**Executive Summary**
This casualty circular, issued by the Directorate General of Shipping, Mumbai on November 17, 2023, addresses the sinking of an OSV vessel on November 21, 2017, due to uncontrolled water ingress from the engine room sea chest filter housing during routine maintenance. The circular identifies causal factors, actions taken, and lessons learned from the incident. The circular requires stakeholders to implement improvements based on the incident.
**Key Points / Main Content**
* **Incident Overview:**
* On November 21, 2017, an OSV vessel sunk due to flooding in the engine room.
* The flooding resulted from uncontrolled water ingress during a sea chest filter cleaning operation.
* The vessel was abandoned after the Master raised a distress alert.
* There was no oil pollution at the site.
* **Causal Factors:**
* Inadequate risk assessment prior to the job.
* Failure of the 2nd Engineer to follow proper procedures for cleaning the sea chest filter, resulting in improper flushing.
* Insufficient supervision by the Chief Engineer.
* Failure to use the seawater pump from the affected sea chest to reduce water pressure at the filter housing.
* **Actions Taken:**
* Master raised a distress alert upon identifying uncontrolled water ingress.
* Master ordered abandonment of the ship due to engine room flooding.
* All crew members were rescued by a nearby vessel.
* A tug was kept standby at the site to monitor the area for any oil pollution.
* **Lessons Learned:**
* Proper risk assessments are necessary for all jobs, particularly high-risk ones.
* The Chief Engineer should maintain adequate supervision for all high-risk jobs on board.
* Emergency procedures, especially for isolating watertight compartments, must be followed when required.
**Impact Analysis**
**Stakeholder:** Ship Owners/Operators
* **Impact:** Need to reinforce safety protocols and ensure proper risk assessment procedures are in place for all maintenance activities.
* **Action Required:** Review and update safety management systems to address the identified causal factors. Ensure crew training emphasizes proper procedures for sea chest filter cleaning and emergency response.
**Stakeholder:** Chief Engineers
* **Impact:** Increased responsibility for supervising high-risk jobs and ensuring proper procedures are followed.
* **Action Required:** Enforce strict adherence to safety protocols, provide thorough oversight of maintenance tasks, and ensure crew competency in emergency procedures.
**Stakeholder:** 2nd Engineers and Other Crew Members Involved in Maintenance
* **Impact:** Need to fully understand and adhere to established procedures for maintenance tasks.
* **Action Required:** Participate in refresher training on proper maintenance procedures, including sea chest filter cleaning, and ensure competence in risk assessment and emergency response.
**Stakeholder:** Directorate General of Shipping (DGS)
* **Impact:** Responsible for disseminating safety information and ensuring compliance with regulations.
* **Action Required:** Monitor the implementation of corrective actions by stakeholders and conduct audits to verify compliance. Communicate lessons learned to the wider maritime community through the DGS website.
Key Entities Referenced
Directorate General of Shipping, Mumbai: The primary issuing authority of the circular.
Casualty Circular – 03 of 2017: The title and identifying number of the circular concerning a vessel sinking due to uncontrolled water ingress.
Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways: The government ministry overseeing the Directorate General of Shipping.
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MINISTRY OF PORTS, SHIPPING AND WATERWAYS
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF SHIPPING, MUMBAI
.DGS Date:t7.11.2023
F. No.25-l 90r,7612020-
Casualtv Circular - 03 of 2017
Sub.: Sinkins ofvessel due to uncontrolled ingress ofwater from the enIlne room sea chest
filter housine during its routine.
Summary of Incident:
On2l.ll.20l7 vessel OSV with towing and Anchor Handling capabilities was operating
at oil field, and was proceeding to a rig for picking up cafgo. Around 1600 hrs, port side high sea
chest filter cleaning job was commenced, and was being done by 28,4E and Oiler. The sea side
valve was shut, vent valve was opened to confirm no ingress of water, and thereafter filter was
opened and cleaned. 2E then decided to flush the filter casing using the pressure from the sea
side (i.e crack opening the ship side valve with filter cover removed), and went on the deck
above to crack open the valve. It is reported that the valve was stuck and 2E used force to open,
upon which the water started flowing through the open filter housing, and then when 2E tried to
close the valve he found the valve wheel was free and water started gushing through the open
filter housing. Bridge was informed, vessel was stopped, offrcer and crew tried to close the filter
housing but due to the water pressure same could not be achieved and water level in the engine
room kept rising. Master upon seeing that water level was increasing uncontrollably, he raised
distress alert. Finally, the vessel was abandoned, and thereafter it sunk due to flooding of engine
room.
There was no oil pollution at site, and another tug was kept standby at time for
monitoring the area.
Causal Factors:
1. Job carried out without adequate risk assessment.
2. 2E did not follow procedure for sea chest filter, cleaning and followed improper
procedure of flushing using sea chest valve.
3. In adequate supervision by chief Engineer, as the job was being carried out his
knowledge and suPervision.
4. Crew failed to use the seawater pump from the affected sea chest, as it would have
reduced water pressure at the filter housing, and crew would have been successful in
closing the filter housing.
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l.
Upon ascertaining uncontrolled water ingress, Master raised distress alert.
2. Due to engine room flooding, Master ordered abandon ship, using liferafts and rescue
boat.
3. All crew were rescued by another vessel which was nearby in the field.
4. Another tug was kept standby at site to monitor the area for any oil pollution.
Lessons Learnt:
l.
Proper risk assessment needs to be carried out for all jobs especially the high riskjobs.
2. Adequate supervision should be maintained by the Chief Engineer for all high risk jobs
on board vessel.
3. Emergency procedures should be followed, especially when required to isolate watertight
compartments.
(Capt. Vikram Singh Manhas)
Dy. Nautical Adviser cum Sr. DDG (Tech.)
To,
All stakeholders through DGS website.