60)
41. States are to contribute 25 per cent of the funds of SDRF and SDMF except the NEH
States which shall contribute 10 per cent, and the rest is to be provided by the Union
Government. The total share of Union Government works out to ₹ 1,55,915.85 crore.
(paragraph 11.61)
42. The graded cost sharing of central assistance through the NDRF (except Response and
Relief) and NDMF should be maintained. States are to contribute 10 per cent for assistance up
to ₹250 crore, 20 per cent for assistance up to ₹500 crore and 25 per cent for all assistance
exceeding ₹500 crore. However, NEH States should contribute 10 per cent of all central
assistance under NDRF and NDMF.
(paragraph 11.62)
43. The norms of assistance should be revised periodically by the Ministry of Home affairs
in line with existing practice.
(paragraph 11.63)
44. Heatwave and Lightning should be added to the list of notified disasters at the National
level.
(paragraph 11.73)
45. The National Disaster Management Information System (NDMIS) should be transformed
into a comprehensive disaster management system for both the Union and the States. The system
should capture real‑time transaction‑level disaster data, serving as a single source for disaster
information, and minimizing the compliance burden on States
(paragraph 11.85)
46. Complete feeding and validation of data in NDMIS portal (for a Financial Year by the 31
May of the succeeding year) will be a necessary condition for States to avail the Disaster
Management Grant from the second year of the award period, that is 2027‑28.
(paragraph 11.85)
47. MHA and States should collaborate to enhance the utility of NDMIS by making it the
335Sixteenth Finance Commission
primary medium for States to submit their memorandum using standardised forms in the event
of disasters and for subsequent release of funds by the Union Government to the States.
(paragraph 11.86)
48. Commission recommends that the existing MHA norms pertaining to the booking of
disaster‑related expenditure and investment should be strictly adhered to, with compliance
regularly audited by the CAG.
(paragraph 11.87)
The Path to Macro and Fiscal Stability
49. We recommend that States’ fiscal deficits continue to be capped at 3 per cent of their
respective GSDP. To ensure the stability of State Government debt, this limit should be strictly
enforced in accordance with clause (3) of Article 293 of the Constitution. It is assumed that
on‑lending by the Union Government under SASCI will be over and above this limit, as is
currently the practice. The Union Government should reduce its fiscal deficit to 3.5 per cent of
GDP by the end of the award period.
(paragraphs 12.9 and 12.10)
50. States should completely discontinue the practice of incurring off‑budget borrowings and
bring all such borrowings onto their budgets. If, for any reason, off‑budget borrowings are
undertaken, there should be a framework for regular annual reporting, preferably as part of the
budget. A suggested format, as in Annexure 12.1, may be adopted for this purpose. The CAG
should include disclosure in this format in the State Finance Accounts.
(paragraphs 12.22 and 12.23)
51. Lending institutions are also in a position to provide an alternative source of data to
strengthen the reporting framework for off‑budget borrowing. We recommend that a framework
should be put in place under which lending institutions periodically report the loans extended to
State‑owned entities where the government has the commitment to provide assistance for debt
servicing.
(paragraph 12.24)
52. There are inconsistencies and lack of uniformity in coverage in the existing FRL
framework of the States. We recommend that governments take necessary action to amend FRLs
in line with the fiscal consolidation roadmap recommended by us. FRBM Acts should require
governments to report to the legislature if the deficit or debt limits prescribed under the
legislative framework are breached. We also recommend expanding the definition of fiscal
deficit and debt to uniformly include all off‑budget borrowings.
(paragraph 12.32)
53. The mechanism under Article 293(3) of the Constitution mandates that States obtain the
Union’s consent before borrowing against the security of their Consolidated Funds, as long as
they have any outstanding loans from the Union Government. This mechanism has been
336Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
extremely useful for effective fiscal management. We recommend that this Constitutional
provision continue to be used to ensure that the States’ borrowings adhere to the recommended
fiscal roadmap.
(paragraph 12.33)
54. There have been instances where States have breached borrowing limits, mainly due to
inaccurate assessments of financing from their Public Accounts. We recommend that
mechanisms be instituted to estimate the financing of the fiscal deficit from the Public Account
as accurately as possible, so that the fiscal deficit limit can be enforced effectively.
(paragraph 12.34)
55. For determining yearly borrowing limits, we recommend that the practice of estimating
GSDP by applying the annual average growth rate of the actual GSDP observed during the latest
three years for which actual GSDP data are available, should be continued.
(paragraph 12.36)
56. To smooth out its debt redemption profile, the Union Government has been following
strategies such as switch auctions and buybacks. We recommend that States also actively
explore adopting similar strategies to manage their redemption pressures in specific years.
(paragraph 12.45)
Reforms in the Power Sector
57. States should actively pursue privatization of DISCOMs. To shield the private investor
from the accumulated debt burden after DISCOM takeover, a special purpose vehicle may be
created by States to warehouse the accumulated debt. To incentivise States towards this move,
the Union Government should make the prepayment or eventual repayment of this debt by the
State an eligible component for assistance under the special incentive scheme for capital
investment (SASCI), but only after the privatization process is complete.
(paragraphs 13.61 to 13.64)
58. While privatization of DISCOMs provides a more definitive and sustainable solution to
the repeated cycles of debt and bailout, if a solution is sought within the public ownership
framework, the States should adopt the best practices of Gujarat and Haryana which are worth
emulating.
(paragraph 13.65)
Containing and Making Subsidies Efficient
59. We recognise that the revenue balance in several States has turned negative while many
of them are also rolling out large‑scale transfer schemes concomitantly. Borrowing for
expenditure on schemes of subsidies and transfers is not sound fiscal policy. The recent
acceleration in the growth of subsidies and transfers needs to be reversed. Therefore, we
recommend that States take steps to review and rationalise their schemes of subsidies and retain
only those schemes that target the poor effectively.
(paragraph 14.52)
337Sixteenth Finance Commission
60. Many subsidy schemes, especially those providing unconditional transfers, tend to have
large and untargeted beneficiary bases. We recommend that governments take immediate
measures to rationalise the beneficiary base by having clearly defined exclusion criteria and a
rigorous review process to ensure that benefits reach the most vulnerable. They should ensure
that, through the rationalisation of schemes and the beneficiary base, the revenue deficit is
reduced and eventually eliminated.
(paragraph 14.53)
61. We recommend that governments establish mechanisms to review subsidies and transfers
and include a sunset or exit clause in their implementation mechanisms. Resorting to financing
of subsidies and transfers through off‑budget borrowings, guarantees, or assignment of revenues
is fiscally imprudent and induces opacity in their accounting. We recommend that such practices
of off‑budget borrowings for financing of subsidies be discontinued, and necessary measures
may be taken to discourage them.
(paragraph 14.54)
62. We find that at present there is lack of uniformity in accounting and disclosure of
subsidies and transfers across States. Therefore, we recommend that the CAG review the current
practices followed in the disclosure of such expenditure items in different States and ensure that
expenditures constituting subsidies and transfers are comprehensively covered in the Appendix
of Finance Accounts, irrespective of how governments classify them.
(paragraph 14.55)
Public Sector Enterprise Reforms
63. Performance of various Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) should be evaluated by the
Union and State Governments, and PSE reforms should be undertaken to leverage their
contribution to Indian economy.
(paragraph 15.30)
64. Inactive PSEs should be considered for immediate closure to reduce fiscal strain on Union
and State Governments. The land and buildings owned by inactive PSEs are valuable assets that
can be deployed in alternative productive uses.
(paragraphs 15.31 and 15.32)
65. The concerned department of Union Government and of State Governments should
mandatorily take up any PSE incurring losses in three out of four consecutive years to the
Cabinet for consideration for closure, privatization or continuation. The Cabinet may then
decide the appropriate action, depending on the strategic importance of the enterprise.
(paragraph 15.33)
66. Each State should make a concerted effort to ensure that all accounts in arrears of State
Public Sector Enterprises (SPSEs) are finalized. This effort, in turn, will enable their audit by
338Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
CAG and the assessment of such SPSEs for continuation, closure, or privatisation as soon as
possible.
(paragraph 15.36)
67. We believe that the idea of State‑level privatisation of SPSEs needs to be given more
attention. Therefore, the States should consider to make a State‑level policy, similar to the
Union’s New Public Sector Enterprise Policy.
(paragraph 15.37)
Arvind Panagariya
Chairman
Annie George Mathew Manoj Panda
Member Member
T Rabi Sankar Soumya Kanti Ghosh
Member (Part‑time) Member (Part-time)
New Delhi
10 November 2025
Finance Commission reports are seen as the documents of their chairmen. I must confess upfront
that such is not the case with this report. The Members of the Commission have played a decisive
role in shaping the recommendations, on occasion, even contrary to the Chairman’s view.
Therefore, my first debt of gratitude is to the Members of the Commission—Smt. Annie George
Mathew, Dr. Manoj Panda, Dr. Soumya Kanti Ghosh, and Shri T. Rabi Sankar—for their deep
engagement throughout the Commission's work. Thanks are also due to Shri Ajay Narayan Jha,
who served as a Member until April 2025.
339Sixteenth Finance Commission
If there was one individual pivotal to the Commission’s work, it was Shri Ritvik Ranjanam
Pandey, Secretary to the Commission. He brought indispensable strengths to the Commission
and, I venture to say, ended up serving as a de facto Member of the Commission as a result. Shri
Pandey possesses unmatched knowledge of Union and State finances, an uncanny ability to
analyse and process data, and never loses sight of the forest for the trees. At the same time, he
led a large team of professional staff that regularly produced first-rate presentations, packed
with information and data, on a wide array of subjects for the Commission. He and his team
never hesitated to put in long hours to meet the needs of a rather demanding Commission.
Of course, even as able a Secretary as Shri Pandey could not have delivered as handsomely as
he did without a dedicated team of professionals. He was ably supported by Shri Kamlesh
Kumar Mishra and Shri Rahul Jain, Joint Secretaries, who led major analytical verticals and
supervised extensive technical work on Union and State finances, grants, and performance
assessment. In this, they were joined by Dr. Prasant Kumar Panda, Economic Adviser, who
brought the necessary technical and analytical muscle to the work.
A dedicated team of officers staffed the Secretariat (Annexure 1.5). Among the Directors,
Deputy Secretaries and Joint Directors, I would like to mention Shri K. Balaji, Shri Raghvendra
Singh, Ms. Amrutha Varshini, Shri Davinder Chodha, Ms. Priya Sarraf, and Shri Ajit Ranjan.
They led the thematic verticals, which formed the backbone of the Commission’s work. Each
of them worked with teams that included Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors, Officers on
Special Duty, Consultants, Senior Consultants, and Young Professionals (Annexure 1.5). Shri
Manish Kumar Lal, Director, oversaw all administrative matters.
Personally, in my own work for the Commission, I greatly benefited from multiple interactions
with Shri Srikanth Vishwanathan of Janaagrah, Dr. Rana Hasan and Shri Chinmaya Goyal of
the Asian Development Bank, Dr. Poonam Gupta of the National Council of Applied Economic
Research (now a Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India), Dr. D. K. Srivastava of EY, Dr. M
Govinda Rao, Member FC-14 and Dr. V. N. Alok of the Indian Institute of Public
Administration. From within the Commission, Ms. Amrutha Varshini, Ms. Priya Sarraf, and
Ms. Nikita Jain provided valuable assistance on data and analysis. The young and bright Tanush
Sawhney of Columbia University, who interned with me during the 2024 summer, significantly
contributed to my understanding of State expenditure patterns.
Shri Kumar Vivek, PS to Chairman, not only deftly managed my office, but also maintained a
steady flow of research inputs and analyses. I especially want to mention his superb management
of the Commission’s visits to the 28 states. With tight schedules and complex logistics, there
was much room for slip-ups, but none happened. Shri Ramagya Maurya, another senior member
of my personal staff, was equally indispensable. Thanks to him, my wife and I could smoothly
settle into our new home in New Delhi and I could squarely focus on the Commission’s work,
340Chapter 16: Summary of Recommendations
free of the worries of day-to-day existence. He and our able protocol officer, Shri Sumeet Singh
Kanwal, also ensured smooth entry and exit at the airport during our numerous domestic and
international travels.
Those mentioned above are but a tiny fraction of those who contributed to the Commission’s
work. In Chapter 1 and its annexes, we have tried to be more comprehensive. I fear that, even
then, we have missed mentioning many who have contributed to the Commission's work. So, in
conclusion, let me thank one and all who lent us a hand directly or indirectly.
(cid:36)r(cid:89)(cid:76)n(cid:71) (cid:51)ana(cid:74)ar(cid:76)(cid:92)a
Chairman
New Delhi
10 November 2025
341Report of Sixteenth Finance Commission (Volume I)